"Remember when Donald Trump’s trade
wars were front-page news? At this point, concerns over Trump’s tariff policy
seem almost quaint: Who cares if an insurrectionist is also a protectionist?
But some of the tariffs Trump
imposed are still in place, and on Friday the World Trade Organization, which
is supposed to enforce rules for global commerce, declared that the official
rationale for these tariffs — that they were needed to protect U.S. national
security — was illegitimate.
And the Biden administration, in
turn, told the W.T.O. — in startlingly blunt language — to take a hike.
This is a very big deal, much bigger
than Trump’s tariff tantrums. The Biden administration has turned remarkably
tough on trade, in ways that make sense given the state of the world but also
make me very nervous. Trump may have huffed and puffed, but Biden is quietly
shifting the basic foundations of the world economic order.
Since 1948 trade among market
economies has been governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, which sets certain ground rules for, um, tariffs and
trade. In 1994 the GATT was folded into the rules of the World Trade
Organization.
The GATT/W.T.O. system doesn’t
mandate any particular level of tariffs. It does, however, forbid countries
from imposing new tariffs or other restrictions on international trade — in
effect, it locks in the results of past trade agreements — except under certain
specified conditions. One of these conditions, laid out in Article XXI, says
that a nation may take action “which it considers necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests.”
If that sounds open-ended, that’s
because it is. And Trump clearly abused the privilege, claiming that we needed
tariffs on steel and aluminum to protect us from the menacing threat of …
imports from Canada.
As it happens, the tariffs on
Canadian metals are gone, as are most
of the similar tariffs on Europe (although the agreement there stops short of
full free trade). But the tariffs on China are still in place. More important,
the Biden administration has declared that the W.T.O. has no jurisdiction in
the matter: It’s up to America to determine whether its trade actions are
necessary for national security, and an international organization has no right
to second-guess that judgment.
Wait, what? According to the right,
Biden and company are globalists, soft on China and unwilling to stand up for
America. Why have they gotten so tough?
Part of the answer is that U.S.
policymakers are more aware than ever before of the threats autocratic regimes
can pose to the world’s democracies. Russia’s operation in Ukraine has shown
that countries sometimes resort to military force even when it doesn’t make
rational sense, and Vladimir Putin’s attempt to punish Europe by cutting off
the flow of natural gas highlights the risk of economic blackmail.
China isn’t Russia, but it’s also an
autocracy (and seems to be becoming more, not less, autocratic over time). And
the Biden administration is trying to limit China’s ability to do harm, with a
special focus on semiconductors, which play such a central role in the modern
world.
On one side, America is now
subsidizing domestic production of
semiconductors, aiming to reduce reliance on China among other suppliers.
Even more drastically, the U.S. has imposed new rules intended
to limit China’s access to advanced semiconductor technology — that is, we’re
deliberately seeking to hobble Chinese technological capacity. That’s pretty
draconian; you can see why I’m a bit nervous.
The thing is, it’s easy to imagine
China appealing to the W.T.O., arguing that these actions violate international
trade rules. But the United States has signaled in advance that it doesn’t care
— that it considers these policies to be outside the W.T.O.’s jurisdiction.
But wait, there’s more. The Biden
administration’s biggest policy achievement so far is the enactment of the
Inflation Reduction Act, which despite its name is largely about fighting
climate change. It does so mainly by subsidizing clean energy, which is fine.
But the subsidies have a strong nationalistic aspect — for
example, tax credits for electric cars are restricted to vehicles assembled in North America.
Almost surely, this economic
nationalism — which allows climate activists to point to all the jobs created
by green energy subsidies — was essential to getting the bill passed. But does
it violate trade rules? I’m not sure how the Biden administration will defend
the policy if challenged, but it might say that protecting the environment is a
national security issue.
That may also be the defense offered
for a proposed U.S.-Europe agreement to impose “climate-based tariffs”
on Chinese steel.
But if the United States, which essentially created the
postwar trading system, is willing to bend the rules to pursue its strategic
goals, doesn’t this run the risk of protectionism growing worldwide? Yes, it
does.
Nonetheless, I think the Biden
administration is doing the right thing. The GATT is important, but not more
important than protecting democracy and saving the planet."
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