Ar yra atvirojo kodo dirbtinis intelektas (DI), galintis žodžiais apibūdinti vaizdo įrašą ir pritaikyti jam samprotavimus?

 

Taip, kuriami keli atvirojo kodo DI modeliai ir sistemos, kurių tikslas – ir apibūdinti vaizdo įrašo turinį žodžiais, ir pritaikyti jam sudėtingą samprotavimą. Šie modeliai paprastai priskiriami vaizdo įrašų didelių kalbų modelių (Vid-LLM) arba multimodalinio DI kategorijai.

 

Pagrindiniai tokie atvirojo kodo modeliai ir sistemos

 

video-SALMONN-o1: Apibūdinamas, kaip „pirmasis atvirojo kodo audiovizualinis didelių kalbų modelis, galintis atlikti samprotavimus, kad padėtų geriau suprasti vaizdo įrašus“, šis projektas orientuotas į bendrąsias vaizdo įrašų supratimo užduotis, įskaitant gebėjimą aptikti sintetinius (netikrus) vaizdo įrašus ir atsakyti į sudėtingus klausimus, naudojant nuoseklų samprotavimą. Tyrėjams yra prieinamas susijusio „RivaBench“ etalono kodas ir duomenys.

 

GLM-4.6V: Šis atvirojo kodo multimodalinis modelis pasižymi stipresniu vizualiniu samprotavimu ir ilgo konteksto supratimu, atliekant visuotinį ilgų vaizdo įrašų apibendrinimą, išlaikant galimybę atlikti detalų samprotavimą pagal laiko užuominas.

 

„Univa“: ambicingas atvirojo kodo projektas, siekiantis tapti „išsamiu vaizdo įrašų generalistu“, gebančiu suprasti, redaguoti ir generuoti sudėtingus, ilgos formos vaizdo įrašus. Pirmieji lyginamieji tyrimai rodo, kad jo supratimo modulis yra labai efektyvus, atliekant sudėtingas vaizdo įrašų užduotis.

 

„EgoThinker“: ši sistema suteikia multimodaliniams dideliems kalbos modeliams (MLLM) stiprias egocentrines (pirmojo asmens perspektyvos) samprotavimo galimybes, naudodama erdvės ir laiko mąstymo grandinę, kad išsamiai suprastų žmogaus ketinimus ir veiksmus. Visas kodas ir duomenys skelbiami „GitHub“.

 

„SiLVR“ (paprasta kalba pagrįsta vaizdo įrašų samprotavimo sistema): ši sistema skirta ilgų vaizdo įrašų supratimui, naudojant paprastą, vieno etapo modulinį metodą, skirtą vaizdo įrašui suspausti į kalbos reprezentaciją, po to taikant LLM samprotavimui apie veiksmus ir istorijas ilguoju laikotarpiu.

 

Samprotavimo vaidmuo

 

„Samprotavimo“ aspektas apima daugiau, nei paprastą objektų aptikimą ar veiksmų atpažinimą; jis apima konteksto, priežastingumo, numatymo ir numanomų ketinimų supratimą, dažnai naudojant „minčių grandinės“ procesus (scenarijaus skaidymą į žingsnius). Tyrėjai aktyviai kuria etalonus ir mokymo metodus, kad pagerintų šias galimybes atvirojo kodo modeliuose.

 

Praktinis įgyvendinimas

 

Norint naudoti šiuos modelius, paprastai reikėtų patiems diegti mašininio mokymosi modelį, naudojant atvirojo kodo bibliotekas, tokias, kaip „OpenCV“ arba „TensorFlow“. Daugelis projektų savo kodą ir duomenis skelbia tokiose platformose, kaip „GitHub“, leisdami kūrėjams pasiekti ir plėtoti tyrimus.

Is There Open Source AI That Can Describe Video in Words and Apply Reasoning To It?

 

Yes, there are several open-source AI models and frameworks being developed that aim to both

describe video content in words and apply sophisticated reasoning to it. These models typically fall under the category of Video-Large Language Models (Vid-LLMs) or multimodal AI.

 

Key Open-Source Models and Frameworks 

    video-SALMONN-o1: Described as the "first open-source audio-visual large language model that can perform reasoning to help understand videos better," this project focuses on general video understanding tasks, including the ability to detect synthetic (fake) videos and answer complex questions using step-by-step reasoning. The code and data for the related RivaBench benchmark are available for researchers.

    GLM-4.6V: This open-source multimodal model features stronger visual reasoning and long-context understanding, performing global summarization on long videos while retaining the ability to perform fine-grained reasoning on temporal clues.

    Univa: An ambitious open-source project aiming to be a "comprehensive video generalist" capable of understanding, editing, and generating complex, long-form video. Early benchmarks suggest its understanding module is highly effective at intricate video tasks.

    EgoThinker: This framework endows MLLMs with strong egocentric (first-person view) reasoning capabilities, using spatio-temporal chain-of-thought to understand human intentions and actions in detail. The full code and data are released on GitHub.

    SiLVR (Simple Language-based Video Reasoning Framework): This framework is designed for long-video understanding, utilizing a simple, single-pass modular approach to compress video into a language representation and then applying an LLM for reasoning about actions and stories across long horizons.

 

The Role of Reasoning

The "reasoning" aspect goes beyond simple object detection or action recognition; it involves understanding context, causality, foresight, and implicit intentions, often using "chain-of-thought" processes (breaking down a scenario into steps). Researchers are actively developing benchmarks and training methods to enhance these capabilities in open-source models.

Practical Implementation

To use these models, you would typically need to deploy the machine learning model yourself using open-source libraries like OpenCV or TensorFlow. Many projects release their code and data on platforms like GitHub, allowing developers to access and build upon the research.

By financing Ukrainian naval drones that destroy Kazakhstan’s oil shipments to Western Europe, the EU elite risks imposing transportation and, by extension, most other costs on the already marginalized EU population. What is the political backlash?

The EU is financing the acquisition and production of Ukrainian drones that can be used for a variety of military tasks, including naval drone attacks, but this is done through special military support funds and programs, and not through the general Ukrainian budget, which is intended to support civilian and state functions.

 

Financing Ukrainian naval drones that attack Kazakhstan’s oil shipments through Russian territory has significant political backlash and economic consequences both within the EU and internationally.

 

Political backlash

 

Diplomatic conflicts with Kazakhstan: Ukraine's attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) (which carries about 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports via the Russian port of Novorossiysk) have already caused diplomatic tensions. Kazakhstan has officially protested, calling the attacks actions detrimental to bilateral relations. The EU has been implicated in financing these attacks, which has significantly worsened EU-Kazakhstan relations, and Astana may seek closer ties with Russia or China.

Internal EU divisions: While some EU countries support tough measures against the Russian energy sector, others, such as Hungary and Slovakia, which still receive oil through Russian pipelines (e.g. Druzhba), are concerned about their energy security. Any disruption to supplies exacerbates these internal divisions and provides fodder for populist leaders who criticize EU energy policy and sanctions.

Global tensions: Attacks on key energy infrastructure could destabilize global markets. The US presidential administration has previously been skeptical of Ukrainian attacks on the Russian oil industry, fearing repercussions for rising global oil prices and the election. The EU's involvement in funding such attacks has led to disagreements with the US and other international partners.

Legality and ethical issues: While Ukraine claims to be targeting Russia's "shadow fleet" and military logistics, the CPC terminal is a civilian facility that is also used by Western companies (e.g. Chevron, ExxonMobil). EU funding of these attacks raises international legal and ethical issues, particularly when civilian infrastructure is affected or international maritime law is violated.

 

Economic and social impacts

 

Rising energy prices: The disruption of the CPC pipeline (which supplies about 1% of global oil supply) has led to rising global oil prices. This directly affects EU citizens, increasing their transportation, heating and general living costs.

 

Economic pressure on Western companies: The attacks are hurting Western energy giants operating in Kazakhstan, which are at risk of billions in losses due to disrupted exports. These companies can put pressure on their governments and EU institutions to soften their stance or secure alternative routes.

Supply chain disruptions: The ongoing disruptions highlight Europe’s energy vulnerability and dependence on transit routes through conflict zones, prompting costly and complex diversification efforts (e.g. via the Middle Corridor).

 

In summary, direct EU involvement in sabotaging Kazakhstan’s oil transport via Russia is causing huge political backlash, including diplomatic disputes with Kazakhstan, internal EU disagreements and public discontent over rising prices, which are undermining the legitimacy and stability of EU institutions. Rising prices have cost Biden’s party power in the US. What will happen to the EU now?

 

“A naval drone attack on an oil infrastructure facility – a loading platform – on Russia’s Black Sea coast has effectively divided Ukraine and Kazakhstan, exposed the fact that the Central Asian country is dependent on a single oil pipeline for its exports, and potentially posed a real threat to oil supplies to Europe.

 

On November 28, naval drones targeted a large floating oil transfer platform 5 kilometers from the port of Novorossiysk, home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

 

The object damaged by the drones is a so-called single-point tanker mooring buoy: a solution for transferring oil to tankers at sea. There are three such platforms in Novorossiysk. Repair work is already underway on one of them. Experts say the naval drone attack has severely damaged the port’s oil handling capabilities.

 

“Each such "The floating loading platform can handle 800,000 barrels of oil per day. The scale of operations will now be reduced to one-third of its previous volume," Vladas Paddackas, an expert at the political intelligence firm Nightingale Intelligence, told RFE/RL.

 

For Russia, which uses the platform for oil from the North Caucasus, this is bad news. But even worse news for Kazakhstan, which exports as much as 80 percent of its oil to Novosibirsk through a single pipeline.

 

“Kazakhstan finds itself in an unenviable situation – it has one main oil export route that runs through one country – Russia,” Dimash Alzhanov, a political expert in the country, told RFE/RL’s Kazakhstan service, adding that now “the country has become a hostage to political decisions made many years ago.”

Strategic vulnerability

 

The pipeline operator, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), did not respond to RFE/RL’s request for comment on the aftermath of the maritime drone attack, which it immediately condemned as a “deliberate terrorist attack.”

 

According to Sergei Vakulenko, an analyst at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, an NGO, oil sales abroad account for 40 percent of Kazakhstan’s total export revenue.

 

The Kazakh government has lodged an official protest with Ukraine over what it calls “the third act of aggression against exclusively civilian infrastructure.” This year, a drone has already damaged a Caspian Oil Pipeline Consortium pumping station in Russia’s Krasnodar region, followed by an attack on the consortium’s office in Novorossiysk.

 

Ukraine’s response to Kazakhstan’s complaint has been particularly harsh.

 

Emphasizing that the country’s armed forces are “systematically weakening Russia’s military and industrial potential.”

 

As the diplomatic row continues to escalate, Kazakhstan is facing a very serious problem.

 

“Two such new platforms in Dubai are almost finished, but they won’t be able to start operating very soon: delivery, installation and all the necessary permits will take at least several months. Given that supplies are already disrupted, the three platforms will not be operating at full capacity until the summer or fall of 2026,” says V. Paddackas.

 

“A modern single-point tanker mooring buoy, similar to the ones owned by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, can cost from $80 to $120 million, which means that replacing it with a new one in case of loss would be a very large and difficult financial burden,” the expert added.

 

Moreover, even if the platform is repaired or replaced with a new one, Ukraine may resort to it again. Only Kazakhstan’s dependence on European markets is only part of the bigger picture. Everything is far from as simple as it might seem at first glance.

Unintended consequences

 

Joe Webster, an expert at the Atlantic Council think tank, told RFE/RL that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s oil blend is “light and low in sulfur” – simply ideal for fuel production.

 

“Kazakhstan is the European Union’s third-largest oil partner, after the United States and Norway. About one in nine imported oil products or barrels of oil comes from Kazakhstan,” he says.

 

In other words, without Kazakh oil, Europe will face even deeper problems with how to replace Russian supplies, which the EU elite has been keen to drastically reduce due to the events in Ukraine in February 2022.

 

“To be honest, I am worried that the problems with the Caspian pipeline consortium could affect Europe. Europe will suffer even more than Russia. So I think it would be fair to ask whether such attacks are actually so strategically justified,” added J. Webster.

 

S. Vakulenka of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center echoes his colleague and also hints at the unexpected side effects of Ukraine’s actions.

 

While the biggest damage, as expected, is done to Russian exports, leaving the market without Kazakh oil in this way will make “India, China and Turkey prefer to buy Russian oil” – even at a higher price than now, the analyst says.

 

Another important aspect in this context is the involvement of the West in the Kazakh oil industry, which has benefited greatly from investments by companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and others. It is important to note that Chevron currently owns 15 percent of the shares of the Kazakhstan Oil Pipeline Consortium.

 

It is very possible that in this case, the only hope for Kazakhstan to continue exporting oil to Russia via the Kazakhstan Oil Pipeline Consortium pipeline is for Western countries to pressure Kyiv to refrain from such attacks in the future.

Few alternatives

 

Kazakhstan’s vulnerability has prompted renewed discussions about whether the country could diversify its export routes.

 

The second largest route for Kazakhstan's oil exports is by tanker across the Caspian Sea to Baku in Azerbaijan. From there, the BTC pipeline runs through Georgia to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.

 

In 2024, 1.5 million tons of oil were pumped through the BTC. For comparison: 63 million tons through the pipelines of the Caspian Oil Pipeline Consortium. The limited number of tankers in the Caspian Sea and the capacity of the pipeline itself hinder the situation, and the BTC route is also significantly more expensive.

 

Kazakhstan also exports oil to European markets via the Druzhba pipeline, which runs through Russia and Belarus. The latter is also affected by Ukrainian drone attacks.

 

So, should Kazakhstan look to the East?

 

According to the World Bank data for 2023 shows that Kazakhstan exported oil to China for 3.81 billion dollars - to Europe for 23.6 billion dollars. As it was not there, reorienting itself to the market of its large and prosperous neighbor would not be an easy task.

 

“I don’t think that the demand in Xinjiang in western China is sufficient to absorb all those barrels,” says J. Webster.

 

In addition, a pipeline to the east coast of China, where the needs are greatest, would, unfortunately, be too expensive.

 

“I don’t know why Chinese oil companies would consider such an option. So the probability that Kazakhstan will redirect oil from Europe to China is very small,” said J. Webster.”

 

Finansuodamas Ukrainos jūrinius dronus, naikinančius Kazachstano naftos transportą į Vakarų Europą, ES elitas rizikuoja sukelti transportavimo ir, tuo pačiu, daugumą kitų kainų jau ir taip išalintiems ES gyventojams. Kokia yra politinė atotranka?

ES finansuoja Ukrainos dronų įsigijimą ir gamybą, kurie gali būti naudojami įvairioms karinėms užduotims, įskaitant jūrinių dronų atakas, tačiau tai daroma per specialius karinės paramos fondus ir programas, o ne per bendrąjį Ukrainos biudžetą, kurio lėšos skirtos civilinėms ir valstybės funkcijoms palaikyti.

 

Finansuojant Ukrainos jūrinius dronus, kurie atakuoja Kazachstano naftos transportą per Rusijos teritoriją, kyla didelė politinė atotranka ir ekonominiai padariniai tiek ES, tiek ir tarptautiniu mastu.

 

Politinė atotranka

 

    Diplomatiniai konfliktai su Kazachstanu: Ukrainos atakos prieš Kaspijos naftotiekio konsorciumo (CPC) infrastruktūrą (kuria teka apie 80% Kazachstano naftos eksporto per Rusijos Novorosijsko uostą) jau sukėlė diplomatinę įtampą. Kazachstanas oficialiai protestavo ir pavadino atakas veiksmais, kenkiančiais dvišaliams santykiams. ES siejama su šių atakų finansavimu, tai smarkiai pablogina ES ir Kazachstano santykius, o Astana gali ieškoti glaudesnių ryšių su Rusija ar Kinija.

    ES vidaus susiskaldymas: Nors kai kurios ES šalys remia griežtas priemones prieš Rusijos energijos sektorių, kitos, pavyzdžiui, Vengrija ir Slovakija, kurios vis dar gauna naftą per rusiškus naftotiekius (pvz., "Družba"), nerimauja dėl savo energijos saugumo. Bet koks tiekimų sutrikdymas paaštrina šiuos vidinius nesutarimus ir suteikia peno populistiniams lyderiams, kritikuojantiems ES energetikos politiką ir sankcijas.

    Pasaulinės įtampos: Atakos prieš pagrindinę energetikos infrastruktūrą gali sukelti pasaulinių rinkų nestabilumą. JAV prezidento administracija anksčiau skeptiškai vertino Ukrainos atakas prieš Rusijos naftos pramonę, baimindamasi pasaulinių naftos kainų kilimo ir rinkimų padarinių. ES įsitraukimas į tokių atakų finansavimą lemia nesutarimus su JAV ir kitais tarptautiniais partneriais.

    Teisėtumo ir etikos klausimai: Nors Ukraina teigia, kad taikosi į Rusijos "šešėlinį laivyną" ir karinę logistiką, CPC terminalas yra civilinis objektas, kurį taip pat naudoja Vakarų įmonės (pvz., Chevron, ExxonMobil). ES finansavimas šioms atakoms sukelia tarptautinės teisės ir etikos klausimus, ypač kai nukenčia civilinė infrastruktūra ar pažeistos tarptautinės jūrų teisės normos.

 

Ekonominiai ir socialiniai padariniai

 

    Energijos kainų kilimas: Sutrikus CPC naftotiekio darbui (kuris tiekia apie 1% pasaulinės naftos pasiūlos), pasaulinės naftos kainos kyla. Tai tiesiogiai paveikia ES gyventojus, didinant transporto, šildymo ir bendras pragyvenimo išlaidas.

 

    Ekonominis spaudimas Vakarų įmonėms: Atakos kenkia Vakarų energijos milžinams, veikiantiems Kazachstane, kuriems gresia milijardiniai nuostoliai dėl sutrikusio eksporto. Šios įmonės gali daryti spaudimą savo vyriausybėms ir ES institucijoms, kad šios sušvelnintų poziciją arba užtikrintų alternatyvius maršrutus.

    Tiekimo grandinių sutrikimai: Nuolatiniai sutrikimai pabrėžia Europos energetinį pažeidžiamumą ir priklausomybę nuo tranzitinių maršrutų per konflikto zonas, skatindami brangias ir sudėtingas diversifikacijos pastangas (pvz., per Vidurinį koridorių).

 

Apibendrinant, tiesioginis ES įsitraukimas į Kazachstano naftos transporto sabotavimą per Rusiją sukelia didžiulę politinę atotranką, įskaitant diplomatinius ginčus su Kazachstanu, ES vidaus nesutarimus ir visuomenės nepasitenkinimą dėl augančių kainų, o tai kenkia ES institucijų legitimumui ir stabilumui. Dėl augančių kainų Bideno partija neteko valdžios JAV. Oi kas dabar bus ES?

 

 

“Jūrinių dronų ataka, surengta prieš naftos infrastruktūros objektą – pakrovimo platformą – Rusijos Juodosios jūros pakrantėje kaip reikiant sukiršino Ukrainą ir Kazachstaną, į dienos šviesą ištraukė faktą, kad ši centrinės Azijos valstybė eksporto srityje priklausoma nuo vieno vienintelio naftos vamzdyno, ir galimai sukėlė realų pavojų naftos tiekimui į Europą.

 

Jūriniai dronai lapkričio 28 dieną nusitaikė į didžiulę už 5 kilometrų nuo Novorosijsko uosto, kur yra Rusijos Juodosios jūros flotilės bazė, plūduriuojančią naftos perpumpavimo platformą.

 

Minimasis dronų pažeistas objektas – vadinamasis vienataškis tanklaivių švartavimosi plūduras: tai jūroje esantis naftos perpumpavimo į tanklaivius sprendimas. Novorosijske tokių platformų net trys. Vienoje jau atliekami remonto darbai. Ekspertai sako, kad jūrinių dronų ataka labai smarkiai pakenkė uosto naftos krovos galimybėms.

 

„Kiekviena tokia plūduriuojanti krovos platforma per dieną gali pakrauti 800 tūkst. barelių naftos. Dabar operacijų mastas sumenks iki vienos trečiosios ankstesnės apimties“, – RFE/RL sakė politinių įžvalgų bendrovės „Nightingale Intelligence“ ekspertas Vladas Paddackas.

 

Rusijai, kuri minima platforma naudojasi naftai iš šiaurinio Kaukazo telkinių, tai bloga žinia. Bet dar blogesnė žinia Kazachstanui, į Novosibirską per vieną vienintelį vamzdyną eksportuojančiam net 80 proc. savo naftos.

 

„Kazachstanas atsidūrė nepavydėtinoje situacijoje – turi vieną pagrindinį naftos eksporto maršrutą, kuris driekiasi per vieną šalį – Rusiją“, – RFE/RL Kazachstano tarnybos žurnalistams sakė šalies politikos ekspertas Dimašas Alžanovas ir pridūrė, kad dabar „šalis tapo prieš daug metų priimtų politinių sprendimų įkaite“.

Strateginis pažeidžiamumas

 

Vamzdyno operatorius – Kaspijos naftotiekių konsorciumas (CPC) – į RFE/RL prašymą pakomentuoti jūrinių dronų atakos, kurią iškart pasmerkė kaip „sąmoningą teroristinį išpuolį“, padarinius nesureagavo.

 

Anot nevyriausybinės organizacijos „Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center“ analitiko Sergejaus Vakulenkos, naftos pardavimas užsienyje sudaro 40 proc. visų Kazachstano eksporto pajamų.

 

Kazachstano valdžia dėl, kaip pati įvardija, „jau trečiojo agresijos akto prieš išskirtinai civilinę infrastruktūrą“ pateikė oficialų protestą Ukrainai. Šiais metais dronas jau apgadino vieną Kaspijos naftotiekių konsorciumo pumpavimo stotį Rusijos Krasnodaro regione, vėliau sekė konsorciumo biuro Novorosijske ataka.

 

Ukrainos atsakas į Kazachstano skundą buvo itin griežtas.

 

Akcentuodama, kad šalies ginkluotosios pajėgos „sistemiškai silpnina Rusijos karinį ir pramoninį potencialą“.

 

Diplomatiniams nesutarimams tik plintant, Kazachstanas susiduria su labai rimta problema.

 

„Dvi tokios naujos platformos Dubajuje jau beveik baigtos, bet labai greitai pradėti eksploatacijos nepavyks: pristatymas, instaliavimas ir visi reikiami leidimai užtruks mažiausiai kelis mėnesius. Turint omenyje, kad tiekimas sutrikdytas jau dabar, trys platformos visu pajėgumu nedirbs iki pat 2026 metų vasaros ar rudens“, – sako V. Paddackas.

 

„Toks modernus vienataškis tanklaivių švartavimosi plūduras, panašus į Kaspijos naftotiekių konsorciumo turimus, gali kainuoti nuo 80 iki 120 mln. dolerių, o tai reiškia, kad praradimo atveju tokio pakeitimas nauju būtų labai didelė ir sunki finansinė našta“, – pridūrė ekspertas.

 

Be to, net ir tada, kai platforma bus sutaisyta ar pakeista nauja, Ukrainai gali ir vėl į ją taikytis. Tik Kazachstano priklausomybė nuo Europos rinkų – viso labo didesnio paveikslo dalis. Viskas toli gražu nėra taip paprasta, kaip kad gali pasirodyti iš pirmo žvilgsnio.

Netikėtos pasekmės

 

Idėjų kalvės „Atlantic Council“ ekspertas Joe Websteris RFE/RL sakė, kad Kaspijos naftotiekių konsorciumo naftos mišinys „lengvas ir turi mažai sieros“ – tiesiog idealiai tinkamas degalų gamybai.

 

„Kazachstanas yra trečias pagal dydį Europos Sąjungos partneris naftos klausimu – po JAV ir Norvegijos. Maždaug kas devintas importuojamas naftos produktas ar barelis naftos yra būtent iš Kazachstano“, – teigia jis.

 

Kitaip tariant, netekusi Kazachstano naftos, Europa susidurs su dar gilesnėmis problemomis, kuo pakeisti Rusijos tiekimą, kurį ES elitas užsigeidė drastiškai mažinti dėl įvykių Ukrainoje 2022 metų vasarį.

 

„Jeigu nuoširdžiai, man neramu, kad Kaspijos naftotiekių konsorciumo problemos gali turėti įtakos Europai. Europa nukentės dar labiau, nei Rusija. Taigi, manau, būtų sąžininga kelti klausimą, ar tokios atakos iš tikrųjų tokios strategiškai pagrįstos“, – pridūrė J. Websteris.

 

S. Vakulenka iš „Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center“ antrina kolegai ir taip pat užsimena apie netikėtus Ukrainos veiksmų pašalinius poveikius.

 

Nors didžiausia žala, kaip ir tikimasi, daroma Rusijos eksportui, tokiu būdu rinką palikus be Kazachstano naftos „Indija, Kinija ir Turkija mieliau pirks rusišką naftą“ – net ir brangiau nei dabar, teigia analitikas.

 

Dar vienas šiame kontekste svarbus aspektas – Vakarų įsitraukimas į Kazachstano naftos pramonę, kuriai buvo labai naudingos tokių bendrovių kaip „Chevron“, „ExxonMobil“, „Shell“ ir kitų investicijos. Svarbu paminėti, kad „Chevron“ šiuo metu priklauso 15 proc. Kazachstano naftotiekių konsorciumo akcijų.

 

Labai galimas dalykas, kad šiuo atveju vienintelė viltis Kazachstanui ir toliau tęsti naftos eksportą į Rusiją Kazachstano naftotiekių konsorciumo vamzdynu yra Vakarų valstybių spaudimas Kyjivui susilaikyti nuo tokių atakų ateityje.

Alternatyvų – mažai

 

Kazachstano pažeidžiamumas paskatino atnaujinti diskusijas, ar šalis galėtų diversifikuoti savo eksporto maršrutus.

 

Antrasis pagal dydį Kazachstano naftos eksporto maršrutas – tanklaiviais per Kaspijos jūrą į Baku Azerbaidžane. Iš ten BTC vamzdynas driekiasi per Sakartvelą į Džeichaną Turkijos Viduržemio jūros pakrantėje.

 

2024 metais per BTC buvo perpumpuota 1,5 tonos naftos. Palyginimui: Kaspijos naftotiekių konsorciumo vamzdynais – net 63 mln. tonų. Keisti situaciją trukdo ribotas tanklaivių skaičius Kaspijos jūroje bei paties vamzdyno pajėgumas, BTC maršrutas dar ir žymiai brangesnis.

 

Kazachstanas „Družba“ vamzdynu, besidriekiančiu per Rusiją ir Baltarusiją, eksportuoja naftą ir į Europos rinkas. Per Ukrainos dronų atakas nukenčia ir pastarasis.

 

Taigi, Kazachstanui vertėtų žvalgytis į Rytus?

 

2023 metų Pasaulio banko duomenys rodo, kad į Kiniją Kazachstanas eksportavo naftos už 3,81 mlrd. dolerių – į Europą už 23,6 mlrd. dolerių. Kaip ten nebūtų, persiorientuoti į didžiosios klestinčios kaimynės rinką būtų užduotis ne iš lengvųjų.

 

„Nemanau, kad Sindziango vakarinėje Kinijoje paklausa pakankama susiurbti visus tuos barelius“, – mano J. Websteris.

 

Be to, vamzdynas iki rytinės Kinijos pakrantės, kur poreikiai didžiausi, būtų, deja, per brangus.

 

„Nežinau, kodėl Kinijos naftos bendrovės turėtų svarstyti tokį variantą. Taigi, tikimybė, kad Kazachstanas naftą iš Europos nukreips į Kiniją, yra labai menka“, – konstatavo J. Websteris.”

JAV kariuomenė ruošiasi žudyti kinus, naudodama, Kinijos turimus, retųjų žemių elementus: JAV armija keičia savo įvaizdį Ramiajame vandenyne --- JAV persvarsto savo įrankius ir taktiką, ruošdamasi konfliktui su Kinija

 

Ar amerikiečių C100 kvadrokopteryje yra kiniškų retųjų žemių elementų?

 

„Performance Drone Works“ (PDW) C100 kvadrokopteris, nors ir yra JAV pagamintas produktas, kurį naudoja Amerikos kariuomenė, labai tikėtina, kad jame yra kiniškų retųjų žemių elementų dėl didelės pramonės priklausomybės nuo Kinijos tiekimo grandinių.

 

Retųjų žemių elementai (REE) yra svarbiausi komponentai, skirti didelio našumo nuolatiniams magnetams, naudojamiems dronų varikliuose, o Kinija šiuo metu dominuoja pasaulinėje rinkoje ir šių medžiagų perdirbime.

 

Pramonės priklausomybė: Didžioji dauguma Amerikos dronų gamintojų labai priklauso nuo kiniškų komponentų, įskaitant variklius ir baterijas, nes Kinija kontroliuoja apie 90 % pasaulinės dronų dalių tiekimo grandinės.

Svarbiausi komponentai: Viename drono variklyje gali būti nuo 12 iki 60 magnetų, pagamintų iš retųjų žemių metalų, tokių kaip neodimis, geležis ir boras, kurie yra būtini lengvam, efektyviam ir galingam skrydžiui.

 

PDW kontekstas: C100 yra JAV armijos patvirtintų dronų sąraše („Blue UAS“), kuriuo siekiama, kai tik įmanoma, vengti kiniškų komponentų; tačiau net ir „Blue UAS“ patvirtinti dronai naudoja Kinijoje pagamintus variklius dėl tinkamų alternatyvų trūkumo JAV tiekimo grandinėje.

 

Tiekimo grandinės problemos: JAV gynybos departamentas pripažino didelę nacionalinio saugumo riziką, kurią kelia ši priklausomybė, ir stengiasi sukurti vidaus tiekimo grandinę „nuo kasyklos iki magneto“, tačiau šis procesas tęsiasi, o JAV vis dar labai priklauso nuo kiniškų retųjų žemių elementų.

 

Todėl tikėtina, kad C100 sudėtyje yra kiniškų retųjų žemių elementų, ypač jo varikliuose.

 

„ŠOFIELDO KAREIVINĖS, Havajai – Sparnuotas dronas suko ratus 2000 pėdų aukštyje virš džiunglių. „Trys keleiviai“, – sakė JAV armijos specialistas Josiah Whitt, skaičiuodamas priešo karius nešiojamojo kompiuterio ekrane.

 

Tokiems kareiviams kaip jis tai buvo neįprasti metai.

 

„Įsigyjame droną, juo treniruojamės, tada gauname naują droną, juo treniruojamės, išbandome“, – sakė 20-metis, kuris mažiau nei prieš mėnesį išmoko pilotuoti „Stalker“.

 

Prisisukęs po žaliu ponču, seržantas Nicholas Cole Hagler pakėlė C100 kvadrokopterį – vieną iš penkių dronų sistemų, kurių 22 metų vyras buvo išmokytas greitai iš eilės. 23 metų seržanto Brocko Beckmano transporto priemonėje: 3D spausdintuvu atspausdintuose dronuose, kurie neria ir sprogsta nykščio stuktelėjimu.

 

Šie jauni Amerikos kareiviai ruošiasi kitam karui Ramiajame vandenyne.

 

Jie atsivežė dalį savo naujausios įrangos didelio masto armijos pratyboms lapkritį, kurios... per dvi savaites keliose Havajų salose. Tokios sistemos dominuoja mūšio lauke Ukrainoje ir Rusijoje. JAV, ilgą laiką priklausiusios nuo brangios kovos įrangos ir ilgų procesų, bando pasivyti, pereidamos į naują erą, kuriai būdinga vikri, santykinai pigi ir vienkartinė įranga.

 

Laikas yra sudėtingas. Iškili pasaulio karinė valstybė turi permąstyti savo išbandytus įrankius ir taktiką, net ir ruošdamasi vienam iš sudėtingiausių iššūkių nuo Antrojo pasaulinio karo: galimam didžiųjų valstybių konfliktui su Kinija.

 

Ypač JAV armijai, kuri du dešimtmečius kovojo su sukilimais Irake ir Afganistane, būsimi konfliktai gali skirtis esminiais aspektais – kur, kaip ir prieš ką.

 

Kinija turi vieną didžiausių pasaulyje raketų arsenalų ir neprilygstamą pramoninę galią, kad galėtų palaikyti pajėgas užsitęsusiame kare. Kova Ramiajame vandenyne reikštų didžiulę, vandeningą mūšio erdvę, nusėtą džiunglėmis nusėtomis salų grandinėmis – visos jos būtų pasiekiamos toms raketoms. Tai reiškia, kad JAV negali tikėtis valdyti dangaus ir joms būtų sunku papildyti atsargas. išsibarsčiusius karius.

 

Armija galvoja apie laivus, bagius ir bombardavimą. Pratybų metu Jungtinėje bazėje Pearl Harbor-Hickam buvo prisišvartavęs nedidelis naujas vandens transportas, skirtas įrangai tiesiai į paplūdimį gabenti. Kareiviai zujo lengvais, manevringais automobiliais, tarsi iš „Pašėlusio Makso“ filmo, kurį vienas karinis pareigūnas pavadino didžiausiu žaidimo žaidimo pokyčiu nuo naktinio matymo laikų. Ruošdamiesi kovai tarp salų, gremėzdiškesnė patrankų artilerija užleido vietą šaudymo ir skraidymo „Himars“ raketų platformoms, kurių šiais metais į Havajus atkeliavo 16.

 

Pirmasis kontaktas

 

Jūrų pakrantėse slypi XXI amžiaus „oro pakrantės“ problema – oro erdvė tarp Žemės ir aukšto dangaus, kur dronai tyko, medžioja ir žudo. Havajų vietovėje naršantys kareiviai labai stengėsi į ją įsilieti, sumažindami vadovavimo postus iki saujelės sunkvežimių, apdengdami transporto priemones maskuojamaisiais tinklais ir augmenija, o veidus dažydami storomis žaliomis juostelėmis.

 

„Šiuolaikinio mūšio lauko tiesa yra ta, kad visus galima pamatyti“, – sakė generolas majoras Jamesas Bartholomeesas, JAV pajėgų vadas. 25-oji armijos pėstininkų divizija, daugiausia dėmesio skirianti Indijos ir Ramiojo vandenyno regionui.

 

Kareiviai turi ruoštis kovai su dronais, prieš dronus ir elektroninės kovos būdu. Žvilgsnis į viršų ir „pirmojo kontakto“ iš dangaus ar elektroninės erdvės įveikimas. Pasak Bartholomeeso, elektromagnetinis spektras yra nauja realybė.

 

Kariai eksperimentuoja su daugybe dūzgiančių, skraidančių aparatų – pratybų metu per dvi savaites paleidžia daugiau nei 600 skrydžių – ir sluoksniuoja juos mūšio lauko gilumoje.

 

Jie sužino, kad sėkmingai kitur pasaulyje išbandyti dronai gali svyruoti tropiniame karštyje. Debesuotumas gali reikšti, kad reikia nekreipti dėmesio į žmogaus pojūčius, o į dronų jutiklius.

 

Jie taip pat galvoja apie būdus, kaip sustabdyti priešo dronus, netyčia nesutrikdant savųjų. Kelios dešimtys M4 automatinių šautuvų dabar turi „išmaniųjų šaudyklių“ priedus, kurie gali užfiksuoti skraidantį droną ir iššauti šūvį, kai taikinys yra sulygiuotas.

 

Aukštųjų technologijų naujovė: nešiojamas dronų blokatorius su dviem maždaug „iPhone“ dydžio įrenginiais. Vienas, vadinamas „Wingman“, aptinka artėjančius dronus, o kitas, „Pitbull“, sutrikdo arba blokuoja droną tuo, kas prilygsta elektromagnetinei strėlei.

 

Tačiau blokavimas reiškia pasirodymą elektromagnetiniame spektre.

 

„Ukrainoje stebime ir mokomės iš savotiško žaidimo „katė ir pelė“, – sakė Bartholomees. „„YouTube“ platformoje lengvai galima pamatyti vaizdų, kaip dronas nugalėtas vienu būdu, o tada jau suplanuotas atsakomasis smūgis.“

 

Abi mobiliosios brigados, sudarančios Bartholomees diviziją – kiekvienoje iš jų yra apie 3500 karių – abi išgyveno tai, ką armija vadina „transformacija kontakte“ – audringą perėjimą prie naujų technologijų.

 

Skirtumas – diena ir naktis, – sakė 31 metų pirmos klasės seržantas Kamakaniokalani Mann Tomita. Maždaug per metus jo pėstininkų būrys nuo vieno tipo drono, mažo kvadrokopterio, perėjo prie septynių tipų eksperimentams. „Turėtų sistemų ir skirtingų išteklių kiekis tiesiog beprotiškas“, – sakė jis.

 

Neseniai popietę jis išmoko kamikadzės stiliaus atakų meno, naudodamas dronų pulką. Kvadrokopterių važiuoklės buvo 3D spausdinamos įmonės viduje, o technologija, leidžianti judėti ir pulti spiečiui, buvo sukurta „Auterion“ – bendrovės, gaminančios autonomines dronų operacines sistemas. Bendrovės įgula buvo Havajų džiunglėse, kad pašalintų gedimus.

 

Septyni dronai pakilo. Spustelėjus ekraną, du pakildavo ir nusileisdavo žemyn. Stebėdamas smūgį iš paslėpto kampo tarp aukštų medžių, Tomita apmąstė naują mirtinų dronų karų pasaulį. „Atvirai kalbant, tai labai, labai baugu“, – sakė jis.

 

Tomitos brigada vaidino priešininką pratybų scenarijuje, kuris kada nors galėtų tapti realybe: JAV sąjungininkės salų teritorija puolama, priešo pajėgos išsilaipino, o Amerika prisijungia prie kovos po kelių savaičių. Kinija ir Taivanas nebuvo paminėti, tačiau paralelės akivaizdžios.

 

Jei Pekinas įsiveržtų ir JAV nuspręstų padėti salų demokratijai, Amerikos kareiviai galėtų atsidurti kovoje „pirmojoje salų grandinėje“, kur yra Taivanas, tarp Japonijos ir Filipinų.

 

Siekiant geriau pasiruošti tokiam karui, 2022 m. Havajuose buvo įkurtas naujas kovinio rengimo centras, vadinamas Jungtiniu Ramiojo vandenyno daugiašaliu parengties centru. Praėjusio mėnesio pratybose jame dalyvavo daugiau nei 8000 karių, daugiausia iš JAV, bet taip pat iš tokių šalių kaip Taivanas, Prancūzija ir Malaizija. Kareiviai vykdė oro atakas, imitavo raketų šūvius salose, naršė tarpekliuose ir ramiai miegojo po medžiais.

 

Tai buvo pirmieji pratybų metai, kai abi pusės – Amerikos kariai, vaidinę save ir priešą – buvo aprūpinti naujausiomis sistemomis, kurias išbando armija. „Turime naujas technologijas prieš naujas technologijas“, – sakė pulkininkas Matthew P. Leclairas, vadovaujantis mokymo centrui. Vertintojai stebėjo, kas jas geriau naudoja, kaip ir kodėl.

 

„Geriausias būdas tai padaryti tampa doktrina“, – sakė jis.

 

Kitais metais viena iš dviejų brigadų išvyks į Filipinus išbandyti savo metodų – tai rotacijos, leidžiančios jiems paeiliui treniruotis priešakinėse pozicijose, dalis.

 

„Galime greitai pritaikyti išmoktas pamokas“, – sakė 25-osios pėstininkų divizijos vadas seržantas majoras Shaunas Curry. „Ar tai veikė čia, Havajuose, ir ar tai veikia pirmoje salų grandinėje, esant 100 laipsnių karščiui ir 100 % drėgmei.“

 

Armija nori pakeisti ne tik tai, ką perka, bet ir kaip perka, nes dėl sparčių technologinių pokyčių nauja įranga gali tapti pasenusi per kelis mėnesius. Ji bando išsivaduoti iš varginančio įsigijimo proceso ir suteikti vadams tam tikro lankstumo kuruoti savo pirkinių krepšelius. Kaip ir „Amazon“, – sakė Curry.

 

Tačiau, norėdamos būti pasirengusios trumpalaikiam konfliktui, JAV taip pat turi didinti savo veiklą. Ukraina ir Rusija kasmet pagamina milijonus dronų iš kiniškų dalių, o Kinija gali pagaminti daugiau nei jos abi.

 

JAV armija tikisi per ateinančius kelerius metus paskatinti vietinę dronų gamybą.

 

„Vienintelė baimė, kurią turiu, yra ta, kad mes kuriame nuostabių prototipų armiją, bet neturime pakankamai didelės dėtuvės“, – sakė Benjaminas Jensenas, vyresnysis Strateginių ir tarptautinių studijų centro mokslinis bendradarbis.“ [1]

 

Gali būti abejotina, kad kinai parduos kiniškas dalis milijonams Amerikos karinių dronų per metus. Mažiausiai penkeriems metams amerikiečiai gali pamiršti apie dalyvavimą dronų karuose. Mažiausiai būtent šio laiko reikia retųjų žemių gamybai nuo nulio išauginti, jei jie tai išvis sugebės. Vakarų Europa? Tai tik durnių teatras ir pinigų vagystė tonomis. Pamirškite apie ją.

 

 

1. U.S. News: Army Changes Its Look in Pacific --- U.S. rethinks its tools and tactics as it prepares for conflict with China. Mandhana, Niharika.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 13 Dec 2025: A6.  

U.S. Military Prepares to Kill the Chinese Using Chinese Own Rare Earth Elements: American Army Changes Its Look in Pacific --- U.S. rethinks its tools and tactics as it prepares for conflict with China

Does American C100 quadcopter have Chinese rare earth elements in it?

 

The Performance Drone Works (PDW) C100 quadcopter, while a U.S. product used by the American military, is very likely to contain Chinese rare earth elements due to pervasive industry reliance on Chinese supply chains.

 

Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical components for the high-performance permanent magnets used in drone motors, and China currently dominates the global market and processing of these materials.

 

 

    Industry Reliance: The vast majority of American drone manufacturers rely heavily on Chinese components, including motors and batteries, as China controls about 90% of the global supply chain for drone parts.

    Essential Components: A single drone motor can contain between 12 and 60 magnets made from rare-earth metals like neodymium-iron-boron, which are essential for lightweight, efficient, and powerful flight.

    PDW Context: The C100 is on the U.S. Army's list of approved drones ("Blue UAS"), which aims to avoid Chinese components where possible; however, even "Blue UAS" approved drones have been found to use Chinese-sourced motors due to a lack of viable alternatives in the U.S. supply chain.

    Supply Chain Issues: The U.S. Department of Defense has recognized the significant national security risk posed by this dependence and is working to establish a domestic "mine-to-magnet" supply chain, but this process is ongoing and the U.S. is still heavily reliant on Chinese rare earths.

 

Therefore, it is probable that the C100 contains Chinese rare earth elements, particularly within its motors.

 

 

“SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii -- A winged drone circled 2,000 feet above the jungle. "Three pax," said U.S. Army Specialist Josiah Whitt, counting enemy troops on a laptop screen.

 

It has been an unusual year for soldiers like him.

 

"We get a drone, we train on it, then we get a new drone, train on it, test it out," said the 20-year-old, who learned to fly the Stalker less than a month earlier.

 

Crouched under a green poncho, Sgt. Nicholas Cole Hagler lifted a C100 quadcopter -- one of five drone systems the 22-year-old has been taught in quick succession. In 23-year-old Sgt. Brock Beckman's vehicle: 3D-printed drones that dive and explode with a nudge of the thumb.

 

These young American soldiers are preparing for the next war in the Pacific.

 

They brought out some of their newest gear for large-scale Army exercises in November that unfolded over two weeks across several Hawaiian islands. Such systems dominate the battlefield in Ukraine and Russia. The U.S. -- long reliant on expensive fighting kit and extended processes -- is trying to catch up, shifting to a new era marked by nimble, relatively cheap and expendable equipment.

 

The timing is tricky. The world's pre-eminent military power must rethink its tried-and-tested tools and tactics even as it girds for one of its most vexing challenges since World War II: potential great-power conflict with China.

 

For the U.S. Army in particular, which spent two decades fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, future conflicts may be different on fundamental counts -- where, how and against whom.

 

China has one of the world's largest missile arsenals and unrivaled industrial strength to buoy forces in a protracted war. Fighting it in the Pacific would involve a vast, watery battlespace speckled with jungle-swathed island chains -- all within reach of those missiles. That means the U.S. can't expect to rule the skies and would struggle to resupply scattered troops.

 

The Army is thinking boats, buggies and bombardment. Docked at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam during the exercises was a small new watercraft designed to move equipment straight to a beach. Soldiers zip around in light, maneuverable vehicles out of a Mad Max movie that one military official called the biggest game-changer since night vision. To prepare for a cross-island fight, clunkier cannon artillery has made way for shoot-and-scoot Himars missile platforms, 16 of which arrived in Hawaii this year.

 

First contact

 

Atop the maritime littorals is the 21st-century problem of "air littorals" -- airspace between the Earth and high skies where drones lurk, hunt and kill. Soldiers navigating Hawaiian terrain took great pains to blend into it, shrinking command posts to a handful of trucks, draping vehicles with camouflage nets and vegetation, and painting their faces with thick stripes of green.

 

"The truth of the modern battlefield is that everyone can be seen," said Maj. Gen. James Bartholomees, commander of the Army's 25th Infantry Division that focuses on the Indo-Pacific.

 

Soldiers must prepare to fight with drones, against drones and via electronic warfare. Looking up and dealing with "first contact" from the sky or the electromagnetic spectrum is the new reality, said Bartholomees.

 

Troops are experimenting with a smorgasbord of buzzing, flying machines -- launching more than 600 flights over two weeks during the exercises -- and layering them through the depth of the battlefield.

 

They are learning that drones tested successfully elsewhere in the world can wobble in tropical heat. Cloud cover can mean defaulting to human senses over drone sensors.

 

They are also thinking of ways to stymie enemy drones without accidentally thwarting their own. Several dozen M4 assault rifles now have "smart shooter" add-ons that can lock onto a flying drone and fire a round when the target is aligned.

 

A higher-tech new arrival: a wearable drone blocker with two units roughly the size of iPhones. One, called Wingman, detects incoming drones and the other, Pitbull, disrupts or jams the drone with what amounts to an electromagnetic arrow.

 

Jamming, however, means showing oneself on the electromagnetic spectrum.

 

"It's a bit of a cat-and-mouse game that we're watching and learning from in Ukraine," said Bartholomees. "There are vignettes that are easily seen on YouTube of how you see a drone that's defeated in one way, that then there's a counter that's already planned."

 

The two mobile brigades that make up Bartholomees's division -- each about 3,500 personnel strong -- have both been through what the Army calls "transformation in contact," the whirlwind shift toward new technology.

 

The difference is night and day, said Sgt. First Class Kamakaniokalani Mann Tomita, 31. In about a year, his infantry platoon went from having one kind of drone, a small quadcopter, to seven types to experiment with. "The amount of systems and different assets that we've had is just insane," he said.

 

On a recent afternoon, he learned the art of kamikaze-style attacks using a flock of drones. The chassis of the quadcopters were 3D printed in-house while the technology to move and attack as a swarm came from Auterion, a company that makes autonomous drone operating systems. The company's crew was in Hawaii's jungles to troubleshoot.

 

Seven drones soared. With clicks on a screen, two peeled off to swoop down for the kill. Tracking the hit from a shrouded nook between towering trees, Tomita reflected on the new world of deadly drone wars. "It's very, very terrifying to be frank," he said.

 

Tomita's brigade was playing the adversary in an exercise scenario that could someday become reality: A U.S. ally's island territory is under attack, enemy forces have landed, and America joins the fight several weeks in. China and Taiwan weren't mentioned, but the parallels are evident.

 

If Beijing invaded and the U.S. decided to come to the island democracy's aid, American soldiers might find themselves fighting in the "first island chain" where Taiwan is located, between Japan and the Philippines.

 

To better prepare them for a war like that, a new combat training center called the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center was created in 2022 in Hawaii. During last month's exercises, it brought together more than 8,000 personnel largely from the U.S. but also from places including Taiwan, France and Malaysia. Soldiers executed air assaults, simulated missile shots across islands, navigated gulches and slept fitfully under trees.

 

It was the first year of exercises where both sides -- American soldiers playing themselves and the enemy -- were given the latest systems the Army is trying out. "We have new tech against new tech," said Col. Matthew P. Leclair, who leads the training center. Evaluators were looking to see who used it better, how and why.

 

"The best way to do it then becomes the doctrine," he said.

 

Next year, one of the two brigades will go out to the Philippines to stress-test its takeaways -- part of a rotation that allows them to take turns training in forward locations.

 

"We can quickly turn lessons learned," said Command Sgt. Maj. Shaun Curry of the 25th Infantry Division. "Did it work here in Hawaii and then does it work in the first island chain in 100 degrees heat, in 100% humidity."

 

The Army wants to change not just what it buys but how it buys, since fast-paced technological shifts can render new equipment obsolete within months. It is trying to break out of a laborious acquisition process and also give commanders some flexibility to curate their own shopping carts. Like Amazon, said Curry.

 

To be ready for a near-term conflict, however, the U.S. also needs to scale up. Ukraine and Russia are making millions of drones a year out of Chinese parts, and China can outproduce them both.

 

The U.S. Army hopes to spur domestic drone production during the next few years.

 

"The one fear I have is that we develop an army of amazing prototypes but we don't have a deep-enough magazine depth," said Benjamin Jensen, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.” [1]

 

It could be doubtful that the Chinese will sell Chinese parts for millions of American military drones a year. For a minimum of five years the Americans can forget about participation in drone wars. This time is needed to scale rare earth production from zero if they will be able to. Western Europe? That just theater and stealing the money by ton. Forget it.

 

1. U.S. News: Army Changes Its Look in Pacific --- U.S. rethinks its tools and tactics as it prepares for conflict with China. Mandhana, Niharika.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 13 Dec 2025: A6.  

Western Europe is suffering from sclerosis, misguided and unfounded leadership militancy, the absence of a single financial market, a tsunami of immigrants unwilling to assimilate, and a shortage of cheap energy

 

Western Europe faces complex problems stemming from a variety of structural, economic, social, and geopolitical factors. These problems are not related to a single cause, but rather work together to create a sense of stagnation (sclerosis) and uncertainty.

Here are the main causes of these phenomena:

1. Sclerosis (economic stagnation)

The term "Eurosclerosis" describes the stagnation of the Western European economy, characterized by high structural unemployment, slow job creation, and sluggish growth, especially compared to the US economy.

 

Rigid labor markets: Strict regulation and generous welfare programs, while providing social security for Swedish startup founders, sometimes inhibit corporate flexibility and innovation.

Excessive regulation and bureaucracy: High tax burdens and complex regulations can discourage entrepreneurial initiatives and investments in fast-growing sectors such as technology.

Low level of innovation: Despite a good scientific base, many promising European technology companies choose to expand and list on US exchanges, where it is easier to obtain venture capital and financing.

 

2. Militarism of leaders

The changing geopolitical situation, especially the conflict in Ukraine, is fueling a belligerent mood and a greater focus on defense.

Geopolitical changes: The conflict in Ukraine has forced European countries to review their security policies and increase military budgets in order to strengthen NATO and reduce dependence on US military support. Western European leaders are mostly stupid, therefore unpopular, and they try to stay in power longer by fomenting war because it attracts attention from the Internet.

Dependence on the US: Many European leaders see Washington’s protection as essential, and therefore try to keep up with US demands for defense funding, which some critics see as excessive dependence and a lack of their own strategic autonomy.

 

3. Lack of a single financial market

European financial markets remain fragmented, unlike the US, which has an integrated capital market.

 

Regulatory fragmentation: Different tax, corporate and securities rules across countries make cross-border transactions and investments difficult.

Overreliance on banks: European companies rely too heavily on bank loans rather than capital markets (stocks or bonds) to finance growth, which hinders investment and economic recovery.

Lack of a European deposit insurance system: The incomplete banking union and the lack of a single deposit insurance system pose risks to long-term financial stability and limit integration.

 

4. Tsunami of immigrants unwilling to assimilate (integration challenges)

Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that creates social tensions.

Cultural and religious differences: Significant cultural and religious differences between immigrants and host societies can make integration difficult. Easy online communication with countries of origin reduces the benefits of assimilation.

Institutional and economic barriers: Immigrants face difficulties in finding employment (due to language, lack of recognition of qualifications), which increases social exclusion and slows down the integration process.

Population concerns: The rapid and large number of arrivals can cause tension in local communities, especially if resources (housing, social services) are lacking, which sometimes fuels anti-immigrant sentiment.

 

5. Lack of cheap energy

The energy crisis has been exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, on which Western Europe has been heavily dependent.

 

Import dependency: Europe remains dependent on imported energy, especially fossil fuels.

Costs of "green" policies: While green energy is a long-term goal, the sudden and not always well-considered transition to renewables, abandoning traditional energy, has contributed to high energy prices and a loss of industrial competitiveness, hindering the adoption of robots and AI, which require a lot of stable and cheap energy.

 

In summary, these challenges are caused by inflexibility in adapting to changing global realities, bureaucratic and regulatory barriers, social tensions, and a changed geopolitical security and energy supply environment, when German leaders recklessly refused to buy cheap Russian energy.

 

“A constant puzzle

 

Trying to understand Europe’s relationship with US President Donald Trump has become a daily mental exercise for EU diplomats. “Is he a partner? Occasionally. A threat? Sometimes. A force reshaping the relationship on his own terms? Always. What is clear is that Europe is facing an unpredictable, dominating partner whose impulses can turn the continent upside down overnight “…these are the words of Politico, which is looking into the backrooms of Brussels and the US.

 

As the final days of 2025 draw to a close, the publication’s team of journalists traditionally presented their list of the leaders of the European political direction for the coming year. This year, the ranking of the 28 most influential political figures on the continent is a little different, but the year was also non-standard. According to the Politico team, this time they had to break their own rule: the top of the ranking was not a European or a person working in Europe, but the US president.

 

In an interview with journalist Dasha Burns on a special episode of The Conversation a few days ago, D. Trump outlined his theory on why he has so much power on the continent: “Europe doesn’t know what to do.”

 

He cited immigration as the main reason for the decline of most European nations. “They want to be politically correct, and that makes them weak,” the US president added.

 

The first months of Trump’s second term have marked a difficult diplomatic year for Europe. His public flirtation with Russian President Vladimir Putin has stunned even seasoned political commentators. His humiliation of Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky has heightened fears that Washington has turned from ally to antagonist.

 

Indeed, in the diplomatic arena, the new Trump administration has blurred the line between foreign policy and political campaigning. “The US president’s dominance has transformed Europe’s economy as much as its diplomacy. His ‘America First’ energy policy and brazen promotion of US oil and gas have fueled a backlash against the Green Deal, reinforcing the argument that Europe has prioritized climate action over competitiveness and jobs,” reads an editorial in Politico.

 

“Washington’s drive for deregulation has undermined Europe’s identity as a global regulatory superpower. From digital privacy to artificial intelligence (AI), Brussels’ old model of meticulous, moralizing rulemaking suddenly seems out of step with the new global mood,” the publication notes.

 

And yet some in Europe are trying to free the continent from Trump’s grip. The EU is investing in its defense and strategic autonomy. Berlin and Copenhagen are turning to European suppliers for their growing arsenals, tacitly endorsing Paris’s long-held view that the transatlantic alliance should be respected but overly reliant on it.

 

True, at a special Politico event to review the trends, U.S. Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder tried to reassure the audience that the United States was not about to betray Europe and that ties with it remained important to Washington.

 

“If the president didn’t think the relationship with the EU was necessary, I don’t think he would have sent me here. He sent me here as the US ambassador because of my business experience, so that we could solve business problems,” said A. Puzder, a close friend of D. Trump, a lawyer.

 

“I think the president wants to see a Europe that is able to defend itself, that is able to help the United States around the world, he wants to see Europe as a strong trading partner. All of that requires a strong economy and strong words about things that need to be fixed, that are not quite right,” the ambassador tried to soften the openly critical view of Europe presented in the new US security strategy.

 

M. Frederiksen in reality

 

Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen found herself in second place next to D. Trump on the list of the most powerful people in Europe. “We all live in M. Frederiksen’s Europe. We just don’t know it yet,” the rating compilers are convinced.

 

Frederiksen, 48, took office in 2019 as Denmark’s youngest prime minister, leading a minority government through a pandemic, an energy crisis and now a changing European security landscape. Once seen as a left-wing idealist, she has become one of the continent’s most pragmatic figures.

 

For the past six years, the Danish prime minister has quietly exported her own model of strict social democracy across the continent. She has even managed to shake off the historically common Danish Euroscepticism.

 

While critics once called Frederiksen’s approach to migration management inhumane, her stance is now viewed differently. Denmark’s so-called detention and deportation model, in which asylum seekers are held in detention centres while their applications are processed and swiftly deported if they are rejected, has inspired similar strategies in both the UK and Italy.

 

“Ms. Frederiksen has also left her mark on the EU’s defense strategy (...). Under her leadership, Denmark has led by example, committing a larger share of its gross domestic product to aid Ukraine than any other EU country over the past four years,” Politico points out.

 

Ms. Frederiksen’s relatively strong position in her homeland does help. As the longest-serving leader of the center-left In Europe, she leads a coalition government that has proven more resilient than in France and less complicated than in Germany. Unlike Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, she does not have to fight a president who openly opposes her policies.

 

But Frederiksen is not invincible. In November, her Social Democratic party suffered a crushing defeat in local elections, losing control of several cities, including Copenhagen, for the first time since 1903. Local critics blame Frederiksen’s mistakes, from the decision to exterminate Denmark’s entire 17 million people to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to the questionable imprisonment of a former intelligence chief. Some even accuse her of being power-mad.

 

Frederiksen’s response to criticism from the left that she is leaning too far to the right has so far been dismissive. She defended her position with a simple but logical question: “If they have better policies, why don’t they win elections?”

 

“The Danish prime minister didn’t bother to attend the Party of European Socialists meeting last October. She also didn’t bother to make excuses for not coming. Despite the challenges, Ms. Frederiksen’s party remains the most popular in Denmark, and she is expected to run for re-election next year,” predicts Politico.

 

Breaking a post-war taboo

 

An equally important figure in Europe has become German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. This man is breaking Germany’s post-war taboo.

 

“For half a century, the current German chancellor has embodied his country’s conservative orthodoxy: a Christian Democrat committed to a balanced budget and willing to rely on Washington to keep the peace. Now, with Germany’s economy in tatters, Merz has rewritten the script: spend big, arm quickly and declare that Berlin – and the rest of Europe – must be prepared to act independently,” the editorial board of the publication sees politics.

 

Washington’s transformation from indispensable friend to unpredictable enemy has shocked Merz, who recently celebrated his 70th birthday. He has previously been described as Germany’s most American chancellor, having spent a decade in the private sector, including at the US asset management firm BlackRock. But that didn’t stop Merz from declaring on the very day he won the chancellorship that Europe must achieve independence from the US.

 

He broke with German tradition by appointing fellow party member Johann Wadephul as foreign minister, a portfolio usually reserved for junior coalition partners. The move is seen as an attempt to reduce internal friction and ensure that Berlin’s diplomacy is conducted directly through the chancellery.

 

Merz also appointed his chief of staff, Jacob Schrot, to head a newly created National Security Council, tasked with coordinating Germany’s expanded security apparatus and ensuring a unified line on defense and foreign policy.

 

A grand comeback?

 

Marine Le Pen, who is poised to become a beacon not only for a new direction for Paris but also for Europe, is poised for one of her legendary comebacks. The French far-right leader, who was banned from running for office in March after a conviction for embezzling EU funds that banned her from public office for five years, is hoping an appeals court will reverse her fate in January.

 

Ms. Le Pen has made it clear that she cannot be ignored, helping to topple the government in September. She is also increasing pressure on her rival, President Emmanuel Macron, to dissolve the National Assembly and call early elections.

 

A three-time presidential candidate, Ms. Le Pen, 57, has led her party to the political mainstream for more than a decade. She reached the second round of both 2017 and 2022 elections, delivering the best performance by the far-right in modern French history.

 

Le Pen says she will use all means at her disposal to fight the ban on her. And if the ban is upheld? Her protégé, Jordan Bardella, the party’s president and head of its delegation to the European Parliament, is ready to intervene. Polls suggest Bardella’s chances of success could be as good as Le Pen’s.

 

Putin is also on the list

 

In any case, Putin has already achieved part of his goal: he has thrown Europe off balance and made it clear that he is the only person on this continent that no one can ignore.

 

Other names

 

Behind the top five is Nigel Farage, who helped lead the UK out of the EU and is now considered the most ardent opponent of Prime Minister Keir Starmer (who, incidentally, has fallen to a lower ranking). True, after a surge in public opinion polls and an impressive showing in local elections in the spring, his right-wing party Reform UK, which has only five seats in parliament, now dictates the course of British politics. The ranking also includes Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Commission, which has the powers of the EU's executive branch; NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who tries to keep Trump's attention with sweet words every day; and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, once considered one of the most radical figures on the EU's political fringes, who today has become an example of governance and the ability to listen to public sentiment.

 

Among other names more common to the top of European politics, there are also those not directly related to it.

 

Here, 39-year-old Gabriel Zucman has a tax named after him: this French economist's proposal to impose a 2 percent tax on households worth more than 100 million euros has made him one of the most discussed and controversial figures in the country.

 

The debate over the so-called Zucman tax has been raging in television studios and parliamentary chambers, eventually moving to cafes and the streets, with inequality at the top of the French political agenda as both fiscal tensions and voter anger mount.

 

France’s public finances are in deep trouble – rising public debt, post-pandemic spending and a cost-of-living crisis have forced the government to look for new sources of revenue. It is this void that young academic Zucman is proposing to fill, and his grand idea seems appealing to a section of society that has long been suspicious of the vast wealth of others.

 

A protégé of star economist Thomas Piketty, Zucman gained international prominence in 2019 when his research on global tax evasion and inequality caught the attention of US progressives Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, who even included Zucman’s wealth tax proposals in their presidential campaigns.

 

His influence grew again last year when Brazil used its presidency of the G20 to call for a minimum global tax on billionaires. At the time, Brazil’s adviser, Zucman, proposed a tax that could generate more than $200 billion a year by taxing the world’s roughly 3,000 billionaires with a 2 percent wealth tax.

 

The economist, who is currently the director of the EU Tax Observatory, has calculated that if the same principle were applied to only EU billionaires, the bloc could raise an additional €65 billion.

 

Politico notes that in today’s context, when the bloc is looking for additional sources of funds to counter new geopolitical challenges, Zucman’s tax is likely to be adopted; the only question is when.

 

Zucman is probably scaring the rich, but another financial figure, Andrea Orcel, is scaring politicians in Berlin and Rome. He reminded Europe that it still lacks a true single market.

 

For more than a decade, Brussels has been talking about creating its own banking union, a unified system that would allow capital to move freely across borders and turn Europe’s patchwork of national lenders into genuine continental champions. The idea was to reduce the eurozone’s vulnerability in times of crisis and allow European banks to compete with Wall Street giants. But progress has stalled, blocked by governments unwilling to relinquish control of their financial powerhouses. Into this vacuum stepped Orcel.

 

The 62-year-old UniCredit chief executive has been trying to do what Brussels has long talked about but never quite accomplished: create a truly pan-European bank. His strategy – to buy stakes in rivals such as Germany’s Commerzbank and Italy’s Banco BPM, sometimes through derivatives, and to do so without being noticed – has delighted shareholders but angered both Berlin and Rome.

 

Despite all the talk of creating European banks that can operate across borders and compete with the US banking heavyweights, national governments still protect their financial champions like jewels in the crown.

 

For many EU leaders, Orcel has become the most dangerous banker of all – the one who has actually tried to implement the principles of the single market.

 

A new era

 

If we delve deeper into the heart of the economic engine, this year is also worth paying attention to Daniel Ek. His departure as CEO of Spotify marked the end of an era in the music streaming industry. D. Ek’s investment in one of Europe’s most promising AI startups, Helsing, could mark the beginning of another era – this time in the continent’s defense sector.

 

Founded in Munich in 2021 by former DeepMind and NATO engineers, Helsing develops AI-powered battlefield modeling and intelligence software. It aims to become a cornerstone of Europe's efforts to develop indigenous defense technologies after events in Ukraine exposed the bloc's dependence on US weapons and surveillance systems.

 

In an interview with Axel Springer CEO Mathias Döpfner, Ek called venture capital a force that Europe must harness to close the gap from the world’s superpowers.

 

A self-proclaimed optimist, Ek has also become a true member of Europe’s support team.

 

He says Sweden’s welfare state model has given him a safety net that allows him to take business risks.

 

The businessman says he wants to prove that the continent can compete globally.

 

Most Valuable Player

 

Politico concludes its list with a nomination for Most Valuable Player. It went to FIFA President Gianni Infantino, who has cultivated a relationship with Trump with unsurpassed condescension. This year, he introduced cryptocurrency in the Oval Office, invited the US president to help present the trophy at this summer’s FIFA tournament in the United States and awarded the Nobel-like FIFA Peace Prize, which Trump accepted with obvious pride.

 

For European leaders struggling with the return of the US Republican leader to the White House, Infantino offered a lesson in how to survive under the rule of a US president. But Infantino’s goal is actually simple: to maintain Trump’s support and ensure that next year’s 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup – the biggest global event of the year, spanning 16 cities in the US, Mexico and Canada – goes smoothly.”

 

The bottom line: The root cause of all Western Europe’s woes is that Western Europe has no normal leader, no Trump. It has to cover up this nakedness with the American Trump. He is now the most important person in Western Europe.

 

 

https://kauno.diena.lt/naujienos/pasaulis/ekonomika-ir-politika/europa-purto-transatlantinio-smugio-banga-1733024