Deleveraging and the Depression Gang

Paul Krugman

June 25, 2012, 11:50 AM16

The Bank for International Settlements has just come out with a report emphasizing the “limits to monetary policy”, which is apparently being taken seriously. I guess I’d start from the observation that the BIS has already embraced liquidationism, the idea that all this suffering is good for us and that trying to mitigate the pain would somehow be a bad thing. Now they’re just trying to come up with additional arguments for doing nothing.

But I thought it might be worth talking for a second about how the various conventional wisdoms of the past few years — the enthusiasm for austerity that swept the VSPs in 2010, and now the chin-stroking doubts about monetary expansion — add up to an insistence that we refuse to do anything that might help us avoid a sustained depression.

What, after all, is the story of this crisis? The simple take many of us have now adopted, which I think gets at most of it, runs along the lines of my Sam and Janet story. At any given time there are some people who would like to borrow more at current interest rates, but are constrained by norms about how much debt is too much. If these norms are loosened, they will borrow more — which is in fact what happened between around 1980 and 2007, as deregulation, financial innovations nobody understood, and general complacency led to a broad willingness to accept higher leverage.

Now, if people are borrowing, other people must be lending. What induced the necessary lending? Higher real interest rates, which encouraged “patient” economic agents to spend less than their incomes while the impatient spent more.

OK, so that’s what happens when an economy is engaged in increased leveraging. Then something makes people remember the dangers of debt, and leveraging gives way to deleveraging.

You might think that the process would be symmetric: debtors pay down their debt, while creditors are correspondingly induced to spend more by low real interest rates. And it would be symmetric if the shock were small enough. In fact, however, the deleveraging shock has been so large that we’re hard up against the zero lower bound; interest rates can’t go low enough. And so we have a persistent excess of desired saving over desired investment, which is to say persistently inadequate demand, which is to say a depression.

By the way, this is in a fundamental sense a market failure: there is a price mechanism, the real interest rate, that because of the zero lower bound can’t do its job under certain circumstances, namely the circumstances we face now.

What to do? One answer is fiscal policy: let governments temporarily run big enough deficits to maintain more or less full employment, while the private sector repairs its balance sheets. The other answer is unconventional monetary policy to get around the problem of the zero lower bound: maybe unconventional asset purchases, but the obvious answer is to try to create expected inflation, so as to reduce real rates.

Now look at what the serious people say: we must have fiscal austerity, not stimulus, because debt is bad; we must not have unconventional monetary policy, because that would endanger “credibility” (where it’s not at all clear what that means).

So basically, we must do nothing to fix this horrific market failure, and allow unemployment to fester instead.

It’s really awesome, when you think about — not just that we’re committing this massive act of folly, but that it’s all being done in the name of sound policy.