Prarastas Amerikos pigių automobilių rinkos idealas: kiniški automobiliai vėl kuria šį Amerikos idealą

 

Kinijos automobilių gamintojai yra pasirengę iki 2026 m. sutrikdyti JAV rinką, potencialiai atgaivindami „pigaus automobilio“ idealą, siūlydami aukštųjų technologijų, daug funkcijų turinčius, elektromobilius, kurių kaina yra gerokai mažesnė, nei Amerikos konkurentų.

 

Kinijos gamintojams gaminant automobilius už mažiau nei 10 000 USD, jie galėtų spręsti JAV įperkamumo krizę, nors dideli tarifai, geopolitinė įtampa ir galimos partnerystės su senaisiais automobilių gamintojais nulems jų patekimą į rinką.

 

Perėjimas prie įperkamų kiniškų transporto priemonių

 

Kainų skirtumas: Nors vidutinė naujo JAV automobilio kaina viršija 48 000 USD, Kinijos gamintojai siūlo daug funkcijų turinčius elektromobilius už 8 000–42 000 USD, todėl jie yra labai konkurencingi.

 

Įėjimo į rinką strategija: Ekspertai siūlo, kad Kinijos prekių ženklai patektų į rinką 2026 m., greičiausiai per partnerystes arba statant gamyklas Šiaurės Amerikoje, kad būtų apeiti 100 % tarifai. Vartotojų paklausa: neseniai atlikta „AutoPacific“ apklausa rodo, kad 76 % amerikiečių iki 40 metų svarstytų įsigyti Kinijoje pagamintą automobilį, nes jiems reikia prieinamesnių variantų.

 

Pramonės sutrikimai: šių transporto priemonių atsiradimas gali sukelti „smurtinę korekciją“ JAV automobilių rinkoje, priversdamas pereiti nuo brangių, mažos vertės transporto priemonių, tačiau gali sukelti didelių JAV gamybos bazės sutrikimų.

 

Poveikis Amerikos automobilių pramonei

 

„Prarastas idealas“: Amerikos rinka nusistovėjo nuo prieinamų automobilių ir perėjo prie didelį pelną generuojančių didelių transporto priemonių.

 

Konkurencijos grėsmės: tokios įmonės kaip BYD ir kitos Kinijos įmonės jau lenkia Amerikos automobilių gamintojus, o Kinija tampa didžiausia eksportuotoja pasaulyje.

 

Partnerystės metodas: kaip išsamiai aprašyta šioje „CarEdge“ analizėje, sunkumų patiriantys tradiciniai automobilių gamintojai (pvz., „Nissan“) gali pasinaudoti partneryste su Kinijos įmonėmis, kad įgytų reikiamos patirties kuriant pigesnius ir greitesnius elektromobilius.

 

Iššūkiai: nepaisant paklausos, dideli JAV tarifai ir protekcionistinė politika kelia didelių kliūčių neatidėliotinam, tiesioginiam importui.

 

Kaip aptarta Amerikos pažangos centro straipsnyje, Kinijos transporto priemonių patekimo į rinką potencialas, nesvarbu, ar importuojant, ar gaminant vietoje, yra esminis lūžio taškas Šiaurės Amerikos automobilių gamintojams.

 

Amerikiečiams kol kas belieka skųstis:

 

„Redaktoriui:

 

Dėl Clifford Winston straipsnio „Kur dingo visi įperkami automobiliai?“ (nuomonės svečio esė, balandžio 19 d.):

 

Ponas Winstonas teisingai įvardija aktualią įperkamumo problemą, formuojančią mūsų ekonomiką: nevienodas automobilių, kuriais priemiesčių ir kaimo gyventojai naudojasi kasdieniame gyvenime, kainas.

 

Tačiau jis neaptarė pagrindinio šių spartėjančių išlaidų veiksnio: vis sudėtingesnių federalinių ir valstijų vyriausybių saugos, degalų taupymo ir panašių dalykų reglamentų, dėl kurių net bazinių modelių automobilių gamyba tapo daug brangesnė.

 

Kartu su dideliais vartotojų lūkesčiais dėl komforto, našumo ir integruotų technologijų, šiuolaikiniai automobilių pasirinkimai yra saugesni, sunaudoja mažiau degalų ir veikia daug geriau nei tie, kurie buvo gaminami aštuntajame ir devintajame dešimtmečiuose, tačiau visi šie pasiekimai kainavo brangiai.

 

Dauguma amerikiečių kasdieniams poreikiams tenkinti naudojasi automobiliais, tačiau panašu, kad artimiausiais metais vietiniai automobilių gamintojai greičiausiai pristatys gana įperkamus modelius, nes rinkos jėgos spaudžia juos tai daryti.

 

Richard Murdocco

 

Commack, N.Y.

 

Autorius yra Stony Brook universiteto miestų planavimo ir aplinkos politikos docentas.

 

Redaktoriui:

 

Cliffordo Winstono esė apie automobilių įperkamumą Amerikoje skamba su užuojauta, tačiau yra labai naivus ir strategiškai pavojingas. Svarbiausia, kad jame klaidingai diagnozuojama problema.

 

Pigių automobilių nykimas daugiausia vyksta ne dėl tarifų; tai atspindi vartotojų paklausą, saugos standartus ir šiuolaikinių technologijų integravimo kainą.

 

Šiandienos transporto priemonės yra daug saugesnės, švaresnės ir patvaresnės nei aštuntojo dešimtmečio „ekonominės dėžės“. Lyginti kainas skirtingose ​​epochose neatsižvelgiant į tai yra klaidinantis procesas.

 

Dar labiau nerimą kelia raginimas atverti JAV rinką Kinijos automobilių gamintojams. Šios įmonės nekonkuruoja tikroje laisvojoje rinkoje; jos yra gausiai subsidijuojamos, saugomos šalyje ir remiamos valstybės pramonės politikos.

 

Jų įsileidimas nėra laisva prekyba; tai vienašališkas nusiginklavimas. Mes jau matėme, kaip Kinija, naudodama būtent šią strategiją, ištuština Amerikos pramonės šakas, tokias kaip plieno ir saulės energija.

 

Mintis, kad galime reikalauti, kad Kinijos įmonės statytų Jungtinėse Valstijose ir išvengtų subsidijų yra svajonių svajonės. Tos subsidijos dažnai yra paslėptos ir sisteminės. Tuo pačiu metu tai suteiktų Kinijai įtaką svarbiausioms tiekimo grandinėms, ypač baterijų ir transporto priemonių programinės įrangos, remiantis ne kuo daugiau nei pažadais dėl duomenų saugumo.

 

 

Pasekmės neapsiribotų Amerika. Kanada ir Europa būtų priversta sekti šiuo pavyzdžiu arba patirti nuostolių, o tai paspartintų Vakarų gamybos žlugimą.

 

Taip, įperkamumas yra svarbus. Tačiau pramonės stiprybės ir ekonominės nepriklausomybės aukojimas dėl šiek tiek pigesnių automobilių yra blogas sandoris. Šis pasiūlymas neišsprendžia problemos – jis kartoja klaidas, kurios ją sukėlė.

 

Kenneth Margulies

 

Sterling, Virdžinija

 

Redaktoriui:

 

Clifford Winston aiškiai iliustruoja įperkamumo problemą automobilių rinkoje ir siūlo sprendimą – panaikinti užsienio importo apribojimus patikimiems ir įperkamiems automobiliams. Tačiau jis neaptaria didesnės problemos: Amerikos priklausomybės nuo automobilių ir jos nesugebėjimo užtikrinti patikimo alternatyvaus transporto ten, kur jo reikia.

 

Nedaug Amerikos miestų gali pasigirti tvirta ir patikima transporto sistema, tačiau tie, kurie ją turi, gali sujungti priemiesčius, rajonus ir metro mazgus veiksmingais priemiestiniais traukiniais, greitųjų autobusų sistemomis, metro ir lengvaisiais geležinkeliais. Šios sistemos siūlo visų ekonominių klasių žmonėms transporto galimybes, neapsiribojant asmenine transporto priemone. Jos taip pat leidžia žmonėms atsikratyti didėjančių automobilių draudimo ir priežiūros išlaidų.

 

Masinis transportas gali būti neįmanomas visoms Amerikos bendruomenėms, ypač kaimo vietovėms. Tačiau daugelis tankiai apgyvendintų Amerikos miestų gerokai atsilieka nuo panašių tarptautinių miestų, kalbant apie transporto ir transporto infrastruktūrą.

 

Amerika turi panaikinti socialinę viešojo transporto naudojimo stigmą ir nustoti vertinti automobilio savininko statusą. Tikra nepriklausomybė ir laisva rinka žmonėms pasiūlytų daugiau transporto galimybių nei asmeninis automobilis.

 

David Shum

 

Solt Leik Sitis

 

Redaktoriui:

 

Aš labai gerbiu Cliffordo Winstono įgaliojimus ir nuomones. Tačiau kai kuriais atžvilgiais nesutinku su jo argumentu.

 

Praleidęs 50 metų dirbdamas gamintojų pusėje, suprantu, kaip automobilių verslas veikia tiek didmeninės, tiek mažmeninės prekybos lygmenimis.

 

Remiantis mano patirtimi, yra priešingai. Mes nuolat konkuravome dėl kiekvieno kliento ir kiekvieno rinkos dalies taško. Mes niekada neignoravome jokio prasmingo segmento; jei klientai buvo, mes siekėme juos aptarnauti. Kaip pramonės šaka, mes nustojome gaminti „econobox“ tipo automobilius, nes vartotojai jų nebenorėjo.

 

Turiu pažymėti, kad įperkamų automobilių yra kiekviename Amerikos mieste. Mes juos vadiname naudotais automobiliais. Jie taip pat pabrango, nors naudotų automobilių rinka išlieka viena iš paskutiniųjų tikrai laisvų rinkų ekonomikoje, kurią lemia vien pasiūla ir paklausa.

 

Klientai, kurie negali įpirkti naujų automobilių, turėtų apsvarstyti naudotus, kuriuos lengvai galima įsigyti nuomos kompanijų aikštelėse, kur jie gali rasti įperkamų, nors kartais ir žemesnės kokybės, transporto priemonių. Mano nuomone, vadinamoji įperkamumo krizė kyla todėl, kad dauguma žmonių renkasi naujus, aukštos klasės automobilius, o ne nebrangius, daug mažiau prestižinius naudotus.

 

Manau, kad įperkamumo problemos esmė yra tiesiog ta, kad automobilių kompanijos užsiima automobilių pardavimu. Jau daugelį metų nebuvo pastebimos supaprastintų ekonominės klasės modelių rinkos. Kai ji atsiras, gamintojai tikrai sieks patenkinti šią paklausą.

 

Joseph S. Folz

 

Bonita Springs, Florida

 

Autorius yra pensininkas „Porsche Cars North America“ viceprezidentas ir generalinis patarėjas, dirbęs „General Motors“, „Volkswagen“ ir „Audi“.

 

Redaktoriui:

 

Cliffordo Winstono straipsnis apie įperkamų automobilių mirtį yra puikus ir pataiko tiesiai į dešimtuką.

 

Visada didžiavausi, kad pirkdavau išmanius, įperkamus sportinius sedanus. Dėl šios priežasties buvau ištikimas dabar jau nebeegzistuojančio „G.M.“ padalinio „Pontiac“ šalininkas. Kai Alfredas Sloanas įkūrė milžinišką „G.M.“ milžinę, sakoma, kad jis sukūrė prekės ženklo strategiją, skatinančią augimą: „Chevrolet“ buvo įperkamas, pradinio lygio prekės ženklas, kilęs karjeros laiptais nuo „Pontiac“, „Buick“ ir „Oldsmobile“ iki aukščiausio lygio „Cadillac“. Šiandien vidutinė naujo „Chevrolet“ kaina yra maždaug 47 000 USD.

 

 

Kaip bankininkas, prieš 20 metų dirbęs Kinijoje ir remdamas pasaulinę automobilių pramonę, manau, kad „Ford“ generalinis direktorius teisingai svarsto partnerystę su Kinijos automobilių gamintojais, tačiau panašiomis sąlygomis, kokias Kinija taikė užsienio gamintojams.

 

 

Kiniją reikėtų pasveikinti už augimą; ji anksti suprato, kad elektrinės transporto priemonės yra galimybė aplenkti likusį pasaulį. Dabar turime pasinaudoti jos technologijomis, kad pagerintume savo gyvenimą Jungtinėse Valstijose.

 

 

Ponas Winstonas taip pat teisingai pastebėjo, kaip automobilio nuosavybė iš pasididžiavimo jausmo virto naštos jausmu. Vienu metu pirmojo automobilio pirkimas sustiprino laisvės, orumo ir savivertės jausmą. Visi automobiliai buvo tikrosios Amerikos dalis.

 

Šis pasididžiavimas vystėsi iš kartos į kartą – nuo ​​„Smokey and the Bandit“ V-8 Trans Am Pietų širdyje iki „Greitų ir įsiutusių“ automobilių, kurie šlovino Los Andželo tiuningo sceną. Mes mylėjome savo automobilius.

 

Dabar vienintelis greitas dalykas yra tai, kaip greitai jūsų atlyginimas palieka jūsų sąskaitą, kad sumokėtumėte už automobilį, ir kaip tai jus įniršo.

 

Ericas Planey

 

Naujasis Hamburgas, Niujorkas [1]

 

1. The Lost Ideal of the American Car Market: letters. New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 25, 2026.

The Lost Ideal of the American Cheap Car Market: Chinese Cars Will Recover the Ideal

Chinese automakers are poised to disrupt the U.S. market by 2026, potentially reviving the "cheap car" ideal with high-tech, feature-rich EVs priced significantly lower than American competitors.

 

With Chinese manufacturers producing cars for under $10,000, they could address the U.S. affordability crisis, though high tariffs, geopolitical tensions, and potential partnerships with legacy automakers will shape their entry.

 

 

The Shift Toward Affordable Chinese Vehicles

 

    The Price Gap: While the average new U.S. car exceeds $48,000, Chinese manufacturers are offering feature-packed EVs for $8,000 to $42,000, making them highly competitive.

 

 

    Market Entry Strategy: Experts suggest a 2026 entry for Chinese brands, likely through partnerships or building factories within North America to bypass 100% tariffs.

    Consumer Demand: A recent AutoPacific poll indicates 76% of Americans under 40 would consider a Chinese-made car, driven by the need for more affordable options.

    Industry Disruption: The entry of these vehicles could cause a "violent correction" in the U.S. auto market, forcing a shift from high-cost, low-value vehicles, but potentially causing significant disruption to the U.S. manufacturing base.

 

Impact on the American Auto Industry

 

    The "Lost Ideal": The American market has moved away from affordable cars in favor of high-profit, large vehicles.

 

    Competitive Threats: Companies like BYD and other Chinese firms are already outpacing American automakers, with China becoming the world's largest exporter.

    The Partnership Approach: As detailed in this CarEdge analysis, struggling legacy automakers (e.g., Nissan) might use partnerships with Chinese firms to gain necessary expertise in building cheaper, faster EVs.

    Challenges: Despite the demand, high U.S. tariffs and protectionist policies present significant hurdles for immediate, direct imports.

 

As discussed in the Center for American Progress article, the potential for Chinese vehicles to enter the market, whether through imports or domestic production, represents a critical turning point for North American automakers.

The Americans are left to complain so far:

“To the Editor:

 

Re “Where Did All the Affordable Cars Go?,” by Clifford Winston (Opinion guest essay, April 19):

 

Mr. Winston correctly identifies a pressing affordability issue shaping our economy: the lopsided pricing of cars that suburban and rural residents rely on in their daily lives.

 

However, he did not address a key factor in these accelerating costs: increasingly complex federal and state government regulations for safety, fuel economy and the like that made production of even base model cars much more expensive.

 

Paired with outsize consumer expectations for comfort, performance and integrated technology, modern automotive choices are safer, sip less fuel and perform far better than what was produced in the 1970s and ’80s, but all of these advancements have come at a steep cost.

 

The majority of Americans rely on their cars for their day-to-day needs, but it seems that domestic automakers will likely be introducing relatively affordable models in the coming years as market forces press them to do so.

 

Richard Murdocco

 

Commack, N.Y.

 

The writer is an adjunct professor of urban planning and environmental policy at Stony Brook University.

 

To the Editor:

 

Clifford Winston’s essay about the affordability of cars in America sounds compassionate, but it is deeply naïve and strategically dangerous. Most important, it misdiagnoses the problem.

 

The disappearance of cheap cars is not mainly because of tariffs; it reflects consumer demand, safety standards and the cost of integrating modern technology.

 

Today’s vehicles are far safer, cleaner and more durable than 1970s econoboxes. Comparing prices across eras without accounting for that is misleading.

 

More troubling is the call to open the U.S. market to Chinese automakers. These companies do not compete in a true free market; they are heavily subsidized, protected at home and backed by state industrial policy.

 

Allowing them in is not free trade; it is unilateral disarmament. We have already watched China hollow out American industries like steel and solar using this exact playbook.

 

The idea that we can require Chinese companies to build in the United States and avoid subsidies is wishful thinking. Those subsidies are often hidden and systemic. At the same time, this would hand China influence over critical supply chains — especially for batteries and vehicle software — based on little more than promises about data security.

 

The consequences would not stop at America. Canada and Europe would be forced to follow or be undercut, accelerating the collapse of Western manufacturing.

 

Yes, affordability matters. But sacrificing industrial strength and economic independence for slightly cheaper cars is a bad trade. This proposal doesn’t solve the problem — it repeats the mistakes that created it.

 

Kenneth Margulies

 

Sterling, Va.

 

To the Editor:

 

Clifford Winston clearly illustrates the problem of affordability in the automobile market and offers a solution by lifting foreign import restrictions for reliable, affordable cars. But he does not discuss a larger problem: America’s reliance on the automobile and its failure to provide reliable alternative transportation where it is needed.

 

Few American cities boast a robust and reliable transit system, but those that do are able to connect suburbs, neighborhoods and metro hubs with effective commuter rail, rapid bus systems, subway systems and light rail. These systems offer people of all economic classes transportation options beyond the personal vehicle. They also allow people to find relief from the rising costs of auto insurance and maintenance.

 

Mass transit may not be feasible for all American communities, particularly those that are rural. However, many dense American cities fall far behind comparable international cities when it comes to transit and transportation infrastructure.

 

America needs to remove the social stigma of riding public transit and stop valorizing the status of car ownership. True independence and a free market would offer people transportation options beyond the personal car.

 

David Shum

 

Salt Lake City

 

To the Editor:

 

I respect the credentials and opinions of Clifford Winston very highly. But I disagree with his argument in some respects.

 

Having spent 50 years working on the manufacturer’s side of the industry, I understand how the car business operates at both the wholesale and retail levels.

 

Based on my experience, the opposite is true. We constantly competed for every customer and every point of market share. We never ignored any segment that made sense; if customers were there, we aimed to serve them. As an industry, we stopped producing econoboxes because consumers no longer wanted them.

 

I must note that affordable cars are available in every town across America. We call them used cars. They have also become more expensive, though the used car market remains one of the last truly free markets in the economy, driven purely by supply and demand.

 

Customers who can’t afford new cars should consider used ones, which are readily available at rental company lots, where they can find affordable — if sometimes lower-quality — vehicles. In my opinion, the so-called affordability crisis arises because most people prefer new, high-end cars over inexpensive, far less prestigious used ones.

 

I believe that the core of the affordability issue is simply that car companies are in business to sell cars. There has not been a discernible market for stripped down economy models for years. When there is, the manufacturers will surely seek to fulfill that demand.

 

Joseph S. Folz

 

Bonita Springs, Fla.

 

The writer is a retired vice president and general counsel for Porsche Cars North America who has worked for General Motors, Volkswagen and Audi.

 

To the Editor:

 

Clifford Winston’s piece on the death of affordable cars is excellent and hits home.

 

I have always prided myself on purchasing smart, affordable performance sedans. I was a loyalist of G.M.’s now-defunct Pontiac division for that reason. When Alfred Sloan created the juggernaut that is G.M., he was said to have devised an upward-mobility brand strategy: Chevrolet was the affordable, entry-level brand, progressing up the ladder through Pontiac, Buick and Oldsmobile, to the pinnacle, Cadillac. Today, the average price of a new Chevrolet is approximately $47,000.

 

As a banker who 20 years ago worked in China supporting the global auto industry, I believe that Ford’s chief executive is right to consider a partnership with Chinese automakers — but on terms similar to what China imposed on foreign makers.

 

China should be congratulated for its growth; it recognized early that electric vehicles were an opportunity to leapfrog the rest of the world. We must now look to its technology to make our lives in the United States better.

 

Mr. Winston also correctly pointed out how car ownership has flipped from a sense of pride to a sense of burden. At one point, buying your first car increased your sense of freedom, dignity and self-worth. Collectively, cars were a part of true Americana.

 

That pride evolved generationally — from the “Smokey and the Bandit” V-8 Trans Am in the heart of the South to “Fast and the Furious” cars that celebrated the L.A. tuner scene. We loved our cars.

 

Now the only thing that is fast is how quickly your paycheck leaves your account to make your car payment and how furious that makes you feel.

 

Eric Planey

 

New Hamburg, N.Y.” [1]

 

1. The Lost Ideal of the American Car Market: letters. New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 25, 2026.

Americans: No taxation, full stop

  

“Americans are taught that their country was founded in revolt against unfair taxes. (Historians usually argue it was more complicated.) That idea hits harder around April 15th, the deadline for filing tax returns. This year it feels especially apt. If the mantra of the Boston Tea Party was “no taxation without representation”, the current mood in American politics might be summed up by dropping the second half of that slogan.

 

Democrats and Republicans alike seem to be concluding that swathes of Americans should pay almost no income tax at all. To fund the state, many on the left would squeeze the richest few, while many on the right would hit foreigners with tariffs. Neither revenue pool is likely to cover America’s expenses, so the result would be even larger budget deficits.

 

Republicans’ dislike of taxes is longer-standing and better known. Last year’s One Big Beautiful Bill extended expiring tax cuts from Donald Trump’s first term and added more giveaways, including the enormously popular “no tax on tips” provision. That will cost several trillion dollars over the next decade. Meanwhile, Mr Trump has cut around 25,000 employees from the Internal Revenue Service, making it easier for the rich to dodge taxes.

 

Lately Democrats have begun to respond in kind. Senators Cory Booker and Chris Van Hollen unveiled tax plans last month. Each would sharply increase the number of Americans paying no federal income tax.

 

Mr Booker’s plan more than doubles the tax-free standard deduction, to $37,500 for single filers and $75,000 for married couples—a benefit that extends up the income scale to the well-off. He also proposes a range of tax credits aimed at poorer Americans, alongside higher rates on top earners to help pay for them (see chart 1). Even after those offsets, independent scorekeepers put the cost at $5trn-7trn over the next decade, roughly double that of Mr Trump’s effort. (Mr Booker insists he would find the rest of the money by closing loopholes and taxing corporations more.)

 

Mr Van Hollen’s plan has a similar shape, but a less eye-popping price tag. He would eliminate income taxes for singles earning below $46,000 and couples earning below $92,000, before phasing those giveaways out for higher earners. His plan is roughly deficit-neutral, as those tax cuts are paired with hefty surtaxes on those earning more than $1m a year.

 

Neither proposal has a realistic chance of becoming law any time soon: Democrats control no branch of the federal government. But they do indicate the party’s direction of travel. Messrs Booker and Van Hollen are both not-so-subtle presidential aspirants. Mr Van Hollen’s plan in particular, with its less fantastical numbers, has attracted a broad set of co-sponsors from both the left and centre of the party.

 

If Democrats did regain control of both Congress and the White House in 2028, even Mr Van Hollen’s tax cuts would sit uneasily with the party’s other priorities. His $1.5trn in progressive tax rises might pay for those cuts, but would leave little for anything else—such as undoing cuts to health and food assistance in Mr Trump’s tax bill (which would cost a similar amount) or paring back tariffs (which could cost even more). Democrats might have to ditch much of their spending agenda—or turn to more radical options, such as wealth taxes. Mr Van Hollen backs the latter. He is a co-sponsor of a bill from Elizabeth Warren, another Democratic senator, that would impose a 2% annual tax on fortunes over $50m.

 

Don’t tread on me

 

From one angle, these proposals do not differ much from classic Democratic offerings: they redistribute from the wealthy to the rest and add a dollop of deficit spending. But there is a difference. When Joe Biden had the chance to spend big, he directed money towards social programmes and industrial policy. Cutting taxes instead is a departure. Grover Norquist, a Republican campaigner and America’s arch-tax-cutter, evinces a certain smugness about the shift, calling Democrats’ new enthusiasm for tax cuts “a sign of weakness” in their worldview. What has changed?

 

Democrats in Washington usually point to two things: the “affordability crisis” and the immense popularity of “no tax on tips”. Voters, they argue, are desperate for help with the cost of living, even though wage growth has kept pace with prices. The simplicity of a “no tax” message helps reach even sceptics. With Mr Trump causing daily chaos in the White House, this is no time to sniff at big, bold, popular ideas. Still, “no tax on tips” is a relatively cheap policy—there is not that much income in tips. Extending that logic to every dollar earned has a whiff of “nerds copying the jocks”, as one Democratic fiscal wonk puts it.

 

A more cynical explanation is that, as the Democrats’ base has grown richer, it has become harder to reach with most forms of social spending. Mr Booker’s plan offers an appreciable income boost to those in the top fifth of the income scale, and even the top tenth. The very richest, of course, are still squeezed.

 

On a deeper level, Democrats’ support for tax cuts reflects a recognition that distrust in government is widespread. Elon Musk’s DOGE may have been a Republican project, but anxieties that tax dollars are being wasted, that the rich are getting off scot-free, and that the wrong people are in charge are common on the left, too.

 

It is no surprise that virtually any proposal to lower taxes polls well. A recent Economist/YouGov survey found that two-thirds of the public favour the core components of Mr Booker’s plan. More notable is the breakdown in social consent for taxation. The share of Americans who think the income taxes they pay are fair is near the lowest on record, according to Gallup, which has asked the question since 1997 (see chart 2). The only comparable period was at the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency, when America was running a budget surplus and arguably did have room for tax cuts. Today’s fiscal environment could hardly be more different.

 

This discontent is remarkably broad-based. Democrats and Republicans alike think they are overtaxed, as do both rich and poor. YouGov’s polling finds that around 60% of Americans at every income level think they are taxed too much—despite being taxed at very different rates.

 

Statehouses are hearing this, too. Many, citing strong economic growth, have cut taxes in recent years (see chart 3). Enthusiasm is building to go further and faster, leaving some observers wary. “Most have done so responsibly thus far,” says Jared Walczak of the Tax Foundation, a think-tank. “But they now risk overreaching and making reductions they cannot afford.”

 

A wave of localities is pushing through property-tax exemptions for retirees. Florida is flirting with abolishing non-school property taxes altogether. Ohio has a possible ballot initiative to scrap them in all forms. Keisha Lance Bottoms, a Democratic candidate for governor in Georgia, has backed eliminating income taxes for teachers. California is mulling a “one-time” 5% wealth tax on billionaires.

 

Doubtless, the more politically successful of these ideas will enter the national debate. Politicians of both parties seem increasingly inclined to indulge a public that is souring on taxation. Yet with a gaping budget deficit and an ever heavier debt burden, America can ill afford a new tax revolt.” [1]

 

1. No taxation, full stop. The Economist; London Vol. 459, Iss. 9495,  (Apr 18, 2026): 37, 38.

Lithuania ranked as poorest EU country

 

Lithuania’s “average poverty” indicator dragged down by high income inequality and low productivity

 

According to the “average poverty” methodology developed by an economist from Oxford University, which calculates the time it takes to earn $1, Lithuania turned out to be the poorest country in the European Union.

 

There are various indicators, experts remind us, and this one is particularly unfavorable for Lithuania. However, it highlights the country’s weaknesses that need to be overcome.

 

Lithuania’s economic progress cannot be denied, as traditional statistics show. 22 years ago, when Lithuania joined the European Union (EU), the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was 48% of the Community average, and now it reaches 87%.

 

In 2025 Lithuania, in terms of GDP per capita – it amounted to 36,500 euros in purchasing power parity – led the Baltic countries and surpassed countries such as Poland, Portugal or Greece.”

 

This means that for the lowest wage in the European Union we make 87% of the Community GDP average. Where does the wealth we create go? The Lithuanian elite takes it away – to Greece, the United Kingdom and other sweet spots. We are left with bones. Who is to blame? We ourselves. Our voting in elections has bad consequences for ourselves.

Based on data from April 2026, Lithuania was indeed rated as the “poorest” EU country according to the new “average poverty” methodology developed by Oxford University economist Olivier Sterck, which measures the time it takes to earn 1 US dollar (in purchasing power parity).

Here are the main highlights and context of this assessment:

 

The essence of the indicator: According to this method, at the beginning of 2026, Lithuania took the longest time in the EU to earn $1 – 76.4 minutes. For comparison, in the least poor country – Luxembourg – it took about 21 minutes, and in neighboring Estonia – 51 minutes.

 

Here are some key highlights that help you understand where Lithuania’s created value “disappears”:

 

Labor-capital ratio. In Lithuania, a relatively large share of GDP goes to capital (corporate profits) rather than to wages, compared to Western Europe. This means that although we create a lot of value, a larger part of it remains with business owners and goes to Greece, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, rather than to Lithuanian workers.

 

Shadow economy. A significant part of the wealth created still circulates “in the shadows”. This reduces budget revenues, which should be used to finance public services: medicine, education and pensions.

Low added value. Although we have reached 87-90% of the EU average in terms of GDP per capita (purchasing power), we still lead in sectors that require a lot of labor but pay low wages (e.g. transport, furniture production).

Redistribution through the budget. Lithuania redistributes one of the smallest shares of GDP in the European Union. This directly correlates with the voting consequence mentioned here: the chosen direction of low taxes and weak public services leads to high social exclusion.

A small public sector and high income inequality are systemic problems that can only be changed by long-term political solutions, supported by a fair vote of voters for the implementation of voters' own expectations.

Readers' comments:

 

AAAAkvadratu”

“If compared to Europe, the system is definitely not favorable to the bottom. The tax system is regressive, pensions are low, property taxes are low, the poverty rate is the highest in the EU, how is that system favorable to the bottom? Can you be more specific?”

 

Mauras:

 

“A relatively small portion of customers (e.g., the top 10-20 percent) hold the majority – about 70-80 percent – ​​of all household deposits in Lithuanian banks.”

 

Is AI Smarter Than People? It's Complicated. --- As a neuroscientist, I conducted research into artificial versus human intelligence. The results surprised me -- and suggest we've been worrying over the wrong things.

 

“Who's smarter, the human or the machine?

 

In the 30 years I've worked in artificial intelligence, that's been the question driving the conversation.

 

We've also been sold a story about AI that goes something like this: It will handle the tedious, routine work -- the research, the first draft, the number-crunching -- while we focus on the interesting parts: creativity, judgment, the human touch.

 

My research suggests we've been asking the wrong question and drawing the wrong conclusions.

 

A few months ago, I recruited adults from San Francisco's Bay Area for an experiment. I gave each group one hour to make predictions about real-world events, using scenarios drawn from the prediction market platform Polymarket. This provided us a rigorous, objective way to check results against the collective wisdom of thousands of financially motivated forecasters. In addition to AI making predictions on its own, some human teams worked alone, while others worked as human-AI hybrids. (Polymarket has a data partnership with Dow Jones, the publisher of The Wall Street Journal.)

 

The human groups performed poorly, relying on instinct or whatever information had come across their feeds that morning. The large AI models -- ChatGPT and Gemini, in this case -- performed considerably better, though still short of the market itself.

 

But when we combined AI with humans, things got more interesting.

 

Most hybrid teams used AI for the answer and submitted it as their own, performing no better than the AI alone. Others fed their own predictions into AI and asked it to come up with supporting evidence. These "validators" had stumbled into a classic confirmation bias-loop: the sycophancy that leads chatbots to tell you what you want to hear, even if it isn't true. They ended up performing worse than an AI working solo.

 

But in roughly 5% to 10% of teams, something different emerged. The AI became a sparring partner. The teams pushed back, demanding evidence and interrogating assumptions. When the AI expressed high confidence, the humans questioned it. When the humans felt strongly about an intuition, they asked the AI to come up with a counterargument.

 

The hybrids were becoming cyborgs.

 

These teams reached insightful conclusions that neither a human nor a machine could have produced on its own. They were the only group to consistently rival the prediction market's accuracy. On certain questions, they even outperformed it.

 

It's not that these people were more intelligent than the others in the study. But they demonstrated two important qualities: perspective-taking and intellectual humility.

 

Perspective-taking is the ability to genuinely inhabit another point of view. Not to debate it, not to tolerate it, but to actually inhabit it.

 

Intellectual humility is the ability to recognize the edge of your own knowledge and sit with that discomfort rather than trying to rush to fill it.

 

Both of these qualities are, at root, emotional skills.

 

Perspective-taking requires genuine curiosity about minds other than your own.

 

 Intellectual humility requires a kind of emotional courage: the willingness to feel uncertain, even a little foolish, in the presence of something or someone that seems very sure of itself.

 

These are not the soft skills we typically celebrate. We celebrate confidence. We promote decisiveness. We are building AI systems specifically designed to give us the answer before we feel the discomfort of not having it.

 

What my experiment suggests is that the human qualities most likely to matter are not the feel-good ones. They're the uncomfortable ones: the capacity to be wrong in public and stay curious; to sit with a question your phone could answer in three seconds and resist the urge to reach for it. To read a confident, fluent response from an AI and ask yourself, "What's missing?" rather than default to "Great, that's done." To disagree with something that sounds authoritative and to trust your instinct enough to follow it.

 

We don't build these capacities by avoiding discomfort. We build them by choosing it, repeatedly, in small ways: the student who struggles through a problem before checking the answer; the person who asks a follow-up question in a conversation; the reader who sits with a difficult idea long enough for it to actually change one's mind. Most AI chatbots today default to easy answers, which is hurting our ability to think critically.

 

I call this the Information-Exploration Paradox. As the cost of information approaches zero, human exploration collapses. We see it in students who perform better on AI-assisted tasks and worse on everything afterward. We see it in developers shipping more code and understanding it less. We are, in ways that feel like progress, slowly optimizing ourselves out of the loop.

 

This is the divergence I worry about. Not the dramatic science-fiction scenario of AI replacing humans wholesale, but the quieter process of people gradually outsourcing their judgment in increments too small to notice.

 

Over time, this produces two kinds of people: Those who use AI as a genuine intellectual partner -- whose thinking actually gets sharper through the friction of the collaboration -- and those who get better at securing quick answers and worse at knowing what questions to ask.

 

So what can any of us actually do about it?

 

Start with the reframe: The goal of working with AI isn't to get the answer faster. It's to find out what you're missing. Don't deploy AI minions to "do the boring work" for you, as so many sales pitches argue; use it as a savant collaborator to explore uncertainty.

 

In practice, that means before you accept an AI's answer, ask it for the strongest argument against itself. When it hedges or qualifies, pay attention -- that's usually where the real uncertainty lives. Treat it like a brilliant colleague who has read everything and understands nothing -- useful precisely because they're different from you, not because they'll agree with you.

 

For the AI industry, a key design question has gone largely unasked: Is the product building human capacity or consuming it? Nearly all AI benchmarks measure what AI agents can do alone. We desperately need benchmarks for hybrid intelligence. Errors are signals our brains use to trigger learning. An AI that eliminates friction entirely is often eliminating the learning along with it.

 

A hopeful finding is that perspective-taking, intellectual humility and curiosity are not fixed traits. They can be cultivated and respond to practice, the right relationships and environments that reward uncertainty.

 

But they require us to decide -- as individuals, as parents, as educators, as designers of tools -- that this is what we're trying to build. And in the race between human potential and human atrophy, the stakes for building it could not be higher.

 

---

 

Vivienne Ming is a theoretical neuroscientist, cognitive scientist and the author of "Robot-Proof: When Machines Have All the Answers, Build Better People."” [1]

 

1. REVIEW --- Is AI Smarter Than People? It's Complicated. --- As a neuroscientist, I conducted research into artificial versus human intelligence. The results surprised me -- and suggest we've been worrying over the wrong things. Ming, Vivienne.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 25 Apr 2026: C4.