Lithuania is one of the countries where pensions are not enough to live on

 

If you are strong and working – move to a country that cares about the people. If you are retired and in poor health, use your vote to force out of power all politicians, who don’t care about pensions. All the people who do experiments with our tax money (we spend more money per unit of GDP for arms than anybody in NATO) should go away. This money doesn’t buy security: Our military is a tiny puppet theater. This money demonstrates only the ruthlessness of our politicians. In reality nobody in the world cares about them and they retire to Greece, like Gabrielius Landsbergis using spouse's money.

 

"State pensions, compared to the cost of living, are very different in European countries, and pensions in 20 countries are not enough to live on. Lithuania is on the list of these countries, but this does not surprise the professor - it shows political determination and the real situation of pensioners.

 

In Northern and Western Europe, pensions usually cover or exceed essential expenses, but in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, pensions fall short of basic necessities.

 

Such conclusions can be drawn as a result of a salary study carried out by Moorepay, which was published by Euronews Business.

 

Economist Romas Lazutka explained this difference to Delfi not by economic, but by political decisions. True, this may be the result of history.

 

"Let's say, if we take 36 years after independence and take Western Europe - France, Germany, Belgium, Austria - then they eliminated the poverty of pensioners, which existed in 1970, 20-25 years after the war. They put everything in order, because there was an appropriate policy and recognized that people are people - no matter what age and whether they have savings, there are state pensions and they must act," he compared.

 

In 39 European countries, including EU countries, candidate countries, EFTA countries and the UK, the cost of living share of pensions ranges from 22% in Georgia to 225% in Luxembourg.

 

Moorepay has compiled data on average pensions, living standards data is taken from Numbeo and reflects the national average. Therefore, they emphasize that the actual situation may differ depending on the city. The results reflect the cost of living of one person and the pension of one person for October 2025.

 

In several countries (Iceland, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Austria, France, the Netherlands and Sweden), the pension in relation to the cost of living is 150% - 180%.

 

In six countries this figure is 100% - 150%. The state pension is enough to cover one person's expenses (without rent) in Switzerland, Ireland, Great Britain, Poland, the Czech Republic and Greece.

 

In 20 of 39 European countries, the state pension is not enough. It is important that the cost of living does not include rental costs. If they were included, the situation would change.

 

In 2026, the average old-age pension in Lithuania is 750 euros, for people with mandatory service – 810 euros.

 

The list includes Lithuania (85%), Estonia (91%), Slovenia, Slovakia, Portugal, Montenegro, Croatia and Hungary.

 

In other countries, the situation is even worse; in some countries, pensions cover only 65% ​​of the subsistence level (Ukraine, Albania, Moldova, Georgia).

 

53% of the subsistence level is covered by pensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 58% in Cyprus, 61% in North Macedonia, 64% in Turkey and 65% in Latvia.

 

According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2/3 of people aged 65 and over in Europe receive state pensions.

 

Economist Romas Lazutka shared these statistics on the social network Facebook. He shared his reasoning about why in some countries pensioners live well, but in most countries the pension is not enough to live on.

 

According to the professor, such statistics, without taking into account rental costs, give a clear and accurate picture, because rental prices are very different even within the same country (it all depends on the city). In addition, most pensioners have their own housing, especially in Lithuania.

 

"It's good that they compare with the cost of living, because they usually start from the average salary. But if prices in a country are high, for example, in Ireland. The level of development of this country, like in Luxembourg, is higher than in other European countries, because they count the money of American corporations operating in the country due to lower taxes. As a result, prices in the country are high, and pensions are not very large," Lazutka explained.

 

What matters is not how much less the pension is than the salary, but whether it is enough to live on.

 

When asked why the pension in Lithuania is 85% of the subsistence level and why there are such large differences in Europe, he shared his ideas.

 

Lazutka noticed that people immediately began writing on social networks that there were not enough pensions to live on in post-communist countries. But, for example, everything is fine in Poland, but not anymore in Lithuania.

 

“However, if we consider GDP, then Lithuania is ahead of post-communist countries, with the exception of the Czech Republic, Slovenia, we are even ahead of Portugal, Greece, and our pensions are lower,” said the economist.

 

"We know that in Lithuania pensions are small compared to the average salary, we see a high level of poverty among pensioners - about 40%, in other countries it is less than the poverty level of working people. We know this, but there is another angle - whether a person can pay for all the essentials in retirement.

 

It’s not good if a person cannot live on that kind of money,” the professor said, noting that the study deals specifically with state pensions.

 

“And we have enthusiasm for private pensions and their absence is explained by the poverty of our pensioners and small pensions for old age.  Allegedly, because we lived in Soviet times, we did not save for old age, but we had to, because supposedly people travel around the world on private pensions - but this is not so. The graph shows that in many countries you can live on a state pension,” the economist noted.

 

There are private pensions in different countries: from Great Britain, Holland to Denmark. But in these countries, pensioners live well not only because they save for old age themselves, but also because state pensions are higher there. Politics provides them.

 

So, the situation of pensioners is not necessarily related to historical circumstances. For example, in Spain the pension is almost twice the subsistence level. Spain, according to Lazutka, has long been an undemocratic and poor country, but pensioners there live better than in Lithuania.

 

"We are breathing down Spain's neck, but pensioners are breathing lower. This means that the pension policy in post-communist countries creates great inequality and does not take into account the weaker ones - that is, pensioners," the economist believes. Not only this is noted, but also the cult of youth, a young person is considered the future, and those who have more power in society do not want to finance state pensions, which is why they are low.

 

What needs to be done to make pensioners in Lithuania live better?

 

If the average take-home salary in Lithuania, according to rough estimates, is 1,400 euros, and the pension is about 700 euros, then working people must pay 100 euros more in taxes so that this money ends up in the pockets of pensioners. There are twice as many pensioners as workers, so if two people pay 100 euros each, then the pension of one pensioner will already be 900 euros. This is already enough for life.

 

"But, of course, this is 100 euros - the average amount, if the salary is less, then maybe 20, 30 euros for some, and 200 euros for others. Workers will not go hungry or become poor because of this. According to Eurostat, the poverty rate among workers in Lithuania is 7%, and among pensioners - 40%. Why should this be so?

 

They write to me that I can only take and divide, but those countries with large pensions do this; working people pay the most taxes,” Lazutka said.

 

He recalled that Sodra’s budget is in surplus (it has a billion and a few more on top - this is a reserve, but no one uses the reserve).”

 

 

Iranas užbaigia svajonę apie nuotoliniu būdu valdomą karą

 

 

„Vašingtone karo su Iranu planavimas visada prasidėdavo nuo tos pačios užsispyrusios realybės: kovoti bus sunku ir dar sunkiau laimėti. Šalis yra didžiulė ir kalnuota. Didžioji jos karinės infrastruktūros dalis yra palaidota urvuose ir bunkeriuose. Bet koks rimtas planas neutralizuoti Irano branduolines ambicijas ar nuversti režimą greitai priėjo prie tos pačios išvados – kad sėkmei reikalingos sausumos pajėgos ir kad amerikiečiai nukentės.

 

Tada atsirado mašininis mokymasis ir dirbtinis intelektas, o kartu su jais – viliojanti mintis, kad Amerika pagaliau galėtų neribotą laiką kovoti su pagrindiniu priešininku, nesiųsdama savo piliečių į ugnies liniją.

 

Šis pažadas nėra vien fantazija. Dirbtinis intelektas, sujungtas su vis tikslesniais ginklais ir visuotine stebėsena, pakeitė tai, ką JAV kariuomenė gali daryti per atstumą. Tikslumas ir greitis, kuriuo Amerikos pajėgos dabar gali rasti ir sunaikinti priešus, potencialiai patirdamos mažiau JAV ir civilių aukų, yra didelis žingsnis į priekį karo esmėje. Kaip kovo 11 d. sakė JAV Centrinės vadovybės vadas admirolas Bradas Cooperis, vadovaujantis karui su Iranu, Dirbtinio intelekto įrankiai gali paversti taikinio nustatymo procesus, kurie „anksčiau užtrukdavo valandas, o kartais net dienas, sekundėmis“.

 

Vis dėlto, nepaisant padidėjusio dirbtinio intelekto padedamo taikinio greičio ir tikslumo, karas rodo, kad fizinis pasaulis vis dar kelia didelių kliūčių pergalei. Irano dronų mastas ir išsibarstymas yra daugiau nei vien dirbtinis intelektas gali įveikti. Trumpojo nuotolio raketos, ypač mobiliuosiuose paleidimo įrenginiuose, gali išgyventi net ir nuolatinio visuotinio stebėjimo pasaulyje. Jei planuotojai svajojo apie galutinę pergalę nuotoliniu būdu valdomame kare, tai Irane jie pabudo ir suprato sunkesnę realybę.

 

Technologijų sukelti karo pokyčiai per vieną kartą yra išties stulbinantys. Pavyzdžiui, vieną kartą, likus keleriems metams iki 2001 m. rugsėjo 11 d., Jungtinės Valstijos panaudojo palydovinių telefonų duomenis, kad nusitaikytų į Osamą bin Ladeną stovykloje, kurią jis turėjo aplankyti rytų Afganistane, kaip Lawrence'as Wrightas rašė savo knygoje „The Looming Tower“. Tačiau iki to laiko, kai buvo paleistos „Tomahawk“ raketos, bin Ladenas jau buvo sukūręs naujus planus; galiausiai jis niekada nepasirodė Jungtinių Valstijų atakos vietoje. Šiandien, raketoms ir dronams kylant Irano link, realiuoju laiku palydovų ir dronų filmuota medžiaga apie taikinius leidžia jiems koreguoti kursą ir greitį pagal tiesioginius duomenis.

 

Dirbtinis intelektas taip pat teikia geresnę mūšio lauko žvalgybos informaciją iš atstumo, nei būtų galėję padaryti lauke dislokuoti kariai vos prieš kelerius metus. Šiuo metu JAV dronai apgaubia Iraną, renka vaizdo įrašus ir vaizdus bei perima signalus ir perduoda juos visus karo laivams Persijos įlankoje. Šiuos duomenis galima palyginti su žmonėmis pagal jų telefono numerius, jų bendravimo transkripcijas ir vietas, kurias jie neseniai lankėsi. Visa tai padeda priimti sprendimus dėl smūgių.

 

Atokiuose Irano rajonuose, kur raketos ir dronai yra paslėpti požeminiuose bunkeriuose, dirbtinis intelektas gali tirti dirvožemio pokyčius, terminius parašus, naujų statybų išvaizdą ir transporto priemonių judėjimo modelius, ieškodamas galimų paleidimo vietų. Kai Irano kovotojai išeina iš bunkerių, kad paleistų raketas ar dronus, stebėjimo dronai gali juos identifikuoti kaip grėsmę, siunčiant signalą netoliese esantiems laivams ar lėktuvams šaudyti, prieš iraniečiams paleidžiant šaudmenis.

 

Šie pajėgumai buvo aptarti viešai, įskaitant praėjusiais metais viceadmirolą Franką Whitworthą, tuometinį Nacionalinės geospatialinės žvalgybos agentūros vadovą, ir dabartinio Irano konflikto metu Cameroną Stanley, Pentagono vyriausiąjį skaitmeninio ir dirbtinio intelekto pareigūną.

 

Naudojami kuriant išsamius dirbtinio intelekto generuojamus taikinių paketus, šie pajėgumai galėjo sudaryti sprendimų priėmėjams mažos rizikos, greito posūkio karo su Iranu įspūdį. Tačiau kuo toliau konflikte Jungtinės Valstijos įsitraukia, tuo labiau atrodo, kad viltis buvo miražas.

 

Iranas yra didesnis nei Prancūzija, Vokietija, Didžioji Britanija ir Italija kartu sudėjus, o dronus sunku rasti net tada, kai žinai, kur ieškoti. Jų paleidimas nesukelia aptinkamo sprogimo kaip raketa, be to, jie yra mažesni ir lengviau paslėpti. Irano „Shahed“ dronus galima paleisti net iš pikapo galo. Irane yra tiesiog per daug sunkvežimių, išsibarsčiusių per didelėje teritorijoje, kad automatizuota stebėsena ir tikslūs smūgiai surastų ir sunaikintų kiekvieną taikinį prieš tai. skrydis.

 

Trumpojo nuotolio balistines raketas taip pat pasirodė esančios sunkiau atremti nei tolimojo nuotolio raketas, kurios dominavo Izraelio ir Irano 12 dienų kare praėjusiais metais. Dauguma raketų, kurias Iranas paleido šiais metais, buvo trumpojo nuotolio ginklai, nukreipti į Persijos įlankos šalis. Jos yra mobilesnės ir mažesnės, jų skrydžio trajektorijos trumpesnės, o tai reiškia, kad Jungtinės Valstijos turi mažiau laiko rinkti duomenis ir reaguoti. Trumpojo nuotolio raketas taip pat lengviau išsklaidyti, todėl, kaip ir dronus, jas sunkiau susekti ir smogti.

 

Nepaisant visų dirbtinio intelekto valdomo taikinio privalumų, tai nepanaikino civilinių aukų. Pentagonas klaidingą mokyklos pietų Irane taikinį, kuriame žuvo mažiausiai 175 žmonės, dauguma jų – vaikai, priskyrė pasenusiai žvalgybos informacijai. Vyksta vyriausybės tyrimas, tačiau epizodas rodo, kad dirbtinis intelektas neišsprendė pagrindinio iššūkio – užkirsti kelią civilių žūtims tankioje, ginčytinoje aplinkoje.

 

Šis trūkumas ypač kelia nerimą dabar, kai administracija svarsto galimybę dislokuoti sausumos pajėgas Irane. Dirbtinio intelekto karo ribos greičiausiai taps aiškesnės tik tada, kai kariai kovos su Irano priešininkais iš arti. Vienas dalykas jau aiškus: įspūdingi dirbtinio intelekto pajėgumai palengvino karo pradžią, tačiau jų dar nepakako jam laimėti.

 

Marcas Gustafsonas buvo buvęs Baltųjų rūmų žvalgybos vadovas, Situacijų kambario vadovas ir CŽV pareigūnas. Jis yra vyresnysis analizės direktorius „Eurasia Group“. Justinas Kosslynas buvo „Google“ produktų valdymo direktorius ir yra specialusis patarėjas „Eurasia Group“." [1]

 

1. Iran Is Ending the Dream of Remote-Controlled War: Guest Essay. Gustafson, Marc; Kosslyn, Justin.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 5, 2026.

Iran Is Ending the Dream of Remote-Controlled War

 

 

“In Washington, planning for a war with Iran always started with the same stubborn reality: It would be hard to fight and even harder to win. The country is vast and mountainous. Much of its military infrastructure is buried in caves and bunkers. Any serious plan to neutralize Iran’s nuclear ambitions or topple the regime quickly arrived at the same conclusion — that success required ground forces and would result in American casualties.

 

Then came machine learning and artificial intelligence, and with them, the seductive idea that America might finally be able to fight a major adversary indefinitely without sending its citizens into the line of fire.

 

The promise is not mere fantasy. A.I., fused with increasingly precise weapons and blanket surveillance, has transformed what the U.S. military can do from a distance. The accuracy and speed with which American forces can now find and destroy enemies with potentially fewer U.S. and civilian casualties are a major advance in the nuts and bolts of warfare. As Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander of U.S. Central Command who is leading the war with Iran, said on March 11, A.I. tools can turn targeting processes that “used to take hours and sometimes even days into seconds.”

 

Yet for all the increased speed and accuracy of A.I.-assisted targeting, the war is showing that the physical world still imposes major barriers to victory. The scale and dispersion of Iranian drones are more than A.I. alone can overcome. Short-range missiles, especially on mobile launchers, can survive even in a world of constant blanket surveillance. If planners had dreams of a final victory for remote-controlled warfare, in Iran they have awakened to a harder reality.

 

The changes technology has brought to warfare in a single generation are genuinely striking. On one occasion several years before Sept. 11, 2001, for example, the United States used satellite-phone data to target Osama bin Laden at a camp he was expected to visit in eastern Afghanistan, as Lawrence Wright reported in his book “The Looming Tower.” By the time the Tomahawk missiles were fired, however, bin Laden had made new plans; in the end, he never appeared at the site the United States struck. Today, as missiles and drones take off toward Iran, real-time satellite and drone footage of their targets allows them to adjust course and speed based on live inputs.

 

A.I. is also delivering better battlefield intelligence from a distance than soldiers deployed in the field could have done just a few years ago. Right now, U.S. drones are blanketing Iran, collecting video and images and intercepting signals, transmitting all of them to warships in the Persian Gulf. That data can be cross-referenced with people via their phone numbers, the transcripts of their communications and the places they recently visited. All of this informs strike decisions.

 

In remote areas of Iran, where missiles and drones are hidden in underground bunkers, A.I. can study changes to the soil, thermal signatures, the appearance of new construction, and vehicular patterns in search of possible launch sites. When Iranian fighters exit bunkers to fire missiles or drones, surveillance drones can identify them as a threat, sending a signal to nearby ships or planes to fire before the munition is launched.

 

These capabilities have been discussed in public, including last year by Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth, then chief of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and during the current Iran conflict by Cameron Stanley, the Pentagon’s chief digital and artificial intelligence officer.

 

Used to create detailed A.I.-generated targeting packages, these capabilities could have given decision makers the impression of a low-risk, quick-turn war with Iran. The further into the conflict the United States gets, however, the more it seems that hope has been a mirage.

 

Iran is larger than France, Germany, Britain and Italy combined, and drones are hard to find even when you know where to look. Their launch does not emit a detectable explosion like a missile, and they are smaller and easier to conceal. Iran’s Shahed drones can even be launched from the back of a pickup truck. There are simply too many trucks in Iran, spread across too large an area, for automated surveillance and precision strikes to find and destroy every target before it takes flight.

 

Short-range ballistic missiles have also proved harder to counter than the long-range ones that dominated Israel’s and Iran’s 12-day war last year. Most of the missiles that Iran has fired this year have been short-range weapons aimed at Gulf countries. These are more mobile and smaller, with shorter flight paths, which means that the United States has less time to collect data and respond. Short-range missiles are also easier to disperse and so, like drones, are harder to track down and strike.

 

For all the advantages of A.I.-enabled targeting, it has not eliminated civilian casualties. The Pentagon has attributed the mistaken targeting of a school in southern Iran, where at least 175 people died, most of them children, to outdated intelligence. A government investigation is underway, but the episode shows that A.I. has not solved the fundamental challenge of preventing civilian deaths in a dense, contested environment.

 

That shortcoming is especially worrying now, as the administration considers deploying ground forces into Iran. The limits of A.I. warfare will most likely only become clearer if troops fight Iranian adversaries up close. One thing is already clear: A.I.’s impressive capabilities have made it easier to start a war, but they have not yet been enough to win one.

 

Marc Gustafson was the former chief of intelligence at the White House, head of the Situation Room and a C.I.A. officer. He is a senior director of analysis at Eurasia Group. Justin Kosslyn was a director of product management at Google and is a special adviser at Eurasia Group.” [1]

 

1. Iran Is Ending the Dream of Remote-Controlled War: Guest Essay. Gustafson, Marc; Kosslyn, Justin.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 5, 2026.