Inžinieriai valdžioje: Dano Wango požiūris į Kinijos pramonės politiką

„Dvi supervalstybės, JAV ir Kinija, yra įsitraukusios į politinę ir ekonominę sisteminę konkurenciją. Paliaubos, dėl kurių susitarta Donaldo Trumpo ir Xi Jinpingo susitikime Pietų Korėjoje, to nieko nekeičia. Žvilgsnis į naująjį Kinijos vadovybės penkmečio planą atskleidžia senas ir naujas konflikto sritis. Atsižvelgiant į tai, labai svarbu geriau suprasti, kaip veikia šie du konkurentai, besivaržantys dėl pasaulinės dominavimo. Ši puiki knyga suteikia vertingų naujų įžvalgų šiuo klausimu.

 

Autorius Danas Wangas, kuris vaikystėje su tėvais paliko gimtąją Kiniją ir persikėlė į JAV dėl nuolatinio galimybių trūkumo ir šiuo metu yra Stanfordo universiteto mokslo darbuotojas, savo knygai suteikė provokuojantį pavadinimą „Sprandą laužantis: Kinijos siekis inžineruoti ateitį“.

 

Autorius sekė ir kritiškai analizavo spartų Kinijos augimą per pastarąjį dešimtmetį (ir vėliau). Knyga yra gerai parašyta ir įtraukianti, joje gausu asmeninės patirties, jo įžvalgos yra autentiškos, atspindinčios jo didelę patirtį dirbant Kinijoje per pastaruosius kelis metus.“ metų.

 

Su pagarba Kinijos inžinieriams jis pažymi, kad Kinijos Liaudies Respublika pastatė ir toliau stato aukščiausius ir ilgiausius pasaulyje tiltus, moderniausias geležinkelio linijas ir dideles gamyklas – visa tai per rekordiškai trumpą laiką, neįsivaizduojamą Vakaruose. Kinijos vadovybė siekia, kad Kinija taptų dominuojančia pramonės šalimi pasaulyje. Šalis jau seniai peržengė savo, kaip Vakarų dirbtuvių, vaidmenį ir tapo rimta Vakarų pramonės konkurente.

 

Wangas giria didžiulę pažangą, kurią Kinija padarė per trumpą laiką, pavyzdžiui, dėl veikiančios infrastruktūros. Apie tai Vakaruose ir, kaip teisingai pastebi Wangas, JAV galima tik pasvajoti. Wangas pažymi, kad, skirtingai nei Vakarai, Kinija nepasiekė deindustrializacijos kelio ir kad provincijos varžosi statyti dideles, modernias gamyklas savo teritorijoje. Tačiau tai dar ne viskas: Kinija taip pat pasižymi inovacijomis ir valstybės subsidijuojamu mokymu. Kinijos aukštųjų technologijų sektorius pastebimai išaugo. Kinijos įmonės daugelyje sričių lenkia Vakarų, ypač Vokietijos, įmones. Neabejotina: Kinijos... Vakarai, įskaitant Vokietijos įmones, per ilgai nepakankamai įvertino inovacinius pajėgumus!

 

Wang pastebi, kad Kinijos stoiškas pritarimas pramonės vertės kūrimui kyla iš Komunistų partijos ketinimo išlaikyti strategiškai atrinktas kritines vertės grandines šalies viduje ir tokiu būdu kontroliuoti. Prezidento Xi Jinpingo valdymo metu Kinija tam tikra prasme virsta tvirtove su vis aukštesnėmis sienomis. Kinijoje pramonės vertės kūrimo organizavimas daugiausia dėmesio skiria atsparių gamybos procesų ir struktūrų kūrimui. Priešingai, Vakarai pernelyg pabrėžia efektyvių procesų ir struktūrų siekį, kurį iš dalies skatina kapitalo rinkos, taip pat gamybos perkėlimas.

 

Gerbdamas Kinijos ekonominius pasiekimus, Danas Wangas taip pat pripažįsta tamsiąją Kinijos pasirinkto kelio pusę. Jis vaizdžiai ir kritiškai aprašo, ko Kinijos vadovybė reikalavo iš gyventojų siekdama sparčios modernizacijos. Jis išsamiai aptaria žiaurius karantinus pandemijos metu, kuriuos jis pats patyrė. Jis taip pat kritikuoja ilgą negailestingos vieno vaiko politikos laikotarpį, kuris turėjo rimtų pasekmių šalies demografinei raidai. Wang pastebi, kad Kinijos vyriausybė taiko griežtą socialinę inžineriją. Kaip ir Josephas Stalinas prieš tai, galiausiai ji nori būti sielos inžinieriumi.

 

Perskaičius knygą, geriau suprantama šiuolaikinės Kinijos architektūros stipriosios pusės, bet ir silpnosios pusės, ir atpažįstami reikšmingi skirtumai nuo JAV ir apskritai Vakarų ekonominio ir socialinio modelio.

 

Wangas aiškiai parodo, kad Kinija yra autokratinė inžinerinė valstybė, veikianti pagal šūkį „Inžineruokite ateitį!“ ir todėl bet kuriuo metu gali paslysti į pavojingą pernelyg didelę inžineriją.

 

Iš tiesų, Kinijos vyriausybę sudaro inžinieriai, kurie nuolat nori ką nors sukonstruoti.

 

Tai yra ir stiprioji, ir silpnoji pusė.

 

Priešingai, Wangas JAV mato kaip valstybę, kurioje dominuoja teisininkai.

 

Wangas He teigia, kad per daug teisininkų vyriausybėje vilkina ir dažnai net blokuoja ekonominius pokyčius. Jų dėmesys sutelktas į mikrovaldymo procesus, o ne į didelių rezultatų pasiekimą, kaip Kinijoje. Tuo tarpu Amerikos kontekste bankų aristokratijos interesams skiriama per didelė reikšmė. Tai prisidėjo prie to, kad Vakarai pralaimėjo konkurenciją su Kinija.

 

Nebūtina sutikti su šia supaprastinta autoriaus teze, tačiau verta apie ją pamąstyti. Jis linki Kinijos žmonėms valstybės, kuri suteiktų savo piliečiams daugiau laisvių ir pažabotų socialinę inžineriją.

 

Dan Wang: „Sprandą laužantis: Kinijos siekis inžineruoti pasaulį." „Penguin Books“, Londonas, 2025, 288 puslapiai, 31 euras.” [1]

 

1.  Ingenieure an der Macht: Dan Wangs Blick auf Chinas Industriepolitik. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 15 Dec 2025: 16. ROBERT FIETEN

Engineers in Power: Dan Wang's View of China's Industrial Policy

"The two superpowers, the USA and China, are engaged in a political and economic systemic rivalry. The truce agreed upon at the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in South Korea does nothing to change this. A look at the Chinese leadership's new five-year plan reveals the old and new areas of conflict. Against this backdrop, it is extremely important to better understand how these two rivals, vying for global dominance, operate. This remarkable book offers valuable new insights in this regard.

 

The author, Dan Wang, who left his native China for the USA with his parents as a child due to a persistent lack of opportunities and is currently a Research Fellow at Stanford University, has given his book the provocative title "Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the Future."

 

The author has followed and critically analyzed China's rapid growth over the past decade (and beyond). The book is well-written and engaging, and it is Interspersed with personal experiences, his insights are authentic, reflecting his extensive experience working in China over the past few years.

 

He notes with respect for Chinese engineers that the People's Republic has built, and continues to build, the world's highest and longest bridges, the most modern railway lines, and large factories—all in record time, unimaginable in the West. The Chinese leadership aims to make China the dominant industrial nation in the world. The country has long since moved beyond its role as the West's workshop and become a formidable competitor to Western industries.

 

Wang praises the enormous progress made in China in a short time, resulting, for example, in functioning infrastructure. This is something that can only be dreamed of in the West and—as Wang rightly observes—in the USA as well. Wang notes that, unlike the West, China has not followed the path of deindustrialization, and that the provinces are vying to build large, modern factories within their own borders. But that's not all: China also excels in terms of innovation and state-subsidized training. China's high-tech sector has seen significant growth. Chinese companies are outperforming Western, and especially German, companies in many areas. It's undeniable: China's innovative capacity has been underestimated by the West, including German companies, for far too long!

 

Wang observes that China's stoic adherence to industrial value creation is rooted in the Communist Party's intention to keep strategically selected critical value chains within the country and thus under its control. Under President Xi Jinping, China is, in a sense, being transformed into a fortress with ever-higher walls. In China, the organization of industrial value creation focuses primarily on creating resilient production processes and structures. In contrast, the West overemphasizes the pursuit of efficient processes and structures, driven in part by the capital markets, as well as the relocation of production.

 

While respecting China's economic achievements, Dan Wang also recognizes the dark side of the path China has taken. He vividly and critically describes what the Chinese leadership has demanded of the population in the interest of rapid modernization. He discusses the brutal lockdowns in detail. during the pandemic, which he experienced firsthand. He also criticizes the long period of the ruthless one-child policy, which has had serious consequences for the country's demographic development. Wang observes that the Chinese government employs rigorous social engineering. Like Joseph Stalin before it, it ultimately wants to be an engineer of the soul.

 

After reading the book, one gains a better understanding of the strengths, but also the weaknesses, of the architecture of modern China, and one recognizes the significant differences from the economic and social model of the USA, and indeed of the West in general.

 

Wang clearly demonstrates that China is an autocratic engineering state that operates according to the motto "Engineer the future!" and can therefore at any time slip into dangerous over-engineering.

 

Indeed, the Chinese government consists of engineers who constantly want to construct something.

 

This is both a strength and a weakness.

 

In contrast, Wang sees the USA as a state dominated by lawyers.

 

Wang He argues that too many lawyers in government delay and often even block economic change. Their focus is on micromanagement processes, not on achieving major results as in China. Meanwhile, in the American context to make matters worse, the interests of the moneyed aristocracy are given undue prominence in the current Chinese situation. This has contributed to the West losing ground in its competition with China.

 

One doesn't have to accept this simplistic thesis of the author, but it is worth reflecting on. He wishes the Chinese people a state that grants its citizens more freedoms and curbs social engineering.

 

Dan Wang: "Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the World." Penguin Books, London 2025, 288 pages, 31 euros.” [1]

 

1.  Ingenieure an der Macht: Dan Wangs Blick auf Chinas Industriepolitik. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 15 Dec 2025: 16. ROBERT FIETEN

Why Lithuania's economy is destroyed: Germans disappointed after moving production to Eastern Europe - costs grow faster than productivity

German companies have become disappointed with the relocation of production to Central and Eastern Europe, as rapidly growing labor costs exceed productivity growth.

 

Strategy& study shows that due to the declining cost advantage and intensive robotization in Asia, simple relocation of production no longer works, writes Finance.si.

 

Key trends:

 

Cost-benefit mismatch: While Eastern Europe used to attract low costs, now labor costs are growing faster than productivity.

 

Asia's comeback: Thanks to advanced robotization, Asia is once again becoming a more competitive manufacturing location than Eastern Europe.

 

End of business model: Strategy& (PwC Group) indicates that the era when production could simply be relocated without fundamental changes is over.

 

Future prospects: Companies must review their strategies, as geographical proximity no longer covers all costs.

 

This trend shows that German industry needs to transform its business models, and not just look for cheaper labor in the region.

 

The main Lithuanian business news outlet “Verslo žinios” is pretending to bemoan the situation in Lithuania, pressing to hold back the increase in wages in Lithuania against the backdrop of already pitiful prices:

 

“Over the past decade, for many German companies, moving production to neighboring Central and Eastern European countries has been a logical step due to lower costs, geographical proximity and shorter delivery times, writes the German publication “Wirtschaftswoche”. However, a recent study by the consulting firm “Strategy&”, operating in the global consulting giant “PwC” group, shows that the era when production could simply be moved without fundamental changes to the business model is over, writes the Slovenian financial publication Finance.si.

 

Cost advantage is rapidly disappearing

 

The main argument for nearshoring, i.e. moving activities to nearby countries with a labor cost advantage, is rapidly disappearing.

 

According to the results of the study, labor costs in Central and Eastern Europe are growing 3.5 times faster than productivity. As a result, the expected savings are often not achieved.”

 

If the prices of our products are much higher than the prices of Chinese robot products, then no one needs our products on the world market. When no one buys, those dreamed-of savings also disappear.

 

 

Kodėl Lietuvos ekonomikai atėjo krachas: vokiečiai nusivylė, perkėlę gamybą į Rytų Europą – sąnaudos auga greičiau, nei produktyvumas

Vokietijos įmonės nusivylė gamybos perkėlimu į Vidurio ir Rytų Europą, nes sparčiai augančios darbo jėgos sąnaudos viršija produktyvumo augimą. 

 

„Strategy&“ tyrimas rodo, kad dėl mažėjančio sąnaudų pranašumo ir intensyvios Azijos robotizacijos, paprastas gamybos perkėlimas nebeveikia, rašo Finance.si.

 

Pagrindinės tendencijos:

 

    Sąnaudų ir naudos neatitiktis: Nors Rytų Europa anksčiau traukė mažais kaštais, dabar darbo jėgos sąnaudos auga greičiau, nei produktyvumas.

 

    Azijos sugrįžimas: Dėl pažangios robotizacijos Azija vėl tampa konkurencingesnė, negu Rytų Europa, gamybos vieta.

 

    Verslo modelio pabaiga: „Strategy&“ („PwC“ grupė) nurodo, kad era, kai gamybą buvo galima tiesiog perkelti be esminių pokyčių, baigėsi.

 

    Ateities perspektyvos: Įmonės privalo peržiūrėti savo strategijas, nes geografinis artumas nebenuperka visų sąnaudų.

 

Ši tendencija rodo, kad Vokietijos pramonei būtina transformuoti verslo modelius, o ne tik ieškoti pigesnės darbo jėgos regione.

 

Pagrindinis Lietuvos verslo idėjų skleidėjas “Verslo žinios” apsimestinai apverkia Lietuvos situaciją, spausdamas sulaikyti ir taip pasigailėtinų kainų fone Lietuvos atlyginimų kėlimą:

“Per pastarąjį dešimtmetį daugeliui Vokietijos įmonių gamybos perkėlimas į kaimynines Vidurio ir Rytų Europos šalis buvo logiškas žingsnis dėl mažesnių sąnaudų, geografinio artumo ir trumpesnių pristatymo terminų, rašo Vokietijos leidinys „Wirtschaftswoche“. Tačiau naujausias konsultacinės įmonės „Strategy&“, veikiančios pasaulinės konsultacijų milžinės „PwC“ grupėje, tyrimas rodo, kad era, kai gamybą buvo galima paprasčiausiai perkelti be esminių verslo modelio pokyčių, baigėsi, rašo Slovėnijos finansų leidinys Finance.si.

 

Sąnaudų pranašumas sparčiai nyksta

 

Pagrindinis argumentas už nearshoringą, t. y. veiklos perkėlimą į artimas šalis su darbo jėgos sąnaudų pranašumu, sparčiai nyksta.

 

Remiantis tyrimo rezultatais, darbo sąnaudos Vidurio ir Rytų Europoje auga 3,5 karto greičiau, nei produktyvumas. Dėl to dažnai nepavyksta pasiekti numatytų sutaupymų.”

 

Jei mūsų gaminių kainos yra daug didesnės, nei Kinijos robotų gaminių kainos, tai pasaulio rinkoje niekam mūsų gaminių nereikia. Kai niekas neperka, prapuola ir tie išsvajoti sutaupymai.

Both Adversaries Miscalculated Course of Expanding Iran Conflict. The Question Is: Whose Miscalculation Is Bigger?

While both sides are trapped in a longer war than expected, the U.S. and Israel face a arguably larger strategic miscalculation based on the following factors:

 

    Failure of Objectives: The primary goal of the initial strikes—regime change or rapid, decisive victory—was not achieved, leaving the U.S. without a clear exit strategy in a "limitless war".

    Economic/Global Fallout: The strategy failed to prevent Iran from threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a global energy crisis and driving Brent crude prices past $100 a barrel.

    Regional Instability: Instead of isolating Iran, the conflict has forced other Middle Eastern countries into a challenging position, with Iran hitting U.S. military and civilian infrastructure across multiple Gulf states.

    Resource Drain: The war is straining U.S. munitions, with analysts warning it could leave the U.S. vulnerable to challenges from Russia and China in other regions.

    November elections for Mr. Trump might end badly.

 

 

“The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, well into its second week, has now involved at least 12 nations, with economic and political shocks reverberating around the world. Neither side has achieved its strategic objectives so far, and both boast that they can outlast the other.

 

If the conflict turns into a protracted war of attrition, Russia looks set to become a clear beneficiary, raking in profits from spiking oil and natural-gas prices, while the Western economies, Gulf states and even China will all feel spreading pain.

 

While these are still the early days, both sides appear to have miscalculated how the other would behave, triggering an ever-expanding conflict with few clear ways out in the foreseeable future. President Trump, who spoke with President Vladimir Putin of Russia on Monday, said in a news conference that the war will be over "very soon," but followed it by saying that the U.S. would "go further." Iran this week fired hundreds of drones and missiles across the Middle East.

 

Trump's hope, according to U.S. officials, was that the Feb. 28 decapitating strike on the Iranian leadership -- including the killing of the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- would trigger either a collapse of the Iranian regime or the repeat of the Venezuela scenario, in which more pragmatic officials chose to cooperate with Washington.

 

Neither of these scenarios has materialized so far. Khamenei's hard-line son Mojtaba Khamenei took over from his father, vowing vengeance, and no domestic insurgency has so far risen to challenge the Islamic Republic.

 

Despite massive airstrikes, Iran has retained the ability to lob ballistic missiles and drones at U.S. bases across the Middle East, at Israel, and -- critically -- at the main cities of the U.S.'s Gulf partners. It has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which some one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas used to pass.

 

Iran's strategy of all-out attacks on airports, hotels, energy facilities, ports and data centers in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia was meant to collapse the economies and societies of these Gulf monarchies, forcing their leaders to pressure Trump to cease fire on Iran's terms.

 

But this, too, didn't happen. Gulf nations have showcased unexpected resilience, and instead of capitulation warned of retaliation as their air defenses shot down most Iranian drones and missiles, preventing catastrophic damage.

 

"Whatever is hurting us is also hurting the Iranians, and their capability to persevere is less than ours. We can manage, and I don't think they can sustain this," said Bader al-Saif, a historian at Kuwait University.

 

From the Gulf's perspective, a wounded but undefeated Iranian regime would represent the worst possible outcome, as it would retain the ability to terrorize cities such as Doha or Dubai with drones, and continue disrupting oil traffic through Hormuz.

 

The Trump administration is certainly talking up the prospect of a decisive victory. "We will not relent until the enemy is totally and decisively defeated," Trump said Monday. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth employed even more categorical language. "This is war. This is conflict. This is bringing your enemy to their knees. Whether they have a ceremony in Tehran Square and surrender, that's up to them," he said on CBS.

 

If the Iranian regime were to collapse, or at the very least embrace Venezuela-style cooperation with the U.S., this would certainly shore up Washington's global reach -- and its relative power toward China, a key customer of Iranian oil. So far, this doesn't seem to be in the cards, said Ellie Geranmayeh, an Iran expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

 

"You are not going to get a decisive win in a war with Iran, given its territorial size, military capabilities and institutional structure," she said. "The Iranian focus right now is to ensure that everything Trump hears and sees is how bad this war is for the economy and how directly Americans at home are going to be affected by what is happening in Iran. The longer this war of attrition continues, the longer Iran thinks it can keep exacting these costs."

 

A long war depleting Western military stocks, diverting attention from Ukraine and making Russian oil and gas indispensable for the Western economies would certainly be a prize for Putin, said Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser to the Russian central bank and a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. "It would be advantageous for the Kremlin for this conflict to last several months, which would lead to high oil prices for the foreseeable perspective," she said.

 

Even if Trump were to decide enough is enough, and he can call it a victory after killing Ali Khamenei and destroying a large part of Iran's missile arsenal, it isn't at all clear that the Iranian regime under Mojtaba Khamenei would agree to a cease-fire. Hard-liners have suggested Iran won't stop attacks until its own longstanding demands are addressed.

 

"Their calculus is that they paced themselves out, and that in coming days the U.S. and Israel will run out of interceptors and they will be able to inflict much more harm on every one of the U.S. allies in the region, and then Trump will be coming to beg for some kind of cease-fire, for which they could dictate the terms," said Ali Vaez, head of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group conflict-resolution organization. "It is to a degree wishful thinking," he added, "because even if U.S. defensive capabilities suffer, it is still well-stocked on the offensive side and can inflict way more damage to Iran."

 

Continuing Iranian attacks on Gulf states might spur these nations, too, into joining the U.S.-led campaign. "Saudi Arabia right now is doing its best to de-escalate, because it knows that if there will be a response, it will not be a limited response, but a response that will involve Saudi Arabia at the forefront of combating Iranian recklessness," said Saudi political analyst Salman al-Ansari.

 

Yet, as Yemen's Houthis have shown with their attacks in the Red Sea, it doesn't take much sophistication to close major international shipping lanes. With a few drones and antiship missiles, the Iranians could do that too for a long time -- unless the U.S. and allies launch a ground operation to seize the Iranian coastal areas, a risky proposition at best.

 

Vaez, of International Crisis Group, said that it would be unthinkable for Khamenei, given that his entire family was just wiped out, to strike a deal with Trump. Instead, he would likely use any pause in the fighting to seek nuclear weapons.

 

"Even if the guns fall silent," Vaez said, "it will be a very ugly equilibrium, which will not be stable."” [1]

 

Abu priešininkai neteisingai apskaičiavo Irano konflikto plėtros kursą. Kyla klausimas: kieno klaida didesnė?

 

Nors abi pusės yra įstrigusios ilgesniame kare, nei tikėtasi, JAV ir Izraelis susiduria su, ko gero, didesniu strateginiu klaidingu apskaičiavimu, pagrįstu šiais veiksniais:

 

Tikslų nepasiekimas: Pagrindinis pradinių smūgių tikslas – režimo pakeitimas arba greita, lemiama pergalė – nebuvo pasiektas, todėl JAV neturėjo aiškios išėjimo strategijos iš „beribio karo“.

Ekonominės / pasaulinės pasekmės: Strategija nesugebėjo užkirsti kelio Irano grasinimui uždaryti Hormūzo sąsiaurį, sukeldama pasaulinę energetikos krizę ir pakeldama „Brent“ naftos kainas virš 100 USD už barelį.

Regioninis nestabilumas: Užuot izoliavęs Iraną, konfliktas privertė kitas Artimųjų Rytų šalis atsidurti sudėtingoje padėtyje, Iranui smogiant JAV karinei ir civilinei infrastruktūrai keliose Persijos įlankos valstybėse.

Išteklių nutekėjimas: Karas apsunkina JAV amunicijos išteklius, o analitikai perspėja, kad JAV gali tapti pažeidžiamos Rusijos ir Kinijos iššūkiams kituose regionuose.

Lapkričio mėnesio rinkimai ponui Trumpui gali baigtis blogai.

 

„JAV ir Izraelio karas su Iranu, jau antrą savaitę trunkantis, jau įtraukė mažiausiai 12 valstybių, o ekonominiai ir politiniai sukrėtimai aidi visame pasaulyje. Kol kas nė viena pusė nepasiekė savo strateginių tikslų ir abi giriasi, kad gali ilgiau išgyventi nei kita.

 

Jei konfliktas virs užsitęsusiu sekinančiu karu, atrodo, kad Rusija taps akivaizdžia naudos gavėja, gaudama pelno iš kylančių naftos ir gamtinių dujų kainų, o Vakarų ekonomikos, Persijos įlankos valstybės ir net Kinija pajus plintantį skausmą.

 

Nors tai dar tik pradžia, atrodo, kad abi pusės neteisingai apskaičiavo, kaip elgsis kita, sukeldamos vis besiplečiantį konfliktą, iš kurio artimiausioje ateityje bus mažai aiškių išeičių. Prezidentas Trumpas, pirmadienį kalbėdamasis su Rusijos prezidentu Vladimiru Putinu, spaudos konferencijoje pareiškė, kad karas baigsis „labai greitai“, tačiau po to pareiškė, kad JAV „žengs toliau“. Šią savaitę Iranas paleido šimtus dronų ir raketų Artimuosiuose Rytuose.

 

Pasak JAV pareigūnų, Trumpas tikėjosi, kad vasario 28 d. įvykdytas smūgis Irano vadovybei, įskaitant šalies aukščiausiojo vadovo ajatolos Ali Khamenei nužudymą, sukeltų arba Irano režimo žlugimą, arba Venesuelos scenarijaus pasikartojimą, kai pragmatiškesni pareigūnai pasirinko bendradarbiauti su Vašingtonu.

 

 

Nė vienas iš šių scenarijų iki šiol neišsipildė. Chamenei sūnus Mojtaba Khamenei perėmė valdžią iš savo tėvo, prisiekdamas kerštą, ir iki šiol nekilo joks vidaus sukilimas, kuris mestų iššūkį Islamo Respublikai.

 

 

Nepaisant masinių oro antskrydžių, Iranas išlaikė galimybę svaidyti balistines raketas ir dronus į JAV bazes Artimuosiuose Rytuose, Izraelį ir – svarbiausia – į pagrindinius JAV partnerių Persijos įlankoje miestus. Jis taip pat užblokavo Hormūzo sąsiaurį – spūstį, per kurią anksčiau tekėdavo apie penktadalis pasaulinės naftos ir suskystintų gamtinių dujų.

 

 

Irano strategija – visapusiški išpuoliai prieš oro uostus, viešbučius, energetikos objektus, uostus ir duomenų centrus Jungtiniuose Arabų Emyratuose, Bahreine, Kuveite, Katare ir  Saudo Arabijoje turėjo sugriauti šių Persijos įlankos monarchijų ekonomiką ir visuomenę, priversdama jų lyderius daryti spaudimą Trumpui, kad šis nutrauktų ugnį Irano sąlygomis.

 

Tačiau ir to neįvyko. Persijos įlankos valstybės pademonstravo netikėtą atsparumą ir vietoj kapituliacijos perspėjo apie atsakomąsias priemones, nes jų oro gynyba numušė daugumą Irano dronų ir raketų, taip užkirsdama kelią katastrofiškai žalai.

 

„Kas kenkia mums, kenkia ir iraniečiams, o jų gebėjimas atkakliai kovoti yra mažesnis, nei mūsų.“ „Mes galime susitvarkyti, ir nemanau, kad jie gali tai išlaikyti“, – sakė Kuveito universiteto istorikas Baderas al-Saifas.

 

Žvelgiant iš Persijos įlankos perspektyvos, sužeistas, bet nenugalėtas Irano režimas būtų blogiausias įmanomas rezultatas, nes jis išlaikytų galimybę terorizuoti tokius miestus kaip Doha ar Dubajus dronais ir toliau trikdyti naftos transportą per Hormūzą.

 

Trumpo administracija neabejotinai kalba apie lemiamos pergalės perspektyvą. „Mes nepasiduosime, kol priešas nebus visiškai ir galutinai nugalėtas“, – pirmadienį sakė Trumpas. Gynybos sekretorius Pete'as Hegsethas vartojo dar kategoriškesnę kalbą. „Tai karas. Tai konfliktas. Tai parklupdo jūsų priešą.“ „Ar jie surengs ceremoniją Teherano aikštėje ir pasiduos, tai jų reikalas“, – sakė jis CBS.

 

Jei Irano režimas žlugtų arba bent jau pradėtų bendradarbiauti su JAV, kaip ir Venesueloje, tai neabejotinai sustiprintų Vašingtono pasaulinę įtaką ir jo santykinę galią Kinijos, pagrindinės Irano naftos klientės, atžvilgiu. Kol kas tai neatrodo įmanoma, sakė Ellie Geranmayeh, Irano ekspertė iš Europos užsienio santykių tarybos.

 

„Kare su Iranu nepasieksite lemiamos pergalės, atsižvelgiant į jo teritorinį dydį, karinius pajėgumus ir institucinį stabilumą,“  – sakė ji. „Šiuo metu Irano tikslas – užtikrinti, kad Trumpas girdėtų ir matytų tik tai, koks blogas šis karas yra ekonomikai ir kaip tiesiogiai amerikiečiai namuose nukentės nuo to, kas vyksta Irane.“ Kuo ilgiau tęsis šis sekinantis karas, tuo ilgiau Iranas mano, kad gali toliau reikalauti šių išlaidų.“

 

Ilgas karas, kuris išeikvotų Vakarų karinius išteklius, nukreiptų dėmesį nuo Ukrainos ir padarytų Rusijos naftą bei dujas nepakeičiamomis Vakarų ekonomikoms, neabejotinai būtų Putino prizas, sakė buvusi Rusijos centrinio banko patarėja ir Carnegie Rusijos Eurazijos centro darbuotoja Aleksandra Prokopenko. „Kremliui būtų naudinga, jei šis konfliktas truktų kelis mėnesius, o tai artimiausiu metu lemtų aukštas naftos kainas“, – sakė ji.

 

Net jei Trumpas nuspręstų, kad gana, ir galėtų tai pavadinti pergale nužudęs Ali Khamenei ir sunaikinęs didelę dalį Irano raketų arsenalo, visiškai neaišku, ar Mojtaba Khamenei vadovaujamas Irano režimas sutiktų su paliaubomis. Griežtosios linijos šalininkai teigė, kad Iranas nenutrauks atakų, kol nebus patenkinti jo paties ilgalaikiai reikalavimai.

 

„Jų skaičiavimai rodo, kad jie patys susitvarkė ir kad artimiausiomis dienomis JAV ir Izraelis pritrūks perėmėjų ir galės padaryti daug daugiau žalos.“ „… kiekvienam JAV sąjungininkui regione, o tada Trumpas ateis maldauti kažkokių paliaubų, kurioms jie galėtų diktuoti sąlygas“, – sakė Ali Vaezas, Irano projekto vadovas Tarptautinėje krizių grupės konfliktų sprendimo organizacijoje. „Iš dalies tai yra svajonės“, – pridūrė jis, – „nes net jei nukentės JAV gynybiniai pajėgumai, ji vis tiek bus gerai aprūpinta puolime ir gali padaryti Iranui daug daugiau žalos“.

 

Tęsiami Irano išpuoliai prieš Persijos įlankos valstybes gali paskatinti ir šias šalis prisijungti prie JAV vadovaujamos kampanijos. „Saudo Arabija šiuo metu daro viską, kad deeskaluotų padėtį, nes žino, kad jei bus atsakas, tai nebus ribotas atsakas, o atsakas, kuriame Saudo Arabija bus kovos su Irano neapdairumu priešakyje“, – sakė Saudo Arabijos politinis analitikas Salmanas al-Ansari.

 

Vis dėlto, kaip parodė Jemeno husių išpuoliai Raudonojoje jūroje, nereikia daug rafinuotumo, kad būtų uždaryti pagrindiniai tarptautiniai laivybos keliai. Turint kelis dronus ir priešlaivines raketas, Iraniečiai taip pat galėtų tai daryti ilgą laiką – nebent JAV ir sąjungininkai pradėtų sausumos operaciją, siekdami užimti Irano pakrantės zonas – tai būtų, geriausiu atveju, rizikingas pasiūlymas.

 

Tarptautinės krizių grupės atstovas Vaezas teigė, kad būtų neįsivaizduojama, jog Khamenei, atsižvelgiant į tai, kad visa jo šeima ką tik buvo sunaikinta, sudarytų susitarimą su Trumpu. Vietoj to jis greičiausiai pasinaudotų bet kokia kovų pertrauka, kad ieškotų branduolinių ginklų.

 

„Net jei ginklai nutils“, – sakė Vaezas, – „tai bus labai bjauri pusiausvyra, kuri nebus stabili.“ [1]

 

1. Both Adversaries Miscalculated Course of Expanding Conflict. Trofimov, Yaroslav.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 11 Mar 2026: A1.  

Both Adversaries Miscalculated Course of Expanding Iran Conflict. The Question Is: Whose Miscalculation Is Bigger?

 

While both sides are trapped in a longer war than expected, the U.S. and Israel face a arguably larger strategic miscalculation based on the following factors:

 

    Failure of Objectives: The primary goal of the initial strikes—regime change or rapid, decisive victory—was not achieved, leaving the U.S. without a clear exit strategy in a "limitless war".

    Economic/Global Fallout: The strategy failed to prevent Iran from threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a global energy crisis and driving Brent crude prices past $100 a barrel.

    Regional Instability: Instead of isolating Iran, the conflict has forced other Middle Eastern countries into a challenging position, with Iran hitting U.S. military and civilian infrastructure across multiple Gulf states.

    Resource Drain: The war is straining U.S. munitions, with analysts warning it could leave the U.S. vulnerable to challenges from Russia and China in other regions.

    November elections for Mr. Trump might end badly.

  

“The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, well into its second week, has now involved at least 12 nations, with economic and political shocks reverberating around the world. Neither side has achieved its strategic objectives so far, and both boast that they can outlast the other.

 

If the conflict turns into a protracted war of attrition, Russia looks set to become a clear beneficiary, raking in profits from spiking oil and natural-gas prices, while the Western economies, Gulf states and even China will all feel spreading pain.

 

While these are still the early days, both sides appear to have miscalculated how the other would behave, triggering an ever-expanding conflict with few clear ways out in the foreseeable future. President Trump, who spoke with President Vladimir Putin of Russia on Monday, said in a news conference that the war will be over "very soon," but followed it by saying that the U.S. would "go further." Iran this week fired hundreds of drones and missiles across the Middle East.

 

Trump's hope, according to U.S. officials, was that the Feb. 28 decapitating strike on the Iranian leadership -- including the killing of the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- would trigger either a collapse of the Iranian regime or the repeat of the Venezuela scenario, in which more pragmatic officials chose to cooperate with Washington.

 

Neither of these scenarios has materialized so far. Khamenei's hard-line son Mojtaba Khamenei took over from his father, vowing vengeance, and no domestic insurgency has so far risen to challenge the Islamic Republic.

 

Despite massive airstrikes, Iran has retained the ability to lob ballistic missiles and drones at U.S. bases across the Middle East, at Israel, and -- critically -- at the main cities of the U.S.'s Gulf partners. It has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which some one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas used to pass.

 

Iran's strategy of all-out attacks on airports, hotels, energy facilities, ports and data centers in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia was meant to collapse the economies and societies of these Gulf monarchies, forcing their leaders to pressure Trump to cease fire on Iran's terms.

 

But this, too, didn't happen. Gulf nations have showcased unexpected resilience, and instead of capitulation warned of retaliation as their air defenses shot down most Iranian drones and missiles, preventing catastrophic damage.

 

"Whatever is hurting us is also hurting the Iranians, and their capability to persevere is less than ours. We can manage, and I don't think they can sustain this," said Bader al-Saif, a historian at Kuwait University.

 

From the Gulf's perspective, a wounded but undefeated Iranian regime would represent the worst possible outcome, as it would retain the ability to terrorize cities such as Doha or Dubai with drones, and continue disrupting oil traffic through Hormuz.

 

The Trump administration is certainly talking up the prospect of a decisive victory. "We will not relent until the enemy is totally and decisively defeated," Trump said Monday. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth employed even more categorical language. "This is war. This is conflict. This is bringing your enemy to their knees. Whether they have a ceremony in Tehran Square and surrender, that's up to them," he said on CBS.

 

If the Iranian regime were to collapse, or at the very least embrace Venezuela-style cooperation with the U.S., this would certainly shore up Washington's global reach -- and its relative power toward China, a key customer of Iranian oil. So far, this doesn't seem to be in the cards, said Ellie Geranmayeh, an Iran expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

 

"You are not going to get a decisive win in a war with Iran, given its territorial size, military capabilities and institutional structure," she said. "The Iranian focus right now is to ensure that everything Trump hears and sees is how bad this war is for the economy and how directly Americans at home are going to be affected by what is happening in Iran. The longer this war of attrition continues, the longer Iran thinks it can keep exacting these costs."

 

A long war depleting Western military stocks, diverting attention from Ukraine and making Russian oil and gas indispensable for the Western economies would certainly be a prize for Putin, said Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser to the Russian central bank and a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. "It would be advantageous for the Kremlin for this conflict to last several months, which would lead to high oil prices for the foreseeable perspective," she said.

 

Even if Trump were to decide enough is enough, and he can call it a victory after killing Ali Khamenei and destroying a large part of Iran's missile arsenal, it isn't at all clear that the Iranian regime under Mojtaba Khamenei would agree to a cease-fire. Hard-liners have suggested Iran won't stop attacks until its own longstanding demands are addressed.

 

"Their calculus is that they paced themselves out, and that in coming days the U.S. and Israel will run out of interceptors and they will be able to inflict much more harm on every one of the U.S. allies in the region, and then Trump will be coming to beg for some kind of cease-fire, for which they could dictate the terms," said Ali Vaez, head of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group conflict-resolution organization. "It is to a degree wishful thinking," he added, "because even if U.S. defensive capabilities suffer, it is still well-stocked on the offensive side and can inflict way more damage to Iran."

 

Continuing Iranian attacks on Gulf states might spur these nations, too, into joining the U.S.-led campaign. "Saudi Arabia right now is doing its best to de-escalate, because it knows that if there will be a response, it will not be a limited response, but a response that will involve Saudi Arabia at the forefront of combating Iranian recklessness," said Saudi political analyst Salman al-Ansari.

 

Yet, as Yemen's Houthis have shown with their attacks in the Red Sea, it doesn't take much sophistication to close major international shipping lanes. With a few drones and antiship missiles, the Iranians could do that too for a long time -- unless the U.S. and allies launch a ground operation to seize the Iranian coastal areas, a risky proposition at best.

 

Vaez, of International Crisis Group, said that it would be unthinkable for Khamenei, given that his entire family was just wiped out, to strike a deal with Trump. Instead, he would likely use any pause in the fighting to seek nuclear weapons.

 

"Even if the guns fall silent," Vaez said, "it will be a very ugly equilibrium, which will not be stable."” [1]

 

1. Both Adversaries Miscalculated Course of Expanding Conflict. Trofimov, Yaroslav.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 11 Mar 2026: A1.  

Are Multi-Cancer Blood Tests Ready for Prime Time? --- None of the early-detection screenings are FDA approved, leading some doctors to urge caution

“A blood test that can tell if you have cancer?

 

A flurry of such tests that look for multiple cancers with a prick are in various stages of development. The one that is furthest along, Galleri, was recently the subject of a provocative Super Bowl ad from the Hims & Hers telehealth company, beaming an experimental technology into millions of households.

 

But just a few weeks later the test's manufacturer, Grail, announced disappointing study results: The test didn't reach statistical significance in later-stage cancers -- stages 3 and 4.

 

The news comes on the heels of a new law that authorizes Medicare to pay for such tests beginning in 2028 if they are approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

 

There has long been a push for better cancer screening tests. There are currently only five available, and they screen for single cancers: breast, prostate, lung, colorectal and cervical.

 

"New technologies are needed," says Dr. William Dahut, chief scientific officer of the American Cancer Society. "To come up with a way to screen for every single body part, that would mean all we would do would be doing screening tests every day."

 

But are multi-cancer blood tests ready for prime time?

 

The central question isn't whether the tests can detect cancer, but whether they can find cancers early enough to reduce deaths.

 

Despite being on the market, none of the so-called multi-cancer, early-detection tests are currently FDA approved. Rather, some -- like Grail's Galleri -- are available as laboratory-developed tests if ordered by a healthcare provider.

 

Still, you can get one. Grail says it has sold more than 475,000 Galleri tests since the product launched in 2021. The list price is $949, but many providers have discounts, says Dr. Josh Ofman, president of the company.

 

The company submitted an application to the FDA in January for use of the tests in adults with an elevated risk of cancer. That includes adults over the age of 50 and younger people with additional risk factors.

 

Ofman says that while the study didn't reduce combined stage-3 and stage-4 cancers compared with the control group, it did show a 20% reduction in stage-4 cancers.

 

The results, which haven't been published yet, are highly anticipated. They are the first randomized controlled trial of the test, which followed more than 140,000 healthy people in England's National Health Service over three years.

 

Some doctors and researchers say the preliminary data from the trial, announced in a Grail press release, isn't promising.

 

Dr. Scott Ramsey, director of the Hutchinson Institute for Cancer Outcomes Research at Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle, says the study essentially failed to meet its goal of shifting cancer to an early stage disease by 30%.

 

"It did a poor job of picking up early stage cancers," he says. Grail's "own evidence shows that the cancers that are picked up tend to be more aggressive than the ones that are missed."

 

Grail says there was a substantial increase in the number of stage-1 and 2 cancers detected in the NHS trial, but it didn't say if the increase reached statistical significance.

 

In general, the Grail test's detection of early stage cancer in its previous studies is low at 20% to 30%, Ramsey notes; it's 40% for cancers at any stage. "When the performance is that poor, it's missing more cancer than it's finding, particularly at an early stage," he says.

 

Others, such as Dahut, viewed the results hopefully given there was a 20% decrease in stage-4 disease.

 

The Galleri test has a pretty high positive predictive value, says Dahut. Results presented at a conference last year showed that among the 216 people who had a positive blood test, there was a 60% chance they developed cancer within a year.

 

"My sense is that these tests, if they're abnormal, they're a pretty good sign that you have cancer," says Dahut. "And oftentimes the cancers that they found were cancers that are not routinely screened for, such as head and neck cancer and gastric cancers."

 

"But a negative test does not exclude the fact that you could have cancer, you still need to do other screening tests," he says.

 

To evaluate a diagnostic test's effectiveness, it's important to look at both its sensitivity and its specificity, says Dr. Badrinath Konety, president of the Allina Health Cancer Institute in Minneapolis.

 

Sensitivity is how well a test identifies disease, while specificity is how well it avoids false positives.

 

Grail's test appears to have higher sensitivity for more uncommon cancers but less so for common ones, says Konety, particularly when it is early stage common cancers, such as breast and prostate cancer.

 

If a test is positive, people still have to go through the routine diagnostic procedures.

 

"If a test is positive this is going to lead to X-rays and biopsies and additional interventions which are not only costly but can add to complications and the suffering of patients, and what if everything turns out to be negative," Konety says.

 

The tests do a good job of finding cancer. But if someone tests negative for a cancer, Konety is worried the result may create a false sense of complacency, leading them to avoid traditional screening tests. "Are we going to give people a false sense of comfort?" he says.

 

The bottom line: No professional medical societies currently recommend multi-cancer early-detection tests. While they hold promise, their benefits remain unproven. So until the science is settled, it's best to stick with routine cancer screenings.” [2]

 

1. The Galleri test measures methylation patterns in cell-free DNA (cfDNA) circulating in the bloodstream to identify "signals" of cancer. It is designed as a multi-cancer early detection (MCED) tool that can screen for over 50 types of cancer from a single blood draw.

 

2. Your Health: Are Multi-Cancer Blood Tests Ready for Prime Time? --- None of the early-detection screenings are FDA approved, leading some doctors to urge caution. Reddy, Sumathi.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 10 Mar 2026: A12.