Prognosis Apocalyptic

 

"Nexus

By Yuval Noah Harari

Random House, 528 pages, $35

Groucho Marx said there are two types of people in this world: "those who think people can be divided up into two types, and those who don't." In "Nexus," the Israeli historian-philosopher Yuval Noah Harari divides us into a naive and populist type and another type that he prefers but does not name. This omission is not surprising. The opposite of naive and populist might be wise and pluralist, but it might also be cynical and elitist. Who would admit to that?

Mr. Harari is the author of the bestselling "Sapiens," a history of our species written with an eye on present anxieties about our future. "Nexus," a history of our society as a series of information networks and a warning about artificial intelligence, uses a similar recipe. A dollop of historical anecdote is seasoned with a pinch of social science and a spoonful of speculation, topped with a soggy crust of prescription, and lightly dusted with premonitions of the apocalypse that will overcome us if we refuse a second serving. "Nexus" goes down easily, but it isn't as nourishing as it claims. Much of it leaves a sour taste.

Like the Victorian novel and Caesar's Gaul, "Nexus" divides into three parts. The first part describes the development of complex societies through the creation and control of information networks. The second argues that the digital network is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from the print network that created modern democratic societies. The third presents the AI apocalypse. An "alien" information network gone rogue, Mr. Harari warns, could "supercharge existing human conflicts," leading to an "AI arms race" and a digital Cold War, with rival powers divided by a Silicon Curtain of chips and code.

Information, Mr. Harari writes, creates a "social nexus" among its users. The "twin pillars" of society are bureaucracy, which creates power by centralizing information, and mythology, which creates power by controlling the dispersal of "stories" and "brands." Societies cohere around stories such as the Bible and communism and "personality cults" and brands such as Jesus and Stalin. Religion is a fiction that stamps "superhuman legitimacy" on the social order. All "true believers" are delusional. Anyone who calls a religion "a true representation of reality" is "lying." Mr. Harari is scathing about Judaism and Christianity but hardly criticizes Islam. In this much, he is not naive.

Mythologies of religion, history and ideology, Mr. Harari believes, exploit our naive tendency to mistake all information as "an attempt to represent reality." When the attempt is convincing, the naive "call it truth." Mr. Harari agrees that "truth is an accurate representation of reality" but argues that only "objective facts" such as scientific data are true. "Subjective facts" based on "beliefs and feelings" cannot be true. The collaborative cacophony of "intersubjective reality," the darkling plain of social and political contention where all our minds meet, also cannot be fully true.

Digitizing our naivety has, Mr. Harari believes, made us uncontrollable and incorrigible. "Nexus" is most interesting, and most flawed, when it examines our current situation. Digital networks overwhelm us with information, but computers can only create "order," not "truth" or "wisdom." AI might take over without developing human-style consciousness: "Intelligence is enough." The nexus of machine-learning, algorithmic "user engagement" and human nature could mean that "large-scale democracies may not survive the rise of computer technology."

The "main split" in 20th-century information was between closed, pseudo-infallible "totalitarian" systems and open, self-correcting "democratic" systems. As Mr. Harari's third section describes, after the flood of digital information, the split will be between humans and machines. The machines will still be fallible. Will they allow us to correct them? Though "we aren't sure" why the "democratic information network is breaking down," Mr. Harari nevertheless argues that "social media algorithms" play such a "divisive" role that free speech has become a naive luxury, unaffordable in the age of AI. He "strongly disagrees" with Louis Brandeis's opinion in Whitney v. California (1927) that the best way to combat false speech is with more speech.

The survival of democracy requires "regulatory institutions" that will "vet algorithms," counter "conspiracy theories" and prevent the rise of "charismatic leaders." Mr. Harari never mentions the First Amendment, but "Nexus" amounts to a sustained argument for its suppression. Unfortunately, his grasp of politics is tenuous and hyperbolic. He seems to believe that populism was invented with the iPhone rather than being a recurring bug that appears when democratic operating systems become corrupted or fail to update their software. He consistently confuses democracy (a method of gauging opinion with a long history) with liberalism (a mostly Anglo-American legal philosophy with a short history). He defines democracy as "an ongoing conversation between diverse information nodes," but the openness of the conversation and the independence of its nodes derive from liberalism's rights of individual privacy and speech. Yet "liberalism" appears nowhere in "Nexus." Mr. Harari isn't much concerned with liberty and justice either.

In "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" (1795-96), Friedrich Schiller divided poetry between two modes. The naive mode is ancient and assumes that language is a window into reality. The sentimental mode belongs to our "artificial age" and sees language as a mirror to our inner turmoil. As a reflection of our troubled age of transition, "Nexus" is a mirror to the unease of our experts and elites. It divides people into the cognitively unfit and the informationally pure and proposes we divide power over speech accordingly. Call me naive, but Mr. Harari's technocratic TED-talking is not the way to save democracy. It is the royal road to tyranny." [1]

1. Prognosis Apocalyptic. Green, Dominic.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 13 Sep 2024: A.13.

 

US Democrat and presidential candidate Harris counted all the cats in Springfield (USA), where many migrants from Haiti live, and proved that the migrants did not eat a single cat.

 The Lithuanian daily Delfi took part in this mockery of science and assures us that Harris is not lying. Delfi also never lies, because it has a column called "Lies", which is dedicated to spreading Ukrainian propaganda.  

JAV demokratė ir kandidatė į prezidentus Harris suskaičiavo visas kates Springfielde (JAV), kur gyvena daug migrantų iš Haičio, ir įrodė, kad migrantai nesuvalgė nė vienos katės.

Lietuviškas dienraštis Delfi dalyvavo šiame pasityčiojime iš mokslo ir patikina, kad Harris nemeluoja. Delfi irgi niekada nemeluoja, nes turi rubriką "Melagienos", kuri yra skirta Ukrainos propagandai platinti.

Šiurkšti pamoka Europai Afganistano ataskaitoje

 

 

 „Dauguma Europos politikų (ir, jei atvirai, daugelis Europos piliečių) lengviau atsiduso, kai Joe Bidenas 2020 m. buvo išrinktas prezidentu. Jie taip pat tikisi Kamala Harris pergalės lapkritį. Paslaptis yra kodėl. Tai dar labiau glumina, atsižvelgiant į šios savaitės JAV Atstovų Rūmų pranešimą apie pražūtingą Bideno pasitraukimą iš Afganistano.

 

 Tame 350 puslapių politikos postmortem iš Užsienio reikalų komiteto detaliai aprašoma, kaip užsispyręs Bidenas, matyt, bent jau tyliai palaikommas ponios Harris, primetė savo valią giliai skeptiškiems patarėjams, diplomatams ir kariniams pareigūnams. Visi sakė Bidenui, kad visiškas JAV pasitraukimas 2021 m. rugpjūtį būtų bloga idėja. Jis vis tiek įsakė. Prasidėjo chaosas ir 13 amerikiečių karių žūties tragedija.

 

 Amerikoje tai tapo vidaus politine istorija, ir teisingai. Tačiau kredito komiteto pirmininkas Michaelas McCaulis taip pat pabrėžė tarptautinį aspektą. Ši nelaimė palieka randų ir Europoje.

 

 Nuo pat karo su terorizmu pradžios Šiaurės Atlanto sutarties organizacija dalyvavo, siekiant apsaugoti Afganistaną ir nuslopinti terorizmą jame. Misijos įkarštyje, 2011 m., Afganistane buvo dislokuota daugiau, nei 130 000, karių iš dešimčių NATO sąjungininkų ir partnerių, iš kurių apie 100 000 buvo amerikiečiai. Po dešimtmečio išvedimo metu dalyvavo apie 7 000 karių iš 35 šalių ir 2 500 likusių amerikiečių.

 

 Šie sąjungininkai investavo jų kraują į misiją, nes kartu su 2465 amerikiečiais žuvo 1 144 ne JAV NATO kariai. Jie taip pat paaukojo nemažą lobį – milijardų milijardus dolerių, bandydami sukurti pilietinę visuomenę su ligoninėmis, mokyklomis (įskaitant mergaičių) ir demokratinėmis institucijomis, kurias 2021 m. užvaldė Talibanas.

 

 Pagrindiniai NATO partneriai manė, kad Bideno-Harris pasitraukimas buvo klaida nuo pat pradžių. 2020 m. Trumpo administracija bandė susitarti su Talibanu, kurio Talibanas niekada neįvykdė. „Pasitraukimas tokiomis aplinkybėmis būtų suvokiamas, kaip strateginė Talibano pergalė, kuri susilpnintų Aljansą ir padrąsintų ekstremistus visame pasaulyje“, – Atstovų rūmų ataskaitoje cituojamas generolas Nicholasas Carteris, tuometinis JK gynybos štabo vadovas, sausį perspėjęs. 2021 m. kovo mėnesį vykusiame NATO užsienio reikalų sekretorių susitikime valstybės sekretorius Antony Blinken susidūrė su jo kolegų britų, vokiečių ir italų pasipriešinimu administracijos pasitraukimo planui, teigiama Atstovų Rūmų pranešime.

 

 Bidenas veržėsi į priekį, o jo sprendimas buvo katastrofa tiems sąjungininkams. Atėjus laikui, nepasiruošę NATO partneriai stengėsi evakuoti jų karius, piliečius ir Afganistano sąjungininkus, kai šalis atiteko Talibanui. Tada jie turėjo paaiškinti jų rinkėjams, kad du dešimtmečius trukęs karinis įsitraukimas ir didelės užsienio pagalbos teikimas baigėsi niekais.

 

 Tai dar labiau blogėja, nes Europa nešė didžiausią naštą dėl pasitraukimo. Bideno administracijos parodytas silpnumas, tikriausiai, paskatino įvykius Ukrainoje po mažiau, nei metų – didžiausią Europoje sausumos konfliktą nuo 1945 m., kai Rusijai buvo taikomos sankcijos tapo energetinės krizės, vis dar drebinančios žemyną, katalizatoriumi.

 

 Tada yra terorizmas. Atstovų Rūmų ataskaitoje įspėjama, kad asmenys, tariamai susiję su ISIS-K, džihadistų judėjimo „Islamo valstybė“ Afganistano atšaka, nelegaliai gabenami per pietinę Amerikos sieną. Tokių teroristų yra ir Europoje, jie jau veikia.

 

 ISIS-K prisiėmė atsakomybę už kovo mėnesį Maskvoje įvykdytą išpuolį, per kurį Crocus City Hall koncertų salėje žuvo dešimtys žmonių. Berlyno pareigūnai perspėjo, kad grupuotė gali planuoti išpuolius Vokietijoje, o ISIS prisiėmė atsakomybę už rugpjūčio mėnesį Solingeno mieste įvykdytą išpuolį peiliu. Manoma, kad bent vienas iš žmonių, apkaltintų, rengus išpuolį, prieš Taylor Swift koncertą Austrijoje, prisiekė ištikimybę ISIS; jo advokatas šiuos kaltinimus apibūdino, kaip „perdėtus“. Tikėtina, kad Afganistanas tapo dirva Centrinės Azijos terorizmui, kuris dabar atvyksta į Europą.

 

 Europos lyderiai nekenčia Donaldo Trumpo ir todėl, kad jiems nepatinka populistinė jo politikos estetika, ir todėl, kad pripažįsta, kad jis jų negerbia. Jie tikėjosi, kad ponas Bidenas, senas Vašingtono užsienio politikos vadovas, bus labiau linkęs kurti aljansus ir labiau linkęs patenkinti įvairias europiečių nuomones, disfunkcijas ir neurozes.

 

 Kalbėkite apie klaidingą skaičiavimą. Viena iš pamokų Europai yra ta, kad žemynas turi būti pajėgesnis pasirūpinti jo gynyba, o nuo 2022 m. padidėjusios karinės išlaidos rodo, kad šis taškas pagaliau įgrimzta. Tai labai naudinga tiek Europai, tiek JAV.

 

 Kita pamoka yra ta, kad Europa turi būti atsargesnė dėl Amerikos noro ir gebėjimo dirbti su sąjungininkais, vadovaujant demokratinei arba respublikonų administracijai, atsižvelgiant į laikų izoliacinę nuotaiką JAV. Tai nebus naudinga niekam vis pavojingesniame pasaulyje ir gali būti laikoma didžiausia iš daugelio Bideno-Harris eros užsienio politikos nesėkmių." [1]

1. Political Economics: A Harsh Lesson for Europe in the Afghanistan Report. Sternberg, Joseph C.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 13 Sep 2024: A.15.

A Harsh Lesson for Europe in the Afghanistan Report

 

"Most European politicians (and, if we're honest, many European citizens) breathed a sigh of relief when Joe Biden was elected president in 2020. They're hoping for a Kamala Harris win in November, too. The mystery is why. It's all the more puzzling in light of this week's U.S. House report on Mr. Biden's disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal.

That 350-page policy postmortem from the Foreign Affairs Committee lays out in detail how a headstrong Mr. Biden, apparently with at least tacit support from Ms. Harris, forced his will on deeply skeptical advisers, diplomats and military officials. Everyone told Mr. Biden that a total U.S. withdrawal in August 2021 would be a bad idea. He ordered it anyway. Chaos, and the deaths of 13 American service members, ensued.

This has become a domestic political story in America, and rightly so. But credit committee chairman Michael McCaul for also highlighting the international dimension. This disaster leaves scars in Europe, too.

From the beginning of the war on terror, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization participated in the effort to secure Afghanistan and suppress terrorism there. At the height of the mission, in 2011, more than 130,000 troops from dozens of NATO allies and partners were stationed in Afghanistan, of whom around 100,000 were American. At the time of the withdrawal a decade later, around 7,000 troops from 35 countries were involved alongside the 2,500 remaining Americans.

These allies invested their blood in the mission, as 1,144 non-U.S. NATO troops were killed alongside 2,465 Americans. They also sacrificed considerable treasure -- billions upon billions of dollars trying to build a civil society with hospitals, schools (including for girls) and democratic institutions that would be overrun by the Taliban in 2021.

Leading NATO partners believed the Biden-Harris withdrawal was a mistake from the start. In 2020 the Trump administration had attempted to negotiate a deal with the Taliban, which the Taliban never honored. "Withdrawal under these circumstances would be perceived as a strategic victory for the Taliban, which would weaken the Alliance and embolden extremists the world over," the House report quotes Gen. Nicholas Carter, then chief of the U.K. defense staff, as warning in January 2021. At a March meeting of NATO foreign secretaries, Secretary of State Antony Blinken faced opposition to the administration's withdrawal plan from his British, German and Italian counterparts, the House report observes.

Mr. Biden pressed ahead, and his decision was a disaster for those allies. Caught unprepared when the moment arrived, NATO partners struggled to evacuate their troops, citizens and Afghan allies as the country fell to the Taliban. They then had to explain to their electorates that two decades of military engagement and foreign-aid largess had come to nothing.

It gets worse, as Europe has borne the brunt of the withdrawal's baleful consequences. The Biden administration's show of weakness probably encouraged events in Ukraine less than a year later, Europe's largest land conflict since 1945 with sanctions on Russia as the catalyst for an energy crisis still shaking the Continent.

Then there's the terrorism. The House report warns that individuals with alleged ties to ISIS-K, Islamic State's Afghan offshoot, have smuggled themselves across America's southern border. Such terrorists are in Europe, too, and already acting.

ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack in Moscow in March that left dozens dead at the Crocus City Hall concert venue. Officials in Berlin warned the group may be plotting attacks in Germany, and ISIS claimed responsibility for the knife attack in the city of Solingen in August. At least one of the people accused of plotting an attack on a Taylor Swift concert in Austria is alleged to have pledged allegiance to ISIS; his lawyer has described the claims as "exaggerated." It's likely that Afghanistan has become a breeding ground for the Central Asian terrorism now arriving in Europe.

European leaders hate Donald Trump, both because they dislike the populist aesthetics of his politics and because they recognize that he doesn't respect them. They expected Mr. Biden, an old hand in Washington's foreign-policy establishment, to be more eager to cultivate alliances and more willing to cater to Europeans' many and varied opinions, dysfunctions and neuroses.

Talk about a miscalculation. One lesson for Europe is that the Continent must be better able to provide for its own defense, and ramped-up military expenditures since 2022 suggest this point finally is sinking in. This is much to the good both of Europe and the U.S.

The other lesson is that Europe must be warier of America's willingness and ability to work with allies under either a Democratic or a Republican administration, given the isolationist temper of the times in the U.S. This will be good for no one in an ever more dangerous world, and may come to be viewed as the greatest of the many foreign-policy failures of the Biden-Harris era." [1]

1. Political Economics: A Harsh Lesson for Europe in the Afghanistan Report. Sternberg, Joseph C.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 13 Sep 2024: A.15.