Europe Faces Painful Choice: War or Welfare --- Despite promising to raise military budgets, nations are wary of cutting big benefits

 

"GORLITZ, Germany -- When the Cold War ended, European governments slashed their military budgets and spent a windfall of several trillion dollars on social programs -- a popular policy with voters when Europe faced few external threats and enjoyed the security protection of the U.S.

Now, European nations are finding it difficult to give up those benefits, even as the conflict in Ukraine has revived Cold-War era tensions and the U.S. tries to shift its focus to China. Most are failing to get their armies in fighting shape.

The lesson: It was easy to swap guns for butter; reversing the trend is far more challenging.

That means -- despite promises to raise military spending -- defense ministers say they are struggling to get what they need. In Germany, Europe's largest economy, military bases are crumbling or have been converted to civilian use, including sports centers, old people's homes and pension-fund offices. The army, which numbered half a million in West Germany and 300,000 in East Germany during the Cold War, has today just 180,000. It now has a few hundred operational tanks, compared with more than 2,000 Leopard 2 main battle tanks its West German predecessor had in the late 1980s.

"That's frustrating to me," German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told journalists recently, after getting much less than he had requested for next year's military spending. "It means there are certain things I can't do at the pace that. . .the level of threat requires."

It is also likely to frustrate U.S. hopes that Europe will finally begin relieving some of the burden from Washington, which accounts for two-thirds of military spending among North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Both U.S. presidential candidates have said they want Europe to shoulder more of its security costs.

If Donald Trump wins in November, the call for Europe to do so would likely grow louder. Trump said in February the U.S. wouldn't defend allies that don't meet NATO's minimum target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on their militaries, saying Russia could "do whatever the hell they want" with those that missed the target.

In recent days, he said allies should be spending 3% -- matching U.S. levels.

Few European nations, with the exception of Poland or the Baltic states, are close to spending 3% of GDP on their militaries. The U.K. had vowed, under the previous Conservative government, to raise military spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030 from about 2.3%. But new Prime Minister Keir Starmer has refused to put a date on it. Military spending in Italy and Spain, meanwhile, sits under 1.5%.

At the current pace of rearmament, it would take Germany 100 years to return its artillery howitzer stockpiles to their 2004 levels, according to a report published this month by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, an independent think tank.

During negotiations for Germany's 2025 budget this year, Finance Minister Christian Lindner wanted to free up money for defense by freezing social spending for three years -- letting it lag behind inflation. The move was rebuffed by other parties in the governing coalition, and the underlying defense budget was increased by just 1.2 billion euros, equivalent to around $1.3 billion, compared with 2024 -- just enough to cover the latest pay increase for military personnel. Spending on military aid for Ukraine was cut to 4 billion euros, about half this year's level.

What the coalition parties did agree on was a 108 euro-a-year increase over two years in Kindergeld -- an annual 3,000 euro payment per child to all families, regardless of income. Today, that benefit alone, payable for offspring up to age 25, costs more than 50 billion euros a year, as much as Berlin's annual defense ministry budget.

"The idea -- we are dismantling the welfare state because we need more money for the military -- I would find fatal," Economic Affairs Minister Robert Habeck said.

Habeck argued that Germany faced an internal threat from people getting disillusioned with democracy -- a jab at the ascendant far-right AfD party.

"Social spending is necessary to keep the country together," Habeck said.

In the mid-1980s, West German military spending stood at around 3% of GDP and was over 5% in East Germany. In 2022, the now-unified country spent around 1.4%. As a result, the country saved a total of 680 billion euros that was put toward rebuilding the formerly communist East and extending the welfare state there, according to Ifo, a Munich think tank. Europe as a whole has saved about 1.8 trillion euros since 1991 by spending less than 2% of GDP on its armed forces, Ifo calculates.

Days after events in Ukraine in 2022 started, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz promised a "Zeitenwende," or turning point. He pledged Berlin would raise military spending above 2% of GDP, and unveiled a special 100 billion euros off-budget investment fund for rearmament. 

Military experts welcomed the move, but warned the 2% threshold wasn't enough to strengthen the military quickly given Germany's chronic underspending.

Two years later, however, Germany's underlying defense budget sits at 1.3% of GDP, and overall military spending is only meeting the 2% threshold thanks to the off-budget investment fund. When that runs out in 2028, Germany will have to increase its underlying defense budget by 60% that year to keep it above 2% -- which some analysts say is unlikely.

Not including the special fund, the share of the underlying defense budget that goes into procuring new weapons and ammunition has fallen from 10 billion euros in 2022 to 3 billion euros this year, according to Hans-Peter Bartels, president of the German Society for Security Policy, an armed forces lobby organization. The rest goes mainly to personnel, maintenance, training and building costs.

"The Zeitenwende has failed," said Benjamin Tallis, a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, calling the effort to rearm Germany "too little, too slow, too uncertain."

The country's public social-safety net, meanwhile, totaled 1.25 trillion euros last year, 27% of GDP -- higher than Denmark and Sweden and compared with around 23% for the U.S. in 2022, according to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Government officials counter by pointing to the rearmament fund and say strict budget rules mean Germany can't borrow to spend more and cutting welfare risks endangering public support for Ukraine.

Economists say there are many welfare measures that could be pared back to beef up military spending.

Raising Germany's military spending to 3% of GDP would require finding an extra 40 billion euros a year, equivalent to France's entire annual defense budget. A study by Christian Molling, a defense expert and director of the Europe program at the Bertelsmann Foundation in Berlin, and colleagues published this month estimates that plugging the gap in Germany's defenses by 2030 would cost 103 billion euros.

"I'm not sure [cutting welfare spending] is the solution," said Michael Kretschmer, the conservative governor of Saxony, saying the country needs to spend more on defense, but also on schools, infrastructures, and other items. "I think what we need is an economy that grows faster."

---

Fruits of Peace Dividend Are Sweet in One Town

The meticulously restored town of Gorlitz in Germany's far southeast, a setting for Hollywood movies such as "The Grand Budapest Hotel" and "Inglourious Basterds," shows the fruits of the peace dividend.

In baroque town squares, pensioners sip flat whites. Students study free of charge at an airy, revamped university campus overlooking the river. The train station is being refurbished, a central square remodeled and the local hospital is building a new wing for the elderly.

The town also shows why politicians are leery of swapping butter for guns. With an elderly population and weak economy, the city receives the second-highest regional transfers of taxpayer money in the form of subsidies and welfare benefits of any German district. Even so, spending pledges by the central government are straining the resources of Gorlitz, which shoulders some of the costs, including support for children, district administrator Stephan Meyer said.

The district received a 40-million-euro, or $44.3 million, bailout late last year from the state government to cover a budget deficit. Meyer said he expects the gap between revenues and expenditures to grow to around 100 million euros by 2028.

"Everybody understands that we are at a very special juncture. The question is where will the money come from," said Christian Molling of the Bertelsmann Foundation." [1]

 The general well-being and excellent wages help us to attract the skilled migrants whose work ensures our well-being (and now let's all applaud Elon Musk, the most famous representative of such migrants). And if we throw money at rusty and outdated tanks, this conveyor belt of well-being will stop. Therefore, the rulers of Poland have already found themselves in the opposition, now it is the turn of the rulers of Lithuania. It won't be long before Olaf Schoz goes herring fishing in Hamburg, Germany.

1. World News: Europe Faces Painful Choice: War or Welfare --- Despite promising to raise military budgets, nations are wary of cutting big benefits. Fairless, Tom; Bertrand, Benoit.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 16 Sep 2024: A.8.

Žemųjų technologijų pranešimų sistema apsaugo „Hamas“ lyderį Gazoje

 

 „Aukščiausiasis „Hamas“ lyderis Yahya Sinwaras gali būti seniai miręs, jei ne kalėjime ištobulinta žemų technologijų ryšių sistema, apsauganti jį nuo Izraelio, žvalgybą renkančio, tinklo.

 

 Sinwar iš esmės vengė telefono skambučių, trumpųjų žinučių ir kitų elektroninių ryšių, kuriuos Izraelis gali sekti ir dėl kurių žuvo kiti kovotojai. Vietoj to jis naudoja sudėtingą kurjerių, kodų ir ranka rašytų užrašų sistemą, leidžiančią jam vadovauti „Hamas“ operacijoms, net slapstantis požeminiuose tuneliuose, sakė arabų paliaubų tarpininkai.

 

 Ryšio metodas sutrukdė Izraelio kariškiams, ketininantiems surasti spalio 7 d. atakos prieš Izraelį, per kurį žuvo 1 200 žmonių ir sukėlė karą Gazoje, architektą. Sinwaro, kuris nebuvo matomas viešumoje nuo karo pradžios, nužudymas ar paėmimas būtų reikšminga Izraelio pergalė, galinti priartinti 11 mėnesių trukusį karą prie pabaigos, tačiau net ir, kariškai kontroliuojant Gazos ruožą, Izraelio žvalgyba pasirodė tuščiomis rankomis. Izraelio pareigūnai teigė manantys, kad Sinwaras slapstosi Gazos ruože.

 

 Žvilgsnis į tai, kaip Sinwaras išlieka gyvas, pateikiamas iš arabų tarpininkų, kurie per paliaubų derybas tarp Hamas ir Izraelio siųsdavo žinutes, nes šios dvi konflikto pusės tarpusavyje nesikalba tiesiogiai.

 

 Įprasta Sinwar žinutė dabar bus parašyta ranka ir pirmiausia perduota patikimam „Hamas“ nariui, kuris ją perkelia kurjerių grandine, kai kurie iš jų gali būti civiliai, sakė tarpininkai. Pranešimai dažnai koduojami, skirtingais kodais skirtingiems gavėjams, aplinkybėms ir laikui, remiantis sistema, kurią Sinwar ir kiti kaliniai sukūrė, būdami Izraelio kalėjimuose.

 

 Tada raštelis gali pasiekti arabų tarpininką, įžengusį į Gazos ruožą, arba kitą „Hamas“ operatyvinį atstovą, kuris naudojasi telefonu ar kitu būdu, kad išsiųstų jį JAV nurodytos teroristinės grupės nariams į užsienį, sakė tarpininkai.

 

 Sinwar komunikacijos metodai tapo labiau saugomi ir sudėtingesni, nes Izraelis surado ir nužudė jo aukšto rango tėvynainius, ypač per išpuolį Beirute, per kurį žuvo Salehas al Arouri, Hamas politinio lyderio pavaduotojas ir grupės karinio sparno įkūrėjas.

 

 „Esu tikras, kad tai viena iš svarbiausių priežasčių, kodėl IDF jo nerado“, – sakė Michaelas Milšteinas, buvęs Izraelio karinės žvalgybos Palestinos reikalų vadovas, turėdamas omenyje Izraelio gynybos pajėgas.

 

 Izraelio kariuomenė atsisakė komentuoti. „Hamas“ atsisakė atsakyti į klausimus, kaip Sinwar bendrauja.

 

 Izraelio karinė žvalgyba turi vienus iš sudėtingiausių pasaulyje gebėjimų perimti elektroninius ryšius, dažnai vadinamus signalų žvalgyba. Po Arouri mirties Sinwaras beveik visiškai perėjo prie ranka rašytų užrašų ir žodinio bendravimo, kartais balso įrašus platindamas per nedidelį pagalbininkų ratą, sakė arabų tarpininkai.

 

 Po Arouri mirties buvo nužudyta daug kitų aukščiausių Hamas ir Hezbollah pareigūnų, padidinančių pažeidžiamumo jausmą. Liepą Izraelis surengė didžiulį antskrydį, žuvo aukščiausias Hamas karinis lyderis Mohammedas Deifas. Tą mėnesį Izraelis taip pat tariamai nužudė „Hamas“ politinį lyderį Ismailą Haniyehą Teherane ir surengė smūgį Beiruto gyvenamajam pastatui, kuriame nukovė Fuadą Shukrą, pagrindinį „Hezbollah“ lyderį, kuris dešimtmečius išvengė JAV. „Hezbollah“ vado žudikai buvo nukreipti į butą po to, kai jis sulaukė telefono skambučio, greičiausiai, iš asmens, kuris pažeidė „Hezbollah“ vidaus ryšių tinklą, pranešė „The Wall Street Journal“.

 

 „Jie žino, jei naudoja kokius nors elektroninius prietaisus, tai bus pastebėta“, – sakė Gazoje gyvenęs International Crisis Group tyrėjas Azmi Keshawi.

 

 Grupės ekspertai teigė, kad Sinwaro elementarus požiūris į ryšius yra susijęs su sistema, kurią „Hamas“ naudojo ankstyvaisiais savo veiklos metais ir kurios „Hamas“ lyderis ėmėsi, kai buvo sulaikytas 1988 m., o vėliau įkalintas Izraelio kalėjime.

 

 Prieš būdamas įkalintas, Sinwaras įkūrė Hamas vidaus saugumo policiją Majd, kuri gaudė įtariamus bendradarbius ir veikė Izraelio kalėjimuose. Majd  kalėjime įdarbino agentus, vadinamus „sawa'ed“, kurie platino užkoduotus pranešimus iš vieno skyriaus į kitą, rašoma buvusio „Hamas“ operatoriaus, tapusio Izraelio šnipu, knygoje „Hamas sūnus“.

 

 Save'ed ranka rašytus laiškus suvyniodavo į baltą duoną, susukdavo į kamuoliukus, tada leisdavo išdžiūti ir sukietėti, rašoma knygoje. Agentai mėtė kamuolius iš vieno kalėjimo skyriaus į kitą, šaukdami „laisvės kovotojų paštas!

 

 Izraelis apskaičiavo, kad Sinwaras daug metų planavo didelį karą su Izraeliu, įskaitant didžiulio tunelių tinklo statybą. Milšteinas, buvęs Izraelio karinės žvalgybos pareigūnas, sakė, kad jo pasiruošimas, tikriausiai, apėmė ryšių sistemos, kuri apeitų šiuolaikinės žvalgybos rinkimą, sukūrimą.

 

 Metodai tokie veiksmingi, kad jo persekiotojai negali atmesti, kad jo nėra Gazoje.

 

 Prieiga prie Sinwar dabar svarbiau, nei bet kada. Nors jis ilgą laiką buvo „Hamas“ varomoji jėga, grupuotė pasitikėjo pareigūnais už Gazos ruožo, kad atstovautų jos interesams. Tai pasikeitė po Haniyeh nužudymo Teherane – Izraeliui priskiriamo išpuolio – kuris paskatino grupuotę oficialiai patepti Sinwarą bosu.

 

 Perėjimas įvyko kaip tik tada, kai JAV sustiprino pastangas užtikrinti paliaubas Gazoje, tikėdamosi sumažinti įtampą regione. Derybos yra sudėtingos, Izraelio ministras pirmininkas Benjaminas Netanyahu iškėlė daugybę reikalavimų, prieštaringai vertinamais, klausimais, kuriuos bus sunku išspręsti. JAV pareigūnai skeptiškai vertina tai, kad Sinwaras taip pat nori baigti kovas.

 

 Anot Palestinos sveikatos pareigūnų, kurie nenurodo, kiek buvo kovotojų, Sinwaro atsargus požiūris kartais sulėtino derybas dėl karo užbaigimo, dėl kurio jau žuvo daugiau, nei 41 000, palestiniečių. Hamas vadovaujami kovotojai per, spalio 7 d. karą išprovokavusias, atakas paėmė įkaitais apie 250 žmonių, o 97 vis dar liko Gazos Ruože, daugelis iš jų, kaip manoma, žuvo.

 

 Esminiais derybų dėl ugnies taškais Sinwaras tapo nepasiekiamas. Kitais atvejais jis perduoda pranešimus beveik realiuoju laiku. Neaišku, ar komunikacijos vėlavimas yra derybų taktika, ar griežtų Sinwar protokolų atspindys.

 

 Sinwar greitai bendravo, kai reikia. „Reiškiame jums ir jūsų gerbiamai šeimai nuoširdžią užuojautą ir palaiminimus už jūsų šventą auką“, – rašė jis balandį laiške Haniyeh po to, kai Izraelio antskrydžio metu žuvo trys jo sūnūs.

 

 Pasak arabų pareigūnų, tas laiškas į Haniyeh atkeliavo praėjus kelioms valandoms po mirčių.

 

 Birželio mėnesį aukšti JAV pareigūnai, įskaitant Centrinės žvalgybos agentūros direktorių Williamą Burnsą, išskrido į Artimuosius Rytus, kad pastūmėtų Izraelį ir „Hamas“ siekti paliaubų. Burnsas Dohoje surengė derybas su Kataro ministru pirmininku ir Egipto žvalgybos vadovu, kuris vėliau susitiko su Haniyeh, siekdamas priversti Hamas pareigūnus susitarti dėl sankcijų ir arešto grėsmės.

 

 Per tą susitikimą Sinwaras perdavė žinutes realiu laiku, o „Hamas“ atsisakė sutikti nutraukti kovą, nebent Izraelis raštiškai įsipareigotų laikytis nuolatinių paliaubų, sakė arabų tarpininkai. Neaišku, kaip Sinwaras perduodavo jo įsakymus.

 

 Izraelis mažiausiai dešimtmetį žinojo, kad „Hamas“ savo požeminiuose tuneliuose sukūrė fiksuotojo telefono ryšio sistemą. Pasak Hamaso, nepavykusi Izraelio komandos operacija 2018 m., sukėlusi susišaudymą tarp Izraelio ir „Hamas“, buvo Izraelio kariuomenės bandymas prisijungti prie „Hamas“ telefonų tinklo. Izraelio kariuomenė atsisakė komentuoti operaciją.

 

 Prasidėjus dabartiniam karui, tarpininkai siekė tarpininkauti įkaitų sandoriui tarp Izraelio ir „Hamas“, kuris sutrukdytų Izraelio karinei invazijai į Gazos Ruožą, ir pasiuntė kurjerius į Gazos ruožą susitikti su „Hamas“ ginkluoto sparno nariais ir perduoti koduotus pranešimus.

 

 Sinwaras taip pat organizavo telefono skambučius su tarpininkais „Hamas“ fiksuotojo ryšio tinkle tuneliuose, naudodamas kodus ir laiką, kad nustatytų dieną ir laiką, taip pat slapyvardžiais pranešimuose, kuriais siekiama skambinti, sakė tarpininkai. Sinwaras kartais naudodavo žmonių, kurie buvo su juo kalėjime, vardus, kad nuslėptų tikrąją jo tapatybę, sakė tarpininkai.

 

 Kad ir koks būtų atsargus, „Hamas“ lyderis turi padaryti tik vieną klaidą, kad suteiktų Izraeliui galimybių, sakė Thomas Withingtonas, elektroninio karo ekspertas ir Londono Karališkojo Jungtinių paslaugų instituto ekspertų grupės bendradarbis.

 

 „Ta sekundės dalis, kai pamiršti drausmę“, – sakė Withingtonas, – „gali pasirašyti tavo mirties nuosprendį.“" [1]

 

Izraelio žvalgyba nežinojo apie  spalio 7-sios atakos planus. Tai rodo, kad ji nėra tokia jau stipri, kaip čia rašoma.

1. Low-Tech Messaging System Shields Hamas Leader in Gaza. Said, Summer; Jones, Rory.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 16 Sep 2024: A.1.

Low-Tech Messaging System Shields Hamas Leader in Gaza

"Hamas's top leader, Yahya Sinwar, could well be dead if not for a low-tech communications system honed in prison that shields him from Israel's intelligence-gathering dragnet.

Sinwar has largely shunned phone calls, text messages and other electronic communications that Israel can track and that have led to the demise of other militants. Instead, he is using a complex system of couriers, codes and handwritten notes that allows him to direct Hamas's operations even while hiding in underground tunnels, Arab cease-fire mediators said.

The communication method has vexed an Israeli military intent on finding the architect of the Oct. 7 attack on Israel that killed 1,200 people and sparked the war in Gaza. Killing or capturing Sinwar -- who hasn't been seen in public since the war started -- would mark a substantial victory for Israel that could bring the 11-month war closer to an end, but even with military control of the Gaza Strip, Israeli intelligence has come up empty. Israeli officials have said they believe Sinwar is in hiding in Gaza.

A glimpse into how Sinwar stays alive comes from Arab mediators who have ferried messages back and forth during cease-fire talks between Hamas and Israel, which don't talk directly to each other.

A typical message from Sinwar will now be handwritten and first passed to a trusted Hamas member who moves it along a chain of couriers, some of whom might be civilians, the mediators said. The messages are often coded, with different codes for different recipients, circumstances and times, building on a system Sinwar and other inmates had developed while in Israeli prisons.

The note might then reach an Arab mediator who has entered Gaza or another Hamas operative who uses a phone or other method to send it to the U.S.-designated terrorist group's members abroad, the mediators said.

Sinwar's communications methods have become more guarded and complex as Israel has found and killed his high-ranking compatriots, in particular the Beirut attack that killed Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas's deputy political leader and a founder of the group's military wing.

"I'm quite sure this is one of the prominent reasons that the IDF didn't find him," said Michael Milshtein, a former head of Palestinian affairs for Israeli military intelligence, referring to the Israel Defense Forces.

The Israeli military declined to comment. Hamas declined to answer questions about how Sinwar communicates.

Israel's military intelligence has some of the world's most sophisticated abilities to intercept electronic communications, often called signals intelligence. It was after Arouri's death that Sinwar almost entirely shifted to handwritten notes and oral communication, sometimes circulating voice recordings via a small circle of aides, Arab mediators said.

Arouri's death was followed by a number of other killings of top officials in Hamas and Hezbollah, heightening the sense of vulnerability. In July, Israel launched a massive airstrike it said killed Hamas's top military leader, Mohammed Deif. That month, Israel also purportedly killed Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas's political leader, in Tehran and launched a strike on a Beirut residential building that took out Fuad Shukr, a core Hezbollah leader who had eluded the U.S. for decades. The Hezbollah commander was directed to an apartment after receiving a phone call that was likely from someone who had breached Hezbollah's internal communications network, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

"They know if they use any electronic devices, it will be spotted," said Azmi Keshawi, a researcher at International Crisis Group who lived in Gaza.

Sinwar's rudimentary approach to communications harks back to a system that Hamas used in its early years and that the Hamas leader took up when he was detained in 1988 and later imprisoned in an Israeli jail, experts on the group said.

Before being incarcerated, Sinwar founded Hamas's internal security police, called Majd, which hunted down suspected collaborators and was active in Israeli prisons. Majd recruited agents inside prison called "sawa'ed" who distributed encoded messages from one section to another, according to the book "Son of Hamas" by a former Hamas operative turned Israeli spy.

The sawa'ed would wrap handwritten letters in white bread, roll them into balls, then let them dry and harden, the book said. The agents pitched the balls from one section of the prison to the next, shouting "mail from the freedom fighters!"

Israel estimates that Sinwar spent years planning for a major war with Israel, including building a vast tunnel network. Milshtein, the former Israeli military-intelligence official, said his preparations likely included setting up a communications system that would get around modern intelligence gathering.

The methods are so effective that his pursuers can't rule out that he isn't in Gaza.

Access to Sinwar is now more important than ever. While he has long been Hamas's driving force, the group relied on officials outside Gaza to represent its interests. That changed after the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran -- an attack attributed to Israel -- led the group to formally anoint Sinwar as the boss.

The changeover came just as the U.S. stepped up its efforts to secure a cease-fire in Gaza in hopes of de-escalating regional tensions. The negotiations are complex, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel raising a number of demands on controversial points that will be difficult to resolve. U.S. officials are skeptical that Sinwar wants to end the fighting, either.

Sinwar's cautious approach has at times slowed negotiations to end the war, which has now caused the deaths of more than 41,000 Palestinians, according to Palestinian health officials, who don't say how many were combatants. Hamas-led fighters took about 250 people hostage in the Oct. 7 attacks that sparked the war, with 97 still remaining in Gaza, many of them believed dead.

At crucial points in cease-fire negotiations, Sinwar has become unreachable. Other times, he has relayed messages in near real time. Whether communication delays are a negotiating tactic or a reflection of Sinwar's strict protocols is unclear.

Sinwar has communicated quickly when necessary. "We extend to you and your esteemed family our heartfelt condolences and blessings for your sacred sacrifice," he wrote in a letter to Haniyeh in April after three of his sons were killed by an Israeli airstrike.

That letter, Arab officials said, made it to Haniyeh hours after the deaths.

In June, top U.S. officials including Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns flew to the Middle East to push Israel and Hamas toward a cease-fire. Burns held talks with the Qatari prime minister and Egypt's intelligence chief in Doha, who then met with Haniyeh to force Hamas officials into a deal with the threat of sanctions and arrest.

During that meeting, Sinwar relayed messages in real time, and Hamas refused to agree to a halt in fighting unless Israel made a written commitment to a permanent cease-fire, Arab mediators said. It isn't clear how Sinwar was transmitting his orders.

Israel has known for at least a decade that Hamas created a landline phone system in its subterranean tunnels. A failed Israeli commando operation in 2018 that sparked exchanges of fire between Israel and Hamas was an attempt by the Israeli military to tap Hamas's phone network, according to Hamas. The Israeli military declined to comment on the operation.

At the start of the current war, mediators sought to broker a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas that would head off an Israeli military invasion of the Gaza Strip and sent couriers inside Gaza to meet members of Hamas's armed wing and pass on coded messages.

Sinwar also organized phone calls with mediators on Hamas's landline network in the tunnels, using codes to determine the day and time as well as aliases in messages setting up the calls, mediators said. Sinwar at times used the names of people who were with him in prison to disguise his true identity, mediators said.

As careful as he has been, the Hamas leader only has to make one mistake to give Israel a window of opportunity, said Thomas Withington, an expert on electronic warfare and an associate research fellow at London's Royal United Services Institute think tank.

"That split second where you forget discipline," Withington said, "that can sign your death warrant."" [1]

Israeli intelligence was unaware of the plans for the October 7 attack. This shows that it is not as strong as it is written here.

1. Low-Tech Messaging System Shields Hamas Leader in Gaza. Said, Summer; Jones, Rory.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 16 Sep 2024: A.1.