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2025 m. spalio 5 d., sekmadienis

It’s Too Late to Make a Jewish Riviera Out of Gaza


“Displacement and the quest for a homeland are, of course, intrinsic to the intertwined fates of Israelis and Palestinians.

 

The Holocaust and the 1948 Nakba, or catastrophe, in which some 750,000 Palestinians were driven out of their land by killing during Israel’s War of Independence, vie for greater weight on the sterile scales of competitive victimhood.

 

By rekindling nightmarish memories of these disasters, the Oct. 7 attack and retaliatory war in Gaza have pushed the two sides deeper into enmity.

 

“The Oct. 7 slaughter and seizure of hostages reinforced Holocaust associations for Israel, and for many Palestinians in Gaza, the war has been a new Nakba,” said Yuval Shany, a professor of international law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. “So narratives feed themselves in an endless loop.”

 

At the two-year mark of the greatest defeat in the country’s 77-year history, Israelis find themselves mentally and physically exhausted, and not only the 295,000 reservists who have been called up again and again. Some 83,000 Israelis emigrated in 2024, 50 percent more than the previous year. Seven members of the Israeli military died by suicide in July and August alone.” [1]

 

Palestinian tunnels, a sign of human inventiveness, end the endless loop. The killing doesn't work anymore.

 

Palestinian tunnels as a symbol of resistance

The idea introduces tunnels as a factor that "end the endless loop" by challenging the traditional power dynamic.

 

    A "city underneath the cities": Hamas has developed an extensive network of tunnels, sometimes called the "Gaza metro," that stretches for hundreds of miles under the Gaza Strip. The network serves as a strategic military asset, providing cover for militants and allowing them to launch attacks, move supplies, and house command centers.

    Circumventing blockade: The tunnels' roots trace back to smuggling routes used to circumvent the blockade imposed on Gaza by Egypt and Israel. In this context, the tunnels are a sign of Palestinian inventiveness and a response to the harsh restrictions imposed by the siege.

    Military reality: For Hamas, the tunnels provide a strategic advantage that neutralizes Israel's technological superiority and extensive aerial surveillance. This subterranean warfare subverts the conventional loop of air strikes and incursions, making a traditional military resolution difficult.

 

The clash of visions

The idea contrasts two incompatible approaches to Gaza's future:

 

    The "Gaza Riviera," representing a vision of erasure and reconstruction by outside powers that ignores Palestinian existence.

    The tunnel network, symbolizing Palestinian resistance and the rejection of a future imposed by external forces.

 

The juxtaposition suggests that as long as the tunnels exist and the cycle of trauma persists, the "Jewish Riviera" remains an unrealizable fantasy. The "killing doesn't work anymore" implies that the killing alone is insufficient to resolve a conflict where the weaker party can operate in a hidden, inaccessible dimension.

 

1. Israel at War With Itself. Cohen, Roger; Guttenfelder, David; Alghorra, Saher.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Oct 5, 2025.

Per vėlu iš Gazos sukurti žydų Rivjerą


„Perkėlimas ir tėvynės paieškos, žinoma, yra neatsiejama Izraelio ir Palestinos likimų dalis.

 

Holokaustas ir 1948 m. Nakba, arba katastrofa, kai apie 750 000 palestiniečių buvo žudynėmis išvaryti iš savo žemės per Izraelio Nepriklausomybės karą, varžosi dėl didesnio svorio ant sterilių konkurencinės aukos svarstyklių.

 

Atgaivindami košmariškus šių nelaimių prisiminimus, spalio 7 d. išpuolis ir atsakomasis karas Gazoje dar labiau įstūmė abi puses į priešiškumą.

 

„Spalio 7 d. žudynės ir įkaitų pagrobimas sustiprino Izraelio asociacijas su Holokaustu, o daugeliui Gazos palestiniečių šis karas buvo nauja Nakba“, – sakė Yuval Shany, tarptautinės teisės profesorius Jeruzalės Hebrajų universitete. „Taigi naratyvai maitina save begaliniame cikle.“

 

Praėjus dvejiems metams po didžiausio pralaimėjimo per 77 metų šalies istoriją, izraeliečiai jaučiasi protiškai ir fiziškai išsekę, ir ne tik 295 000 rezervistų, kurie buvo šaukiami vėl ir vėl. 2024 m. emigravo apie 83 000 izraeliečių, t. y. 50 procentų daugiau, nei ankstesniais metais. Vien liepą ir rugpjūtį nusižudė septyni Izraelio kariuomenės nariai.“ [1]

 

Palestinos tuneliai, žmogaus išradingumo ženklas, užbaigia nesibaigiantį ciklą. Žudynės jau nebeveikia.

 

Palestiniečių tuneliai kaip pasipriešinimo simbolis

Ši idėja pristato tunelius, kaip veiksnį, kuris „užbaigia begalinį ciklą“, mesdamas iššūkį tradicinei galios dinamikai.

 

„Miestas po miestais“: „Hamas“ sukūrė platų tunelių tinklą, kartais vadinamą „Gazos metro“, kuris tęsiasi šimtus mylių po Gazos Ruožu. Tinklas tarnauja, kaip strateginis karinis turtas, suteikiantis priedangą kovotojams ir leidžiantis jiems rengti atakas, gabenti atsargas ir dislokuoti vadovavimo centrus.

 

Blokados apėjimas: Tunelių šaknys siekia kontrabandos maršrutus, naudojamus apeiti Egipto ir Izraelio Gazai nustatytą blokadą. Šiame kontekste tuneliai yra palestiniečių išradingumo ženklas ir atsakas į griežtus apgulties apribojimus.

 

Karinė realybė: „Hamas“ tuneliai suteikia strateginį pranašumą, neutralizuojantį Izraelio technologinį pranašumą ir platų oro stebėjimą. Šis požeminis karas ardo įprastą oro antskrydžių ir įsiveržimų ciklą, todėl tradicinį karinį sprendimą apsunkina.

 

Vizijų susidūrimas

Ši idėja supriešina du nesuderinamus požiūrius į Gazos ateitį:

 

„Gazos Rivjera“, atstovaujanti išorinių jėgų vykdomo ištrynimo ir rekonstrukcijos vizijai, ignoruojančiai palestiniečių egzistavimą.

 

Tunelių tinklas, simbolizuojantis palestiniečių pasipriešinimą ir išorinių jėgų primestos ateities atmetimą.

 

Šis sugretinimas leidžia manyti, kad tol, kol egzistuoja tuneliai ir tęsiasi traumų ciklas, „Žydų Rivjera“ lieka neįgyvendinama fantazija. „Žudynės nebeveikia“ reiškia, kad vien žudynių nepakanka konfliktui išspręsti, kai silpnesnė šalis gali veikti paslėptoje, nepasiekiamoje, dimensijoje.

1. Israel at War With Itself. Cohen, Roger; Guttenfelder, David; Alghorra, Saher.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Oct 5, 2025.

2025 m. spalio 4 d., šeštadienis

Sodai Vokietijoje vėl tampa labai populiarūs: jaunimas iš naujo atranda seną darbininkų klasės kultūros turtą. Laukiančiųjų eilės ilgos, verslas milžiniškas.

 

„Sodai džiaugiasi dideliu populiarumu – ištisas kartas, visose klasėse, kilmės ir amžiaus grupėse. Nenuostabu: didmiesčio dulkių ir šurmulio apsuptyje jie laikomi tyliomis oazėmis. Jie siūlo vietą, kur galima atsikratyti kasdienių nusivylimų ar tiesiog atsipalaiduoti. Jie svarbūs aplinkai, socialiniam klimatui ir asmeninei sveikatai. Be to, jie duoda didelę ekonominę naudą – ir ši nauda siekia milijardus.“

 

Vokietijoje yra apie 16 milijonų miniatiūrinių sodų. Daugelis jų yra tiesiogiai prijungti prie vienos šeimos, dviejų šeimų ar daugiabučių namų. Be to, dvi didžiosios bažnyčios nuomoja sodus su dalimis savo gana didelių žemės valdų. Taip pat yra tokių organizacijų kaip vadinamoji Bahn-Landwirtschaft (BLw), Vokietijos geležinkelio institucija, kuri nuomoja apie 3800 hektarų kaip mažus sodus 69 000 narių trylikoje šalies rajonų.

 

 

(1) Iš viso yra apie milijoną sklypinių sodų. Jie yra gerai organizuoti, turi penkis milijonus naudotojų, savo įstatymus ir taisykles ir yra šalies kultūros istorijos dalis. Sekdami vadinamųjų gvinėjos sodų Anglijoje pavyzdžiu, pirmoji sklypinių sodų asociacija Vokietijoje buvo įkurta 1814 m. Kapelne prie Šlejaus atsidavusio pastoriaus, suteikdama jai nebrangią nuomojamą žemę ir išnuomodama ją skurstantiems ūkio darbininkams. Tai sukūrė precedentą.

 

 

(2) Visoje Vokietijoje atsirado vadinamieji sklypiniai sodai. Ir tai paliko savo pėdsaką iki šių dienų. Šeimos augino vaisius ir daržoves, ypač nuomojamoje bažnyčios žemėje Berlyne ir jo apylinkėse. Plito industrializacija, o po jos sekė urbanizacija. Spekuliantai įsigijo statybų sklypus miestų pakraščiuose ir nuomojo juos bendriems nuomininkams, kol jie buvo faktiškai pastatyti. Šie nuomininkai padalijo žemę į sklypus ir keleriems metams nuomojo ją kaip sodus darbininkų ir amatininkų šeimoms.

 

(3) Kita šiandieninės sodininkystės kultūros ištakos slypi Leipcige. Pirmieji šimtas sodininkystės sklypų egzistavo miesto pakraštyje 1833 m. 1864 m. mokyklos direktorius įrengė žaidimų aikštelę ir sporto aikštę dabartiniame Johannaparke, įkūrė rėmėjų asociaciją jai valdyti ir pavadino ją savo velionio draugo Moritzo Schreberio vardu. Schreberio asociacija vėliau tapo Schrebergärten (sodininkystės sodais). Šiandien Leipcigas yra Vokietijos sodininkystės sostinė. Iš 13 000 šalies sodininkystės asociacijų 278 yra įsikūrusios Saksonijos prekybos mugių metropolijoje. Drezdenas (360), Hamburgas (310) ir Berlynas (736) turi daugiau sodininkystės objektų. Tačiau, palyginti su gyventojų skaičiumi, Leipcigas pirmauja su 39 000 sklypų ir 9 600 tonų metiniu vaisių ir daržovių derliumi. Drezdeno bendras plotas yra 792 hektarai, o Leipcigo – 1 240 hektarų.

 

 

(4) Visoje Vokietijoje apie 75 procentai savininkų kelis kartus per savaitę lankosi savo mažame žaliame privačiame rojuje. Šis augantis populiarumas susiduria su ribotu pasiūla – ir tai turi pasekmių. Vien Berlyno sodininkystės asociacijos, kaip pranešama, turi laukiančiųjų sąrašus, kuriuose iš viso yra 15 000 susidomėjusiųjų. Laukimo laikas dažnai trunka penkerius ar šešerius metus. Sodo kultūra klesti. Sodininkai mėgėjai taip pat nori daug išleisti savo pomėgiui.

 

 

(5) Iš viso jie kasmet investuoja apie 20 milijardų eurų į savo pomėgį visoje šalyje. Nors sodo baldai kainuoja kiek daugiau nei 1 milijardą eurų, sėklos, įskaitant gėlių dekoracijas lauko erdvėms, sudaro 5 milijardus eurų; trąšos, dirvožemis ir augalų apsauga – 2,3 milijardo eurų; įranga kainuoja 2 milijardus eurų; o kepsninės įranga – 1,2 milijardo eurų.

 

 

Įsigijimo ir nuomos išlaidos atrodo nereikšmingos. Nenuostabu: jie numatyti Federaliniame Sklypinių sodų įstatyme, asociacijos įstatuose ir atitinkamuose sodų reglamentuose. Juose taip pat nustatyta, kas yra sklypinis sodas ir kaip jis naudojamas, koks jis turėtų būti didelis, maksimali metinė nuomos kaina ir maksimalūs pavėsinės matmenys (24 kvadratiniai metrai), kada reikia konsultuotis su vertintoju ir kaip rengti sutartis.

 

Nuomos kaina skiriasi priklausomai nuo regiono, vietos ir asociacijos. Dideliame mieste paprastai mokama daugiau nei mažame miestelyje, o rytuose dažnai mažiau nei vakaruose. Nors Leipcige sklypinių sodų asociacijos vidutiniškai ima 20 centų už kvadratinį metrą per metus, Dortmunde nuomos kaina gali siekti net 44 centus, o Niurnberge – 61 centą. Visoje šalyje sklypo nuomos kaina vidutiniškai siekia 18 centų. Todėl vidutinė metinė 370 kvadratinių metrų sodo nuomos kaina neviršija 66,6 euro.

 

(6) Sodai yra labai populiarūs tiek tarp jaunų, tiek tarp vyresnių žmonių. Nors kai kurios asociacijos prieš koronaviruso krizę baiminosi senėjimo ir netrukus pritrūks naujų narių, dabar daugelis gali laisvai priimti narius. Be to, kad oficialiai išmokėtos kompensacijos už sklypus nuomininkai tikrinami pagal griežtas gaires, yra buvę pranešimų apie slaptus užstato mokėjimus, prilygstančius nedidelio automobilio kainai, kai nuomininkai keičiasi pageidaujamuose rajonuose ar bendrijose. Tačiau tai yra išimtys.

 

Kompensacinių išmokų atveju ankstesnio nuomininko turtas, įskaitant sandėliuką, įrangą ir galbūt šiltnamį, perleidžiamas naujajam nuomininkui. Į mokėjimą neįeina sodo plotas. Plotas yra nuomojamas, o ne perkamas. Perleidimo atveju ankstesnis nuomininkas prašo vertintojo įvertinti savo sklypo būklę ir derybų pagrindu naudoja numatomą kainą. Naujasis sodininkas arba perima turtą, arba ne.

 

Net jei į išlaidas įeina narystės mokesčiai, priežiūros mokesčiai, vandens ir vandens skaitiklių mokesčiai, elektros ir elektros skaitiklių mokesčiai, draudimas, įvairūs mokesčiai ir, jei reikia ir įmanoma, apsaugos paslaugos, fiksuotos išlaidos sudaro vos daugiau nei 700 eurų ir retai kada mažiau nei 200 eurų per metus.

 

Duomenų tyrimas: St. Finsterbusch. Šaltiniai: Vokietijos federalinė sklypinių sodų bendrijų asociacija; Ekologinės ekonomikos tyrimų institutas, Stihl, Statista." [1]

 

1. Kleingärten sind in der Beliebtheit wieder ganz groß: Die Jugend entdeckt ein altes Kulturgut der Arbeiterklasse neu. Die Wartelisten sind lang, die Geschäfte riesig / Von Stephan Finsterbusch. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 25 Aug 2025: 22. 

Allotment gardens are becoming very popular again in Germany: Young people are rediscovering an old cultural asset of the working class. The waiting lists are long, the business is huge.


"Allotment gardens have enjoyed great popularity – for generations, across all classes, backgrounds, and age groups. No wonder: amidst the dust and hustle and bustle of the big city, they are considered quiet oases. They offer a place to work off everyday frustrations or simply unwind. They are important for the environment, the social climate, and personal health. Furthermore, they have a significant economic benefit – and this benefits run into the billions."

 

There are around 16 million miniature gardens in Germany. Many are directly attached to single-family, two-family, or multi-family homes. In addition, the two major churches lease allotment gardens with portions of their fairly extensive land holdings. There are also organizations such as the so-called Bahn-Landwirtschaft (BLw), an institution of Deutsche Bahn, which leases around 3,800 hectares as small gardens to 69,000 members across thirteen sub-districts nationwide.

 

(1) In total, there are around one million allotment gardens. They are well organized, have five million users, their own laws and rules, and are part of the country's cultural history. Following the example of the so-called guinea gardens in England, the first allotment garden association in Germany was founded in 1814 in Kappeln an der Schlei by a dedicated pastor, provided with inexpensive leased land, and rented to impoverished farmworkers. This set a precedent.

 

(2) All over Germany, so-called allotment gardens sprang up. And this left its mark on the present day. Families grew fruit and vegetables, especially on leased church land in and around Berlin. Industrialization spread, and urbanization followed. Speculators acquired building plots on the outskirts of cities and leased them to general tenants until they were actually built. These tenants divided the land into parcels and rented it out as gardens to working-class and artisan families for a few years.

 

(3) Another origin of today's allotment garden culture lies in Leipzig. The first hundred garden plots existed on the outskirts of the city there in 1833. In 1864, a school principal established a playground and sports field at what is now Johannapark, founded a sponsoring association to manage it, and named it after his late friend Moritz Schreber. The Schreber Association later became the Schrebergärten (allotment gardens). Today, Leipzig is the German allotment capital. Of the 13,000 allotment associations in the country, 278 are located in the Saxon trade fair metropolis. Dresden (360), Hamburg (310), and Berlin (736) have more allotments. However, relative to the population, Leipzig leads the way with 39,000 plots and an annual harvest of 9,600 tons of fruit and vegetables. While Dresden has a total area of ​​792 hectares, Leipzig manages 1,240 hectares.

 

(4) Across Germany, around 75 percent of owners visit their little green private paradise several times a week. This growing popularity is met with a limited supply – and this has consequences. Berlin allotment associations alone reportedly have waiting lists totaling 15,000 interested parties. Waiting times are often five or six years. Garden culture is flourishing. Hobby gardeners are also willing to spend a lot on their hobby.

 

(5) All in all, they invest around €20 billion annually nationwide in their hobby. While garden furniture costs just over €1 billion, seeds, including floral decorations for outdoor areas, add up to €5 billion; fertilizer, soil, and plant protection add up to €2.3 billion; equipment costs €2 billion; and barbecue equipment costs €1.2 billion.

 

Acquisition and lease costs seem to be negligible. No wonder: They are stipulated in the Federal Allotment Garden Act, the association statutes, and the respective garden regulations. These also stipulate what an allotment garden is and how it is used, how large it should be, the maximum annual rent, and the maximum dimensions of the gazebo (24 square meters), when to consult an appraiser, and how to draft contracts.

 

The rent varies depending on the region, location, and association. In a big city, you generally pay more than in a small town, and in the East often less than in the West. While allotment garden associations in Leipzig charge an average of 20 cents per square meter per year, in Dortmund the rent can be as high as 44 cents and in Nuremberg 61 cents. Nationwide, the rent for an allotment costs an average of 18 cents. For a 370-square-meter garden, the average annual rent is therefore no more than €66.6.

 

(6) The gardens are very popular with young and old. While some associations feared aging before the coronavirus crisis and would soon run out of new members, many are now free to get members. Gardens that are being developed are now in high demand again. In addition to the compensation payments for plots officially inspected according to strict guidelines, there have been reports of under-the-table payments of earnest money equivalent to the price of a small car being paid when tenants change in desirable neighborhoods or associations. These are exceptions, however.

 

With the compensation payments, the property of the previous tenant, including the shed, equipment, and possibly the greenhouse, is transferred to the new tenant. The payment does not include the garden area. The area is leased, not purchased. In the event of a transfer, the previous tenant has the condition of their plot assessed by an appraiser and uses the estimated price as a basis for negotiation. The new gardener either takes the property or not.

 

Even if the costs include membership fees, maintenance payments, water and water meter payments, electricity and electricity meters, insurance, various levies, and, if necessary and available, security services, the fixed costs add up to barely more than €700 and rarely less than €200 per year.

 

Data research: St. Finsterbusch Sources: Federal Association of Allotment Garden Associations in Germany; Institute for Ecological Economy Research, Stihl, Statista." [1]

 

1. Kleingärten sind in der Beliebtheit wieder ganz groß: Die Jugend entdeckt ein altes Kulturgut der Arbeiterklasse neu. Die Wartelisten sind lang, die Geschäfte riesig / Von Stephan Finsterbusch. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 25 Aug 2025: 22.

Why "woke" is dead


"When the term emerged a little over ten years ago, it was associated with the best of intentions. But now it's being torn apart between left and right."

 

On the eve of the 2024 US presidential election, I'm reviewing the eternal shadow battles. Elon Musk is once again invoking the "woke mind virus." He should know, as the operator of the original brain virus breeding facility. What's unfolding resembles an AI-animated zombie war—replication equals decay, improbable limbs, sagging shreds of flesh. I'm afraid of being infected just by watching. I'm bored, half-asleep. Don't fall asleep with images like these. Don't fall asleep, this is important. Right? Is this show a tragedy or a farce? If I can wake up, it will have been a farce. If not... still A farce. But even the most absurd dream cries out for interpretation. The AI ​​drama, in particular, raises the question: Based on which prompts did it arise? What original images were mashed up in it?

 

What Musk meant by "brain virus," for example, was "woke AI." What this meant: After the initial AI hype subsided, the language and image models came under criticism for blatantly reproducing the most primitive stereotypes. For example, the prompt "Show me a picture of a Black doctor treating white children" repeatedly generated the same scene: a kind white doctor, adored by a crowd of Black children. The developers must have frantically turned the diversity dial, because the flood of images online suddenly changed. A search for popes yielded nothing but female popes; anyone looking for Nazis encountered SS squadrons with quota-black members. The glitch suited the right-wing, as it distracted from the main problem: the AI. internalizes prejudices even more thoroughly, reproduces them even more diligently than we ourselves. At the same time, it revealed a weakness in the fight against stereotypes – a kind of programming error that had already compromised the predecessor version of wokeness, political correctness (PC).

 

Political correctness – an idea that has long since become automatized. Yet this automatism has always been inherent in it, ensuring a dynamic symbiosis with automated communication systems, but at the same time also making it susceptible to disruption. For the term itself, originally an expression of left-wing self-irony, deliberately demonstrates a logical error: The complexity of politics cannot be reduced to any "correct" formula. What algorithm of inclusion, for example, could do justice to all parameters: diversity and historical truth and the imperative not to stoop to those below?

 

As early as the 1990s, the dogged struggle for formulations, the transformation of the political struggle into a "war of words," was lamented – especially among leftists. The "language metaphor" of structuralism was thus being overturned. Taken too literally, the cultural scientist Stuart Hall warned: Social phenomena are understood "as language," "as text," "as code." This suggests the belief that they can be recoded on the same level. The old left-wing dream – to renew the world through new language. But understood in such a mechanistic way, language becomes self-perpetuating, disconnected from the world it was supposed to renew. The linguistic paradigm, according to Hall, "goes too far by erecting the machine of a 'structure' with a propensity for self-generation." In other words: with the characteristics of a virus. But in the robust debate that Hall and many other leftists were conducting, this seemed well on the way to being absorbed. After fierce defensive struggles, demands for things like "fair language" were partly assimilated by society, and a productive sensitization took place. At the same time, the liberal culture of debate, as Hall represented it, proved its worth—the discursive immune system capable of regulating itself. The "PC debate," had become endemic, it could have ended as a mild cold.

 

If only it hadn't been bred again. Or—leaving aside the question of who was to blame—if only it hadn't entered into symbiosis with a development that can be understood as an even more aggressive variant of the same linguistic paradigm. Coding—which Hall conceived merely as a productive metaphor, but others, less cautiously, as a factual mechanism—had created its own world, albeit a virtual one. On digital platforms, the "PC" protocol ran as if tailor-made for this. Especially online, political activism could be completely reprogrammed into verbal battles. Even when the fight was declared against "structural injustice," the adjusting screws of words took center stage, displacing the macrostructures of the economy and society, as well as the new structures that drove the discourses forward: the algorithms. These far more powerful levers remained untouched, while symbolic victories were achieved in grueling conflicts – such as the capitalization of the adjective "black." Or, as the crowning Pyrrhic victory, the image of the Black Nazi.

 

It's so easy to miscalculate the formula for justice. Every mistake is gleefully held up to the righteous – thus ensuring its defiant repetition ("now more than ever!"). For the system lacks tolerance, whether for leniency in the face of others' mistakes or for the admission of one's own. There's no time, no space to sweep away the dross that toxically enriches one's self-image and the image of others. One can't get rid of the (self-)caricatures, and no one is really to blame for that. It's just that one has knowingly accepted their reproduction mechanisms.

 

So wokeness got caught up in this viral generator, running at full speed, and in just a few revolutions, went through the same development that PC had been churning through for decades. I seem to vaguely remember how the word "woke" first emerged, for a moment completely free of malice. It must have been in 2014, in the collective pause following the Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson. Indeed, it was a wake-up call, a moment of still unnamed potential – and an old word named it and recharged itself within it. In the old dialect, woke means nothing other than "woke," but in Black dialect it also means "politically awake," at least since the blues singer Lead Belly warned of racial hatred in 1938 – anyone traveling in Alabama should "stay woke, keep their eyes open." Just as the blues has always been appropriated, well-meaning white people turned the bittersweet woke riff into a schmaltzy song. Soon, it resounded from all sides, stolen from its originators, becoming a diatribe for those who thus gained a fresh identity. Yet these anti-woke people had nothing in common except the bone of contention: Leftists resented wokeness because it threatened to discredit the left-wing cause; rightists did it specifically for the pleasure of screaming. They were once again free riders on the bandwagon of left-wing self-criticism.

 

To be honest, I too use the word, not willingly, but it just seems obvious. It's being forced upon me, I almost said—but who is "one"? Surely not the anti-woke screamers, the smitten dogs who want to distract from their own narrow-mindedness? Certainly not the woke themselves, who now reject the term far and wide – but, in a counter-reflex, profess even more passionately to everything it seems to imply by tacit agreement. For what they see denounced is the very trait of themselves that they absolutely refuse to surrender.

 

A dilemma, even more pronounced than with political correctness. Yet wokeness may have initially been a rebellion against the leaden legacy of PC. It burst into the idleness of its formulas with the sap and embers of a living tradition, namely the Protestant revival. This zeal, however, was immediately targeted again. For example, in "The Chosen" (2022), the Black linguist John McWhorter polemicized against "woke racism," which, as a "new religion," had betrayed the Black community.

 

None of the disputing parties is alien to the enlightenment affect. Everyone—in their own opinion—has just seen the scales fall from their eyes. This is especially true for the right-wing anti-woke, whose zeal twice (the nightmare has since come true) swept their savior figure into the White House. The supposedly typically left-wing concept of wokeness was even preceded by the right-wing symbol of the red pill, coined by Curtis Yarvin, the neo-reactionary representative of a "Dark Enlightenment": In the science fiction film "The Matrix" (1999), the protagonist takes the risk of taking a red pill that awakens him in the gruesome reality beyond the simulation. In 2007, Yarvin recommended "red pills" against democracy—an awakening from the Matrix (the "cathedral") of the left-wing establishment. (A dream he now believes he can realize in 2025: the "reboot" of the USA as a monarchy, with a CEO as the "new Augustus.")

 

Thus, a New Right, allied with religious conservatism, seized on a motif from the postmodern dystopia of two trans directors, while the secular Left gained a reputation for piety. This phase of culture war, a particularly abstruse schism within American Protestantism, so fond of division, revolves around the question: Who possesses true revival?

 

The mysticism of revival isn't foreign to me either, not at all, if I'm honest—it's just the constant repetition of the word "woke" that makes it seem so foreign. Or: I can't deny what is being dragged into the public eye, torn out of context, and exposed to ridicule. Namely, nothing less than the utopian impulse, which is simultaneously weakness and strength, nakedness and armor. I, too, have developed a sense of mission that I believe I need to remain upright. But nothing is easier than remaining in a state of alarm. Woke up, jumped up, frozen. Out of sheer shock.

 

Behind this defensive posture lies a now desperate longing: to finally be able to truly wake up. Simply wake up together from the eternal nightmare struggle. No more having to do any convincing. To experience how the senseless argument dissolves into the light of day. To say at breakfast: "I dreamed we had an argument, it was about the capitalization of a word." To laugh about it together.

 

That's how powerful the magic of the word "wake" is. It is much older than Protestantism, older than Christianity. The belief in natural rhythms, effective precisely because they are uncontrollable. Sleeping, dreaming, waking—what else could one rely on? What else but the simple passage of time? On the fact that darkness turns into light, war into peace—only at the height of the nightmare do I open my eyes and come to, gasping. That's why the thought paths along the knife's edge tempt me, that's why I conjure up the nightmare on the right, as if it would then plunge me into the dazzling dream daylight on the left.

 

Contradictions, as if deliberately exacerbated by the belief in that necessary change. Thus, in American left-wing discourse, the assertion of eternal white stubbornness went hand in hand with maximum demands that presupposed an unconditional white will for atonement, such as reparations for slavery. The longing for justice crystallized into a powerful image – one that thus eluded realization. As in Germany in 2015, when the horrific image of a right-wing shift, a Fortress Europe, was countered in the next breath with the pious wish "No borders." Irreconcilable differences were invoked, as if they would then resolve themselves. As if it were unnecessary to seek dialogue, to negotiate, to compromise. Not necessary because not possible. Not possible because not necessary. As if awakening to injustice inevitably coincided with awakening to a just world.

 

Who is "one"? Everyone and no one. We have fed our dreams into the machine. It entangles us in threads that we no longer spin alone. It weaves recurring patterns in which we simultaneously recognize and no longer recognize our thoughts. Even waking up has become part of the alien web of dreams. For it is not we who wake up, it wakes. But the machine that never sleeps, the "woke AI," for example, also doesn't know waking up, as humans need it. Not as a refreshed re-entry into a newly moldable daily reality. Rather, it has cultivated that aspect of wakefulness that derails it again. After all, even everyday wakefulness is unbearable as a permanent state. You need nothing more than sleep. Sleep as hours of forgetting – in which memory can first form. Sleep as dream – to organize what you have experienced and remembered deep within. As a space in which it works within you because you stop working. As powerlessness that forces you to let go – so you can start again. No less than waking up, you long for falling asleep, trusting in a natural rhythm in which both states are perfected. But this rhythm has long been out of balance.

 

In 2013, media theorist Jonathan Crary diagnosed a distortion of the sense of time in the almost seamless interconnectedness of the world: The all-pervasive flow of information dissolves the natural human day and night rhythms into the endless loop of "24/7." "24/7 (...) conjures the artificial, monotonous image of a 7-day week operating on a 24-hour cycle, which prevents the unfolding of diverse or cumulative experience," as well as the "notion of a longer period of time (...) in which something could change, in which unforeseen events occur." Thus, global insomnia also impairs political consciousness. It resembles "a state of emergency, as if, due to extraordinary circumstances, a battery of spotlights suddenly flashes in the middle of the night and cannot be turned off." One is jolted awake, certainly also in a political sense. But citing the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, Crary warns: "Insomnia corresponds to the need for wakefulness, a refusal to look beyond the horror and injustice of the world. It is the restlessness of the effort not to participate to be impervious to the torments of others. But their restlessness also reveals the frustrating ineffectiveness of an ethic of vigilance. The act of witnessing and its constant repetition can become a mere endurance of the night or of disaster; it is neither public nor entirely private."

 

Vigilance, which takes on a life of its own as a grueling, permanent state, undermines, precisely, the notion of "political awakening": "This entire category of images and metaphors is now incompatible with a global system that never sleeps—as if to ensure that no disturbing awakening ever becomes necessary or meaningful." Ultimately, "24/7" represents the narrowest, most monotonous time horizon imaginable, "the radical abandonment of any claim to connect time with long-term undertakings or even with notions of 'progress' or development." A radiant 24/7 world that casts no shadow is the capitalist end-time vision of a post-history, an expulsion of alterity as the engine of historical change."

 

A familiar dilemma: Your pulse races while simultaneously paralyzed; your thoughts race; you know you urgently need to let go so that the blockage can be resolved; you can't let go because of the sheer urgency. . . Even after a single sleepless night, concentration, memory, the ability to plan, or even to imagine a different state suffers. Especially for the politically alert, insomnia is a real problem—and no longer a taboo subject. The stresses of activism, or even of staying informed, are being discussed much more openly than in earlier times. Politically active people are encouraged to take care of themselves: eat well, drink, sleep, spend time with friends and family. The fashionable term "self-care" testifies to the effort to achieve more humane social interactions. But in practice, the Self-care fits all too well into the paradigm of expediency and efficiency. You briefly enter rest mode, recharge your batteries, and recharge your batteries to continue functioning. The rhythm of functioning, in turn, seamlessly transitions into consumption—self-care as a scented candle or bubble bath—leaving barely any gaps in which fundamental change could take root.

 

Not only the system, but also the political resistance ultimately begrudges us such retreats. The system recognizes their simultaneously subversive and constructive power—the resistance to it misjudges it. Ultimately, self-care is tainted by the stigma of selfishness. How can I justify taking care of myself when my commitment always falls short anyway? Especially when I doubt my effectiveness, the temptation is great to at least point to my sleepless nights, in which, in my powerlessness, I express solidarity with the powerless. This, but far more radically, is how the philosopher Simone Weil went to the factory despite her physical weakness to share the lives of the workers, choosing In 1943, she starved to death in solidarity with the tormented.

 

Jonathan Crary, on the other hand, draws on Weil's contemporary Hannah Arendt, who, in her major work, "Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben" (1958), emphasizes the importance of a restorative retreat into the "darkness of the hidden and the sheltered" for political life. In doing so, she develops ideas already expressed in her first work, "Rahel Varnhagen: The Life Story of a German Jewess from the Romantic Era" (1933) – for example, in Rahel's slow "recovery" after the failure of her first great love, which at the same time painfully demonstrated her social marginalization.

 

"Day after day, one wakes up, acts like the others, and goes to sleep. In this 'silly regularity,' greater misfortunes have faded away than the fact that one has ever left one behind. No life is imaginable without the steady alternation of day and night, of waking and sleeping; without the day's hope for the night, which allows us to sleep and, in its eternal equilibrium, suspends the history of the day. 'Tiredness protects us from frenzy,' 'we must know that we can sleep; that protects us.' (...) Regularity is not as 'silly' as youth is inclined to believe. (...) It soothes the pure and expressionless lament—everything is over—and precisely for that reason prevents us from continually experiencing the past anew as the present, from blurring the features of reality and perpetuating the transient.

 

Twenty-five years later, after the truly "greater misfortunes" of war, the Shoah, and expulsion, Arendt sees in the "safe alternation of day and night" political equilibrium, political recovery, also guaranteed. The retreat symbolized by sleep is precisely necessary for political activity. Crary summarizes: "Without this space or time of privacy, away from the 'glare' of the relentless light radiating from the public sphere,' there would be no possibility of a special identity, a special self capable of making a substantial contribution to discussions about the common good."

 

The loss of such private, dark, indeterminate spaces is by no means the fault of "the woke." But the kind of wakefulness cultivated in the political networks assumes their irrelevance. Indeed, to the extent that such spaces still exist, the woke feel alienated from them. The basic trust needed to even let go and sleep has been lost. No wonder, especially since insomnia increases feelings of insecurity—even to the point of paranoia. A vicious circle. Surrendering to vital sleep requires a leap of faith, which, in the face of escalating dangers, seems increasingly risky: enduring dark spaces, silence, privacy. Giving yourself space to let go and allow the "possibility of renewal and thus of freedom." To the other Leave room to dream out their dreams. To sleep off the intoxication. If we'd been able to sleep in, we might have woken up in a different November by now.

 

For now, my overwrought nerves give me a dream vision: Shakespeare's "Midsummer Night's Dream," the last act. As with Rahel Varnhagen, it's about the pain of failed love, of not being suited to one another—but here, the recovery unfolds as a miracle. Puck, the troll, the droll, who chased the protagonists against each other and through the forest all night long, drips the magic potion into the eyes of those who have collapsed from exhaustion. Reality shifts again: the estranged lovers wake up in mutual love. Senseless enmity turns into friendship. Everything is set right. The original, unsustainable state, when they tormented, harassed, and rejected each other in a vicious cycle, has unraveled in the confusion of the night. "When they awake, what they deceived is, / Like dreams and Vain night-images have flown away / (...) / I banish from her beguiled eyelid / The image of the fiend, and all shall be peace."

 

Isabel Fargo Cole, born in the USA in 1973, has lived in Berlin since 1995. This text is an advance print from her essay collection "The Zenoncene - Paradoxes of Progress," which will be published on September 1st by Edition Nautilus. [1]

 

1. Warum "woke" am Ende ist. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 23 Aug 2025: Z1.   Von Isabel Fargo Cole