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How A.I. Might Change the Way Doctors Think


“One of the first doctorly tasks for medical students is learning to write the clinical note. Before they have even finished their anatomy and physiology courses, they are sent to patients’ bedsides with a teaching physician and asked to come back with a written account of what happened there: what the patient said, what was observed and, in due course, as they gain experience, what diagnoses might explain the patient’s symptoms and what might be done to treat them. When I was in med school, this work felt like an earned, almost ceremonial initiation, one of the humble rituals through which a student starts to act and feel like a doctor.

 

We were there to learn, and without caseloads of our own to manage, we sure had the hours to write these notes. But as we matured into resident physicians, then attending physicians, that time no longer felt available to us, and the production of notes no longer felt like a privilege. They felt tiresome and detached from what medicine was really about: talking with patients, thinking through their symptoms and, hopefully, making them better. Many of us began to see the note as something that had very little to do with — and maybe even got in the way of — treating patients. If we reclaimed all those hours, couldn’t we take better care of people?

 

So, when the hospital where I work as an E.R. doctor debuted artificial-intelligence assistants — they listen in the background through our phones as we meet with patients, then churn out polished, in-depth notes — I was eager to try them out. I had already heard about their potential, having spoken a couple of years earlier to the chief executive of a leading A.I. medical-scribe company. As he described his product, I imagined the doctor I would become: a better, more attentive healer, someone able to unhurriedly devote more time to patients at their bedsides instead of furiously typing at her computer. (Selfishly, I also envisioned improved interactions with my own physician, whom I see once a year, always with her eyes glued to her screen as her fingers click away on a keyboard.)

 

This is also the vision that the makers of A.I. scribes are selling to medical facilities. Start-ups have proliferated, raising nearly $5 billion since 2019 and promising to both relieve clinicians from burnout and provide health systems with greater efficiency. For a study published last year, every one of the 43 nonprofit health systems in the United States that completed the survey reported that it was developing, piloting or already deploying A.I. scribes. While of course not every physician will choose to use this tool — though institutional pressures could someday make it feel more like a requirement than an option — the rate of adoption has reached as high as 80 percent in some clinics and departments.

 

Adam Rodman, a Harvard Medical School professor and the director of A.I. programs at the Carl J. Shapiro Institute for Education and Research, referred to A.I. on a recent podcast as “probably the fastest-adopted medical technology of all time.” For all of the exhilarating possibilities A.I. brings to medicine — diagnosing rare diseases, predicting individuals’ risks, discovering elusive drugs — one of its strongest footholds in health care today is its ability to eavesdrop on conversations and quickly generate notes from them.

 

This process involves more than merely transcribing a recorded interaction between doctor and patient. An A.I. scribe extracts and synthesizes the information from that conversation — sometimes offering its own take as well — and produces a document in the structure and tone of a clinical note.

 

The note, I must say, comes out beautiful! No typos, proper grammar, complete sentences. Many doctors are delighted. I have been too. After all, wasn’t this always A.I.’s great seduction? To transport us away from all the boring, tedious busywork? Only later did it occur to me that something might also get lost along the way.

 

At least for now, though, trialing A.I. to write notes offers maybe the safest way to broadly introduce this technology into health care — as a low-risk application, far removed from the much more frightening prospect of letting machines make life-or-death decisions about treatment. No wonder A.I. scribes are spreading so quickly. Health systems, after years of hearing doctors complain that the computer was coming between them and their patients, are finally investing in something that seems to promise a way back.

 

The modern chart began to emerge around the turn of the 19th century, as medicine moved into hospitals, where patients were under observation day after day, their illnesses followed over time. Early American hospital records consisted mostly of admission and discharge books, with more administrative information about patients than clinical details. Eventually, hospitals began preserving fuller case histories, retrospectively copied by scriveners from physicians’ private notebooks. By the end of the century, New York Hospital, one of the country’s first hospitals, advised physicians to write at the bedside “with such care and in such a manner” that their notes could become part of the permanent institutional record.

 

This documentation served the hospital’s record-keeping needs more than those of the individual patient. It wasn’t until 1907, at the Mayo Clinic, in Rochester, Minn., that the chart started to be integrated more directly into the patient’s care. Around the same time, nursing observations, test results and other clinical information also began finding their way into the medical record. Henry Plummer, an endocrinologist at Mayo, and his assistant, Mabel Root, created a dedicated record for each patient, gathering a person’s medical history in one file rather than leaving it dispersed across separate ledgers and admissions documents. The patient, not the ward or the single hospital stay, became the organizing principle. A chart now followed a person across visits and time; if the patient returned, another doctor could pick up the thread of his or her care.

 

The notes themselves, however, could be chaotic. Lawrence Weed, a physician and research scientist, saw any disorder in doctors’ notes as disorder in thought. He criticized writing that concealed how a doctor had moved from symptom to diagnosis to plan. Weed’s response, while he was a professor in the 1960s at what is now Case Western Reserve University, was to put forward the methodical structure that became the basis for what’s now known as the SOAP note still used today: subjective, for what the patient reports; objective, for what the doctor observes or measures; and, arguably most important, the assessment and plan: what the doctor thinks is happening and what she intends to do about it. This discipline pushed physicians to bring order to their thinking and make their reasoning visible on the page.

 

For decades, these notes were clipped to patients’ charts at the feet of their beds, or they filled big binders at the nurses’ stations. Then electronic medical records came along, as well as the computers that facilitated them; as this innovation became widespread in the late 2000s, it transformed clinical notes once again. My own development as a doctor coincided with this transition in American medicine. For several years, I bounced back and forth between paper and electronic notes, both jotting and typing, depending on the protocol at the hospital where I happened to be working. As someone who first got a computer in high school, I felt mostly at ease with the electronic medical record and didn’t mind when it fully took over. But several older, much wiser colleagues who were two-finger typists were unable to adapt and had to stop seeing patients. Medicine lost some really good doctors during that time.

 

Typing offers at least one undeniable advantage, though: It removes the hazardous potential of doctors’ handwriting, which is often as illegible as their signatures. A scribbled “hydroxyzine” could be mistaken for “hydralazine,” whose use might cause a plunge in blood pressure rather than the soothing of an itch; a hurried “1” could look like “7” and lead to a dangerous overdose. Whatever frustrations the electronic medical record later brought — copy-paste clutter, inbox overload, endless clicks — it nonetheless made the note legible and easy to share. And even as the note moved from paper to screen, the words themselves were still composed by doctors.

 

When I first began using A.I. scribes, I regarded them as the natural next step in this long evolution of the medical record. I had not yet thought to ask whether changes to the note’s structure or the medium in which it was produced were a different sort of advance from letting a machine write the note. Instead, I was focused on all the notes I had to juggle during a busy, exhausting shift and the relief A.I. scribes would provide. As long as the note captured my thinking in some way, even if the words were not my own, what difference did it make how it came to be drafted?

 

In the E.R., interactions between patient and doctor rarely unfold neatly and logically. A patient starts with a description of chest pain, circles back to a fever, remembers a medication he stopped taking, mentions a family history of heart disease only after his wife prompts him, then adds one more symptom as the encounter is wrapping up. But the A.I. scribe converts that wandering, stuttering exchange into a tidy clinical synthesis — a miracle, it seems! The messy human sprawl of the visit returned to me clean and perfectly punctuated in less than a minute.

 

For a while, after I started using the scribe, my role in creating the medical note seemed simple: read the draft, correct what was wrong, sign it. So fast, so easy.

 

But then the process began to discomfit me, as I slowly realized that editing a note I did not create does not demand the same of me as writing a note. I was no longer thinking through the interaction with a patient and the meaning of the information I had gathered from the visit. I was checking a version that had already been made for me.

 

This distinction seemed small at first. The notes had been generated from my encounters, from the things that were said in the exam room. And I was still revising and proofreading the A.I.’s output afterward. Over time, though, I have come to see how much of my own thinking had been bound up in the writing process itself.

 

Daniel Kahneman, the behavioral psychologist and Nobel laureate in economics, distinguished between two modes of judgment: the quick, intuitive impressions that arise almost automatically and the slower, more effortful reasoning that questions them. A doctor must work in both. Often, I begin to sense a diagnosis as soon as I walk into a patient’s room, before I can fully explain it; when I write my notes, I tend to slow down to do my more deliberate thinking.

 

The process of note-writing helps me formulate my medical decision-making and then check whether it really holds up. If I find myself trying too hard to explain away a patient’s symptoms, trying too hard to dismiss a worrisome vital sign, trying too hard to fit an abnormal result into a reassuring narrative, then maybe I need to revise my conclusions. Have I not ruled something out as convincingly as I first thought? Am I tethering myself too quickly to a diagnosis? The patient might need another question, another exam, another test. You have to convince yourself as much as anyone else.

 

When that cognitive labor is offloaded to a machine, I’ve come to see, my job shifts. Even when I try to speak my reasoning aloud for the A.I. scribe, I am still doing something different from writing the note myself. I am no longer using the note, sentence by sentence, to think through the case in my own words, to decide what to emphasize, what to soften — or, as I’m writing, to identify when my reasoning strains. And unlike when I dictate a note, I can’t watch my own phrasing appear on the screen in real time. With the A.I.-generated note, I am instead auditing afterward. I am playing a version of “Where’s Waldo?” — What’s missing? Has this note gone astray, and if so, where? — and it’s a search made all the more difficult because the A.I.’s draft arrives fluent, confident. It sounds so right.

 

That cognitive shift does not happen the moment the A.I. scribe delivers a note. It begins in the exam room. Because I know A.I. is recording, I stop listening in the same way. Before A.I. scribes arrived, I would outline a story in my head as a patient talked, fitting the pieces together so I would know what to ask next. In the scribe’s presence, that work is deferred. Let the machine do it! The mind drifts.

 

In E.R. settings, patients handed off from one doctor to another when shifts change often feel less known to us; an inherited patient can come already filtered through someone else’s account. With A.I. running in the background, something similar happens: Even when I’m the first doctor to see someone, those patients began to feel, strangely, less my own.

 

That altered feeling in the exam room troubles me for another reason: The machine is eavesdropping. I am not so worried that the audio might surface in a courtroom years later. (We have been told the recordings are stored for three months.) What unsettles me is that the interaction no longer feels quite like what medicine, at its heart, is supposed to be: an intimate exchange between two humans. The hospital room should be able to hold fear, shame and guilt, to shelter the things people say in the depths of illness. I have listened to mothers admit they resent their babies; partners confess infidelity; cancer patients say they are ready to die but loved ones refuse to let go; a subway conductor grieve the man who fell onto the tracks in front of his train. When every word is being recorded, no matter that the recording stays confined to a machine, something feels diminished. There is, or ought to be, something close to sacred in such moments.

 

The practice of medicine also depends on another kind of exchange: the one between doctors. Last year, a colleague had a follow-up visit with a patient I had seen. Reading my note, she texted me afterward: “I felt your anxiety.” That was what I had hoped that patient’s note would transmit: not just my conclusions but also the pressure behind them — what worried me, where I still felt uneasy. The note was providing what Weed believed the medical record should: “a communication for all time.”

 

Now, when I read some notes generated by A.I. for other doctors, I am less sure about what my colleagues really thought. Bloated notes can turn a straightforward matter into an opus. A.I. can give as much attention to a stubbed toe as to complex rheumatologic findings and unusual surgical complications. Notes can be well composed without necessarily being clarifying. Often, I find myself skimming, trying to tease out what concerns might lie beneath all the lovely prose. What, exactly, was the doctor trying to say here? What, in fact, was she thinking?

 

Today, if they want, patients can also read these notes, instantly on an app on their phones — and sometimes they do, even while still lying on the stretcher in front of you. This can occasionally be awkward, though overall it is probably a good thing.

 

Even so, medical language can confuse or cause alarm. Perhaps A.I. could translate doctors’ notes automatically and make the jargon and shorthand more understandable. I recall a patient who was upset by a note in which another doctor, describing her symptoms, wrote “+anorexia.” The doctor meant poor appetite related to her recent illness; the patient thought she had been diagnosed with an eating disorder, anorexia nervosa. And doctors’ notes have long carried their own codes and biases; A.I. might avoid such stigmatizing expressions.

 

Currently, though, it’s not foolproof. Recently, a colleague lamented that it had introduced a new offense, calling her patient “an alcoholic.” (At least doctors can conveniently blame the machine now: A.I. did it, not me!)

 

Just a few years ago, it seemed that the business of medicine was catching on to the fact that rigid, templated notes didn’t necessarily improve the care patients received. The dreaded “review of systems” — a checklist for symptoms we had to go through for every organ in a person’s body — stopped being required for billing purposes. Nor did we have to catalog every feature of, say, someone’s abdominal pain just to be fully reimbursed for having treated it. The focus returned to our medical decision-making, the section of the note doctors long valued the most. Why, then, are we now letting A.I. take over this task?

 

Its rollout might offer a possible answer. When A.I. scribes were introduced at my hospital, a video circulated that showed several colleagues championing the initiative. Toward the end, one physician listed the selling points: increased productivity, increased revenue and — coming last — improved care. Perhaps the sequence meant nothing. But now I wonder whether the note is being turned over to A.I. to help doctors do better by their patients or to pursue efficiency in yet another area of medicine.

 

So far, studies have found that doctors who choose to use A.I. scribes experience a reduced burden when it comes to documenting their work and feel less burnout. Many clinicians who rely on the technology also report that it substantially lightens their cognitive load, a temptation I know myself: I too have been drawn to it, particularly when I’m tired, because, well, it makes my job feel less taxing — in the moment, anyway.

 

But what remains largely unstudied is how A.I. scribes affect cognition in a deeper sense: how outsourcing the note to them erodes the ways doctors think and alters the process by which they decide what matters. The danger is not only that A.I. might write something wrong. It is that, in writing something fluid and plausible, A.I. may make it easier for us to offload some of the reasoning medicine requires, to do less of the painstaking work of sorting through uncertainty ourselves. That loss, I fear, will eventually show up in the clinical care patients receive.

 

On certain afternoons, in my early years at med school, preselected patients — motivated, I suspect, by the boredom of lying around all day in their hospital beds — surrendered to us students. We timidly repeated meandering questions (patients no doubt wondering why they were being asked the same thing again) and clumsy exams (students wondering why we couldn’t hear through our stethoscopes before realizing the wrong side was touching the patient). Still, we managed to collect precious material in the little notebooks that we stuffed into the pockets of our white coats. We then did our best to piece together our scribbles into a coherent clinical note, struggling on the page to make sense of what these patients had just told us. Though I didn’t know it at the time, it was then that I was starting to think like a doctor.

 

What proved most thorny were the real, live persons in front of us. Unlike their textbook analogues, these patients didn’t stick to how their diagnoses said they should feel. They had too many symptoms. Or too few. Or they were described in terms that didn’t match what we had memorized. Why did these symptoms point toward one diagnosis and not another? How to explain the signs that seemed off in some way? Our syntheses were often thin or flat-out wrong; we knew too little medicine for it to be otherwise. But that was not really the point. The note was where we began learning how to take a scatter of subjective descriptions and bodily findings and make meaning out of them.

 

We were taking part in a tradition that William Osler, a founding professor of the Johns Hopkins medical school, helped establish in the late 1800s, in which a medical education was expected to extend beyond the lecture hall. Students were sent to the bedside early in their schooling, where they were told to “observe, record, tabulate, communicate.” Writing was an important part of that apprenticeship, turning what students heard and saw at the bedside into instruction. As the education scholar Janet Emig wrote in an influential 1977 essay, “Writing represents a unique mode of learning — not merely valuable, not merely special, but unique.”

 

A student’s note is rarely elegant. But it shows the conversion that medicine requires: from describing to understanding to judgment. It demonstrates what has been noticed and missed, what has been overvalued and underestimated. “The student’s way of organizing the data should reveal to the teacher whether or not the student writing the history sees the whole story,” Weed wrote. When I work with students in the E.R., their notes, imperfect as they are, tell me how a future doctor is learning to think.

 

The next generation of doctors is coming of age in a world where A.I. can summarize research, answer clinical questions, make diagnoses. I wouldn’t suggest that students and trainees should be insulated from A.I. entirely. The tools may be shiny and new, but the habit is not: Doctors have always used reference works, from pocket manuals to door-stopper textbooks.

 

In the E.R., I won’t hesitate to consult A.I. platforms, such as OpenEvidence, a professional chatbot that is trained on peer-reviewed medical literature; more than ever before, they provide me with information that is current, easier to find and personalized for patients. In these ways, A.I. can help me return to the bedside with sharper judgment, armed with the latest evidence.

 

But that is different from outsourcing the written account in which a doctor — or a student who will become one — thinks through a patient. As far as I know, medical students are not using A.I. to write their notes. I worry, though, that as the profession grows more comfortable treating the note as something A.I. can handle, the exercise of writing one may begin to seem expendable.

 

Which is why an email I received several months ago felt so consequential — and so disheartening. Third-year medical students rotating through our E.R., it read, would no longer be required to write notes during their shifts.

 

Maybe I will eventually figure out how to use A.I. scribes without letting them shortcut my clinical reasoning. Maybe the editing process, if done carefully enough, can spur some of the thinking that writing once demanded. Or maybe I will simply be swept along in their uptake, as A.I. scribes become less a choice than an institutional norm.

 

In medicine, what becomes routine inevitably becomes part of what trainees understand doctoring to be. If note-writing recedes, any loss might not be obvious at first, obscured in part by the immediate rewards of efficiency. Later, however, we might realize how much the making of a doctor depended on that work.

 

Helen Ouyang is a physician and associate professor at Columbia University and contributing writer for the magazine. She is also a fellow at the Type Media Center.” [1]

 

1. How A.I. Might Change the Way Doctors Think. Ouyang, Helen.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jul 1, 2026.

Kinijos planas išsaugoti darbo vietas nuo dirbtinio intelekto


„Kinijos laboratorija neseniai pristatė dar vieną neįtikėtinai galingą ir neįtikėtinai pigų dirbtinio intelekto modelį. „Z.ai“ sukurtas GLM-5.2 yra beveik toks pat geras kaip naujausias „Anthropic“ modelis, tačiau kainuoja mažiau nei dešimtadalį jo kainos.

 

 

Dirbtinio intelekto lenktynės tarp JAV ir Kinijos buvo abiejų šalių aukščiausių valdžios lygmenų dėmesio centre.

 

 

Tačiau galingiausio modelio sukūrimas nėra vienintelis – ir galbūt net ne geriausias – būdas įvertinti dirbtinio intelekto sėkmę. Šiandien rašau apie sritį, kuriai skirta mažiau dėmesio, bet kurioje Kinija gali turėti pranašumą: žmogiškųjų ir politinių DI revoliucijos pasekmių valdymą.

 

 

Jei yra vienas dalykas, kurio bijo Kinijos komunistų partija, tai neramus proletariatas.

 

 

Uhane, didžiausioje pasaulyje atviroje laboratorijoje be vairuotojų automobiliams, taksi vairuotojai pirmą kartą skundėsi dėl augančio robotų taksi parko prieš dvejus metus. Buvo pateiktos peticijos. Socialinių tinklų įrašai buvo pažymėti grotažymėmis. Vietos gyventojų pasipiktinimas buvo triukšmingas.

 

 

Tai sutelkė dėmesį partijos nariai, kurie greitai reagavo, kad cenzūruotų protestus internete. Tačiau tai taip pat paskatino permąstyti tai, kas neramina daugelį ir Vakaruose. Kaip išvengti masinio žmonių išstūmimo iš darbo rinkos dėl dirbtinio intelekto – ir su tuo susijusios politinės reakcijos?

 

Kinija turi daugiau patirties automatizuojant darbus nei dauguma šalių. Jos gamyklose dirba daugiau nei du milijonai robotų. Daugelyje miestų važinėja bevairiai pristatymo furgonai. Aptarnavimo robotai aptarnauja svečius viešbučiuose ir restoranuose. Automobilių stovėjimo aikštelėse robotai keičia išsikrovusias elektromobilių baterijas. Dronai pristato pietus.

 

Iki šiol pasekmės daugiausia buvo darbininkų tarpe. Tačiau dirbtinis intelektas pirmiausia kelia grėsmę kolegijų absolventams. Autoritariniam režimui, kuris bijo politinio nestabilumo, ši grupė istoriškai kėlė problemų.

 

Štai kodėl Kinijos tikslas tapti pasauline dirbtinio intelekto supervalstybe dabar oficialiai susietas su kitu tikslu: išlaikyti žmones dirbtinio intelekto ekonomikos centre. Ir per pastaruosius metus vyriausybė pradėjo ryžtingiau veikti, kad tai įvyktų.

 

„Darbo išlaisvinimas“, po vieną teismo bylą

 

Kai Komunistų partija nori parodyti, kad ji iš tikrųjų kažką reiškia, įtraukdama tai į penkerių metų planą. Dabartinio penkerių metų plano 72 puslapyje Kinija įsipareigoja „išsamiai spręsti“ dirbtinio intelekto poveikio užimtumui klausimą.

 

Kalbėjausi su Kyle'u Chanu iš Brukingso instituto, kuris tyrinėja Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto politiką.

 

Jis man pasakė, kad Kinija nori, jog dirbtinis intelektas papildytų žmones – tai yra, padarytų juos produktyvesnius senose ir naujose pramonės šakose, – o ne juos pakeistų. Ir pereidama prie šios dirbtinio intelekto ekonomikos, ji teigia norinti sušvelninti poveikį, kad būtų išvengta socialinių pasekmių.

 

Mano kolegė Catie Edmondson neseniai rašė apie tai, kaip tai atrodo. Žmogiškųjų išteklių ir socialinės apsaugos ministerija žada „tikslinę užimtumo paramą pagrindinėms pramonės šakoms“. Vienas Nacionalinio liaudies kongreso narys ragina sukurti „DI nedarbo draudimo programą“ kaip apsauginį tinklą atleistiems darbuotojams. Partijos pareigūnai ragino rengti profesinį mokymą, kuris padėtų darbuotojams prisitaikyti prie DI orientuotos darbo rinkos.

 

Kinijos mokslininkai netgi kuria sritį, kurią vadina DI marksizmu – bando taikyti marksistinį požiūrį į tokius klausimus kaip „Kas arba kas kuria vertę po DI revoliucijos?“. (Mašina? Žmogus, kuris ją išrado? Žmogus, kuris ją valdo?)

 

Turbūt labiausiai stebina tai, kad vyriausybė labai remiasi įmonėmis, kad šios išvengtų atleidimų iš darbo. O tie, kurie nesilaiko nurodymų, gali atsidurti teisme.

 

Jau buvo priimta keletas garsių sprendimų, kuriais palaikomi atleisti darbuotojai. Balandžio mėnesį teismas nusprendė, kad technologijų įmonė neteisėtai atleido darbuotoją, pakeitusi jį dirbtinio intelekto programine įranga. Nutarime buvo pateiktas netiesioginis įspėjimas kitiems darbdaviams.

 

„Dirbtinio intelekto technologijų kūrimas turėtų būti taikomas darbo jėgos išlaisvinimui, užimtumo skatinimui ir žmonių pragyvenimo šaltinių gerinimui“, – rašė Hangdžou tarpinis liaudies teismas. „Darbo teisė leidžia darbdaviams atlikti technologinius pakeitimus ir atnaujinti savo veiklą, tačiau ji taip pat turėtų atsižvelgti į darbuotojų teisėtų teisių ir interesų apsaugą.“

 

Kaip tai veiks praktiškai ir kiek toli vyriausybė iš tikrųjų pasirengusi eiti su įmonėmis, kurios nesilaiko reikalavimų, dar reikia pamatyti. Tačiau šie sprendimai pabrėžia, kiek Kinija galvoja apie šią problemą.

 

 

Dvi skirtingos dirbtinio intelekto vizijos

 

 

JAV leidžia technologijų įmonėms imtis iniciatyvos dirbtinio intelekto srityje, o Silicio slėnis daugiausia dėmesio skiria vienam dalykui: sukurti itin intelektualias mašinas, galinčias pakeisti žmones. Atrodo, kad Trumpo administracija plačiai pritaria šiam požiūriui arba bent jau nenori jo sustabdyti.

 

 

Kinijos požiūris kitoks. Kinija įsivaizduoja, kaip nori, kad atrodytų jos ekonomika ir visuomenė, ir kaip dirbtinis intelektas gali padėti tai pasiekti, sako „Brookings“ ekspertas Chanas. Ji nori savarankiškos ekonomikos, todėl diegia dirbtinį intelektą kiekvienoje pramonės šakoje – nuo ​​​​prabangių verslų, pavyzdžiui, robotika, siekia atvėsinti senas pramonės šakas, tokias kaip plieno ar cemento – padidinti produktyvumą, kad niekada nebegalėtų tapti strategiškai pažeidžiamas.

 

Jis taip pat nori stabilumo, todėl, net ir tai darydamas, galvoja, kaip išlaikyti žmones užimtus.

 

Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto viziją valdo valstybė, kuria siekiama vyriausybės tikslų. Amerikos viziją vadovauja įmonės – tokios įmonės kaip „Open A.I.“ siekia superintelekto, nes tai atitinka jų pačių interesus, o ne dėl platesnės JAV strategijos, kol kas.

 

Pamoka iš Kinijos nėra ta, kad šalys turėtų laikytis jos konkretaus požiūrio į dirbtinį intelektą ir darbo vietas, sako Chanas – pavyzdžiui, Kinijos stiliaus kontrolė technologijų pramonėje nėra įmanoma daugumoje Vakarų šalių. Tačiau Kinija rodo, kad politikos formuotojai turi įtakos šiai technologijai. Jie gali daryti įtaką jos krypčiai, o ne tiesiog leisti (DI) lustams kristi ten, kur nori.

 

Žmonių pasirinkimai vis dar svarbūs. Tai viena iš priežasčių, kodėl jau matome dvi labai skirtingas dirbtinio intelekto ateities vizijas, kurios vyksta realiuoju laiku.“ [1]

 

1. The World: China’s plan to save jobs from A.I. Bennhold, Katrin.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jul 1, 2026.

China’s plan to save jobs from A.I.

 


 

“A Chinese lab recently unveiled another astonishingly powerful and astonishingly cheap artificial intelligence model. GLM-5.2, produced by Z.ai, is almost as good as Anthropic’s latest model but runs at less than a tenth of its price.

 

The A.I. race between the U.S. and China has been front of mind at the highest levels of government in both countries.

 

But creating the most potent model is not the only — and maybe not even the best — way to measure A.I. success. Today I write about an area that’s had less attention, but where China might well have an edge: managing the human and political fallout from the A.I. revolution.

 

If there is one thing China’s Communist Party fears, it’s a restive proletariat.

 

In Wuhan, the world’s largest open-air laboratory for driverless cars, taxi drivers first complained about the growing fleet of robotaxis two years ago. Petitions were filed. Social media posts were hashtagged. The local outcry was noisy.

 

It focused minds in the party, which reacted swiftly to censor the protests online. But it also set off a bigger rethink of something that worries many in the West, too. How to avoid mass displacement of humans by A.I. in the labor market — and the political backlash that comes with it?

 

China has more experience than most countries with automating jobs. More than two million robots work in its factories. Driverless delivery vans roam many of its cities. Service robots attend to guests in hotels and restaurants. Parking-lot robots swap out dying E.V. batteries. Drones deliver lunch.

 

So far the fallout has been mostly among blue-collar workers. But A.I. is primarily threatening college graduates. And for an authoritarian regime that fears political instability, that’s a group that has historically caused trouble.

 

Which is why China’s goal to become the world’s A.I. superpower is now officially twinned with another one: keeping humans at the core of the A.I. economy. And over the past year, the government has started acting more decisively to make that happen.

 

‘Liberating labor,’ one court case at a time

 

When the Communist Party wants to show it really means something, it puts it in a five-year plan. And on Page 72 of its current five-year plan, China commits to “comprehensively address” the impact of A.I. on employment.

 

I spoke to Kyle Chan at the Brookings Institution, who studies China’s A.I. policy.

 

He told me that China wants A.I. to augment humans — that is, make them more productive across old and new industries — not replace them. And in the process of transitioning to this A.I. economy, it says, it wants to cushion the impact to avoid social fallout.

 

My colleague Catie Edmondson recently wrote about what this looks like. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security is promising “targeted employment support for key industries.” One member of the National People’s Congress is calling for an “A.I.-unemployment insurance program” as a safety net for displaced workers. Party officials have pushed for vocational training to help workers adapt to an A.I.-centric job market.

 

Chinese scholars have even been developing a field they call A.I. Marxism — trying to apply a Marxist lens to questions like “Who or what creates value after the A.I. revolution?” (The machine? The human who invented it? The human who operates it?)

 

Perhaps most strikingly, the government is leaning heavily on companies to avoid layoffs. And those who don’t fall in line might find themselves in court.

 

There have already been several high-profile rulings siding with workers who were dismissed. In April, a court ruled that a tech company had illegally laid off a worker after replacing him with A.I. software. The ruling delivered an implicit warning to other employers.

 

“The development of artificial intelligence technology should be applied to liberating labor, promoting employment and improving people’s livelihood,” the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court wrote. “Labor law allows employers to undertake technological changes and upgrade their operations, but it should also take into account the protection of workers’ legitimate rights and interests.”

 

Just how that will work in practice, and how far the government is actually prepared to go with companies that don’t comply, remains to be seen. But what these rulings underscore is how much China is thinking about the problem.

 

Two different A.I. visions

 

The U.S. is letting tech companies take the lead on A.I., and Silicon Valley is focused primarily on one thing: achieving superintelligent machines capable of displacing humans. It’s an approach the Trump administration seems to be broadly on board with, or at least isn’t willing to stop.

 

China’s approach is different. China is imagining what it wants its economy and society to look like and how A.I. can help achieve that, Chan, the Brookings expert, says. It wants a self-reliant economy, and so it’s embedding A.I. in every industry — from flashy new businesses like robotics to uncool old industries like steel or cement — to turbocharge productivity so it can never be strategically vulnerable again.

 

It also wants stability and so, even as it does so, it’s thinking about how to keep humans employed.

 

China’s vision for A.I. is state-driven, aimed at achieving government goals. America’s is company-led — companies like Open A.I. are pursuing superintelligence because it fits with their own interests, not because of a broader U.S. strategy, for now.

 

The lesson from China isn’t that countries should follow its specific approach to A.I. and jobs, Chan says — Chinese-style control over the tech industry isn’t feasible in most Western countries, for example. But China shows that policymakers have agency over this technology. They can influence its direction, rather than just letting the (A.I.) chips fall where they may.

 

Human choices still matter. That’s one reason we’re already seeing two very different visions for the future of A.I., playing out in real time.” [1]

 

1. The World: China’s plan to save jobs from A.I. Bennhold, Katrin.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jul 1, 2026.

Skaitmeninis suverenitetas? Rezultatų nerasta.

 

„Praėjusį rudenį vis dar buvo jaučiamas skubumas. Kartu su Prancūzijos prezidentu Emmanueliu Macronu Vokietijos kancleris Friedrichas Merzas 2025 m. lapkritį Berlyne surengė pirmąjį Skaitmeninio suvereniteto viršūnių susitikimą.

 

Tikslas: išlaisvinti Europą nuo priklausomybės nuo Kinijos ir Amerikos skaitmeninių produktų ir paslaugų.

 

Norint sparčiai progresuoti, reikia „pradėti nuo savęs“, – kalboje sakė Merzas: „Mes paverčiame valstybę pagrindine suverenių viešojo administravimo įrankių kliente.“

 

Maždaug po keturių mėnesių paieškos sistemos „Ecosia“ atlikta apklausa rodo, kad valstybė gana lėtai vykdo šį projektą. 2025 m. gruodį bendrovė paklausė 147 federalinių ir valstijų ministerijų, kokias naršykles ir paieškos sistemas jų darbuotojai naudoja savo darbo įrenginiuose. „Ecosia“ šiuo tikslu rėmėsi Informacijos laisvės įstatymu. Maždaug du trečdaliai apklaustųjų atsakė išsamiai; likusieji nurodė saugumo problemas arba visai neatsakė. Rezultatai aiškūs: Vokietijos ministerijų darbuotojai beveik išimtinai naudoja [paieškos sistemos pavadinimas] savo interneto paieškoms.“ JAV produktai grįžta.

 

Tai labiausiai matyti naršyklių naudojime. Kiekviena apklaustoji ministerija naudoja „Mozilla Firefox“, „Google Chrome“, „Apple Safari“ arba „Microsoft Edge“; pastaroji buvo iš anksto įdiegta kompiuteryje 98 procentais atvejų. Panašus, bet subtilesnis vaizdas išryškėja paieškos sistemų atveju: 74 procentai naudoja JAV paieškos sistemas, tokias kaip „Bing“ ar „Google“, o likusios – Europos alternatyvas, tokias kaip „Ecosia“ ar „Startpage“. Kadangi ne visos ministerijos atsakė, bendras procentas greičiausiai yra mažesnis.

 

„Tikimės, kad ši apklausa paskatins apmąstymų procesą“, – „F.A.Z.“ sakė „Ecosia“ generalinis direktorius Wolfgangas Oelsas. Tiek naršyklės, tiek paieškos sistemos yra itin svarbi skaitmeninė infrastruktūra: „Jos yra vartai į internetą“. Pasak Oelso, rizikinga, kad kelios JAV įmonės dominuoja šioje prieigoje. „Paieškos sistemos nustato rezultatų rodymo tvarką“, – sakė jis. „Jos kontroliuoja, kokia informacija yra suvokiama, taigi ir visuomenės nuomonę.“ Todėl dar svarbiau turėti tam tikrą paieškos sistemų įvairovę.

 

Be to, yra „perjungimo“ rizika: politinių ar ekonominių konfliktų atveju paslaugos gali būti apribotos arba nutrauktos. Taip pat negarantuojama tinkama jautrių duomenų apsauga; JAV įmonės turi prieigą prie informacijos apie tai, ko ieško Vokietijos ministerijos, teigia Oelsas.

 

Generalinis direktorius, žinoma, yra suinteresuotas, kad ministerijos atsisakytų JAV įmonių ir pereitų prie Europos tiekėjo, pavyzdžiui, „Ecosia“. Philippas Staabas, Berlyno Humboldto universiteto ir Einšteino skaitmeninės ateities centro darbo, ekonomikos ir technologinių pokyčių sociologijos profesorius, turi panašių abejonių, tačiau kai kuriuos aspektus vertina mažiau kritiškai nei Oelsas.

 

Kadangi naršyklės ir paieškos sistemos naudojamos interneto svetainėms pasiekti ir internetinei paieškai atlikti, jis nemato itin didelės duomenų apsaugos rizikos, Staabas sakė F.A.Z.: „Slapta informacija labiau tikėtina, kad bus saugoma kitur.“ Jis taip pat mano, kad „išjungimo jungiklio“ rizika yra maža, nes ministerijos šioje srityje nepriklauso nuo atskirų JAV tiekėjų. Perėjimas prie alternatyvių paslaugų yra greitas ir paprastas. „Jų naudojimas nepadaro jūsų pažeidžiamu šantažo“, – sako Staabas.

 

Tuo pačiu metu apklausa rodo, kad net ir ten, kur egzistuoja Europos alternatyvos, vis dar daugiausia naudojamasi Amerikos tiekėjais. „Technologinė priklausomybė yra milžiniška“, – sako jis. Naršyklės ir paieškos sistemos yra esminės problemos viršūnė: programos ir operacinės sistemos dažnai yra iš JAV įmonių, sako Staabas: „Jei „Edge“ yra iš anksto įdiegta, visas administravimas paprastai pagrįstas „Microsoft Office“ paketais.“

 

Tačiau čia „išjungimo jungiklio“ rizika yra didelė – ir nuo 2025 m. vasario mėn. tai nebėra tik teorinė baimė. JAV prezidentas Donaldas Trumpas įvedė sankcijas Karimui Khanui, kuris, būdamas Tarptautinio baudžiamojo teismo Hagoje vyriausiuoju prokuroru, buvo išdavęs arešto orderius Izraelio vyriausybės pareigūnams. Netrukus po to Khanas nebegalėjo pasiekti savo „Microsoft“ pašto dėžutės. Šis incidentas sukėlė plačias diskusijas. 2025 m. spalį Tarptautinis baudžiamasis teismas paskelbė, kad nebegaus savo programinės įrangos iš „Microsoft“. Sumažinti priklausomybę nuo JAV tiekėjų buvo ilgalaikis tikslas. Staabas sako: „Apie tai buvo diskutuojama, bet dabar Vokietijos vyriausybėje jaučiamas tam tikras atgimimas. Tai nereiškia, kad tai galima įgyvendinti nedelsiant.“

 

Europos paieškos sistema „Ecosia“ taip pat vis dar remiasi JAV paslaugų rezultatais. Ji bendradarbiauja su Prancūzijos bendrove „Qwant“, kad išspręstų šią problemą. „Ecosia“ kuria savo nepriklausomą infrastruktūrą. Prancūzijoje indeksavimas jau baigtas, o Vokietijoje jis vis dar yra bandymų etape. „Tai pavyks tik tuo atveju, jei mes taip pat turėsime tam tikrą rinkos dalį“, – sako Wolfgangas Oelsas, atkreipdamas dėmesį į dideles fiksuotas išlaidas. „Kuo daugiau žmonių naudojasi „Ecosia“, tuo didesnės pajamos iš reklamos ir tuo geriau apmokyti paieškos algoritmai“, – sako jis. Atsižvelgiant į tai, svarbu, kad Vokietijos ministerijos pasikliautų „Ecosia“. Kiekvienas, rimtai žiūrintis į skaitmeninį suverenitetą, sako Oelsas, turi konkrečiai stiprinti Europos tiekėjus.

 

Vokietijoje Šlėzvigas-Holšteinas atlieka novatorišką vaidmenį atsisakydamas JAV programinės įrangos. Nuo 2023 m. žemės vyriausybė vykdo savo skaitmeninę strategiją, savo administravime remdamasi atvirojo kodo programomis. Tačiau, remiantis „Ecosia“ apklausos rezultatais, naršyklės ir paieškos sistemos vis dar yra iš JAV tiekėjų. „Mes nesiekiame aiškios „pirk europietišką strategiją“, – paaiškino skaitmeninės politikos ministras Dirkas Schrödteris, atsakydamas į F.A.Z. užklausą. Jis teigė, kad skaitmeninio suvereniteto negalima pasiekti tampant priklausomu nuo Europos, o ne nuo JAV įmonių. Žvelgiant iš valstijos vyriausybės perspektyvos, svarbu „sutelkti dėmesį į sprendimus, sukurtus aktyvioje kūrėjų bendruomenėje“, – sakė Schrödteris, pridurdamas, kad ateityje jie skirs daugiau dėmesio naršyklėms ir paieškos sistemoms.

 

Tačiau Federalinė skaitmeninių reikalų ministerija šiuo metu neplanuoja jokių tolesnių žingsnių, F.A.Z. sakė atstovas. Jie nei skatins, nei įpareigos naudoti Europos naršykles ir paieškos sistemas ministerijose. Tai būtų „kišimasis į laisvąją rinką, kuris iškreiptų konkurenciją, slopintų inovacijas ir sukeltų papildomų pastangų bei išlaidų“. Šis atsakymas glumina, atsižvelgiant į kitą Friedricho Merzo kalbą Skaitmeniniame aukščiausiojo lygio susitikime, kurioje jis paskelbė strateginius sprendimus dėl Europos skaitmeninių sprendimų viešajame administravime. „Mes, kaip vyriausybės, – sakė jis, – turime atlikti namų darbus ir namuose.“ [1]

 

1.  Digitale Souveränität? Fehlanzeige. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 31 Mar 2026: 13.   SOPHIA COPER

Digital sovereignty? Nothing to Show for It


“Last autumn, there was a sense of urgency. In November 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz—together with French President Emmanuel Macron—hosted the first summit on digital sovereignty in Berlin.

 

The goal: to break Europe’s dependence on Chinese and US digital products and services.

 

To make rapid progress, one had to ‘start with oneself,’ Merz said in a speech: ‘We are making the state an anchor customer for sovereign tools within public administration.’

 

About four months later, a survey by the search engine Ecosia reveals that the state is advancing this initiative at a rather leisurely pace. In December 2025, the company asked 147 federal and state ministries which browsers and search engines their employees use on their work devices. Ecosia cited freedom of information laws in making the request. Around two-thirds of those contacted provided substantive answers; the rest cited security concerns or did not respond at all. The results are clear: employees in German ministries rely almost exclusively on US products for internet searches.

 

This is most evident in browser usage. Every ministry that responded uses either Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, or Microsoft Edge—with the latter being pre-installed on the computer in 98 percent of cases. The picture regarding search engines is more nuanced, though similar: 74 percent use US search engines like Bing or Google, while the rest use European alternatives such as Ecosia or Startpage. However, since not all ministries responded, the overall share is likely lower.

 

‘We hope this survey sparks a process of reflection,’ Ecosia CEO Wolfgang Oels told the *F.A.Z.* Both browsers and search engines constitute critical digital infrastructure, he noted: ‘They are the gateway to the internet.’ It is risky for a handful of US companies to dominate this access point, Oels added. ‘Search engines determine the order in which results are displayed," he says. "They control what information is perceived, and thus public opinion as well." This makes having a certain diversity of search engines all the more important.

 

Then there is the "kill switch" risk: in the event of political or economic conflicts, services could be restricted or shut down. Adequate protection of sensitive data is not guaranteed either; US companies have access to what is being searched for within German ministries, according to Oels.

 

Naturally, the CEO has a vested interest in seeing ministries break away from US companies and switch to a European provider like Ecosia. However, Philipp Staab—Professor of the Sociology of Work, Economy, and Technological Change at Humboldt University of Berlin and the Einstein Center Digital Future—shares similar concerns but views certain aspects less critically than Oels.

 

Since browsers and search engines are used to access websites and conduct online searches, he does not see a particularly significant data protection risk, Staab told the *F.A.Z.*: "Sensitive information tends to reside elsewhere." He also considers the "kill switch" threat to be low, as ministries are not dependent on individual US providers in this area. Switching to alternative services can be done quickly and easily. "Using them does not leave you open to coercion," says Staab.

 

At the same time, the survey shows that even where European alternatives exist, American providers remain the dominant choice. "The technological dependence is enormous," he says. Browsers and search engines represent just the tip of a fundamental problem: applications and operating systems frequently come from US companies, Staab notes: "If Edge comes pre-installed, the entire administrative system is usually based on Microsoft Office packages."

 

In this area, however, the "kill switch" risk is high—and since February 2025, it has been more than just a theoretical concern. At that time, US President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Karim Khan, who, as Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague had issued arrest warrants for Israeli government officials. Shortly thereafter, Khan lost access to his Microsoft email account. The incident sparked a widespread debate. In October 2025, the International Criminal Court announced that it would no longer source its software from Microsoft in the future. Becoming less dependent on US providers has long been a topic of discussion, says Staab: "But now there is a certain awakening within the German government. That doesn't mean it can be implemented immediately."

 

The European search engine Ecosia also still relies on results from US services. However, it is working together with the French company Qwant also working on building its own independent infrastructure. Indexing has already been completed in France, whereas Germany is still in the testing phase. "It will only succeed if we also secure a certain market share," says Wolfgang Oels, pointing to the high fixed costs. "The more people use Ecosia, the higher the advertising revenue and the better the search algorithms are trained," he says. Against this backdrop, it is important for German ministries to opt for Ecosia. Anyone serious about digital sovereignty, Oels argues, must make a concerted effort to strengthen European providers.

 

In Germany, Schleswig-Holstein is playing a pioneering role in moving away from US software. Since 2023, the state government has been pursuing its own digital strategy, relying on open-source programs for administrative operations. However, the browsers and search engines used still come from US providers, according to Ecosia's survey. Digital Affairs Minister Dirk Schrödter explained in response to an inquiry by the *F.A.Z.* that the state government is pursuing "no explicit 'buy European' strategy"; digital sovereignty, he noted, is not achieved simply by swapping dependence on US companies for dependence on European ones. From the state government's perspective, it is important to "focus on solutions developed within an active developer community," Schrödter said, though he added that browsers and search engines would receive greater attention in the future.

 

The Federal Ministry for Digital Affairs, by contrast, is currently planning no further steps, a spokesperson told the *F.A.Z.*; the ministry intends neither to promote nor to mandate the use of European browsers and search engines within government departments. Such a move would constitute "an intervention in the free market that would distort competition, stifle innovation, and result in additional effort and costs." This response is puzzling in light of a speech given by Friedrich Merz at the Digital Summit, in which he announced strategic decisions favoring European digital solutions for public administration. "We as governments," he said, "must also do our homework at home." [1]

 

1.  Digitale Souveränität? Fehlanzeige. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 31 Mar 2026: 13.   SOPHIA COPER

Jūsų sveikata: vienišos žvaigždės erkės plinta visoje JAV. Jų įkandimai gali sukelti potencialiai gyvybei pavojingą alergiją raudonai mėsai ar net pieno produktams.


„Štai dar viena priežastis prisidengti per įkarštį erkių sezonu šią vasarą: yra įkandimas, kuris gali sukelti alergiją mėsainiams, šoninei ir kepsniui.

 

Taip, Laimo liga nėra vienintelė grėsmė sveikatai, kurią gali kelti erkės. Vis daugiau žmonių sužino apie alfa-gal sindromą – potencialiai gyvenimą keičiančią alergiją, susijusią su vieniša žvaigždės erke.

 

Ši liga sukelia alergiją raudonai mėsai. Kai kuriais atvejais ji taip pat sukelia alergiją pieno produktams ir kitiems produktams ar vaistams, gautiems iš žinduolių (pagalvokite apie želatiną).

 

Ir vienišos žvaigždės erkės juda dėl klimato kaitos ir augančių baltauodegių elnių populiacijų. Jos plečiasi už savo tradicinės bazės ribų pietryčių ir pietų centrinėje JAV dalyje, stumdamosi toliau į šiaurę ir vakarus.

 

Erkės ypač paplitusios pakrančių zonose, tokiose kaip Martos vynuogynas prie Masačusetso krantų ir Safolko apygarda Niujorke. Ir ne, nors ir turi pavadinimą, erkės neatsirado Teksase.

 

Jos taip vadinamos dėl vieno balto taško ant jų nugaros, kuris atrodo kaip viena žvaigždė.

 

Ligų kontrolės ir prevencijos centrai apskaičiavo, kad net 450 000 amerikiečių serga alfa-gal sindromu. Tai toli gražu neprilygsta Laimo ligos lygiui, kuri kasmet sukelia panašų diagnozių skaičių.

 

Tačiau tai nėra priežastis nusiraminti. Skirtingai nuo Laimo ligos, kuri yra infekcija, alfa-gal yra alergija. Ją sukelia erkės seilės ir tai, kaip jos sąveikauja su tam tikrų žmonių imuniniu atsaku.

 

Kai įkanda vieniša žvaigždėta erkė, ji į kraują įveda cukraus molekulę alfa-gal. Imuninė sistema reaguoja, ir kitą kartą valgant raudoną mėsą ir susijusius produktus, ji juos atpažįsta kaip grėsmę, todėl sukelia alerginę reakciją.

 

Dažniausi simptomai yra dilgėlinė ir virškinimo trakto sutrikimai, tačiau simptomai gali progresuoti iki dusulio ir net anafilaksinio šoko.

 

„Tai gali būti visiškai pavojinga gyvybei ir, deja, mirtina, tačiau tai itin reta“, – sako dr. Scott. Comminsas, medicinos ir pediatrijos docentas Šiaurės Karolinos universitete Chapel Hill mieste.

 

Papildoma problema: kai kurie gydytojai mano, kad atvejai vis dar nepastebimi. Juk iki šiol daugelis sveikatos priežiūros paslaugų teikėjų mažai žinojo apie būklę, kurią sukelia vienišos žvaigždės formos erkių įkandimai.

 

2023 m. CDC ataskaitoje nustatyta, kad 42 % sveikatos priežiūros paslaugų teikėjų turėjo mažai žinių apie alfa-gal sindromą, o 35 % nebuvo tikri savo gebėjimu jį diagnozuoti.

 

Pacientai teigia, kad klaidinga sindromo diagnozė yra dažna ir diagnozė gali būti atidėta. Taip yra todėl, kad alerginės reakcijos dažnai pasireiškia praėjus trims–šešioms valandoms po sukėlėjo suvalgymo. Tarp dažniausių klaidingų diagnozių: dirgliosios žarnos sindromas.

 

Taigi, kam yra alergiški žmonės, sergantys alfa-gal sindromu? Visi yra alergiški jautienai ir kitai mėsai, pavyzdžiui, kiaulienai, avienai ir elnienai, bet ne ne žinduolių mėsai, pavyzdžiui, paukštienai ar žuviai. Mažesnė dalis taip pat yra jautri pieno produktams ir turi vengti želatinos ir jos turinčių produktų, įskaitant želė, guminukus ir net gelinius skausmą malšinančius vaistus, taip pat vaistų, pagamintų iš žinduolių. ląstelės.

 

Dr. Johnui Walshui, 57 metų šeimos gydytojui iš Keip Koralo, Floridos, lapkritį buvo diagnozuotas alfa-galas, kai jam pasireiškė pasikartojantys veido patinimo ir kvėpavimo sutrikimų epizodai. „Kaip gydytojas, vos žinojau, kas yra alfa-galas“, – sako jis.

 

Nuo tada, kai atsisakė raudonos mėsos, želatinos ir kitų produktų, pagamintų iš žinduolių dalių, Walshas vis dar patiria sunkių reakcijų. Per Kalėdas jis atsidūrė skubios pagalbos skyriuje, pabudęs su patinusiu veidu ir liežuviu. Jis nėra tikras, kas tai sukėlė, bet mano, kad tai galėjo būti natūralūs kažkokie skoniai arba kryžminė tarša.

 

Vasarį jam vėl pasireiškė anafilaksinė reakcija, suvalgius jūros gėrybių, kurios, jo manymu, galėjo būti kryžminės taršos. „Tai tiesiog smarkiai pakeitė mano elgesį“, – sako jis.

 

Vienas veiksnys, kurį žmonės linkę pamiršti: raudonos mėsos sultinys, naudojamas daugelyje padažų ir sultinių restoranuose. Be to, maisto gamintojai nurodo „natūralius skonius“, kurie gali būti iš jautienos arba kiaulienos gauti ingredientai.

 

Reakcijos sunkumui taip pat gali turėti įtakos kiti veiksniai, tokie kaip fizinis krūvis, alkoholis, miego trūkumas ir infekcijos.

 

Nors Geriausias gydymo būdas – vengti raudonos mėsos, kita alternatyva – injekcinis vaistas „Xolair“. Maisto ir vaistų administracijos 2024 m. patvirtintas visoms maisto alergijoms gydyti, šis vaistas padeda sumažinti alergines reakcijas po atsitiktinio sąlyčio su juo.

 

Kai kuriems žmonėms susidaro antikūnai prieš alfa-galą, bet niekada neatsiranda alergija raudonai mėsai, sako dr. Jeffrey Wilsonas, alergologas ir medicinos docentas Virdžinijos universiteto astmos, alergijos ir imunologijos skyriuje. Tyrimai rodo, kad regionuose, kuriuose yra didelė vienišų žvaigždėtųjų erkių populiacija, iki 30 % tirtų žmonių turės alerginių antikūnų prieš alfa-galą, tačiau alergija išsivystys tik 2 %.

 

Geros naujienos: maždaug trečdaliui žmonių alfa-gal išnyks per trejus–penkerius metus“, – sako Comminsas.

 

Svarbiausia – išvengti papildomų pavienių erkių įkandimų. „Kai kuriems iš šių žmonių, kurie yra ūkininkai ar medžiotojai, tai tampa tikru iššūkiu“, – sako jis.

 

76 metų Jimui Fitzgeraldui iš Savanos, Džordžijos valstijos, alfa-gal buvo diagnozuota 2022 m. po dviejų alerginių epizodų.

 

Išėjęs į pensiją miškininkas Fitzgeraldas visą savo karjerą dirbo miškuose ir per daugelį metų pašalino tūkstančius erkių. Todėl jis negalvojo apie dviejų erkių pašalinimą 30 dienų prieš pirmąjį epizodą.

 

Gavęs diagnozę, jis nustojo valgyti bet kokią raudoną mėsą ar želatiną. „Tai šiek tiek vargina“, – sako jis. „Pasiilgau gero mėsainio, bet kalakutienos mėsainis nėra blogai.“

 

O koks teigiamas aspektas? „Mano cholesterolio kiekis niekada nebuvo geresnis“, – sako jis.” [1]

 

1. Your Health: Lone-Star Ticks Expand Across the U.S. --- Their bites can trigger a potentially life-threatening allergy to red meat or even to dairy. Reddy, Sumathi.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 01 July 2026: A11.