Why Is Putin at War Again? Because He Keeps Winning.

"By Chris Miller

Mr. Miller is an assistant professor of international history at the Fletcher School at Tufts University and a co-director of the school’s Russia and Eurasia program. He has written extensively about Russia and is the author of “Putinomics.”

There is no world leader today with a better track record when it comes to using military power than President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Whether against Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, or in Syria since 2015, the Russian military has repeatedly converted battlefield success into political victories. Russia’s rearmament over the past decade and a half has been unmatched by a comparable increase in Western capabilities. So it is no surprise why Russia feels emboldened to use its military power while the West stands by.

Russia’s past three wars are textbook examples of how to use military force in limited ways to achieve political goals. The invasion of Georgia in 2008 lasted five days but forced that country into humiliating political concessions. In Ukraine in 2014, regular Russian military units were deployed at scale for a few weeks, but this proved enough to force Kyiv to sign a painful peace deal. When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, some Western analysts predicted a disaster along the lines of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which began in 1979 and ended, after a decade of quagmire, in retreat. Instead, that Syria’s civil war served as a testing ground for Russia’s most advanced weaponry.

For the past decade, Americans have come to believe that Russia’s strength lies in hybrid tactics — cyber-warfare, misinformation campaigns, covert operations — and its ability to meddle in other countries’ domestic politics. Yet as we have searched for Russian phantoms behind every misinformed Facebook post, Russia has replaced the poorly equipped army it inherited from the Soviet Union with a modern fighting force, featuring everything from new missiles to advanced electronic warfare systems. Today, the threat to Europe’s security is not hybrid warfare but hard power, visible in the cruise missiles that have struck across Ukraine.

“We are 50 percent plus of global G.D.P.,” Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, argued recently, contrasting this to Russia’s unimpressive 3 percent share of the world’s economic output. However, economies don’t fight wars; militaries do. America’s economic power was tested when Mr. Biden threatened tough sanctions if Russia were to invade Ukraine; Mr. Putin did so anyway, betting that hard power would carry the day.

There’s still no doubt that America’s military has better trained soldiers and more capable systems in aggregate. However, what matters is not theoretical military matchups but the ability to use force for specific aims. Russia has developed precisely the capabilities needed to rebuild its influence in Eastern Europe. The United States, meanwhile, has watched its room for maneuver in the region steadily shrinking, hemmed in by Russian antiaircraft systems and cyber and electronic warfare threats.

Letting the military balance in Europe shift in Russia’s favor was a choice. The United States has itself partly to blame. Even after Russia’s first attacks on Ukraine in 2014, America’s reinforcements on the continent were only enough to slow the rate of improvement in Russia’s position. The Biden administration has presided over military spending cuts once inflation is considered. America’s roughly $700 billion defense budget may look impressive, but Russia has the advantage of paying less for soldiers’ salaries and for domestically produced equipment. Adjusting for these differences, Russia’s defense budget has grown far more rapidly than America’s over the past two decades

It may be that, in trying to swallow all of Ukraine, Mr. Putin has finally overstepped. A long occupation of Ukraine would stretch Russia’s capabilities, especially because its military advantages will be less significant if the conflict shifts into Ukraine’s populous cities. However, we should not simply assume that Ukraine will become Putin’s Afghanistan or his Iraq because other leaders have made their own errors. Mr. Putin could simply choose to destroy Ukraine and leave the West to pick up the pieces. Such a dismembered, dysfunctional Ukraine could well suit his interests. Russia’s recent wars have been carefully calculated and limited in cost. There’s no guarantee that this conflict won’t be, too.

The U.S. strategy of making public intelligence about Russia’s military buildup around Ukraine was clever, but Mr. Putin has called our bluff. It was once popular to mock the Russian president for his 19th-century worldview, but his use of military power to bolster Russia’s influence has worked in the 21st century, too. The West’s assumption that the arc of history naturally bends in its direction is looking naïve. So, too, is the decision to let our military advantage slip. Soft power and economic influence are fine capabilities to have, but they cannot stop Russian armor as it rolls toward Kyiv."

Jei Landsbergių stumiamos sankcijos praeis, tai deginsime mėšlą iš Lansbergių tvartelio

Tokiu būdu vėl pavirsime tradiciniais senoviškais Rytais.

„Rusija veržiasi būtent į Ukrainą, bet, priklausomai nuo Kremliaus problemų, likusioje Europoje gali būti taikomas karinis energijos normavimas. Gamtinių dujų kainos Europoje – ir taip skaudžiai aukštos – vis dar kyla.

 

    Gamtinių dujų ateities kainos Europoje ketvirtadienio rytą išaugo beveik 40% iki 40,39 dolerių už milijoną Didžiosios Britanijos šiluminių vienetų, maždaug aštuonis kartus aukštesnės, negu šios kainos yra JAV. Europa labai priklauso nuo Rusijos gamtinių dujų; 2020 m. dujų eksportas iš šalies patenkino maždaug 38 % Europos Sąjungos poreikio. Remiantis S&P Global Platts duomenimis, iki pavasario liko keli mėnesiai, gamtinių dujų atsargos regione yra maždaug ketvirtadaliu mažesnės, nei penkerių metų vidurkis.

 

    Labiausiai tikėtinas scenarijus, kai sutrinka tik gamtinių dujų srautai per Ukrainą, atrodo lengviau valdomas. Ukraina nėra tokia svarbi Europos energetikai, kokia buvo 2000-ųjų pradžioje, kai šalis buvo pagrindinis kanalas, kuriuo Rusija eksportavo gamtines dujas į Europą. 2006 m. 80% Rusijos dujų tiekimo į Europą buvo tiekiama per Ukrainą.

 

    Pastaraisiais metais Ukraina vaidino mažesnį vaidmenį, o vasario 20 d. maždaug 18% gamtinių dujų, kurias Rusijos „Gazprom“ vamzdynais siuntė į ES, tekėjo per šią šalį.

 

    Svarbu prisiminti, kad Rusija nuo praėjusių metų griežtai riboja gamtinių dujų srautą per Baltarusiją ir Ukrainą, o srautai, kurie tiesiogiai iš jos pačios į Europą patenka, dažniausiai nepakito. „Gazprom“ per Ukrainą siunčia maždaug 1,7 milijardo kubinių pėdų gamtinių dujų per dieną, t.y. tik 40% kiekio, kurį jis siųsdavo 2021 m. sausį.

 

    Tai reiškė, kad Europa pradėjo labiau pasikliauti jūra gabenamų suskystintųjų gamtinių dujų importu, o daugelis iš JAV sausį eksportuotų SGD krovinių priėmė beveik 77% JAV SGD krovinių, teigia Suskystintų gamtinių dujų centras.

 

    JAV didžiausias suskystinimo pajėgumas yra 11,6 milijardo kubinių pėdų per dieną. Darant prielaidą, kad naudojimas yra didelis, tai gali reikšti, kad JAV per dieną išsiunčia 8–9 milijardus kubinių pėdų. Tai palieka apie 3 milijardus kubinių pėdų per dieną JAV SGD, kurios gali būti eksportuojamos.

 

    Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad JAV SGD kroviniai turi klientų iš Azijos, kur pasiūla taip pat yra maža, nėra begalinės svyravimo erdvės. Vis dėlto, daugiau SGD iš JAV ir kitų, pavyzdžiui, Kataro, ir iš saugyklos galėtų padėti užlopyti skylę iš Ukrainos. Remiantis „S&P Global Platts“ duomenimis, Europoje yra apie 1,3 trilijono kubinių pėdų saugyklose.

 

    Tačiau blogiausias scenarijus, kai Rusija nuspręstų užsukti kitų vamzdynų čiaupus, būtų katastrofiškas. Rusijos prezidentas Vladimiras Putinas antradienį energetikos konferencijoje pareiškė, kad šalis to nedarys, rašoma „The Wall Street Journal“ pranešime.

 

    Vis dėlto scenarijaus negalima visiškai atmesti. Nikosas Tsafosas, Strateginių ir tarptautinių studijų centro energetikos ir geopolitikos skyriaus pirmininkas, anksčiau šį mėnesį vykusiame spaudos konferencijoje sakė, kad pagal tokį scenarijų Europos žemynas svarstys „dujų normavimą pramonės klientams“ ir kad šalys turės pradėti deginti tai, ką gali, „naftą, anglį, medieną“ ir pridurti, kad kainos taps „iš esmės beprasmės“.

 

    Nors yra ir kitų šalių, kurios vis dar galėtų tiekti šiek tiek gamtinių dujų, iš esmės išnaudojami geriausi tiekėjai. Norvegijos ministras pirmininkas sakė, kad šalis tiekia gamtines dujas maksimaliu pajėgumu, teigiama Reuters pranešime. Kataras, didžiausias SGD eksportuotojas, turi šiek tiek ribotus pajėgumus siųsti tiekimą, nes didžioji dalis jo kiekių sutarčių yra sudaryta su Azija.

 

    Tai gali tapti lūžio tašku Europai, kuri tikrai sieks diversifikuoti savo gamtinių dujų šaltinius. SGD importas yra akivaizdžiausias sprendimas, tačiau Europai SGD terminalus greičiausiai reikės statyti daugiau vietų. Šiandien trečdalis Europos SGD importo pajėgumų yra Ispanijoje ir Portugalijoje, o 24 % – JK. Tiek importo, tiek eksporto terminalų planavimas ir statyba užtrunka ne vienerius metus.

 

    Švelni žiema ir stiprūs SGD srautai iki šiol apsaugojo žemyną nuo dar didesnio kainų kilimo, pažymi Christopheris Louney, RBC Capital Markets žaliavų strategas.

 

    Kadangi Kremlius ir oras taip pat sunkiai nuspėjami, neaišku, kuris iš jų tiksliai atjos gelbėti Europą.“ [1]

 

 Panašu, kad Vokietijos Olafo Scholzo sprendimas sustabdyti „Nord Stream 2“ Europai kainuos daug pinigų, kurie galėtų būti panaudoti, kad mūsų ekonomiką pervesti prie ekologiškų energijos šaltinių. Oi kur tu, mamyte Merkel...

 

1. Europe's Energy Options Look Limited --- If Russia starts cutting off natural gas altogether, though, there isn't a whole lot the world can do to help
Lee, Jinjoo. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 25 Feb 2022: B.12. 

If the sanctions pushed by the Landsbergiai pass, we will burn manure from the Lansbergiai barn

In this way we will once again turn into the traditional ancient East.

"It is Ukraine that Russia is invading but, depending on the Kremlin's whims, the rest of Europe could be subject to warlike rationing of energy. Natural-gas prices in Europe -- already painfully high -- are headed higher still. How much can the rest of the world pitch in?

Natural-gas futures in Europe soared almost 40% to $40.39 per million British thermal units on Thursday morning, about eight times where prices are in the U.S. Europe depends heavily on Russian natural gas; gas exports from the country met roughly 38% of European Union demand in 2020. With spring some months away, natural-gas inventory is running about a quarter below the five-year average in the region, according to data from S&P Global Platts.

The most likely scenario, one where only natural-gas flows through Ukraine are disrupted, seems more manageable. Ukraine isn't nearly as important to European energy as it was back in the early 2000s when the country was the main conduit through which Russia exported its natural gas to Europe. In 2006, 80% of Russian gas supplies to Europe went through Ukraine.

In recent years, Ukraine played a smaller role and as of Feb. 20, roughly 18% of the natural gas that Russia's Gazprom sent through pipelines to the EU went through the country, according to its own disclosure.

One fine point to remember here is that Russia has been severely limiting natural-gas flow through Belarus and Ukraine since last year while keeping flows that go directly from itself to Europe mostly intact. Gazprom has been sending roughly 1.7 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas through Ukraine, just 40% of the volume it used to send in January 2021.

This has meant Europe has started relying more heavily on seaborne liquefied-natural-gas imports, many from the U.S. Europe was on the receiving end of nearly 77% of U.S. LNG cargoes exported in January, according to the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas.

The U.S. has a peak liquefaction capacity of 11.6 billion cubic feet per day. Assuming high utilization, it could imply the U.S. is sending 8 billion to 9 billion cubic feet a day. That leaves about 3 billion cubic feet a day worth of U.S. LNG that can be exported on the generous end of the estimate.

Given that U.S. LNG cargoes have Asian customers, where supply is also tight, there isn't infinite wiggle room. Still, some more LNG from the U.S. plus those from others -- such as Qatar -- and from storage could help patch the hole from Ukraine. There is about 1.3 trillion cubic feet in storage tanks in Europe, per S&P Global Platts data.

But the worst-case scenario -- one in which Russia opts to turn the taps off on other pipelines -- would be catastrophic. Russian President Vladimir Putin said at an energy conference on Tuesday that the country wouldn't do that, according to a report from The Wall Street Journal.

The scenario can't be completely ruled out, though. Nikos Tsafos, chair of energy and geopolitics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said at a press briefing earlier this month that in such a scenario, the continent will be looking at "rationing of gas to industrial customers" and that countries will have to start burning what they can, "oil, coal, wood," adding that prices would become "essentially meaningless."

While there are other countries that could still provide some natural gas, the top suppliers are essentially tapped out. Norway's prime minister said the country is delivering natural gas at maximum capacity, according to a report from Reuters. Qatar, a top LNG exporter, has somewhat limited capacity to send supplies given that much of its volumes are contracted with Asia.

This could end up being a turning point for Europe, which will surely look at diversifying its natural-gas sources. LNG imports are the most obvious solution, but Europe will likely need to build LNG terminals in more places. Today, a third of Europe's LNG import capacity is located in Spain and Portugal, with 24% in the U.K. Both import terminals and export terminals take years to plan and build.

A mild winter and strong LNG flows had so far shielded the continent from even worse price increases, notes Christopher Louney, commodity strategist at RBC Capital Markets.

With the Kremlin and the weather being equally hard to predict, it is unclear exactly which one will ride to Europe's rescue." [1]

It seems that Germany's Olaf Scholz decision to stop Nord Stream 2 will cost Europe a lot of money, that could be used to transfer our economy to green energy sources. We miss Mutti Merkel already.

1. Europe's Energy Options Look Limited --- If Russia starts cutting off natural gas altogether, though, there isn't a whole lot the world can do to help
Lee, Jinjoo. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 25 Feb 2022: B.12.