Europe, Unlike U.S., Fosters Links to China

 

"The first China shock that devastated manufacturing in the U.S. in the early 2000s bypassed large parts of Europe. A second shock now under way looks much more threatening.

But rather than simply erect ever higher barriers to the flood of Chinese imports, as the U.S. has done, European leaders are seeking an alternative: rolling out a welcome mat.

European officials have largely been in favor of investments from Chinese battery makers such as CATL and from Chinese electric-vehicle manufacturers such as BYD in Hungary and Chery Automobile in Spain.

In the 1980s, faced with a wave of low-cost Japanese auto imports, the Reagan administration negotiated export quotas that encouraged Japanese manufacturers to build factories in the U.S.

U.S. officials have been less willing to repeat that formula with China, which they consider a national-security threat. The White House, for example, is weighing curbs on Chinese "connected cars" that could transmit customer data back to China. Europeans worry less about such risks, though they could change their minds -- as they did on telecom infrastructure supplied by Huawei Technologies.

While China's purchases of existing European businesses have collapsed, greenfield investment -- i.e. newly created companies or plants -- has risen, reaching 78% of all Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe last year, according to data compiled by the Mercator Institute for China Studies and Rhodium Group.

At the core of this strategy is a fear that Europe, especially Germany, which relies much more on manufacturing than the U.S., could be hit by one of two nightmare scenarios: a global trade war, or a new flood of cheap Chinese imports.

European Union regulators this month signaled plans to impose relatively modest tariffs -- the highest will be half the 100% announced by President Biden -- on Chinese auto imports. Some analysts saw this as an implicit encouragement to Chinese producers to shift auto factories to Europe instead, which some have started doing.

China's commerce minister, Wang Wentao, and his EU counterpart, trade commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis, agreed via videoconference Saturday to start consultations on the EU's anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese electric vehicles, China's ministry said. EU spokesman Olof Gill said the two sides had a candid and constructive call and would continue to engage. "The EU side emphasized that any negotiated outcome to its investigation must be effective in addressing the injurious" subsidies, he said.

For both Europe and China, closer cooperation would hedge against a return to the White House by Donald Trump, who is pledging 10% across-the-board tariffs on imports. That threat argues against Europe fully throwing in its lot with the U.S., while encouraging China to smooth over tensions with Europe and maintain access to its lucrative market.

If so, Europe's industrial and technological ties to China could strengthen as the U.S.'s weaken. And Chinese car brands will play an increasingly important role in Europe, but no role in the U.S.

The EU's approach "accepts that the China-EU industrial complex exists and is explicitly trying to encourage more of it," said Jacob Kirkegaard, senior fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This poses risks for Europe, said Noah Barkin, Europe-China expert at Rhodium: "If the European car industry remains deeply integrated with China and the U.S. industry is completely decoupled from China, that is likely to lead to bilateral tensions between the EU and U.S." Indeed, Europe exports twice as much to the U.S. as it does to China.

Why risk that? Europe's car industry is deeply intertwined with China's through joint ventures that have a large share of China's market. Moreover, Europe has more to lose than the U.S. from a breakdown in global trade. It has 2 1/2 times as many manufacturing jobs, and more than a third of its manufactured goods are exported, versus one-fifth for the U.S., former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said this month.

Manufacturing comprises 15% of Europe's overall output, and 18% of Germany's, versus 11% of the U.S.'s. 

But China increasingly competes in products it used to buy from Europe. Its companies produce more industrial machines and equipment than their rivals in the U.S., Germany and Japan combined.

"The first China shock was a net positive for Germany," said Moritz Schularick, president of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. "The second shock is a real wake-up call."

China once welcomed foreign investment as a way to import new technology. Now, said Barkin, "We are in a position where Europe is keen for transfers of technology to flow in the other direction."

China is likely to produce seven million battery-powered EVs this year, up from five million last year, said Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer, a German auto industry expert. Europe is likely to produce 1.2 million this year, down from 1.5 million last year, he said. 

This advantage of scale enabled Chinese manufacturers to move ahead of international competitors in technology for electric vehicles, including batteries.

Allowing Chinese manufacturers to grow in Europe could help European manufacturers by encouraging more people to switch to EVs, and governments to build charging infrastructure, some analysts say. 

Another advantage: The U.S. EV market could lag behind Europe and China's, with inferior technology and higher prices." [1]

Oh, and America, refusing to electrify its cars, makes global warming much worse for everybody. To get votes from labor unions, Biden sacrifices the future of all Earth. Isn't that crazy?

 

American concern about the security of connected Chinese cars is misguided. Connected cars of American company Tesla are used in China. This shows the possibility to work in this area, since Chinese are concerned about their security as much as Americans are.

German producers with their high quality work will find their niche in the competition with China. 

1. U.S. News --- THE OUTLOOK: Europe, Unlike U.S., Fosters Links to China. Fairless, Tom; Bertrand, Benoit.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 24 June 2024: A.2.

Saulės amžius

"Sukako 70 metų nuo tada, kai AT&T "Bell Labs" pristatė naują technologiją, skirtą saulės šviesą paversti energija. Telefonų kompanija tikėjosi, kad ji galės pakeisti baterijas, kurios naudoja įrangą nutolusiose vietose. Ji taip pat suprato, kad įrenginius maitina vien tik šviesa. parodė, kaip mokslas gali paversti ateitį nuostabia, taigi, buvo spaudos įvykis, kurio metu saulė neleido žaisliniam apžvalgos ratui nustoti suktis.

 

 Šiandien saulės energija jau seniai praėjo žaislų fazę. Plokštės dabar užima maždaug pusę Velso ploto, o šiais metais pasauliui tieks apie 6 % elektros energijos – tai yra beveik tris kartus daugiau elektros energijos nei Amerika suvartojo 1954 m. Tačiau šis istorinis augimas yra tik antrasis įspūdingiausias dalykas, susijęs su saulės energijos augimu. Įspūdingiausia yra tai, kad jis niekur nesibaigia.

 

 Saulės energijos augimą vadinti eksponentiniu yra ne hiperbolė, o fakto konstatavimas. Įdiegtos saulės energijos pajėgumai padvigubėja kas trejus metus, taigi kiekvieną dešimtmetį išauga dešimt kartų. Toks tvarus augimas retai pastebimas tame, kas svarbu. Dėl to žmonėms sunku susivokti, kas vyksta. Kai prieš dešimt metų ji buvo dešimtadaliu dabartinio dydžio, saulės energiją vis dar vertino, kaip nereikšmingą net ekspertų, žinančių, kaip greitai ji auga, nuomone. Kitas dešimt kartų padidinimas prilygs viso pasaulio branduolinių reaktorių parko padauginimui iš aštuonių per trumpesnį laiką, nei paprastai reikia pastatyti tik vieną iš jų.

 

 Tikėtina, kad iki 2030-ųjų vidurio saulės elementai bus vienintelis didžiausias elektros energijos šaltinis planetoje. Iki 2040-ųjų jie gali tapti didžiausiu ne tik elektros, bet ir visos energijos šaltiniu. Atsižvelgiant į dabartines tendencijas, bendra jų pagamintos elektros kaina žada būti daugiau, nei perpus, pigesnė už pigiausią šiandien. Tai nesustabdys klimato kaitos, bet gali ją sulėtinti daug greičiau. Didžioji pasaulio dalis, įskaitant Afriką, kur 600 mln. žmonių vis dar negali apšviesti jų namų, pradės jaustis turtingais energijos atžvilgiu. Tas jausmas žmonijai bus naujas ir permainingas.

 

 Norėdami suprasti, kad tai nėra kažkokia aplinkosaugininkų karštligiška svajonė, apsvarstykite saulės ekonomiką. Didėjant bendrai pagamintos prekės gamybai, sąnaudos mažėja. Kai sąnaudos mažėja, paklausa didėja. Didėjant paklausai, gamyba didėja, o sąnaudos toliau mažėja. Tai negali tęstis amžinai; gamyba, paklausa arba abi visada tampa suvaržytos. Ankstesniuose energijos perėjimuose – nuo ​​medienos prie anglies, anglies prie naftos ar naftos prie dujų – gavybos efektyvumas augo, tačiau galiausiai jį kompensavo vis didesnės kuro paieškos išlaidos.

 

 Kaip paaiškinama mūsų šios savaitės esė, saulės energijai tokių apribojimų nėra. Ištekliai, reikalingi saulės elementams gaminti ir sodinti saulės fermose – tai silicio turtingas smėlis, saulėtos vietos ir žmogaus išradingumas, kurių visų trijų yra gausu. Ląstelių gamybai taip pat reikia energijos, tačiau saulės energija taip pat greitai čia padaugėja. Kalbant apie paklausą, ji ir didžiulė, ir elastinga – jei atpiginsite elektrą, žmonės ras jai panaudojimą. Rezultatas yra tai, kad, priešingai, nei ankstesni energijos šaltiniai, saulės energija nuolat atpigdavo ir pigs.

 

 Yra ir kitų apribojimų. Atsižvelgiant į žmonių polinkį gyventi ne šviesiu paros metu, saulės energiją reikia papildyti saugykla ir papildyti kitomis technologijomis. Sunkiąją pramonę ir aviaciją bei krovinių gabenimą buvo sunku elektrifikuoti. Laimei, šios problemos gali būti išspręstos, nes elektrolizės būdu sukurti akumuliatoriai ir kuras palaipsniui atpigs.

 

 Kitas nerimas yra tas, kad didžioji dauguma pasaulio saulės baterijų ir beveik visas išgrynintas silicis, iš kurio jie gaminami, yra iš Kinijos. Jos saulės energijos pramonė yra labai konkurencinga, labai subsidijuojama ir viršija dabartinę paklausą – tai nemenkas pasiekimas, atsižvelgiant į visus saulės energijos pajėgumus, kuriuos Kinija įdiegia savo teritorijoje. Tai reiškia, kad Kinijos pajėgumai yra pakankamai dideli, kad plėtra tęstųsi ilgus metus, net jei kai kurios susijusios įmonės žlunga ir kai kurios investicijos išsenka.

 

 Ilgainiui pasaulis, kuriame daugiau energijos pagaminama be naftos ir dujų, gaunamų iš nestabilių ar nedraugiškų pasaulio dalių, bus patikimesnis. Vis dėlto, nors Kinijos komunistų partija negali nulemti saulės šviesos kainos, kai OPEC bando kontroliuoti naftą, nerimą kelia faktas, kad gyvybiškai svarbi pramonė gyvena vienoje priešiškoje šalyje.

 

 Amerika labai jaučia susirūpinimą, todėl Kinijos saulės energijos įrangai ji nustatė muitus. 

 

Tačiau kadangi beveik visa saulės kolektorių paklausa tebėra ateityje, likęs pasaulis turės daug galimybių patekti į rinką. Amerikos įsisavinimą saulės energijai gali sužlugdyti iškastinį kurą skatinantis Trumpo prezidentavimas, tačiau tik laikina ir skausminga. Tai taip pat galėtų būti sustiprinta, jei Amerika išlaisvintų užblokuotą paklausą, palengvindama plokščių montavimą namuose ir prisijungimą prie tinklo – šalis turi teravatų naujos saulės energijos galingumus, laukiančius, kol bus prijungti.  Anglies dioksido išpūstos kainos padėtų, kaip ir perėjus nuo anglies prie dujų Europos Sąjungoje.

 

 Turėtų būti siekiama, kad saulės energijos gamybos ratas apsisuktų kuo greičiau. Taip yra todėl, kad ji siūlo pigesnę energiją. Nauda prasideda nuo produktyvumo padidėjimo. Viskas, kam žmonės šiandien naudoja energiją, kainuos pigiau – ir tai apima beveik viską. Tada ateis dalykai, kuriuos padarys įmanoma pigi energija. Žmonės, kurie niekada negalėjo sau leisti, pradės apšviesti namus ar vairuoti automobilį. Pigi energija gali išvalyti vandenį ir netgi jį gėlinti. Jis gali vairuoti alkanas dirbtinio intelekto mašinas. 

 

Tai gali padaryti milijardus namų ir biurų labiau pakenčiamus vasaromis, kurios ateinančiais dešimtmečiais bus vis karštesnės.

 

 Tačiau didžiausią reikšmę turės tie dalykai, apie kuriuos dar niekas nepagalvojo. Dėl radikalios gausos pigesnė energija išlaisvins vaizduotę, sukeldama mažyčius proto ratus, kurie suksis su jauduliu ir naujomis galimybėmis.

 

 Šią savaitę šiauriniame pusrutulyje minima vasaros saulėgrįža. Saulė, kylanti į aukščiausią tašką danguje, po dešimtmečių nušvis pasaulį, kuriame niekam nereikia eiti be elektros palaiminimų ir kur prieiga prie energijos atgaivina visus, prie kurių ji prisiliečia." [1]

 

 Amerikos muitai saulės energijos įrangai daro mūsų vasaras karštesnes, negu galėtų būti be tų muitų. Dar Amerika atsisako konkuruoti, atsiribodama nuo pasaulinės rinkos. Eksponentinis augimas yra baisus tiems, kurie negali konkuruoti. Kinijai eksponentiškai augant saulės energijos gamybai, nacionalistiniai Vakarai lieka dulkėse. Dar blogiau, Vakarai pagamino daugiausiai anglies dvideginio ir įdiegė teršiančias viską aplinkui, anglies dvideginio gamybos technologijas. Pasauliniai Pietai, gaunantys pigią ir švarią saulės ir vėjo energiją iš Kinijos, turės dar stipresnę neigiamą nuomonę apie Vakarus.

 

1. The solar age. The Economist; London Vol. 451, Iss. 9402,  (Jun 22, 2024): 11.

The solar age

"It is 70 years since AT&T’s Bell Labs unveiled a new technology for turning sunlight into power. The phone company hoped it could replace the batteries that run equipment in out-of-the-way places. It also realised that powering devices with light alone showed how science could make the future seem wonderful; hence a press event at which sunshine kept a toy Ferris wheel spinning round and round.

Today solar power is long past the toy phase. Panels now occupy an area around half that of Wales, and this year they will provide the world with about 6% of its electricity—which is almost three times as much electrical energy as America consumed back in 1954. Yet this historic growth is only the second-most-remarkable thing about the rise of solar power. The most remarkable is that it is nowhere near over.

To call solar power’s rise exponential is not hyperbole, but a statement of fact. Installed solar capacity doubles roughly every three years, and so grows ten-fold each decade. Such sustained growth is seldom seen in anything that matters. That makes it hard for people to get their heads round what is going on. When it was a tenth of its current size ten years ago, solar power was still seen as marginal even by experts who knew how fast it had grown. The next ten-fold increase will be equivalent to multiplying the world’s entire fleet of nuclear reactors by eight in less than the time it typically takes to build just a single one of them.

Solar cells will in all likelihood be the single biggest source of electrical power on the planet by the mid 2030s. By the 2040s they may be the largest source not just of electricity but of all energy. On current trends, the all-in cost of the electricity they produce promises to be less than half as expensive as the cheapest available today. This will not stop climate change, but could slow it a lot faster. Much of the world—including Africa, where 600m people still cannot light their homes—will begin to feel energy-rich. That feeling will be a new and transformational one for humankind.

To grasp that this is not some environmentalist fever dream, consider solar economics. As the cumulative production of a manufactured good increases, costs go down. As costs go down, demand goes up. As demand goes up, production increases—and costs go down further. This cannot go on for ever; production, demand or both always become constrained. In earlier energy transitions—from wood to coal, coal to oil or oil to gas—the efficiency of extraction grew, but it was eventually offset by the cost of finding ever more fuel.

As our essay this week explains, solar power faces no such constraint. The resources needed to produce solar cells and plant them on solar farms are silicon-rich sand, sunny places and human ingenuity, all three of which are abundant. Making cells also takes energy, but solar power is fast making that abundant, too. As for demand, it is both huge and elastic—if you make electricity cheaper, people will find uses for it. The result is that, in contrast to earlier energy sources, solar power has routinely become cheaper and will continue to do so.

Other constraints do exist. Given people’s proclivity for living outside daylight hours, solar power needs to be complemented with storage and supplemented by other technologies. Heavy industry and aviation and freight have been hard to electrify. Fortunately, these problems may be solved as batteries and fuels created by electrolysis gradually become cheaper.

Another worry is that the vast majority of the world’s solar panels, and almost all the purified silicon from which they are made, come from China. Its solar industry is highly competitive, heavily subsidised and is outstripping current demand—quite an achievement given all the solar capacity China is installing within its own borders. This means that Chinese capacity is big enough to keep the expansion going for years to come, even if some of the companies involved go to the wall and some investment dries up.

In the long run, a world in which more energy is generated without the oil and gas that come from unstable or unfriendly parts of the world will be more dependable. Still, although the Chinese Communist Party cannot rig the price of sunlight as OPEC tries to rig that of oil, the fact that a vital industry resides in a single hostile country is worrying.

It is a concern that America feels keenly, which is why it has put tariffs on Chinese solar equipment. However, because almost all the demand for solar panels still lies in the future, the rest of the world will have plenty of scope to get into the market. America’s adoption of solar energy could be frustrated by a pro-fossil-fuel Trump presidency, but only temporarily and painfully. It could equally be enhanced if America released pent up demand, by making it easier to install panels on homes and to join the grid—the country has a terawatt of new solar capacity waiting to be connected. Carbon prices would help, just as they did in the switch from coal to gas in the European Union.

The aim should be for the virtuous circle of solar-power production to turn as fast as possible. That is because it offers the prize of cheaper energy. The benefits start with a boost to productivity. Anything that people use energy for today will cost less—and that includes pretty much everything. Then come the things cheap energy will make possible. People who could never afford to will start lighting their houses or driving a car. Cheap energy can purify water, and even desalinate it. It can drive the hungry machinery of artificial intelligence. It can make billions of homes and offices more bearable in summers that will, for decades to come, be getting hotter.

But it is the things that nobody has yet thought of that will be most consequential. In its radical abundance, cheaper energy will free the imagination, setting tiny Ferris wheels of the mind spinning with excitement and new possibilities.

This week marks the summer solstice in the northern hemisphere. The Sun rising to its highest point in the sky will in decades to come shine down on a world where nobody need go without the blessings of electricity and where the access to energy invigorates all those it touches." [1] 

  America's tariffs on solar equipment are making our summers hotter than they would be without them. More concerning is a fact, that  America refuses to compete, excluding itself from the world market. Exponential growth is horrible for those that cannot compete. As China grows its solar power production exponentially, nationalistic West is left in the dust. Worse, the West produced most carbon dioxide and introduced contaminating everything around, carbon dioxide producing technologies. Global South getting cheap and clean solar and wind energy from China will have even much stronger negative opinions about the West.

1. The solar age. The Economist; London Vol. 451, Iss. 9402,  (Jun 22, 2024): 11.