“What does President Trump actually want to do with Iran? The week that the U.S. struck the country's nuclear sites, he posted on Truth Social that "if the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!" But since then he has been pushing to end the Israel-Iran war.
The instinct behind Mr. Trump's post was the right one. If unimpeded, Iran's jihadist rulers will rebuild their nuclear program. Iran's deputy foreign minister told NBC News on July 3: "Our policy has not changed on enrichment."
To prevent Iran from achieving its ambitions, the U.S. should press its advantage and work openly with Israel and the Gulf states to undermine the regime.
The phrase "regime change" understandably makes Americans nervous. Since the Soviet Union's collapse, the U.S. has struggled to match military capability with coherent political purpose. Washington didn't define a clear political objective during its long Afghanistan campaign. The goal should have been to maintain an Afghan government in Kabul that would deny al Qaeda and the Taliban a haven at a low cost to America and allies. The U.S. objective instead became an impossible transformation of the country. It's no surprise this failed.
Compared with this incoherence, Mr. Trump's decision to strike Iran's nuclear program and then engineer a rapid cease-fire looks like a strategic masterstroke. Tehran's nuclear program has always been about weapons development, and crippling it was the right move.
The Iranian threat to America, however, is broader. Iran's support for its terrorist proxies endangers regional stability and U.S. lives. Iranian assistance with Russia's illegal oil exports reduces America's ability to pressure Moscow on the Ukraine conflict Because China also relies heavily on Iranian and Russian crude, keeping Iran in check would give the U.S. more leverage over Beijing.
Iran remains a dangerous threat, and the policy question is whether taking out that threat requires deposing the current regime now rather than waiting it out. History suggests the time to act is now.
Much like Mr. Trump aimed to do with his strikes on Iran, in the 1991 Gulf War the U.S. used overwhelming force to achieve a clearly defined political objective: the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi conquest. America suffered almost no losses and received broad international backing. The U.S. so thoroughly humiliated Saddam Hussein that American forces could have removed him from power. But President George H.W. Bush declined to do so, fearing regional instability.
The Iraqi threat to U.S. lives persisted. After the Gulf War, America discovered that the Central Intelligence Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency had underestimated Iraq's nuclear weaponization progress in the 1980s. The IAEA's inspectors determined that without the Gulf War, Iraq could have built a nuclear device in the early 1990s, although delivering it on a missile would have taken much longer. Iraq also maintained chemical and biological weapons infrastructure through the 1990s. After international actors supervised the destruction of Iraq's Scud missile arsenal after the Gulf War, Saddam insisted on producing indigenous missiles. In 1994, Iraq again menaced Kuwait. Saddam likely planned to invade, according to high-ranking Iraqi sources. Rapid U.S. military deployments deterred him. But Iraq remained a threat to American interests given its regional designs, support for international terrorism, and interest in destructive weapons.
The result of U.S. hesitancy in 1991 was that America became embroiled in another, more complex and difficult war after a decade of sanctions and intermittent bombing. In 2003 the U.S. invaded Iraq. As before, American victory was swift. A relatively small force swept to Baghdad and ejected Saddam from power.
But bureaucratic problems and a commitment to chimerical "democratization" led to a power vacuum and an insurgency, which destroyed American will for major foreign interventions.
As the Iraq problem persisted after the Gulf war, the threat from Iran persists after Operation Midnight Hammer. The Trump administration can't repeat the mistakes of 2003, occupying a country with no serious plan. But it shouldn't repeat the mistake of 1991 either. The Iranian regime will remain a threat to America until different leaders occupy Tehran. If Mr. Trump leaves the clerics in charge, the U.S. will eventually have to deal with an even worse conflict -- as it did in Iraq.
If Iran is left to its own devices, there is little possibility of a domestic transformation. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, still lives, as do many leading officials. The assaults on American positions in Qatar and Iraq are unlikely to be the end for a regime that regularly pronounces "Death to America." The only way to eliminate this threat is to eliminate its ideological source -- the regime led by Ali Khamenei.
Now is the perfect time to target Mr. Khamenei and thereby decapitate the regime in Tehran. Airstrikes by Israel and the U.S. have done serious damage. Israeli action against the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas, along with the Assad regime's collapse, have also debilitated the Axis of Resistance.
Killing the supreme leader would set off a power struggle inside Iran.
Such a move is unlikely to lead to representative government, but that shouldn't be the goal. Mr. Khamenei's killing would likely elevate a military-led regime that could be convinced -- through an appeal to self-preservation -- to dismantle its nuclear program and end its proxy wars. Such a plan would require coordination with Israel. The U.S. should preposition military assets to hunt down Iran's remaining ballistic missiles if Tehran's reaction warrants it. The U.S. should ensure that European powers reinstate sanctions on Iran. Finally, the U.S. should work with the Gulf states, Israel and Turkey to create a policy for a post-Khamenei Iran that could offer incentives for Tehran's good behavior.
While striking Iran's nuclear sites was a triumph, the challenge of transforming that tactical success into a strategic victory remains. Leaving the jihadist clerics in charge would assure a future confrontation that is far more dangerous.
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Mr. Cropsey is president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as a deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of "Mayday" and "Seablindness."” [1]
“Mr. Khamenei's killing would likely elevate a military-led regime that could be convinced -- through an appeal to self-preservation -- to dismantle its nuclear program and end its proxy wars.” Chile all over again. Americans installed military government there too. After the democratic election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970, the United States, under President Richard Nixon, pursued policies aimed at undermining his socialist government
.
These efforts included:
Economic Pressure: The Nixon administration implemented an "invisible blockade," halting bilateral aid and discouraging international loans to Chile, according to NPR. The same is done for Iran
Covert Funding: The CIA provided funds to Allende's political opponents, including conservative media organizations like El Mercurio, to weaken support for his government.
Military Contacts: While there is debate on the extent of direct US involvement in the 1973 coup, the CIA maintained contact with Chilean military officers who were planning to overthrow Allende's government.
On September 11, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet led a military coup that overthrew Allende's government, resulting in Allende's death and the installation of a brutal dictatorship that lasted 17 years. While the US government did not directly orchestrate the coup, it created a climate that made it more likely. The subsequent Pinochet regime engaged in widespread human rights abuses, including torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.
The US role in Chile during this period remains a subject of ongoing debate and criticism. The same would be with Iran.
The problem is that CIA installed Shah in Iran using this method. Iranians still remember it. CIA could have some difficulty in making Iranians to take the same medicine again.
The United States, particularly through the CIA, played a significant role in orchestrating the 1953 Iranian coup d'état
This operation, known as Operation Ajax in the US and Operation Boot in Britain, led to the overthrow of Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and the restoration of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power.
The coup was motivated by several factors:
Protection of British oil interests: Mossadegh had nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a move that Britain strongly opposed and which led them to seek support from the United States to undermine his government.
Protection of Western economic interests in Iran's oil industry: Following the coup, the US played a role in restructuring Iran's oil industry, ensuring that a consortium of American, British, and French oil companies had a significant share in its operations.
The US actively participated in the coup through various means, including:
Propaganda campaigns: The CIA engaged in covert operations to discredit Mossadegh and stir up anti-communist sentiment.
Financial support and bribery: The CIA provided funds to pro-Shah forces and allegedly bribed officials and influential figures to facilitate the coup.
Working with the Iranian military: The CIA cultivated relationships with elements within the Iranian military and helped them coordinate the overthrow of Mossadegh's government.
The 1953 coup had a profound and lasting impact on US-Iran relations, contributing significantly to the anti-American sentiment that fueled the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The coup is viewed by many Iranians as a symbol of Western interference in their internal affairs and remains a contentious topic that continues to shape Iranian perceptions of the United States. While some argue that the coup was an Iranian affair with minimal US involvement, others emphasize the central role played by the US in orchestrating the events that led to Mossadegh's overthrow. The US government formally acknowledged its role in the coup in 2013 by releasing declassified documents. The legacy of the 1953 coup continues to influence US-Iran relations and remains a subject of ongoing debate and analysis.
1. The Perfect Time for Regime Change in Iran. Cropsey, Seth. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 09 July 2025: A15.
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