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World News: Cheaper Swarms of Missiles Shatter Old Strategies --- Interceptors are in short supply, making U.S. and allied bases more vulnerable


 

“MANAMA, Bahrain -- Technological advances making ballistic missiles cheaper and more precise have allowed Iran and the Houthis of Yemen to strike foes across the Middle East.

 

The development and spread of these weapons, once the preserve of nuclear superpowers, mean military doctrines worldwide will need profound change -- fast.

 

Along with the drone revolution unfolding in Ukraine, this transformation has strategic implications worldwide, including for the U.S. military posture in Europe and Asia as key military and infrastructure assets become increasingly vulnerable.

 

With advances in ballistic missiles "even nonstate actors are able to operate at significant ranges, redefining what the deep battle space is," said retired British Air Marshal Martin Sampson, who heads the Middle East office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

 

And, he said, defenses against these missiles haven't caught up with the transformation. "Everything that is fixed is a target now."

 

This year, Iran inflicted serious damage on U.S. military bases, forcing the abandonment of key U.S. installations in the Persian Gulf. U.S. military compounds along the corniche here in Bahrain's capital are dotted with the charred hulks of destroyed radars and communications installations.

 

Meanwhile, Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis are continuously striking Saudi airports and energy facilities, putting economic pressure on their much-wealthier adversary.

 

Both the U.S. and its allies in the region are starting to run short of interceptors for Patriot and Thaad systems, the main defenses against ballistic missiles. Farther afield, this global shortage has left Ukraine’s military-industrial assets unprotected against salvos of Russian missiles aimed at its army, energy grid and key bridges and weapons’ factories.

 

The implications of this imbalance are profound for the way the U.S. military operates. Since World War II, Washington has used a network of bases worldwide to protect its allies and keep rivals in check.

 

Today, these bases are vulnerable even to third- and fourth-rate military forces like those of Iran and the Houthis that are located hundreds or even thousands of miles away.

 

China, Russia and North Korea possess much bigger and more-sophisticated ballistic-missile arsenals. Their production of these missiles heavily outpaces the manufacturing of interceptors by the U.S. and allies.

 

The Pentagon, asked about this challenge, didn't respond to a request for comment.

 

"What the war in Iran has shown is that not only is the U.S. military fragile in terms of its stockpiles, but also the way the U.S. plans to fight doesn't work in the current era. Military power has been democratized," said Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis at the Defense Priorities think tank that advocates restraint in U.S. foreign policy. "The U.S. way of war relies heavily on the ability to operate from forward bases and protect these bases. But we see from the Middle East that these bases, the way they have been constructed, are simply not defensible, even against a weak adversary."

 

While the conflict in Ukraine has focused attention on the drone revolution, drones carry relatively small warheads and are fairly easy to intercept. They can be effective against flammable targets, such as oil refineries. But, unlike ballistic missiles, with their powerful charges that can penetrate hardened structures, drones usually can't destroy power plants, fortified aircraft hangars or military production lines.

 

U.S. and allied military officials acknowledge that the new ballistic-missile threat must spur a rethinking of the U.S.'s global military posture, especially considering the shortage of interceptors, which the U.S. military-industrial base won't be able to rectify for several years. No decisions on how to adapt have been announced.

 

One senior Western defense official said nations that can provide their own ballistic-missile defenses would become prime locations for U.S. military facilities. This has happened in the Middle East, where U.S. military operations are increasingly concentrated in Israel, which makes and operates its own missile-defense systems.

 

Amid the conflicts raging in Ukraine and in the Middle East, few things are in shorter supply nowadays than ballistic-missile interceptors, some of the costliest and most advanced military products out there. Only a handful of Western manufacturers can make them. The biggest, Lockheed Martin, can't meet surging global demand.

 

It isn't until next year that a European company, the Franco-Italian Samp/T consortium, is planning to start manufacturing the new-generation Aster missiles capable of addressing ballistic-missile threats.

 

Meanwhile, as the Houthis have shown, the barriers to becoming a ballistic-missile power are falling fast, with odds stacked toward the attacker in the foreseeable future, said Fabian Hoffmann, missile expert at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies. "Even the United States, with its industrial capacity, is not prepared to defend against an attacker that builds ballistic missiles at industrial scale."

 

Many military officials wonder whether it even makes sense to invest big parts of their defense budgets in ballistic-missile interceptors, arguing that it is best to focus on deterrence.

 

"I wonder if it's worth it to try defending ourselves against this kind of weapon," said retired French Lt. Gen. Michel Yakovleff. "We are now returning to the logic of deterrence between states. France has never renounced first nuclear use, and if Russia fires a salvo of 200 ballistic missiles in one night on key economic and civilian targets in Europe, it's starting to tempt a French nuclear missile in response."

 

Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, agreed that reinforcing deterrence must become a key policy.

 

"You cannot defend the United States from Fort Hood, Texas, or Fort Bragg, North Carolina. You have to be able to position capabilities, logistics, maintenance, command and control out where we need it," he said. But "maybe the ones in the Middle East were not as important as we thought, and are so vulnerable. There will have to be a cost-benefit analysis."

 

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West Is Caught in Historic Trap

 

Ballistic missiles used to be very expensive and imprecise, and mid-to-late 20th-century military doctrines treated them as mostly suitable for carrying nuclear weapons.

 

"For a long time, these systems were so inaccurate that they didn't have a lot of conventional value, especially over longer ranges. But what we have seen in the last few decades is the development of increasingly precise ballistic missiles and now this technology is spreading around the world," said Fabian Hinz, missile expert at the Conflict Armament Research organization.

 

 "The Western way of war was always about securing air superiority, or air supremacy really fast," he said.

 

"But now, even if your adversary doesn't have advanced air capabilities, they may still be able to strike your rear with missiles."

 

The nuclear dimension meant that the development of antiballistic-missile defense had been viewed as a destabilizing factor in the nuclear equilibrium between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and was limited by international treaties.

 

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty between Moscow and Washington, which remained in effect until 2019, made European nations shy away from developing their own ground-launched ballistic-missile capabilities.” [1]

 

These swarms of missiles are why even Mr. Zelensky talks about peace. Western European governments – not so much. They still don’t understand what is going on and feel that their personal rear is safe.

 

•           Critiques of European Urgency: Critics of Western European policy argue that leaders in countries further from the front lines feel insulated from immediate physical danger.

 

From this perspective, European governments are accused of prolonging the conflict diplomatically while lacking the military stockpiles—such as Patriot interceptors—needed to independently replace dwindling U.S. support.

 

Some commentators also point to domestic political pressures, upcoming elections, and budget constraints in countries like France and Germany as factors complicating consistent European strategy.

•           European Security Concerns: Conversely, European leaders and foreign policy analysts argue that Western Europe's caution toward immediate peace talks stems from direct security concerns rather than a sense of safety. According to analyses from institutions like the Center for Strategic and International Studies, European governments worry that swarms of missiles forcing Ukraine into a deal that concedes to Russian demands would ultimately threaten broader European security. Of course, it could be both.

 

 

1. World News: Cheaper Missiles Shatter Old Strategies --- Interceptors are in short supply, making U.S. and allied bases more vulnerable. Trofimov, Yaroslav.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 12 Nov 2026: A8. 

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