The Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Realism): Many political realists argue that nuclear weapons and the balance of power now—specifically the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)—are the primary factors preventing major conflict in the world. There are always the dreamers, stating that they could make war like porcupines have sex (very slowly and carefully), this way avoiding the nukes in some magical, fairy tale-like, way. Main reason for the fancy ideas from the dreamers is to sell expensive military kit, promising to get riches of other people in compensation. From a strict realist viewpoint, assuming an adversary will play by conventional rules once a conflict begins ignores the fundamental rule of state survival: when pushed to the brink, a nuclear-armed power will use every tool at its disposal.
“FOR MOST of the past 800 years, the sight of German soldiers inspired dread in Lithuanian hearts. Today, as a small Baltic state with Russia as a direct neighbour, Lithuania is happy to host a permanently deployed German armoured brigade.
In 2029 Germany, Europe’s largest country, plans to spend 3.5% of GDP, or €162bn ($182bn), on defence. That is more than the combined defence spending of Britain and France last year. Far from being alarmed by German rearmament, many neighbours are counting on it.
Put bluntly, after decades of underinvestment in defence, mainstream European leaders have a horror of being abandoned by America before the region is strong enough. They turned to near-panic after Mr Trump was re-elected in 2024, and he made clear his scorn for Ukraine and its allies in NATO and the European Union.
European leaders broadly agree on the need to support Ukraine and prepare for America to become, at best, NATO’s offshore protector of last resort. That shared task helped Britain repair ties with allies that take defence seriously, including nuclear-armed France, big-spending Germany, and Ukraine’s most loyal supporters in northern and eastern Europe.
The balance of fear has changed, too, in Germany, where the public had to overcome its unease about military might. Though cold-war West Germany maintained one of NATO’s largest armies, politicians allowed citizens to indulge in a comfortable fantasy, portraying post-1989 Germany as a commerce-minded, pacifist friend to all. Some on the left treated Germany as something like a recovering addict to militarism, which if allowed even a sniff of gunpowder might go on a terrible bender before waking with a headache to discover it had occupied Luxembourg, once again.
Such angst was cured by Mr Trump. German defence spending grew in earnest after Ukraine’s events in 2022, inspiring what Germany’s then-chancellor, Olaf Scholz, called a Zeitenwende, or “turning-point”. Spending surged after 2024 and the return of an America-First president.
European unity is, however, more fragile than it appears. Over the next 12 months, elections will be held in Spain, France, Poland and Italy. In several cases, parties on the nationalist right are poised for power.
Some right-wing populists have histories of sympathising with Russia, including Marine Le Pen, front-runner in the French presidential contest, and Roberto Vannacci, a former general and Russia-admirer challenging Italy’s conservative prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, from her right.
If Poland’s feuding politicians agree on one thing it is on loathing Russia.
Still, some Polish conservatives cast Ukraine as needy, ungrateful and too slow to acknowledge crimes committed by Ukrainians against Poles during the second world war. Aid for Ukraine should come with conditions, they growl.
Above all, the nationalist right is united in opposing deeper European integration, even in pro-EU Spain, where the Vox party may enter government. An exultant Ms Le Pen has predicted that a year of elections will transform the EU from a would-be superstate into a “Europe of nations”.
A nationalist wave could also derail Europe’s rearmament. To avoid frightening its neighbours, Germany can grow its armed forces and defence industries only if it puts its fiscal and military might at the service of NATO and Europe, argues Liana Fix, the author of a new book, “Germany Rearmed: The Return of War and the End of Illusions”. To be a “European” power means, in effect, to act within the Franco-German alliance in which Germany has bound its strength since 1945. But that creates a dilemma. Ms Fix fears a division of Europe into a north-eastern bloc, including the Baltic states, Britain, Nordic countries and Poland, which still is focused on Russia, and a Mediterranean bloc of southern governments ready to appease Mr Putin, to buy his oil and gas and to focus security spending on hardening borders against poor-world migrants. Germany would have a national interest in securing Poland and the Baltics as a buffer against Russia, Ms Fix writes. But if France does not want to join a northern bloc, Germany’s national and European interests would be at odds.
The coming chorus of Putin appeasers
True, as Ms Le Pen scents victory, she has moderated her formerly Putin-friendly rhetoric. Casting herself as an heir to Charles de Gaulle, she pledges to maintain strong armed forces. But at a minimum her sharp-elbowed, France-first approach to industrial spending could derail multinational defence projects. At worst, Europe would conclude it cannot rely on France in a crisis.
The Trump administration’s role is both unhelpful and incoherent. Mr Trump continues to push Europeans to spend more on defence.
At the same time, he seeks detente with Mr Putin and offers noisy support to pro-Russian parties on Europe’s nationalist right, including Germany’s largest party, the Putin-friendly, Ukraine-spurning Alternative for Germany.
But if Europe has no need to deter Russia, it is unclear why Mr Trump thinks it needs to rearm: the continent is hardly about to take on China [1].
Europe needs to learn the right lessons from the Trump era. The MAGA shock made Europeans, led by Germany, serious about their own security, at long last. To complete the task, Europe must now shun Trump-style populist nationalism, which risks wrecking that project. Anything else would be a fearful blunder.” [2]
1. Trump needs EU to buy obsolete and expensive American weapons in fake rearming. Why? Americans need the money to turn their own military to plentiful swarms of drones and missiles, leaving Germans holding the bag and loaded with useless tanks of the previous century. Tanks, airplanes, ships and helicopters cannot be protected from swarms of cheap and precise drones and missiles, as we see in Iran.
A. The Financial and Industrial Incentive for the U.S.
The Trump administration has consistently pushed European nations to meet or exceed defense spending targets, explicitly suggesting that they buy American arms. This strategy carries distinct advantages for the U.S.:
• Economic Subsidies: U.S. defense companies actively compete for a share of Europe's increased military spending. High-value foreign military sales help sustain domestic American manufacturing lines, lower per-unit costs for the Pentagon, and fund U.S. research into next-generation systems.
• Interoperability vs. Lock-in: The U.S. benefits when NATO allies use American platforms—like the F-35 fighter jet or Patriot missile systems—because it ensures seamless military interoperability. However, critics argue this creates long-term technological and logistical dependence on Washington, limiting European strategic autonomy.
B. The Drone Warfare Shift: Are Legacy Platforms Obsolete?
Modern conflicts have demonstrated that traditional, multi-million dollar platforms—like main battle tanks, helicopters, and large surface ships—are highly vulnerable to asymmetrical drone swarms and precision missiles.
• The U.S. Response: The Pentagon is actively pivoting toward its own mass-produced, low-cost autonomous drone and missile programs (such as the Replicator initiative) to counter near-peer adversaries.
• The "Legacy" Catch: Despite the vulnerability of heavy armor, military analysts note that heavy platforms are still deemed necessary for holding territory and providing combined-arms capabilities.
2. Fear united Europe. Nationalism may tear it apart. The Economist; London Vol. 461, Iss. 9524, (Nov 7, 2026): 63.
The dilemma is that building next-generation electronic warfare and active-protection systems to defend these legacy platforms is incredibly expensive, creating a risk that buyers absorb high costs for rapidly aging technology.
C. European Pushback and the "Buy European" Strategy
European nations are highly cognizant of the risk of being "left holding the bag" or relying entirely on an unpredictable U.S. foreign policy. This has triggered a significant policy rift:
• The EU Shift: The European Union has frozen certain non-EU entities from specific defense loan programs and introduced initiatives that require a high percentage of military equipment to be sourced within the EU. Countries like Denmark, Canada, and Portugal have even faced domestic reconsideration or regret regarding major American acquisition programs like the F-35.
• Industrial Realities: On Reddit's r/europe, a community consensus notes that while Europe possesses highly capable domestic land-based military systems—such as the Leopard 2 tank or Caesar artillery—it still faces a multi-decade lag in matching American advancements in 5th-generation aerospace, satellite, and rocket technologies.
Consequently, U.S. officials have openly criticized Europe’s "Buy European" mandates. The U.S. argues that capping non-European content during an active security crisis withholds immediate, combat-proven capabilities from frontline states and risks fracturing the collaborative framework of NATO.
US stockpiles of the most superfluous weapons are already empty, which is why the EU is no longer needed by the US.
2. Fear united Europe. Nationalism may tear it apart. The Economist; London Vol. 461, Iss. 9524, (Nov 7, 2026): 63.
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