They are both hated in their own countries that are ready to let them go. When Trump will throw them under the bus in Ukraine, they will fly out of politics and back to their banking.
As of late October 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz are facing considerable challenges both at home and abroad, including questions over their political longevity and their relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump. The notion that they will soon be out of office stems from low public approval and strategic vulnerabilities exacerbated by shifts in U.S. policy towards Ukraine.
Shared political and economic headwinds
Low Approval Ratings: Both leaders are currently struggling with low approval from their own electorates. Merz has consistently low personal popularity in Germany, with satisfaction dropping to its lowest point in August 2025. Similarly, Macron's approval ratings have reached a historic low, with some commentators calling him "politically radioactive".
Controversial decisions: Merz has faced criticism for perceived inconsistencies and impulsiveness, including relying on votes from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) to push through an immigration bill in January 2025. This caused a public backlash and a rebuke from former Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Economic Uncertainty: Both leaders are under pressure to improve economic performance in their respective countries. France's economy is expected to be impacted by political instability, while Germany is facing a flagging economy and the need for significant spending cuts.
Tensions with the U.S. over Ukraine
Trump's Ukraine stance: The return of Donald Trump to the White House has significantly strained transatlantic relations. He has shown impatience with Ukraine's President Zelenskyy, used inflammatory analogies comparing the conflict to children fighting, and has expressed skepticism about a ceasefire, favoring a permanent peace deal instead.
European pushback: Macron and Merz have been strong proponents of continued European support for Ukraine. In June 2025, they challenged Trump in the White House by insisting that any peace negotiations must be based on a ceasefire. Their position was contradicted by Trump, who suggested letting Russia and Ukraine "fight for a while".
Potential vulnerability: This friction leaves European leaders exposed. If Trump withdraws full U.S. support for Ukraine, as he has hinted he might, Macron and Merz would face intense pressure to fill the void, potentially without the political capital to do so.
"Banking" and political fate
The claim that they will "fly out of politics and back to their banking" is partially rooted in fact, but is highly speculative in terms of predicting their future.
Merz's banking background: Merz has a history in the private financial sector. After his political career was sidelined by Merkel, he worked as a corporate lawyer and served as chairman of the German branch of investment manager BlackRock.
Emmanuel Macron's connection to banking stems from his past career as an investment banker at Rothschild & Co. before entering politics, as well as his present policy initiatives on banking and finance as President of France.
Uncertain future: While Merz and Macron have faced significant political setbacks and opposition, there is no solid evidence to confirm their imminent departure from politics. The expectation reflects a common sentiment among critics who point to their unpopularity and potential political vulnerabilities in the face of shifting global dynamics.
“WHEN THE French and German governments gather in the Mediterranean port of Toulon on August 29th, the meeting will be heavy in symbolism. It will be the two countries’ 25th joint cabinet meeting, a marker of the importance both place on their mutual ties. Toulon is a naval base, a key strategic point for the European Union’s only nuclear-armed power. At a crucial moment for Europe’s security, the event reaffirms what is still the eu’s indispensable bilateral relationship.
Yet deep uncertainty will hang over the event. On August 25th François Bayrou, France’s prime minister, called a vote of confidence for September 8th over his debt-reduction plans. His government may well fall. Emmanuel Macron will remain in charge of foreign affairs regardless. But instability at home makes the need to tighten the link between the leaders—Mr Macron and Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor—harder yet more urgent.
Happily, there are propitious signs for the renewal of a relationship that stalled under Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor until May. French dismay over Mr Scholz’s decision to prioritise America over Europe, and a poor personal relationship between the two men, saw the Franco-German “motor” run out of juice. By contrast, Mr Merz, whose Christian Democrats (CDU) unseated Mr Scholz in February’s German election, invested early in Mr Macron. His bold, sometimes surprising approach to policymaking—seen in his decision to loosen Germany’s debt rules to fund a huge rise in defence spending—has impressed his French partner. The two have made a great show of their bond, issuing joint op-eds and travelling together to global hotspots such as Washington and Kyiv.
Last month Mr Merz, who has an eye for ceremony his predecessor lacked, ensured veal saddle and chanterelles were on the menu when he hosted Mr Macron at a villa on the outskirts of Berlin. On August 28th Mr Macron will return the favour, treating Mr Merz to dinner at his summer residence, the medieval fort of Brégançon on the Med. So far the chemistry between the two leaders, both former financiers who speak English together, seems unusually good. In private Mr Macron calls him “direct, simple, frank, aligned”. Mr Merz has celebrated their “deep personal bond”.
Besides the geopolitical crises of the moment—Ukraine, Gaza, Iran—two broad subjects will be on the agenda in Toulon: improving European competitiveness, and bolstering defence and security co-operation. The countries will announce a raft of joint “lighthouse projects” in areas like ai and quantum computing. A meeting of the revamped Franco-German defence and security council will also take place.
Mr Merz delighted French observers when he declared in February that Europe must reduce its dependence on America, apparently embracing Mr Macron’s long-standing ambitions for European “strategic autonomy”. Among other things, a quiet conversation has begun on the extension of France’s nuclear deterrent to the rest of Europe. German officials admit freely that merely discussing the details of deterrence is helpful in forging the strategic culture they have long lacked.
But whether Germany is ready to unshackle itself from America’s security guarantees, and its off-the-shelf military kit, remains to be seen. “There is huge potential for disappointment on the French side,” says Jacob Ross at the German Council on Foreign Relations. In Ukraine, as a debate over security guarantees gathers pace, Germany is unlikely to make a big direct contribution to policing any ceasefire. But the hope is that its financial and logistical support for Ukraine can justify the place it has sought in the “coalition of the willing” spearheaded by France and Britain.
The two leaders also know they need to broaden their alliances. France and Germany already work well with Britain on dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. They now want to revitalise the “Weimar triangle” with Poland; this week they joined Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, on a visit to Moldova to back its embattled pro-Western government. “Given the geopolitical challenges today, the Russian threat and the Trump administration, the Franco-German relationship alone is now insufficient,” says Sébastien Maillard of the Institut Jacques Delors, a think-tank.
Inside the eu the pair appear to agree on the importance of slashing red tape and reducing the still-considerable barriers to trade, especially in services, within its single market. Progress on this in recent years has been glacial. They are slowly converging on the trade and security challenges presented by China, too.
Yet there are several points of disagreement. Mr Macron’s unwillingness to approve the eu’s trade deal with Mercosur, a Latin American bloc, has infuriated many in Berlin. France insists on amending the agreement to protect European farmers. The German view is that Europe, thumped by American tariffs, must seek partners wherever it can find them. Brussels insiders think a workaround will be crafted that provides Mr Macron with the cover he needs to wave the deal through.
A yet trickier source of friction is over two military grands projets with troubled histories: the Main Ground Combat System, a next-generation battle tank, and, especially, the Future Combat Air System (fcas), a complex aviation initiative interlacing a fighter jet, drones and a “combat cloud” communications system. Tensions have risen over what the Germans regard as a power-grab by French firms; last week the defence ministry warned that the jet was imperilled by demands from French industry for sole leadership. The two defence ministers have vowed to iron out their differences by the year’s end. But it is not obvious how political will can resolve industrial mistrust. French officials insist there is “no plan B”. But scepticism over the fcas remains rife in Berlin.
Ever since Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle signed the Elysée Treaty in 1963, vowing to build an integrated Europe upon their post-war link, the strength of the relationship has depended on the respective leaders’ ability to overcome their differences. Today the two leaders not only share a desire to make the tie work, but understand each other’s domestic constraints. Mr Merz is unlikely to give voice to his government’s concerns over France’s unstable public-debt load, for example. Mr Macron has eased his calls for Germany to back a programme of common eu debt for defence.
But political capital as well as goodwill is needed, and neither leader has much. Less than four months in, Mr Merz’s hold on his coalition with the Social Democrats is wobbling, his break with fiscal orthodoxy has irritated many in his own ranks, and the hard-right Alternative for Germany is nipping at his heels. Mr Macron, whose presidential term runs until 2027, is in an even deeper hole. If his government falls, France will lose its third prime minister in just over a year.
Such troubles will not help Mr Macron and Mr Merz in their quest to make something of their renewed partnership, but they render the effort even more vital. “Our shared strategic interest outweighs our national differences,” says Roland Theis, a cdu mp. Europe is a fretful and vulnerable place right now, and needs a strong Franco-German link more than ever. The two leaders cannot afford to get it wrong.” [1]
1. Time for some Merz-Macron magic. The Economist; London Vol. 456, Iss. 9463, (Aug 30, 2025): 23, 24.
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