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The West Globalized, Therefore Deindustrialized and Lost Military Abilities: Rayon Snarls Plans to Make More Patriot Missiles --- Humble fabric is one of myriad chokepoints in U.S. munitions industry


Efficiency & Specialization: Decades of globalization and lean peacetime manufacturing lowered costs and let firms specialize in complex niches, but left defense supply chains vulnerable when combat consumption spikes. There are no skilled workers in the West to do the job. There are other structural hurdles, importantly, capital is gone to China, and is not returning – it is impossible to compete. This why both Biden's and Trump's efforts to re-shore industry failed. This is why humanoids are not walking on our streets. This is why we produce lowest quality cars possible.

 

“Earlier this year, a senior Pentagon official met with a vendor far down the supply chain of a top U.S. missile maker for an urgent conversation. The subject: rayon.

 

The material in question wasn't the breezy fabric in your favorite Hawaiian shirt. The Pentagon was focused instead on a carbonized version capable of withstanding temperatures in the thousands of degrees, which is critical for making high-end Patriot interceptors sought after around the world for missile defense.

 

Only one rayon product of this kind is approved for use in the most advanced Patriot missiles, and it comes from the Kansas factory of a single supplier, Park Aerospace. With Patriot stockpiles shrinking, the Pentagon official pushed Park for more rayon to help ramp up missile production. It soon became clear that the company's hands were tied.

 

The problem lay not in Kansas but thousands of miles across the Atlantic near the vineyards of Bordeaux in France. That's where Park's supplier, ArianeGroup -- a maker of space rockets and ballistic missiles -- produces the carbonized rayon fabric, which it then ships to Park for further processing. ArianeGroup had warned supply was limited.

 

While the Pentagon isn't shy about applying pressure to get what it wants, Park's chief executive, Brian Shore, was certain that approach wouldn't work with Ariane.

 

"They're a French company," said Shore in an interview. "They can't be bullied."

 

The struggle to find enough rayon for Patriot missiles is emblematic of the challenges the U.S. faces in quickly surging production of critical munitions. Supply chains are riddled with chokepoints. One or two components made by suppliers several levels down can gum up the works. In many cases, those products come from outside the U.S. via complex webs of companies, with few or no ready American alternatives.

 

Overhauling this fragile industrial base to achieve record new rates of production is a herculean task. Hundreds of subcontractors need to ramp up in unison, in many cases by expanding factories or building new ones from scratch. Finding alternative materials and putting them through batteries of tests to meet ultraprecise standards can be a long, costly undertaking.

 

To be ready to surge today, companies needed to have launched a new munitions plan five or more years ago, one defense executive said.

 

Another likened the effort to pushing a basketball through a garden hose.

 

The hose was once bigger.

 

After the Soviet Union collapsed, U.S. policymakers sought a "peace dividend." At a 1993 meeting that came to be known in national-security circles as the Last Supper, Clinton administration officials informed industry bigwigs of their plans to slash military spending. Over the next quarter-century, top-tier American aerospace and defense companies consolidated, falling from 51 to just five primary contractors.

 

Their once-dense supplier networks shrank as specialized manufacturers and machine shops quit defense work or went out of business entirely.

 

The closures were exacerbated by a broader manufacturing shift overseas, from the processing of minerals and mixing of chemicals to the production of cables, coatings, casings and chips. Workers in America with niche skills lost their jobs, sweeping away decades of know-how.

 

In the decade preceding a 2022 Pentagon report, the number of small businesses in the U.S. defense industrial base shrank by 40%.

 

Data from March by defense software company Air shows how high-stakes missile programs rely on largely the same cluster of vendors. More than 70% of second-tier suppliers for the newest generation of Patriot missiles, the PAC-3, also supply Thaad, another interceptor the U.S. has expended and wants in large quantities. The overlap is even more acute in the third tier.

 

This also means a failure at one supplier -- a natural disaster, workers' strike or bankruptcy -- could have cascading effects across a number of weapons.

 

The Pentagon is scrambling to reverse the decadeslong drawdown. It inked a seven-year deal with Lockheed Martin, which makes the most advanced Patriot missile, and another with L3Harris, which supplies solid rocket motors for those missiles, to accelerate production. It is also reaching out directly to third- and fourth-tier suppliers to try to ease bottlenecks hidden beneath the surface.

 

The Pentagon said in a statement that it is "continually working on supply chain resilience and qualifying new suppliers." L3Harris said it is confident it will "maintain the materials needed to produce at quantities required, through at least the end of our 7-year framework agreement." The company said it was on target to qualify an additional source of rayon, but didn't say how long that would take.

 

The U.S. faces urgent interceptor demands today, not just for its own armed forces but also a host of allies, including Ukraine. Concern around the Patriot crunch has grown so prominent, Park Aerospace CEO Shore is fielding questions about it even at doctor's appointments.

 

"'How many do they have left, Brian? Because I've heard a lot of stuff,'" Shore said a physician asked him on a recent visit.

 

The PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor, which means it slams into an incoming target -- a ballistic missile, for example -- to destroy it. By end-July, the U.S. had rapidly burned through its already-stretched inventory, leaving it roughly 65% smaller than before the Iran war began in February, according to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.

 

Priced at about $4 million apiece, each interceptor of the latest model, PAC-3 MSE, takes roughly two years and many hundreds of components to make.

 

While Lockheed builds the interceptor, it relies on Boeing for the seekers lodged in each missile's nose that help it to home in on incoming projectiles. L3Harris' dual-pulse solid rocket motor extends its range. There are energetics and electronics, castings and chemical precursors, micro-thrusters and motion controllers, and a dizzying array of other inputs -- each with their own supply chains.

 

Rayon used in the PAC-3 MSE begins its life as strands of fiber at a factory in the Czech Republic owned by a Thailand-based chemicals conglomerate.

 

That yarn makes its way to France to be woven into fabric. The ArianeGroup, a joint venture between European aerospace giants Airbus and Safran, carbonizes the fabric near Bordeaux.

 

Ariane then sells the blackened rolls it calls Raycarb to Park Aerospace, its lone North American distributor. Park coats the material with a custom-designed resin inside a temperature-controlled facility in Newton, Kan., before sending it on to L3Harris, which layers it inside the nozzles of solid rocket motors bound for Lockheed's Patriot factory.

 

This process isn't like building a car engine, where the manufacturer can buy pistons from a second supplier if the first supplier runs out. Even a tiny flaw in the structure of a solid rocket motor can cause a Patriot interceptor to veer off course, which means each component has to go through a rigorous selection process to be qualified.

 

"There's a lot of testing that's involved," said Shore. "You could go down the path for two years, everything's looking good -- then at the last test it fails, and now you're back to the drawing board."

 

Rayon feels unlikely as a chokepoint in munitions production. It's so intensely flammable in its brushed form that knockoff "torch sweaters," made of easily ignited rayon masquerading as wool, sparked consumer panic and a Federal Trade Commission investigation in the 1950s.

 

Researchers at the American chemical company Union Carbide discovered in 1958 that the same rayon, when slowly baked in a vacuum, transforms into a form of carbon fiber that can resist extremely high temperatures. Plastered inside a rocket nozzle, it forms an ablative barrier that burns off gradually while protecting the motor from melting as the fuel burns at temperatures above 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit.

 

Making rayon suitable for rockets is trickier than spinning fabric for clothing. Fibers have to be long and continuous. They also have to be washed free of impurities, which produces toxic runoff.

 

For most of the Cold War, the sole producer of aerospace-grade rayon in North America was a textile factory on the banks of the Shenandoah River in Front Royal, Va. After the factory fell on hard times in the 1980s, NASA and the Department of Defense pooled $38 million to keep it running, but state authorities shut it down in 1989 for discharging dangerous chemicals into the river.

 

The void was filled by North American Rayon Corp., which produced rocket-ready rayon out of a factory in Elizabethton, Tenn. But it, too, started to stumble financially in the mid-1990s. NASA and the Pentagon stockpiled NARC rayon until the company wound down production in 1998.

 

With the stockpile dwindling in the mid-2000s and no major U.S. options left, the Pentagon had to look abroad for new supplies.

 

One promising candidate was a French aerospace engine maker, Snecma Propulsion Solide, which had been experimenting with ablative materials made from high-tenacity rayon fibers used in car tires. NASA previously tested tire-cord rayon and found it lacked strength, but Snecma developed a proprietary treatment that solved the problem.

 

Snecma's product, which it called C2, matched or beat NARC rayon in tests. Perhaps more important, the company could be confident that European enthusiasm for high-performance car tires would ensure steady supplies of fiber.

 

Snecma joined with a U.S. materials company -- later folded into Park Aerospace -- to get a resin-coated version of C2 qualified for Patriot rocket nozzles in 2005. Snecma later became part of ArianeGroup.

 

Ariane didn't respond to specific questions for this story. It said it is ready to expand production capacities, including the possibility of adding manufacturing facilities outside of its core countries France and Germany.

 

The U.S. defense industry has one other major source of rayon which is also European, Enka, based in Obernburg, Germany. But that isn't qualified for use in PAC-3 MSE -- and the company is in trouble. Enka's main business is supplying rayon for men's suits and women's high fashion, which took a severe hit after the Covid pandemic popularized working from home.

 

U.S. defense contractors and the Pentagon eventually committed to buying enough rayon for Enka to justify keeping its factory running, with the Pentagon promising to purchase more than 470,000 pounds of the fabric over a two-year period.

 

As the defense market heats up, Park is working with L3Harris to try out Enka and other rayon sources that could work as "gap fillers" for PAC-3 MSEs, Shore said. They are putting contenders through suites of tests, but nothing has crossed the finish line.” [1]

 

Make love, not war. What else can you do?

 

1. Rayon Snarls Plans To Make More Patriot Missiles --- Humble fabric is one of myriad chokepoints in U.S. munitions industry. Mandhana, Niharika; Chin, Josh; FitzGerald, Drew.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 19 Nov 2026: A1. 

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