"Four Battlegrounds"

"Abstract

"Four Battlegrounds" by Paul Scharre is a fascinating account of emerging technologies especially Artificial Intelligence (AI) in military affairs and modern warfare. New technologies from the invention of gun powder, artillery, automobile, airplane, tank, and submarine have propelled revolution in military affairs throughout human history. The first computer-based model was used by the Russian military known as the Unified Command and Control System (UCS). It was developed during the late 1960s and became operational in the Soviet Armed Forces in the mid-1970s. It integrated various data sources, such as radar, satellite imagery, and communications, to provide comprehensive real-time information about the tactical and operational situation to military commanders. Since then, computer technology has penetrated every aspect of military activity.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly evolving and changing the military culture and has the potential of revolutionizing various aspects of warfare. AI assists in analyzing vast amounts of data collected by military sensors, satellites, and intelligence sources. By utilizing machine learning algorithms, AI can identify patterns, detect trends, and extract actionable intelligence from large data sets, supporting decision-making processes in a shorter time span. AI enables the development of autonomous systems operating on land, air, and sea, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and autonomous submarines. These systems can perform surveillance, reconnaissance, and even combat missions without human intervention, reducing risks to personnel.

Full Text

"Four Battlegrounds" by Paul Scharre is a fascinating account of emerging technologies especially Artificial Intelligence (AI) in military affairs and modern warfare. New technologies from the invention of gun powder, artillery, automobile, airplane, tank, and submarine have propelled revolution in military affairs throughout human history. The first computer-based model was used by the Russian military known as the Unified Command and Control System (UCS). It was developed during the late 1960s and became operational in the Soviet Armed Forces in the mid-1970s. It integrated various data sources, such as radar, satellite imagery, and communications, to provide comprehensive real-time information about the tactical and operational situation to military commanders. Since then, computer technology has penetrated every aspect of military activity.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly evolving and changing the military culture and has the potential of revolutionizing various aspects of warfare.

 AI assists in analyzing vast amounts of data collected by military sensors, satellites, and intelligence sources. 

By utilizing machine learning algorithms, AI can identify patterns, detect trends, and extract actionable intelligence from large data sets, supporting decision-making processes in a shorter time span. 

AI enables the development of autonomous systems operating on land, air, and sea, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and autonomous submarines. 

These systems can perform surveillance, reconnaissance, and even combat missions without human intervention, reducing risks to personnel.

AI is also employed in the development of what is called ‘intelligent weapons systems’. AI algorithms help improve targeting accuracy, optimize trajectories, and enhance overall effectiveness. This information can then be used to make better-informed decisions, AI algorithms can also be used to monitor and analyze data from military equipment, enabling predictive maintenance. By predicting failures and recommending maintenance actions, AI helps increase equipment reliability, reduce downtime, and enhance operational readiness.

AI has a crucial role in military cybersecurity to detect and respond to cyber threats. AI systems can analyze large amounts of data, identify patterns, and detect anomalies that can prevent and mitigate cyber-attacks. AI’s role in training is developing sophisticated simulation tools for military training purposes. AI-based training systems can be used to simulate realistic combat scenarios, allowing soldiers to hone their skills in a safe and controlled environment. This technology can also be used in medical evaluation and ordnance disposal saving human lives.

In addition to many limitations of technology in human conflict, use of AI in the military also raises ethical and legal considerations, such as ensuring appropriate human oversight and control, minimizing risk of collateral damage, and addressing potential biases in decision-making algorithms. The major challenge is the need for ethical guidelines and regulations to govern the development and use of AI in military contexts as different cultures have different perspectives.

The book gives use of emerging technologies in four battlegrounds of the future: land, sea, air, and cyberspace. Scharre expertly navigates through each domain, providing readers with a comprehensive understanding of how traditional and unconventional warfare are being reshaped by advancements in technology. Scharre uses case studies to explain these technologies that are shaping the battlefield and changing the dynamics of conflict.

Scharre is well qualified to discuss the subject in depth in view of his own career in the military, defense policy and technology sector. He is familiar with the terrain of all three areas as he a former U.S. Army Ranger who has served tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq, served as policy advisor in the Pentagon and is familiar with the culture of technology companies at the forefront of groundbreaking work on defense application of AI.

Scharre is not a disciple of ‘tech mania’ and presents a balanced view providing an insightful analysis of opportunities presented by emerging technologies while at the same time highlighting the limitations as well as potential dangers. He also addresses the moral dilemmas faced by policymakers, military leaders, and soldiers on the ground. He examines the challenges of adhering to international laws and conventions while leveraging cutting-edge capabilities and the potential for unintended consequences in an interconnected world.

There will be fierce competition between United States and China to develop and implement the game-changing technology of AI in military domain and the winner will dominate the future. We hope that humans don’t repeat the history that in their quest for domination focus only on destructive creativity ignoring constructive creativity. 

Humans invented weapons for industrial scale carnage of the First World War managing to kill about 18 million humans of all races, religions, and ethnicities in four long years. 

In 1918, God reminded them what he can do by sending influenza pandemic that killed 21 million people globally in four short months. 

He has sent a signal in 2022 in the form of COVID-19 that should encourage reflection by all powers that are obsessed with global domination only through coercive means.

Paul Scharre. Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (New York: W. W. Norton), 2023" [1]

1. "Four Battlegrounds". Hussain, Hamid.  Defence Journal; Karachi Vol. 25, Iss. 11,  (Jun 2023): 50.

 

 

 

Karas ir dirbtinis intelektas

 "KOMPIUTERIS gimė karui ir per karą. Kolosas buvo pastatytas 1944 m., siekiant nulaužti nacių kodus. Iki šeštojo dešimtmečio kompiuteriai organizavo Amerikos oro gynybą. Vėlesniais dešimtmečiais mašinų žvalgyba vaidino nedidelį vaidmenį kare. Dabar kalbama apie tapimą esminiu, kaip civilinis pasaulis stebi sparčią dirbtinio intelekto (AI) galios ir plitimo pažangą, taip ir karinis pasaulis turi ruoštis naujovių antplūdžiui, kuris taip pat destabilizuoja.

 

 

 

 Šiandieniniai greiti pokyčiai turi keletą priežasčių. Vienas iš jų yra pats karo tiglis, ypač Ukrainoje. Maži, nebrangūs lustai nuolat nukreipia Rusijos ir Ukrainos bepiločius orlaivius į jų taikinius, tobulindami technologiją, kuri kažkada apsiribojo supervalstybės raketomis. Antrasis – pastaruoju metu eksponentinis dirbtinio intelekto pažanga, leidžianti stebėtinus objektų atpažinimo ir aukštesnio lygio problemų sprendimo žygdarbius. Trečia – konkurencija tarp Amerikos ir Kinijos, kuriose AI laiko raktą į karinį pranašumą.

 

 

 

 Rezultatai labiausiai matomi išmaniųjų žudymo mašinų pažangoje. Oro ir jūrų dronai buvo gyvybiškai svarbūs, abiem Ukrainos pusėms aptinkant ir atakuojant taikinius. 

 

 

Dirbtinis intelektas yra kaip blokavimo sprendimas, nes jis leidžia dronui pasiekti taikinius, net jei GPS signalai arba ryšys su pilotu buvo nutrauktas. 

 

 

Nutraukus ryšį tarp piloto ir lėktuvo, armija netrukus turėtų dislokuoti daug daugiau pigios amunicijos. Galų gale savaime besiorientuojantys spiečiai bus skirti užtvindyti gynybą.

 

 

 

 Tačiau tai, kas labiausiai matoma apie karinį AI, nėra svarbiausia. Kaip paaiškinama mūsų instruktaže, ši technologija taip pat keičia vadovavimą ir kontrolę, kurią kariuomenės pareigūnai naudoja karams organizuoti.

 

 

 

 Priekinėje linijoje dronai įkūnija tik paskutinę ir dramatiškiausią žudymo grandinės grandį, o žingsnių serija prasideda taikinio paieška ir baigiasi puolimu. Didesnė AI reikšmė yra tai, ką jis gali padaryti, prieš smogiant dronui. Kadangi jis rūšiuoja ir apdoroja duomenis viršžmogišku greičiu, jis gali paimti kiekvieną tanką iš tūkstančio palydovinių vaizdų arba interpretuoti šviesą, šilumą, garsą ir radijo bangas, kad atskirtų jaukus nuo tikrojo taikinio.

 

 

 

 Toli nuo fronto linijos jis gali išspręsti daug didesnes problemas, nei tas, su kuriomis susiduria vienas dronas. Šiandien tai reiškia paprastas užduotis, pavyzdžiui, išsiaiškinti, kuris ginklas geriausiai tinka grėsmei sunaikinti. Atėjus laikui, „sprendimų palaikymo sistemos“ gali greitai ir plačioje teritorijoje – galbūt, visame mūšio lauke – suvokti gluminantį karo sudėtingumą.

 

 

 

 To pasekmės dar tik aiškėja. AI sistemos, kartu su autonominiais robotais sausumoje, jūroje ir ore, greičiausiai, suras ir sunaikins taikinius precedento neturinčiu greičiu ir didžiuliu mastu.

 

 

 

 Tokio karo greitis pakeis kario ir programinės įrangos balansą. Šiandien armijos laiko žmogų „kilpoje“, patvirtinant kiekvieną mirtiną sprendimą. Kadangi taikinių radimas ir smūgiavimas sutrumpėja į minutes ar sekundes, žmogus gali tiesiog „sėdėti ant kilpos“ kaip žmogaus ir mašinos komandos dalis. Žmonės prižiūrės sistemą, nesikišdami į kiekvieną veiksmą.

 

 

 

 Paradoksas yra tas, kad net jei AI suteikia aiškesnį mūšio lauko pojūtį, karas gali tapti neskaidresnis žmonėms, kurie jame kovoja. Liks mažiau laiko sustoti ir pagalvoti. Modeliams priimant vis labiau išsakytus sprendimus, jų rezultatus bus vis sunkiau patikrinti, nesuteikiant priešui mirtino pranašumo. Armijos baiminasi, kad jei jų dirbtinio intelekto patarėjams nepadės ilgesnio pavadėlio, jas nugalės priešininkas, kuris tai padarys. Dėl greitesnės kovos ir mažiau pauzių bus sunkiau derėtis dėl paliaubų arba sustabdyti eskalaciją. Tai gali būti palanki tvarka gynėjams, kurie gali nusileisti į priedangas, o puolėjai, žengdami į priekį, pralaužia priedangą. Arba tai gali suvilioti užpuolikus smogti iš anksto ir su didžiule jėga, kad būtų sugriauti jutikliai ir tinklai, nuo kurių priklausys AI palaikomos armijos.

 

 

 

 Dirbtiniu intelektu pagrįsto karo mastas reiškia, kad masinis ir pramoninis krūvis, greičiausiai, taps dar svarbesnis, nei šiandien. Galbūt, manote, kad naujos technologijos leis kariuomenėms tapti lieknesnėmis. Tačiau jei programinė įranga gali atrinkti dešimtis tūkstančių taikinių, kariuomenėms prireiks dešimčių tūkstančių ginklų, kad į juos smogtų. Ir jei gynėjas turi pranašumą, puolėjams reikės daugiau ginklų, kad galėtų prasibrauti.

 

 

 

 Tai nėra vienintelė priežastis, dėl kurios AI karas teikia pirmenybę didelėms šalims. Dronai gali atpigti, tačiau skaitmeninės sistemos, sujungiančios mūšio lauką, bus velniškai brangios. Kuriant AI perpildytas armijas reikės didelių investicijų į debesų serverius, galinčius tvarkyti slaptus duomenis. Armijos, kariniai jūrų laivynai ir oro pajėgos, kurios šiandien yra savo duomenų talpyklose, turės būti integruotos. Mokant modelius, reikės prieigos prie daugybės duomenų.

 

 

 

 Kuriai didelei šaliai AI palankiausias? Kažkada buvo manoma, kad Kinija turi pranašumą dėl savo duomenų bazės, privačios pramonės kontrolės ir laisvesnių etinių suvaržymų. Tačiau dabar tik Amerika atrodo priekyje pasienio modeliuose, kurie gali suformuoti naujos kartos karinį AI. Ir ideologija yra svarbi: neaišku, ar autoritarinių valstybių armijos, kurios vertina centralizuotą kontrolę, sugebės pasinaudoti technologijos, kuri iškelia žvalgybą ir įžvalgą iki žemiausio taktinio lygio, privalumus.

 

 

 

 Jei tragiškai prasidėtų pirmasis AI varomas karas, tarptautinė teisė greičiausiai būtų nustumta į paraštes. Dar daugiau priežasčių šiandien galvoti, kaip apriboti naikinimą. Kinija turėtų atsižvelgti į Amerikos raginimą atmesti, pavyzdžiui, branduolinių ginklų kontrolę. O prasidėjus karui, karštosios linijos tarp žmonių taps svarbesnės, nei bet kada. Dirbtinio intelekto sistemos, kurioms liepta maksimaliai padidinti karinį pranašumą, turės būti užkoduotos vertybėmis ir suvaržymais, kuriuos žmonių vadai laiko savaime suprantamu dalyku. Tai apima numanomą žmogaus gyvybės vertinimą – kiek civilių yra priimtina nužudyti, siekiant didelės vertės taikinio? – ir tam tikrų destabilizuojančių smūgių, pavyzdžiui, branduolinių išankstinio perspėjimo palydovų, vengimą.

 

 

 

 Neaiškumai yra gilūs. Vienintelis tikras dalykas yra tai, kad, dirbtinio intelekto skatinami, pokyčiai artėja. Tikriausiai, nugalės kariuomenės, kurios anksčiausiai ir efektyviausiai numato ir įvaldo technologijų pažangą. Tikėtina, kad visi kiti taps aukomis.“ [1]

 

 

 

Jei AI valdys kokius nors ginklus, AI valdys branduolinius ginklus. Branduolinis ginklas yra svarbiausias šalies išlikimui, todėl greitas reakcijos laikas čia bus būtinas, naikinti branduolinius išankstinio perspėjimo palydovus bus pirmutinė užduotis.

 

 

 

1. War and AI. The Economist; London Vol. 451, Iss. 9402,  (Jun 22, 2024): 12.

War and AI

"THE COMPUTER was born in war and by war. Colossus was built in 1944 to crack Nazi codes. By the 1950s computers were organising America’s air defences. In the decades that followed, machine intelligence played a small part in warfare. Now it is about to become pivotal. Just as the civilian world is witnessing rapid progress in the power and spread of artificial intelligence (AI), so too must the military world prepare for an onrush of innovation. As much as it transforms the character of war, it could also prove destabilising.

 

Today’s rapid change has several causes. One is the crucible of war itself, most notably in Ukraine. Small, inexpensive chips routinely guide Russian and Ukrainian drones to their targets, scaling up a technology once confined to a superpower’s missiles. A second is the recent exponential advance of AI, enabling astonishing feats of object recognition and higher-order problem solving. A third is the rivalry between America and China, in which both see AI as the key to military superiority.

 

The results are most visible in the advance of intelligent killing machines. Aerial and naval drones have been vital to both sides in Ukraine for spotting and attacking targets. AI’s role is as the solution to jamming, because it enables a drone to home in on targets, even if gps signals or the link to the pilot have been cut. Breaking the connection between pilot and plane should soon let armies deploy far larger numbers of low-cost munitions. Eventually self-directing swarms will be designed to swamp defences.

 

But what is most visible about military AI is not what is most important. As our briefing explains, the technology is also revolutionising the command and control that military officers use to orchestrate wars.

 

On the front line, drones embody just the last and most dramatic link in the kill chain, the series of steps beginning with the search for a target and ending in an attack. AI’s deeper significance is what it can do before the drone strikes. Because it sorts through and processes data at superhuman speed, it can pluck every tank out of a thousand satellite images, or interpret light, heat, sound and radio waves to distinguish decoys from the real thing.

 

Away from the front line, it can solve much larger problems than those faced by a single drone. Today that means simple tasks, such as working out which weapon is best suited to destroying a threat. In due course, “decision-support systems” may be able to grasp the baffling complexity of war rapidly and over a wide area—perhaps an entire battlefield.

 

The consequences of this are only just becoming clear. AI systems, coupled with autonomous robots on land, sea and air, are likely to find and destroy targets at an unprecedented speed and on a vast scale.

 

The speed of such warfare will change the balance between soldier and software. Today, armies keep a man “in the loop”, approving each lethal decision. As finding and striking targets is compressed into minutes or seconds, the human may merely “sit on the loop”, as part of a human-machine team. People will oversee the system without intervening in every action.

 

The paradox is that even as AI gives a clearer sense of the battlefield, war risks becoming more opaque for the people who fight it. There will be less time to stop and think. As the models hand down increasingly oracular judgments, their output will become ever harder to scrutinise without ceding the enemy a lethal advantage. Armies will fear that if they do not give their AI advisers a longer leash, they will be defeated by an adversary who does. Faster combat and fewer pauses will make it harder to negotiate truces or halt escalation. This may favour defenders, who can hunker down while attackers break cover as they advance. Or it may tempt attackers to strike pre-emptively and with massive force, so as to tear down the sensors and networks on which AI-enabled armies will depend.

 

The scale of AI-based war means that mass and industrial heft are likely to become even more important than they are today. You might think new technology will let armies become leaner. But if software can pick out tens of thousands of targets, armies will need tens of thousands of weapons to strike them. And if the defender has the advantage, attackers will need more weapons to break through.

 

That is not the only reason AI warfare favours big countries. Drones may get cheaper, but the digital systems that mesh the battlefield together will be fiendishly expensive. Building AI-infused armies will take huge investments in cloud servers able to handle secret data. Armies, navies and air forces that today exist in their own data silos will have to be integrated. Training the models will call for access to vast troves of data.

 

Which big country does AI favour most? China was once thought to have an advantage, thanks to its pool of data, control over private industry and looser ethical constraints. Yet just now America looks to be ahead in the frontier models that may shape the next generation of military AI. And ideology matters: it is unclear whether the armies of authoritarian states, which prize centralised control, will be able to exploit the benefits of a technology that pushes intelligence and insight to the lowest tactical levels.

 

If, tragically, the first AI-powered war does break out, international law is likely to be pushed to the margins. All the more reason to think today about how to limit the destruction. China should heed America’s call to rule out ai control over nuclear weapons, for instance. And once a war begins, human-to-human hotlines will become more important than ever. AI systems told to maximise military advantage will need to be encoded with values and restraints that human commanders take for granted. These include placing an implicit value on human life—how many civilians is it acceptable to kill in pursuing a high-value target?—and avoiding certain destabilising strikes, such as on nuclear early-warning satellites.

 

The uncertainties are profound. The only sure thing is that AI-driven change is drawing near. The armies that anticipate and master technological advances earliest and most effectively will probably prevail. Everyone else is likely to be a victim." [1]

 

If AI will control any weapons, AI will control nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons are the most important for survival of a country, so the quick reaction time here will be essential, destroying nuclear early-warning satellites will be first in order.

 

1. War and AI. The Economist; London Vol. 451, Iss. 9402,  (Jun 22, 2024): 12.