What are the "values" of Lithuania's foreign policy?

I was not mistaken in writing the question this way. Social democrats, peasants and others who were  Lithuanian rulers pursued a foreign policy based on the same "values". Only liberal conservatives have brought this policy to absurdity.

 

    "Today's events have already led to a recent shift in the so-called 'value' foreign policy. As long as its proponents base their decisions, actions or omissions on a 'value' foreign policy, critics say it has gone bankrupt, "suffered a fiasco", "collapsed" and so on and so forth. And they are right - that is indisputable. However, a much more important question is - where does this initiative come from?

 

    Let's start with a brief discussion of "value" foreign policy - whether it is really value, as it is said.

 

    Representatives of the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats, the Liberal Movement and the Freedom Party were among the first to express support for Belarusian protesters after last year's presidential election in Belarus and called for the punishment of Alexander Lukashenko's regime for cracking down on peaceful demonstrators.

 

    "It is important to keep up the pressure to finally change the situation in Belarus." In an interview with the German media in the summer of 2006,  told Aušrinė Armonaitė, one of the architects of the “valuable” foreign policy, the Lithuanian Minister of Economy and Innovation and the leader of the Freedom Party.

 

    It is interesting that in the above-mentioned interview with German journalists, A. Armonaitė did not mention a word about the German-Russian gas pipeline Nord Stream 2, which was nearing completion. After all, it is this controversial project that shows that one of Europe's most important values, solidarity, has been neglected for economic gain.

 

    When Lukashenko forcibly landed a Ryanair plane flying from Athens to Vilnius and arrested a Belarusian blogger Roman Protasevičius, Gabrielius Landsbergis, a colleague of Armonaitė's government, called on the West to immediately impose economic sanctions on the Minsk regime. However, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister took a more restrained view of the imprisonment of another opposition figure, Alexei Navalny, who had returned to Russia from Germany where he was treated after poisoning.

 

    Mr Landsbergis called on the EU to take immediate action with sanctions against those responsible for imprisonment. Navalny's case was dropped after the EU decided to blacklist several Russian officials.

 

    In Lithuania, if we compare it with the history of the presidential election in Belarus, the reform of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as it is often ridiculed, supported Vladimir Putin. The amendments allowed the current Russian leader to be re-elected president of Russia, despite the previous four terms. This topic in Lithuania was not much escalated widely - there was no talk of sanctions against Russia, such as the suspension of Nord Stream 2, or any other measures.

 

    Thus, the question remains as to how the application of the scale of values ​​is measured here, or, more simply, why the principle of a “values” foreign policy, say, is applied far differently in the case of Russia and Belarus.

 

    Finally, the visit of the Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė and the delegation led by her to the authoritarian United Arab Emirates (UAE) this year does not comply with the principles of value foreign policy. In 2020 the non-governmental organization Freedom House, which assesses how democratic and open the world is, called the UAE a "non-free" country. Other influential NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, have drawn attention to the poor human rights situation in the UAE.

 

    If not idealism (values), perhaps realism (pragmatic interests) is the driving force of “value” foreign policy?

 

    If that were the case, Lithuanian foreign policy strategists would probably have reacted much more restrainedly to the revolution in Belarus, which, resisted by Lukashenko's administration, was doomed to failure.

 

    In the same way, Lithuanian foreign policy makers, if their actions were based on realism, in general, pragmatic interests, would not insist on Belarus's international isolation, which is clearly beneficial only to Russia. The migrant crisis has only heightened fears that Belarus is gradually turning into Putin's vassal, the territory from which hybrid attacks on Lithuania, Poland and Latvia are being organized. Territory over which Russian strategic bombers are already flying. An area that could soon house Russian military bases as well. When our foreign policy strategists explain, that Belarus is to be isolated even more, the question arises as to which evil is greater: will dictator A. Lukashenko in Belorus be worse than Putin's military base 20 km from the Lithuanian capital Vilnius?

 

    Finally, although attempts are being made to base the conflict with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over Taiwanese representation on realism, the arguments of senior Foreign Ministry officials are unconvincing.

 

    After all, Deputy Foreign Minister Mantas Adomėnas finally acknowledged that the decision on the Taiwanese representation was determined by the desire to draw the attention of the United States to the Eastern European region, as the main focus of the United States is currently on China.

 

    However, it remains unclear what exactly the Americans promised in exchange for Lithuania's decision? Minister A. Armonaitė, meanwhile, predicts that the Taiwanese representation will bring more benefits than harm to the country's economy. In fact, so far this decision has only damaged relations with China, and Lithuania has damaged its reputation in the eyes of international business. It is hard to imagine any international business entering a country whose decisions are unpredictable, hot, reckless and rulers do not know how to calculate.

 

    If we have already given Taiwan a diplomatic gift, why was it not possible to get firm guarantees that Taiwan will really carry out high-tech production in Lithuania that is financially beneficial for our country? In that case, Lithuania's actions would still be justified - what we are already doing is ruining relations with China, but at least we are getting a chip factory. Relations are now broken, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is reportedly in talks with the German government over the possible construction of a chip plant in Germany. It is probably not surprising that a reviewer of the German publication Süddeutsche Zeitung calls Lithuanians "fools".

 

    Neither idealism nor pragmatism motivates foreign policy makers. So what?

 

    “Valuable” foreign policy arises from the identity of Lithuanian foreign policy makers - that is, how the foreign policy elite in Lithuania understands who they are and what they are not.

 

    This identity can be defined as follows: the perception of oneself (that is, Lithuania at the same time) is small, weak and self-sufficient, next to which the enemy (Russia) is, and from which a powerful “intercessor” (USA) must defend it. The goals of foreign policy makers are influenced and formed by this perception - to find an “advocate” and constantly try to draw his attention to himself.

 

    Therefore, it is not idealism - it is certainly not values ​​- and not the pragmatism of foreign policy or its efficiency, but visibility and audibility that are the fundamental "values" of Lithuanian foreign policy makers."

 

For thirty years, the Lithuanian government has been running around every night and shouting, "We are here. We are here ..." Big countries hated that. They would periodically throw a millstone into us and miss. Now China has hit the mark.