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2026 m. sausio 5 d., pirmadienis

Which City Burns Next?


“One year ago this week, the Santa Ana winds roared over the Santa Monica Mountains at over 60 miles per hour, gusting up to 100 in some spots in what some people called, loosely, once-in-a-century fire conditions. What followed was a new kind of fire disaster, for which even the fire-wise communities of the American West seem deeply unprepared.

 

Over 16,000 structures were destroyed by the Palisades and Eaton fires, more than had ever been burned through in any year in the long history of the tinderbox Los Angeles basin. Thirty-one people were killed, more than are known to have perished in any other fire event in Los Angeles County since modern record-keeping began. Entire swaths of neighborhoods were incinerated.

 

But those fires were not the only ones to begin in the greater Los Angeles area that week. According to Cal Fire records, on Jan. 7 and Jan. 8, at least six others sparked under those same wind and climate conditions, each of which was contained and extinguished without burning more than a handful of structures. And the monstrous Palisades and Eaton fires could themselves be traced to correctable human error: The Palisades fire was a holdover from a smaller burn the Los Angeles Fire Department had visited six days earlier, extinguishing the above-ground flames but leaving the fire to smolder underground even when crews on-site suspected it was still burning; and the Eaton fire in Altadena was, at least according to the Department of Justice, probably sparked by faulty power lines.

 

One moral of this story: Last January’s catastrophic fire disaster did not have to be a catastrophe at all, only a close call.

 

Another moral comes from the wisdom repeated to me by firefighters, policymakers and researchers over the past year: that there is more to fire risk than ignitions and fire response, that what can burn will eventually burn, and in a landscape baked by warming in which human structures have been erected in open defiance of known risk, some of those fires will prove catastrophic. “California is built to burn,” the fire historian Stephen Pyne once told me. “It is built to burn explosively.”

 

Fire has always been a part of life in the American West, with megafire and fire disasters colonizing the entire country’s apocalyptic climate imagination over the last decade. But the Los Angeles fires mark a new phase, and seem to affirm a new consensus among a certain cohort of fire experts, that we have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the problem and mismanaged fire risk as a result.

 

Watching from afar, we still reflexively call these disasters “wildfires,” perhaps imagining that they ignite in some distant forest. But there may be little truly “wild” about such fires beyond the ferocity of the burn. Increasingly, disaster strikes almost entirely within an urban envelope, drawing on homes and landscaping for fuel rather than trees and wild brush. These are not forest fires encroaching on human settlement but rather human settlements burning like only forests used to. And stopping them will require something much harder, and more unpopular, than clearing out distant forests of dead wood.

 

The climate scientist Daniel Swain has called the phenomenon the return of the “urban firestorm,” a throwback to horrors from centuries past, when cities such as Chicago and San Francisco could burn for miles and days on end. By the middle of the 20th century, that kind of urban fire had come to look like an extinct beast.

 

Then came the next generation of disasters: the Tubbs fire in Santa Rosa, Calif., in 2017 and the Camp fire in Paradise, Calif., in 2018; the Marshall fire in Boulder County, Colo., in 2021 and the 2023 Lahaina fire in Maui, Hawaii, which killed more people than any American fire in over a century.

 

Probably, the list features your most vivid impressions of our new age of wildfire. But in 2023, a group of researchers reviewed some of the decade’s most nightmarish fires in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, or PNAS, and declared that “wild-land-urban fire disasters aren’t actually a wildfire problem.” The ignitions weren’t wild, the predominant fuel wasn’t wild, the surrounding landscape wasn’t really wild land and wild-land firefighting wasn’t able to change the outcome, either.

 

Picture a wildfire and you most likely imagine a forest or a vast grassland with many thousands of acres burning before human communities are threatened. These kinds of fires do still burn prodigiously through the West. But so many recent disasters began within, or only just outside, the urban environment, doing most of their damage within just a few hours, tearing through thousands of homes before anything could be done to stop them. Sometimes, the initial ignition was in a nearby park or adjacent wild area, with a brief burning of vegetation working as a wick to the urban fire. But just as often, it was not. The Lahaina fire was first spotted near a local middle school.

 

For a decade or more, as fire people have argued about the relative contribution of global warming and fire suppression to the growing crisis, they’ve tended to agree about the best way to mitigate future risk: better management of undeveloped lands, with thinning of brush and forest to reduce wildfire fuel on the landscape through a variety of measures, including more intentional fire.

 

The problem is often defined almost entirely in terms of forest management, as it was in a 2022 Wildfire Crisis Strategy document prepared by the Department of Agriculture. But federal land increasingly contributes little to disasters in urban and semi-urban settings, said David Calkin, the lead author of the PNAS paper and a pioneering fire-risk scientist who recently left the U.S. Forest Service lamenting its direction under President Trump.

 

“We know the wild lands need fire,” he said. But we also need to stop pretending that these disasters are wild-land fires. They aren’t. “It’s a different beast,” Calkin said. Instead, we should start thinking about the risks of those disasters primarily in terms of community design: how homes are built, with what materials and in what configuration.

 

Instead of thinning fuels in the wild land, as we’ve struggled to do now for decades, perhaps we need to thin the fuel of the community itself.

 

This may sound simpler than thinning the American West of ready-to-burn fuel, accumulating decades of fire suppression and warming. In reality, the job is “staggering,” Calkin said.

 

Ideally, it would involve redrawing property lines and reconstructing houses with fire-hardened materials and fire-smart principles; a much more aggressive program of landscape management and more small-scale prescribed burning; eliminating or at least limiting flammable vegetation; retraining urban firefighting forces to prepare for the new threats; establishing some permanent firebreaks; and perhaps rerouting roads and homes away from natural wind patterns.

 

If we could do all that, we could find our way to a much more comfortable relationship to California fire, probably, even with climatic changes that seem to increase those risks almost year by year.

 

But there are few places in California or across the West that are doing that with anything like urgency and scale.

 

“The astonishing thing is not that Los Angeles burns but that so much of its development has enhanced rather than blunted the threat from fire,” Pyne, the fire historian, reflected last January. The city was built with exposed wood and shake-shingle roofing, he pointed out, making homes “maximally primed to burn”; demand for public forests and parks meant, for all their pleasures and beauty, fire risks were mostly preserved within the design of the city itself; suburbs invariably pressed up against brush landscapes, which generate new fuel basically every time it rains.

 

When you survey the California landscape, with its mix of natural and semi-natural and completely unnatural features, it now looks like a vast expanse of fuel, Michael Wara, who studies wildfire at Stanford, said. Perhaps one kind of person worrying about fire risk to his or her home might look exclusively at the proximity to the natural vegetation on the landscape and how parched it might appear. But increasingly, the built environment, which used to seem like a natural firebreak, now looks like so much fuel ready to burn. “It’s about how much energy is stored in the landscape, not just in plant material but in other features of the environment, where we live and where our kids sleep at night,” he said.

 

“If I stored explosives in my backyard, and then if they went off someday, no one would say, well, was there an ignition? You’d say, get rid of the bombs.”

 

Can we? In 2020, California mandated the development of new fire-safe standards in high-risk zones, a bundle of changes called Zone Zero to make yards less flammable by cutting back on vegetation close to homes. Across the state, a patchwork of rules and recommendations govern the structure of the home itself, a suite of policies sometimes called “home hardening” and sometimes “fire-smarting.” Even combined, such measures cannot eliminate fire risk, but by some estimates they might reduce it by half, with the cumulative effect dependent on how many homes around you were up to code, too.

 

In other words, it’s a test of pro-sociality, like the pandemic emergency: You might not be able to eliminate fire risk from a community, but slow the spread and you give firefighters and homeowners a fighting chance, with fire people often comparing fire-smarting your home to masking.

 

In 2023, when the deadline to create the Zone Zero regulations arrived, officials had failed to produce them. None had been produced either by last January, when the Pacific Palisades and parts of Altadena and Malibu burned clear through. In the aftermath of those fires, with the smell of vaporized homes and their contents still hanging in the air, a new deadline was established for the end of 2025 — then waived after a series of contentious public hearings, with regulators now set to return to the subject in March. The rules aren’t likely to go into effect before 2029 at the earliest. And on the ground, when community leaders have tried to implement stricter fire rules for homes, they are often met with homeowner resistance.

 

Consider Brentwood, which sits against Pacific Palisades in the line of canyons that flow south from the Santa Monica Mountains into the Los Angeles basin and which, from the awesome vantage of those flatlands, gives the skyline of the city both its literal and its spiritual twinkle.

 

Last January, the Palisades fire threatened to begin ravaging Brentwood, too, before firefighters forced the flames back. On their way, navigating narrow streets lined with combustible vegetation, “they were like, I’ve never been through a more terrifying place in my life,” Wara told me. “They were looking at these backyards and going, holy cow, how do I even get out of here if we’re not successful?”

 

A year later, there is probably no community in the state fighting back against Zone Zero harder than the homeowners of Brentwood. The Los Angeles Times called the neighborhood the “epicenter of the outrage” after an especially confrontational public meeting in September.

 

The rules require the first five feet of the home to be an “ember-resistant zone.” But there is disagreement over what that means. Homeowners say the rules are too one-size-fits-all. They fear forced removal of trees, which they say give the neighborhood its urban canopy, and insist that hedges running alongside homes not only provide privacy but could also swallow flying embers and stop them from igniting the houses hidden just behind them. Their hedges, they argued, were well hydrated.

 

Officials highlighted homes where better landscaping may have saved the structures from the recent fires. Homeowners pointed to examples of others where action hadn’t been taken and they still survived. The two sides argued over studies showing that home hardening was more effective against fire than vegetation management was, and homeowners asked why fire risk should require tugging hedges out of the ground but not replacing wooden porches or door frames.

 

Perhaps some of this sounds reasonable, or perhaps it sounds like fire-safety NIMBYism. But the problems are much larger than Brentwood, with hardly any community in the state seeming to meet the challenge of urban fire at the appropriate scale — which is growing. Above the problem of homeowner resistance you can stack local officials, who are rarely comfortable challenging the preferences of their constituents and the aesthetic sensibilities of the California dream, embodied by non-native and often quite combustible vegetation.

 

Above that, you can stack local planning and zoning, which has often produced communities like the Pacific Palisades where streets can serve as wind tunnels carrying embers from home to home so efficiently that even an initial burst, Calkin said, could ignite as many as a hundred homes almost simultaneously.

 

You might hope that a disaster like the fires last January would prompt a reckoning with the way those communities were designed, with property lines perhaps redrawn to better resist future fires. But the interest in rebuilding quickly is too great, from homeowners and investors alike, such that the state has been forced to waive certain building codes to accelerate progress in Palisades, Malibu and Altadena — which have only just barely begun to rebuild.

 

Fire response remains a problem, too: Urban firefighting forces are unaccustomed to fires burning through dozens of homes at once, and wild-land firefighters who may be called in to help are unaccustomed to fires burning through urban environments. And there are problems of fire oversight. An after-action report prepared by the L.A. Fire Department was watered down, downplaying, for instance, failures in leadership. The original author of the report and the department’s battalion chief, Kenneth Cook, called these edits “highly unprofessional.”

 

At the state and national level, there’s been inconsistent guidance and erratic implementation concerning fuel reduction in parks and national forests, such that even those places with plans to thin the landscape of brush and other fuels aren’t always effective in doing so. A wildfire management plan prepared by California State Parks just before the fires a year ago called for allowing fires to burn through large parts of Topanga State Park, where the Palisades fire began, so long as they didn’t threaten homes and other “fire exclusion zones.” The plan also outlined several “avoidance areas” where firefighting was meant to be restricted. In the months before the fires, several projects were designed to thin fuel in parts of the Palisades that burned, including one project completed less than 36 hours before the initial fire began.

 

In the spring, the pyrogeographer and wildfire YouTuber Zeke Lunder embarked on a bike tour with some fire friends of the foothill communities of the Santa Monica Mountains: Bel-Air, Beverly Hills and Beverly Glen. He later released an indelible five-part video series, “Danger in Plain Sight,” documenting the fire-risk conditions there, which he called “exactly the same as in the Palisades.”

 

“The hazards are ridiculous from a physical geography standpoint,” Lunder told me. “That intersection of canyons that funnel the wind, the intensity of the Santa Anas, the draftiness of those winds, and then this super flammable natural landscape, mingled with a superflammable urban landscape — you couldn’t really make it much worse unless you installed some giant fans.”

 

“It is just mind-blowing down there on the ground in these neighborhoods.”

 

In these conditions, Lunder had written just after the January fires began, “it is nearly almost impossible to cut enough brush to make the homes defensible.” And when fires burn from house to house, often sparing trees while transforming modern structures themselves into fuel, the very concept of “defensible space” gets confusing: What is being defended from what, exactly, and how? “I’d love to live here if it wasn’t on fire,” Lunder said. “But the hazards are insane.”

 

He keeps repeating the word, sometimes throwing in an expletive as he reviews satellite imagery, fire maps and Google maps and GoPro footage with me. “It’s hard to say that there’s nothing that can be done,” he said, but there isn’t much being done.

 

“I think we’re going to burn up Bel Air and Beverly Hills next, and then I don’t know what’s going to happen,” Lunder went on.

 

“We should rebuild them with concrete or tile and stone.

 

But somehow, we’re still not getting that memo. People are rushing back to build stick-frame houses in Palisades.” He shook his head in disbelief. “The potential in the landscape is always there,” he said, adding, “I think we really have to think more about building hobbit houses.” At the very least, perhaps, start seeing the problem of urban fire clearly for the first time.

 

David Wallace-Wells (@dwallacewells), a writer for Opinion and a columnist for The New York Times Magazine, is the author of “The Uninhabitable Earth.”” [1]

 

1. Which City Burns Next?: David Wallace-Wells. Wallace-Wells, David; Mangan, Jim.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jan 5, 2026.

Taip, politikai turėtų kandidatuoti, remdamiesi įperkamumu


„Svarbiausias žodis politikoje ir ekonomikoje šiuo metu yra „įperkamumas“. Amerikiečiai to nori, o politiniai kandidatai puola esamus pareigūnus už tai, kad jie to nesuteikia, tačiau ekonomistai skundžiasi, kad vyriausybė negali to įgyvendinti. Politikos komentatoriai perspėja, kad kandidatai, kurie išnaudoja amerikiečių nusivylimą dėl didelių kainų, rizikuoja greitai prarasti visuomenės paramą, jei užims pareigas ir nepadės, kaip nutiko prezidentui Trumpui.

 

Neabejingi ekonomistai ir komentatoriai yra teisūs, jei „įperkamumas“ reiškia kainų mažinimą visose srityse. Tik ilga ir gili recesija gali sumažinti daugumos prekių ir paslaugų kainas. Tačiau amerikiečiai vis tiek nori, kad kainos sumažėtų. Jie nebus patenkinti išgirdę, kad kainų augimo tempas – infliacija – yra mažesnis.

 

Laimei, politikai gali priimti realesnę įperkamumo darbotvarkę, apibrėžtą dviem paprastais kriterijais:

 

Pirma, ji sutelkta į siaurą būtiniausių, didelių prekių, kurios daugeliui vartotojų apibrėžia įperkamumo problemą, rinkinį, įskaitant vaikų priežiūrą, būstą, sveikatos priežiūrą ir elektrą.

 

Antra, ji pabrėžia, kaip šios būtiniausios prekės yra be reikalo brangios, nes jų rinkos tam tikru būdu yra ydingos.

 

Daugumai to, ką perkame, rinkos veikia gerai, o vyriausybės kainų nustatymas padarytų daugiau. Žalos nei naudos. Nors maisto produktų gamyba galėtų gauti daugiau naudos iš didesnės konkurencijos, vyriausybė, pavyzdžiui, mažai ką gali padaryti dėl maisto produktų kainų (akivaizdu, kad panaikinus neseniai respublikonų priimtą maisto paramos mažinimą, būtų lengviau mažas pajamas gaunančioms šeimoms).

 

Tačiau vaikų priežiūros rinka neveikia gerai. Brangiausiose apskrityse vaikų priežiūra gali kainuoti daugiau nei 20 000 USD per metus, o tai yra našta net ir santykinai dideles pajamas gaunančioms šeimoms. Tie, kuriems to labiausiai reikia, jauni tėvai, dažnai neuždirba pakankamai, kad rinka galėtų pasiūlyti gausybę kokybiškų vaikų priežiūros paslaugų. Taigi, nebent jauna šeima yra išskirtinai turtinga, vyriausybė turi subsidijuoti jų vaikų priežiūros paslaugų pirkimą. Naujausi tyrimai rodo, kad didelės viešosios investicijos į vaikų priežiūros sektorių greitai pritraukia naują pasiūlą, o nauja pasiūla stabdo kainų augimą.

 

Būstas taip pat yra būtinas, tačiau jo trūksta. Pasak Kongreso tyrimų tarnybos, 2023 m. apie ketvirtadalį namų savininkų ir pusę nuomininkų būstui išleido daugiau, nei 30 procentų, savo bendrųjų pajamų. Vyriausybės politika iškreipė rinką.

 

Zonavimo taisyklės ir kiti reguliavimo niuansai atgraso vystytojus nuo įperkamų namų statymo.

 

Tarifai didina statybos kainą – vieno skaičiavimo duomenimis, tipiško namo statybos kaina padidėja beveik 11 000 USD. Vyriausybė turi greitai padidinti įperkamo būsto pasiūlą.

 

Naujame Amerikos pažangos centro plane, kurį padėjau parengti, teigiama, kad federalinė vyriausybė turėtų pasinaudoti savo įtaka, kad paskatintų nepakankamai aprūpintas bendruomenes

 

finansuoti naujus įperkamus daugiabučius namus,

 

plėsti modulinių namų gamybą ir

 

išplėsti esamas vietos programas, kurios šalina kliūtis įperkamų namų statybai.

 

Labai svarbu pabrėžti būsto pasiūlos didinimą. Jei vyriausybė tiesiog duotų pinigų žmonėms būstams pirkti ar nuomotis, daugiau pinigų siekiant to paties skaičiaus vienetų būtų tiesiog didesnės kainos.

 

Daugiausia ta pati logika taikoma ir mūsų sugedusiai sveikatos priežiūros rinkai. Vyriausybė atlieka didžiulį vaidmenį šioje rinkoje per Įperkamos priežiūros įstatymą, „Medicare“, „Medicaid“, Vaikų sveikatos draudimo programą, derybas dėl vaistų ir kt. Šios programos leidžia milijonams žmonių gauti sveikatos priežiūrą, kurios kitaip negalėtų sau leisti. Tačiau žmonės ir vyriausybė vis tiek moka per daug.

 

Mūsų sveikatos sistema yra dvigubai brangesnė, nei mūsų tarptautinių kolegų, siūlydama, kad vyriausybė galėtų išleisti mažiau, o vartotojai – mažiau mokėti, nors daugelis, pripratę prie JAV sveikatos priežiūros sausainių indelio, uždirbtų mažiau.

 

Kaip neseniai teigėme su Stanfordo universiteto ekonomistu Neale'u Mahoney, tam reikėtų sušvelninti taisykles, ribojančias medicinos specialistų tiekimą, apriboti ligoninių ir gydytojų užmokesčius, sumažinti „Medicare“ tinkamumo amžių ir leisti federalinėms agentūroms derėtis dėl mažesnių kainų už daug daugiau vaistų.

 

Elektros energijos rinka taip pat yra labai reguliuojama ir dažnai neteikia pirmenybės vartotojams. Elektros energijos kainos penkerius metus iki Covid-19 pandemijos iš esmės buvo nepakitusios, o nuo 2020 iki 2025 m. išaugo apie 40 procentų. Politikai pradeda sėkmingai taikyti elektros energijos tarifų ribojimą ir versti energiją eikvojančius duomenų centrus mokėti didesnę jų prijungimo prie tinklo išlaidų dalį. Taip pat padėtų atšaukti pono Trumpo siekį sustabdyti atsinaujinančios energijos projektų statybą. Nepaisant jo pastangų nutraukti jų kūrimą, atsinaujinantys energijos šaltiniai yra sparčiausiai augantys ir pigiausi padidėjusio tiekimo šaltiniai.

 

Kiekviena iš šių idėjų – suteikti jauniems tėvams išteklių kokybiškoms vaikų priežiūros paslaugoms įpirkti, padidinti įperkamo būsto pasiūlą, apriboti sveikatos priežiūros išlaidas, išplėsti pasiūlą pakankamai švarios energijos, kad sumažėtų elektros energijos sąskaitos – yra realu. Partija, kuri žada ir įgyvendina šią darbotvarkę, atsidurtų toje pernelyg retoje geros politikos ir geros politikos sankirtoje.

 

Jaredas Bernsteinas buvo prezidento Joe Bideno ekonomikos patarėjų tarybos pirmininkas nuo 2023 iki 2025 m. ir yra Stanfordo ekonomikos politikos tyrimų instituto bei Amerikos pažangos centro politikos bendradarbis.“ [1]

 

1. Yes, Politicians Should Run on Affordability: Guest Essay. Bernstein, Jared.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jan 5, 2026.

Yes, Politicians Should Run on Affordability

 


 

“The most important word in politics and economics right now is “affordability.” Americans want it, and political candidates attack incumbents for failing to provide it, but economists grumble that the government can’t deliver it. Political commentators warn that candidates who exploit Americans’ frustration with high costs risk quickly losing public support if they enter office and fail to help, as has happened to President Trump.

 

The naysaying economists and commentators are right, if “affordability” means cutting prices across the board. Only a long and deep recession can reduce prices on most goods and services. But Americans still want prices to drop. They won’t be satisfied to hear that the rate at which prices are rising — inflation — is lower.

 

Fortunately, politicians can embrace a more realistic affordability agenda defined by two simple criteria:

 

First, it is focused on a narrow set of essential, big-ticket items that define the affordability problem for many consumers — including child care, housing, health care and electricity.

 

Second, it highlights how these essentials are unnecessarily expensive because the markets for them are flawed in some way.

 

For most of what we buy, markets work well, and government price setting would do more harm than good. Though food production could benefit from more competition, there is not much the government can do about grocery prices, for example (obviously, reversing Republicans’ recent cuts to food support would help low-income families).

 

The market for child care, however, doesn’t work well. In the most expensive counties, child care can cost more than $20,000 a year, a burden for even relatively high-income families. Those who need it most, young parents, often don’t earn enough to prompt the market to supply plentiful quality child care. So, unless a young family is uniquely wealthy, the government must subsidize their child care purchases. Recent research reveals that robust public investment in the child care sector quickly elicits new supply, and new supply restrains price growth.

 

Housing is also essential but undersupplied. About a quarter of homeowners and half of renters spent more than 30 percent of their gross income on housing in 2023, according to the Congressional Research Service. Government policies have warped the market.

 

Zoning rules and other regulatory sludge discourage developers from building affordable homes.

 

Tariffs are raising the cost of building — adding, by one estimate, nearly $11,000 to the construction cost of the typical home. The government needs to boost the supply of affordable housing, fast.

 

A new plan from the Center for American Progress that I helped write argues that the federal government should use its leverage to encourage undersupplied communities

to finance new affordable multifamily housing,

expand the production of modular housing and

scale up existing local programs that are eliminating barriers to affordable home building.

 

The emphasis on increasing housing supply is crucial. If the government just gave money to people to buy or rent homes, the result of more money chasing the same number of units would be just higher prices.

 

Much of the same logic applies in our broken health care market. The government plays a huge role in this market through the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, drug negotiations and more. These programs enable millions of people to get health care they otherwise couldn’t afford. But people and the government still pay too much.

 

Our health system is twice as expensive as those of our international peers, suggesting that the government could spend less and consumers could pay less — though many with their hands in the U.S. health-care cookie jar would earn less.

 

As the Stanford University economist Neale Mahoney and I recently argued, that would require loosening rules that restrict the supply of medical professionals, capping hospitals’ and doctors’ charges, lowering the Medicare eligibility age and allowing federal agencies to negotiate lower prices on many more drugs.

 

The market for electricity, too, is highly regulated and often fails to prioritize consumers. Electricity costs were essentially flat for the five years before the Covid-19 pandemic, then climbed about 40 percent between 2020 and 2025. Politicians are starting to run, successfully, on capping electricity rates and forcing energy-gobbling data centers to pay more of the costs of adding them to the grid. Reversing Mr. Trump’s drive to halt the building of renewable energy projects would also help. Despite his efforts to pull the plug, renewables are, by far, the fastest-growing and least expensive sources of increased supply.

 

Each of these ideas — providing young parents with the resources to afford quality child care, increasing the supply of affordable housing, capping health care costs, expanding the supply of clean energy enough to lower electricity bills — is realistic. The party that promises and delivers on this agenda would position itself at that all-too-rare intersection of good policy and good politics.

 

Jared Bernstein was the chair of President Joe Biden’s Council of Economic Advisers from 2023 to 2025 and is a policy fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Center for American Progress.” [1]

 

1. Yes, Politicians Should Run on Affordability: Guest Essay. Bernstein, Jared.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jan 5, 2026.

Pasitenkinkite Maduro 2.0: Vakarų bandymai kurti tautą visada baigiasi blogai, su epinio masto korupcija

 

Vakarų vadovaujamos tautos kūrimo pastangos susidūrė su dideliais iššūkiais, dažnai duodamos nepasiekiamų pradinių tikslų rezultatų ir pasižyminčios politiniu nestabilumu, smurtu ir korupcija.

 

Šiame kontekste dažnai minimi istoriniai pavyzdžiai yra JAV vadovaujamos intervencijos Vietname, Irake, Ukrainoje ir Afganistane.

 

Pagrindiniai veiksniai, prisidėję prie šių sunkumų:

 

Giliai įsišaknijęs vietos kontekstas: išorės jėgos dažnai stengiasi iki galo suprasti ir valdyti sudėtingą vietos politinę, etninę ir religinę dinamiką.

Vietos pritarimo stoka: primestos institucijos dažnai neturi teisėtumo be stiprios vietos gyventojų paramos ir dalyvavimo.

Ambicingi terminai: tautos kūrimas iš esmės yra ilgalaikis procesas, tačiau išorės veikėjai dažnai veikia spaudžiami vidaus politinio spaudimo, kad pasiektų greitų rezultatų.

Dėmesys kariuomenei, o ne valdymui: saugumo operacijoms dažnai skiriama daug išteklių, kartais veiksmingų ir atskaitingų civilinių institucijų kūrimo sąskaita. Tai veda prie nesibaigiančio karo, kurio metu nukenčia daugybė žmonių.

Šis klausimas išlieka sudėtinga ir prieštaringai vertinama tema tarptautinių santykių ir vystymosi politikos srityje.

 

Visada atsiranda karo kurstytojų, kurie skatina, šią kančias ir švaistymą sukeliančią, nelaimę:

 

„Sekmadienį Karakase ir Vašingtone išaušus, kitą dieną po to, kai JAV per drąsų reidą pagrobė diktatorių Nicolas Maduro, išryškėjo nauja realybė. Kitaip tariant, diktatoriaus parankiniai vis dar valdo Venesuelą ir, regis, nėra pasirengę jos pasiduoti. Ar prezidentas Trumpas nori susitaikyti su Maduro 2.0?

 

Buvusi viceprezidentė Delcy Rodriguez dabar eina prezidento pareigas. Kaip ir ponui Maduro, jai yra paskelbtos JAV ir Europos Sąjungos sankcijos. Po to, kai šeštadienį buvo sučiuptas ponas Maduro, ji viešai paskelbė nepaklusnius pareiškimus. Ji yra griežtos linijos socialistė, gerai žinoma dėl glaudžių ryšių su Kubos žvalgyba.

 

Ponia Rodriguez brolis Jorge Rodriguezas tebėra Nacionalinės Asamblėjos vadovas. Taip pat valdžioje tebėra liūdnai pagarsėjęs vidaus reikalų ministras Diosdado Cabello. Karakase jis pareiškė, kad JAV tik iš dalies sėkmingai įvykdė savo misiją ir kad chavistų revoliucija tęsis.

 

Ar tai neramina Trumpo administraciją? Nors tai ir nesimato. Ponas Trumpas šeštadienį gyrėsi, kad ponia Rodriguez darys tai, ko nori JAV, kitaip. Jis grasino „antrąja karinės intervencijos banga“, jei ji to nepadarys.

 

Tačiau ponas Trumpas nieko neužsiminė apie naujų rinkimų surengimą kaip JAV tikslą. Valstybės sekretorius Marco Rubio sekmadienį pareiškė, kad galiausiai rinkimai turės būti surengti, nors, regis, nemanė, kad tai taip skubu. Ponas Rubio atrodė įsitikinęs, kad JAV embargas Venesuelos naftos eksportui pakankamai suspaus režimą, kad jis paklustų JAV reikalavimams.

 

„Norime, kad narkotikų prekyba būtų sustabdyta. Norime, kad mūsų keliu nebesiartintų gaujų nariai. Nenorime matyti Irano ir, beje, Kubos buvimo praeityje.“ „Norime, kad tos šalies naftos pramonė būtų naudinga ne piratams ir Jungtinių Valstijų priešininkams, o žmonėms“, – CBS laidoje „Face the Nation“ sakė ponas Rubio.

 

Tai svarbūs tikslai, tačiau ponas Rubio užsimena, kad Maduro aparatas gali pasilikti, jei paisys šių reikalavimų.

 

Tai rizikingas statymas, ypač turint omenyje, kad naujieji režimo lyderiai labai priklauso nuo Kubos, Rusijos, Kinijos ir Irano pagalbos.

 

Mažai tikėtina, kad šie žmonės taps proamerikietiškais demokratais.

 

Juo labiau, nes JAV kariuomenė paliko Venesuelą pasibaigus Maduro operacijai. Ponas Rubio sekmadienį sakė, kad nerealu prisiimti daugiau rizikos reido metu, siekiant nukirsdinti daugiau režimo narių, ir tai yra gana teisinga.

 

Tačiau nepaisant pono Trumpo pažado, kad JAV „valdys šalį“, nėra kam to padaryti. Tai gali nuraminti MAGA kritikus, kurie baiminasi, kad jis mėgdžioja George'o W. Busho okupaciją Irake. Tačiau tai sumažina JAV gebėjimus įtikinti režimą.

 

Daug kas priklauso nuo to, ar Maduro minia baiminasi antro JAV karinio smūgio. Dar daugiau priklauso nuo to, ar Trumpo administracija nori siekti naujų rinkimų. JAV nereikia remti jokio kandidato. Tačiau demokratinė vyriausybė, tokia, kuri laimėjo 2024 m. rinkimus, bet ją pavogė ponas Maduro, būtų patvaresnė sąjungininkė.

 

Trumpo administracija kalba apie savo užsienio politikos „realizmą“. Tačiau jei Maduro 2.0 išliks nepaklusnus valdžioje po šešių mėnesių, jos rizika su jo pakalikais neatrodys labai realistiška.“ [1]

 

Be kariuomenės vietoje neįmanoma surengti sąžiningų rinkimų. Jei susiduriate su ryžtingais žmonėmis, tie į kareivius šaudo ir juos sprogdina. Reikia dar daugiau kareivių. Ir taip be galo.

 

1. Don't Settle for Maduro 2.0. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 05 Jan 2026: A14.