"France doesn't agree with America's new stance toward China, and neither does the rest of Europe. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian put it bluntly this week: "We see the rise of an Indo-Pacific strategy led by the United States that is militarily confrontational. That is not our position. We don't believe in the logic of systematic military confrontation, even if sometimes we must use military means."
For the European Union, the timing of the Aukus announcement could hardly have been worse. The next day, the EU released its long-planned "strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific."
Here's a sample: The EU will "pursue its multifaceted engagement with China, engaging bilaterally to promote solutions to common challenges, cooperating on issues of common interest and encouraging China to play its part in a peaceful and thriving Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, and working with international partners who share similar concerns, the EU will continue to protect its essential interests and promote its values while pushing back where fundamental disagreements exist with China, such as on human rights."
The document did note "the importance of a meaningful European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific" and promised that the EU will "explore ways to ensure enhanced naval deployments by its Member States in the region." But France, the EU's leading naval power, is essential to this strategy, and the French foreign minister indicated last week that Australia's withdrawal from the submarine contract would affect his country's participation.
The U.S. wants the EU to make a clean break with China, a choice that most of Europe would prefer to avoid. President Emmanuel Macron speaks often about his vision of "European strategic autonomy," with Europe operating "beside America and China."
In effect, Germany has adopted a similar stance. During her 15 years as chancellor, Angela Merkel has visited Beijing 12 times, usually accompanied by German industrialists. Her efforts have borne fruit. German exports to China have more than quadrupled. China is Germany's second-largest export market -- and a major destination for goods produced by Germany's politically powerful automobile and machine-tool industries.
With strong support from France, Germany took the lead last year to push through a European investment agreement with China over the objections of senior figures in Joe Biden's presidential transition team.
China's growing economic power could drive a wedge between Europe and the U.S. at the moment that Beijing's rising military power threatens American allies and interests in the Indo-Pacific.
If Europe stands aside from America's new challenges in the Indo-Pacific, it is hard to believe that America's commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance will be unaffected.
The U.S. can't force Europe to act in ways contrary to its interests, and there's little reason to try. But there are many voices in Europe -- in Germany and elsewhere -- who don't think breaking with the U.S. on China would be in Europe's best interest. Now is the time for them to speak out." [1]
It turns out that Gabrielius Landsbergis, destroying Lithuania's trade and transit with China, is behaving like a pilot fish among big fish, but against the EU's economic interests.
1. Politics & Ideas: On China, We May Not Always Have Paris
Galston, William A. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 22 Sep 2021: A.17.
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