"The public is in a state of shock over the tariffs
imposed by the administration of the President of the United States of America,
Donald Trump, on countries around the world, including allied countries in
Europe, tariffs, which will soon be frozen for 90 days.
It has become a tradition that D. Trump's policy is viewed
with skepticism: in other words, the tariffs imposed by the US presidential
administration are illogical, archaic, and harmful to American consumers and
will greatly harm the global economy.
As usual, the criticism is mainly directed by those who seek
to maintain the status quo in the global economy at all costs. The logic of the
latter is as follows: the United States should continue to participate in and
support (as a hegemon) free global trade, because it is profitable for the
United States itself, and not try to defend its economic interests with
tariffs.
Only time will tell whether this criticism is justified.
However, it should be noted that even D. Trump himself does not claim that
everything will necessarily work out one hundred percent.
The US leader has made it clear that
at first it may be difficult, various perturbations may occur, but the goal -
the reindustrialization of the United States - justifies the means.
The US does not really have another way. Yes, the
"treatment" is difficult, but it may end in recovery. Otherwise,
i.e., if the current situation continues, the US (and therefore the global
economy) is threatened with trouble: perhaps an economic-financial crisis,
perhaps even the insolvency of the world's largest economy - the US.
The question of whether such a scenario would be beneficial
to the West and Lithuania remains open.
Ignoring (cancelling) D. Trump or claiming that the United
States presidential administration has conceived and is implementing an
“illogical”, “unfounded” policy is equally illogical and unfounded, if you are
at least a little interested in international political economy.
Free market and protectionism
In order to understand the logic of
D. Trump’s administration’s decisions, one should briefly travel back to the
19th century. At that time, the German economist and politician Friedrich List
criticized the free market and free foreign trade principles of Adam Smith, the
so-called “father” of liberalism, and other liberals.
A. Smith held the view that free
trade is one of the most important conditions for creating economic prosperity.
According to him, countries will specialize – they will produce only those
goods that they produce more efficiently than other countries, and then, by
trading with other countries without obstacles, they will generate more global
capital than by producing everything themselves. State interference in free
trade (e.g., through tariffs or other trade restrictions), in A. Smith's view,
reduces both efficiency and global wealth.
A. Smith's ideas were developed at
the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries by the British [1] economist and
politician David Ricardo, who formulated the so-called Theory of Comparative
Advantage. According to it, countries should not produce everything, but only
those goods whose production costs are the lowest compared to other goods that
the country can produce. The remaining necessary goods, countries will be able
to purchase on the free market from other countries and thus achieve greater
overall economic benefit.
F. List did not claim that
participation in free trade is useless. However, he emphasized that it is
useful only for developed industrial countries. And for developing
non-industrialized countries, including F. List's native Germany in the 19th
century, participation in free trade does not bring advantages.
On the contrary, specialization slows
down industrial development, since there are no incentives to create industry,
since the missing goods can be purchased from other countries. Among other
things, according to F. List, in world trade, countries trade different goods:
some export higher, and others lower value-added products or raw materials.
Thus, if a country does not create
industry, it remains a producer and exporter of low value-added products. Thus,
it not only loses to developed countries (in terms of assets received), but
also becomes dependent on them.
A country that does not have or has
lost industry eventually loses its scientific potential and technologies, since
industrial development is impossible without scientific and technological
innovations.
Finally, a country that does not have
or has lost industry eventually loses its scientific potential and
technologies, since industrial development is impossible without scientific and
technological innovations [2].
F. List's recipe is simple: in simple
terms, a developing country can initially participate in free trade (e.g.,
trade in raw materials, agricultural products). Participation in free trade
allows it to accumulate the necessary capital for the creation and development
of industry. The country must then invest this capital in the creation of
industry, development and technology, and to protect the young industry from
foreign import competition, to introduce tariffs. Finally, when the new
industry has grown and matured, the state returns to free trade - only this
time as a developed and independent of other states, able to control the path
of its development.
Will services and technology save it?
Apologists for the so-called "post-industrial
society" concept, which claims that after the industrial revolution,
societies move to a higher stage of economic development, dominated by services
and the knowledge economy, rather than manufacturing and industry, explain that
the service and technology creation sectors compensate for the loss of
industry.
This is not absolutely true.
Neither services nor technology
creation create the same added value as high-tech industrial production carried
out in the state. This fact is quite well illustrated by the huge US budget
deficit, which testifies that the service sector is not necessarily more
profitable and stable than the industrial one.
What can we say about the deindustrialized regions of the
United States, such as the so-called “Rust Belt,” which are today burdened by
deep economic and social problems.
This situation once arose in the heart of American industry
for several reasons: first, in the 1960s and 1970s, faced with economic
competition from Japan and Germany, which had recovered from the war, the
United States had an international trade deficit for the first time in post-war
history. The United States had already resorted to protectionist measures at
that time in order to defend its economic interests.
Second, at the same time, Washington
and Beijing turned a new page in diplomatic relations, seeking to balance the
power of the Soviet Union.
The so-called ping pong policy not
only opened the door to the huge US market for Chinese manufacturers, but also
ensured a source of foreign currency, necessary for the development of the
agricultural and industrial sectors. Relatively cheap labor and the ability to
freely sell products on the US market allowed Chinese industrial enterprises to
grow rapidly.
The development of Chinese industry
was also contributed by investments, most of which the Chinese received from
the United States. A significant number of American corporations not only moved
factories to China and other cheap labor countries, but also supported
initiatives to reduce the protection of the US domestic market.
Although it was argued that free trade
would bring more benefits than harm, in the long run, imported products helped
to push more expensive American goods out of the market. Due to competition
from foreign manufacturers, thousands of American workers lost their jobs, and
the US industrial sector suffered a shock.
Statistics confirm that the
importance of the US industrial sector in the country's economy is declining.
If in the 1950s the manufacturing sector accounted for about 21–25 percent of
the US gross domestic product (GDP), and this sector employed about 30 percent
of all US workers, then over the following decades (especially after 1970) the
importance of manufacturing has consistently decreased: to 10 percent GDP (in
2021) and to 8–9 percent of all jobs in the United States (2020).
Moreover, as production moved from
the United States to low-cost countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, China,
etc., the latter countries not only created their own industry, but also
technologically modernized it, using the capital accumulated from the export of
industrial goods for this purpose.
Today, the aforementioned countries
challenge the United States: not only are huge corporations in these countries
forming and have been formed, but also the funds generated from the export of
industrial products are being invested in the development and production of new
technologies, an arms race is underway, and fierce competition for
strategically important resources is taking place.
In other words, as the relative
economic power of Southeast Asian countries grows in the world, the economic
muscles of the United States, Europe, and other old power centers are
contracting.
This is again confirmed by
statistics: if after the Cold War the US share in the world economy fluctuated
from 25 to 30 percent of global GDP, today this figure is 15-25 percent;
accordingly, China's share in 1991 was about 2-3 percent of global GDP, and
today it is almost 17 percent.
The US still leads the world in many aspects of power: from
the so-called "hard" (e.g. economic, financial, military) to the
"soft" (e.g. culture, diplomacy). However, history shows that the
status of the hegemon of the international system is not eternal. And if no
action is taken now, the US will eventually lose the competitive struggle.
The logic of Trump’s policies
Therefore, in a sense, what D. Trump
is doing is both logical and consistent, and even inevitable.
The goal of the US presidential
administration is to reindustrialize the country. And tariffs are a means to do
so.
Trump did not invent tariffs, nor was he the first to try
them. One can think of Otto von Bismarck’s Germany (mid-to-late 19th century),
Meiji Japan (1868–1912), and other countries that achieved impressive economic
growth rates after industrialization.
Perhaps this is an archaic way to return manufacturing,
perhaps this policy will succeed, perhaps not. That is not even important.
The important thing is that there is
probably no other path to recovery.
Skeptics sarcastically joke that Trump is trying to bring
back the textile industry from India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, or Pakistan to the
US. Not quite. We are talking about higher value-added production: aviation,
automotive, energy, computer and information technologies, microelectronics,
biomedicine, etc.
The European Union’s Time Will Come
In general, the critics of the Trump administration need to admit
this: if the logic of the US president’s decisions is negative or if attempts
are made to ignore it, there is a risk of falling behind global processes.
For example, the European Union (EU)
faces identical problems to the US. Moreover, these problems will become
increasingly acute because, on the one hand, US tariffs will cause China and
other global producers to look for places to export their surplus goods, and on
the other hand, the US is turning from a payer of Europe’s security bills and
guarantor of exclusive trade rights into an economic competitor. The clouds are
gathering.
The strongest industrial country on
the Old Continent, Germany, which still pulls the EU train like a locomotive,
has been facing economic challenges for some time. Because the same laws of the
free market that forced Trump to resort to protectionist instruments also apply
here in Europe. The Germans and their industry, if not properly protected (yes,
with the same tariffs), are facing similar problems as the US industry – i.e.,
the German industry, which is not properly protected, will eventually lose out
in the competitive battle against relatively cheap manufacturers like China.
And Chinese production is becoming more advanced every year, thus increasing
the pressure on European products.
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how vulnerable Europe is:
with the collapse of global trade chains, the Community has been left without
the components necessary for its industry. Even the EU did not have a
microelectronics industry for a long time and has only now come to terms with
it.
And this is not even the biggest
problem: entire regions of the EU, including Eastern, Central and Southern
Europe, are either drowning in debt or remain producers of low-value-added
products and therefore applicants for European payments, instead of being
industrialized high-tech zones that create real added value.
In 2004 having annexed huge
territories, the EU has not been able to use them properly, because it is
drowning in a swamp of inefficient and inert bureaucracy, and therefore cannot
make any decisions that meet today's needs.
And those decisions will be needed:
if the US manages to reindustrialize, Europe will have no other choice. But
will it be able to?
Today, unfortunately, maintaining the flawed economic status
quo is the most important goal and value of the EU, because the Brussels
bureaucrats care about the process, not the result. However, in reality, the
situation on the Old Continent is not much better than that of the US across
the Atlantic."
We, the EU citizens, are
entering the robotic economy without leaders, who understand what is
going on here. We are entering the robotic economy therefore naked, not
prepared to participate in the competition.
1. The British
economist and politician David Ricardo, who formulated the so-called Theory of
Comparative Advantage, had a good reason to push free trade on other countries.
The British had strong industry in 19-th century, so they needed open markets
to sell their goods. Only China is in such a position today.
2. Also,
scientific and technological innovations are impossible without industrial
development. How will you innovate industry, if you don’t have any industry?
Your talents are not needed in your own country. You become one big group of
stupid people. Just look into the mirror.
Komentarų nėra:
Rašyti komentarą