"One powerful answer is that conservatism-under-liberalism should defend human goods that are threatened by liberal ideas taken to extremes. The family, when liberal freedom becomes a corrosive hyper-individualism. Traditional religion, when liberal toleration becomes a militant and superstitious secularism. Local community and local knowledge, against expert certainty and bureaucratic centralization. Artistic and intellectual greatness, when democratic taste turns philistine or liberal intellectuals become apparatchiks. The individual talent of the entrepreneur or businessman, against the leveling impulses of egalitarianism and the stultifying power of monopoly.
What does it mean to conserve the family in an era when not just the two-parent household but childbearing and sex itself are in eclipse? What does it mean to defend traditional religion in a country where institutional faith is either bunkered or rapidly declining? How do you defend localism when the internet seems to nationalize every political and cultural debate? What does the conservation of the West’s humanistic traditions mean when pop repetition rules the culture, and the great universities are increasingly hostile to even the Democratic-voting sort of cultural conservative?
At least you can still defend the heroic entrepreneur, say the libertarians — except that the last great surge of business creativity swiftly congealed into the stultifying monopolies of Silicon Valley, which are leading the general corporate turn against cultural and religious forms of conservatism as well.
This set of problems explains the mix of radicalism, factionalism, ferment and performance art that characterizes the contemporary right. What are we actually conserving anymore? is the question, and the answers range from the antiquarian (the Electoral College!) to the toxic (a white-identitarian conception of America) to the crudely partisan (the right to gerrymander) to the most basic and satisfying: Whatever the libs are against, we’re for.
So the question for the right isn’t one of commitment, but capacity. Can conservative energies be turned away from fratricide and lib-baiting and used to rebuild the structures and institutions and habits whose decline has pushed the right toward crisis?"
2021 m. balandžio 24 d., šeštadienis
Net dirbdami Vakaruose, mes prarandame 14 000 dolerių vertės atlyginimo per metus dalį dėl monopsonijos
Lietuvoje monopsonija neaptariama, bet darbdaviai ja naudojasi be sąžinės graužimo.
Even working in the West, we lose part of the salary equal $ 14,000 a year due to monopsony
"Marshallian economics was a realm of beautiful symmetries. Supply and demand naturally reached an equilibrium, and workers were paid the precise value of what they contributed to production. So long as companies had to compete on the price and quality of their goods, consumers could force producers to make improvements by purchasing cheaper, superior goods from their competitors. The market would respond to consumers and the wealth of society would increase.
The snake to this Eden was monopoly. If a single producer captured enough market share, it could immunize itself from competition and force consumers to respond to its preferences — higher prices, inferior quality, suppressed innovation. Marshall recognized that most markets were not perfectly competitive. But like other thinkers of his day, he believed that these were passing flaws and that markets had a natural tendency toward competition. The market was almost always improving itself of its own accord; only conditions of pure monopoly could impede this progressive trend.
Economist Robinson turned Marshall’s framework on its head. Competition, she argued in her landmark 1933 book, “The Economics of Imperfect Competition,” wasn’t an on-off switch between pure monopoly and pure competition. A competitive market was not the normal state of affairs — it was a rare “special case.” Markets typically reached a state of “equilibrium” in which Marshall’s progressive improvements halted while exhibiting many of the flaws of a monopoly regime.
The most potent arrow in Robinson’s conceptual quiver was a new idea she called “monopsony.” A monopoly had always been understood to involve a single seller forcing its prices on powerless buyers, like the U.S. oil industry at the turn of the century. But buyers, Robinson observed, could enjoy the forbidden fruits of imperfect competition as well: If only one buyer for a good existed, then that buyer could dictate its price, no matter how many sellers might be competing for its purchases. This was monopsony.
Crucially, Robinson argued that workers, as sellers of their own labor, almost always faced monopsonistic exploitation from employers, the buyers of their labor. This technical point had a political edge: According to Robinson, workers were being chronically underpaid, even by the standards of fairness devised by the high priests of the free market.
Under classical conceptions of monopoly, economists and lawyers often interpreted labor unions as unfair barriers to competition. Instead of allowing employers to freely compete for individual workers, their reasoning went, unions forced them to negotiate with a cartel. In the 1920s, an influential Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises, declared that the entire function of labor unions was to prevent fair competition for wages through the threat of “primitive violence” against strikebreakers.
But under Robinson’s framework, it was not unions that created competition problems in the market for labor; instead, labor markets were anti-competitive by their very nature, except in rare, special cases. In effect, she had reimagined competition policy as a labor-rights issue. The problems she exposed were not the excesses of a few over-the-top corporate behemoths, resolved with a few breakups and spinoffs. Monopsony, Robinson’s argued, is endemic to the labor market and demands an ongoing regulatory response throughout the economy.
A growing body of empirical literature indicates that Robinson’s conceptual insights were correct: Intensifying corporate concentration has suppressed worker wages over the past quarter-century. Imperfect competition is not only real but also appears to be intensifying. The economist Simcha Barkai pegs the figure at about $14,000 a year in lost wages for the typical worker.
The conservative Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh cited “monopsony” in a 2019 ruling against Apple; a recent investigation by House Democrats concluded that Amazon deploys monopsony power and that its warehouses tend “to depress wages” for warehouse and logistics workers when they enter a local market. In an era of historically weak organized labor and the accelerating concentration of job opportunities in a few big cities, much of the country faces a decline in potential buyers of labor and limited opportunities for redress through collective bargaining."
In Lithuania, monopsony is not discussed, but employers use it without remorse.
2021 m. balandžio 23 d., penktadienis
Putinas ir toliau naudojasi pavydėtinais teigiamais reitingais
"Net krintant pragyvenimo lygiui, Vakarų sankcijoms ir Rusijos valdžios pažadams uždrausti Vakarų socialinius tinklus, tokius kaip" Twitter "ir" TikTok ", p. Putinas ir toliau naudojasi pavydėtinais teigiamais reitingais. Sociologai sako, kad nedaugelis gali jausti gilų palaikymą p. Putinui, Kremliui. ir toliau gali tikėtis, kad teigiami reitingai bus maždaug 60%. „Yra momentas, kai populiarumas toliau nesumažės“, - sakė Levas Gudkovas, nepriklausomos rinkimų organizacijos „Levada Center“ vadovas. “[1]
1. 1.World News: Putin Retains Popularity Despite Wave of Protests --- Navalny's high-profile opposition does little to shake Russian's faith in longtime president
Grove, Thomas. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]21 Apr 2021: A.9.
Mr. Putin continues to enjoy enviable approval ratings
"Even amid falling living standards, Western sanctions and promises from Russian authorities to ban Western social networks such as Twitter and TikTok, Mr. Putin continues to enjoy enviable approval ratings. Sociologists say while few may feel deep support for Mr. Putin, the Kremlin can continue to count on approval ratings of around 60%.
"There's a point at which popularity won't fall any further," said Lev Gudkov, head of independent polling organization Levada Center." [1]
1. 1.World News: Putin Retains Popularity Despite Wave of Protests --- Navalny's high-profile opposition does little to shake Russian's faith in longtime president
Grove, Thomas. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]21 Apr 2021: A.9.
Laikas ir Lietuvai sumažinti bereikalinga didžiules išlaidas ginklams
"Nedaugelis žiniasklaidos priemonių pastebėjo, tačiau JAV Baltieji rūmai siūlo fiskalinį 2022 m. Pentagono biudžetą, kurio vertė yra 715 mlrd. dolerių. Tai padidėjo 1,6 proc., Palyginti su 2021 m. 704 mlrd. Ne gynybos vidaus išlaidos padidės 16 proc., švietimo departamento - padidės 41 proc., sveikatos ir žmogiškųjų paslaugų - 23 proc., o plinkos apsaugos agentūroz- 21 proc. Ponui Bidenui pasiūlius atskirą 2,3 trln. dolerių „infrastruktūrai“, jūs manote, kad Pentagonas bus įtrauktas. Orlaiviai ir jūrų laivai yra labiau pateisinami, kaip viešieji darbai, o ne subsidijos „Teslų“ pirkimui. Ponas Bidenas sąmoningai pareiškia apie savo partijos politinius prioritetus: sviestas ir daugiau sviesto, bet ginklams mažiau “[1].
1. Biden's Defense Budget Squeeze
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]19 Apr 2021: A.16.
It is time also for Lithuania to reduce unnecessary huge spending on weapons
"Few in the media have noticed, but the White House is proposing a fiscal 2022 Pentagon budget of $715 billion. That's a 1.6% increase from 2021's $704 billion, but it's a cut in the military's spending power assuming likely inflation of more than 2%. Non-defense domestic discretionary spending will surge 16%, with the Education Department rising 41%, Health and Human Services 23% and the Environmental Protection Agency 21%.
With Mr. Biden proposing a separate $2.3 trillion for "infrastructure," you'd think the Pentagon would be included. Aircraft and naval ships are certainly more justified as public works than subsidies to buy Teslas. Mr. Biden is making a conscious statement about his party's political priorities: butter and more butter, but less for guns." [1]
1. 1. Biden's Defense Budget Squeeze
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]19 Apr 2021: A.16.
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