How Europe is returned back to Stone Age without using any nuclear weapons

"As the depth of winter approaches, Europeans are increasingly worried about their ability to heat homes and power factories. Although natural gas storage levels are nearly full and prices have eased, the European gas price is still four to five times higher than average in recent years — and President Vladimir Putin of Russia has just threatened to cut what little Russian gas still flows to Europe.

Despite the economic pain and Mr. Putin’s best efforts, the West has remained largely united in confronting Russia. Yet fissures are now beginning to show in the trans-Atlantic alliance as European leaders — especially President Emmanuel Macron of France, who has been visiting Washington this week — blame U.S. energy and climate policy for worsening their energy predicament.

In recent remarks to French business leaders, Mr. Macron complained about the cost of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas and “massive state aid schemes,” referring to the clean energy subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act. “I think it is not friendly,” he said.

Other European leaders have joined in, using inflammatory rhetoric to blame three aspects of U.S. policy.

Some European officials have accused U.S. companies of profiteering for selling relatively inexpensive U.S. natural gas at much higher prices in Europe. These accusations are baseless. American liquefied natural gas, or L.N.G., is sold in Europe at a price set by the market. While that price is more than five times the U.S. natural gas price today, most of that L.N.G. is sold to middlemen, usually at the U.S. price plus some markup. Those middlemen, not U.S. export companies, benefit when the overseas gas price is much higher. ‌Most of these resellers are not American. The largest are European companies — TotalEnergies and Shell.

European attacks on the United States are particularly perplexing given that American L.N.G. has played such a pivotal role in helping Europe replace gas from Russia, which had supplied around 40 percent of Europe’s imports before the war. Indeed, many European leaders questioned America’s opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would have further increased that dependence on Russian energy. The United States not only was the largest L.N.G. exporter in the world in the first half of 2022 but also supplied more than three-quarters of the European Union’s additional needs in the first half of the year. Unlike most other L.N.G. suppliers from other countries, whose contracts restrict where the liquefied natural gas can be sold, the vast majority of contracts for gas from the United States have no constraints on their destination, and thus most of those L.N.G. cargoes were diverted to Europe to help with the crisis.

Several European leaders have also criticized the very large clean energy subsidies in the climate provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act. “Nobody wants to get into a tit-for-tat or subsidy race,” the Irish trade minister, Leo Varadkar, said recently. “But what the U.S. has done really isn’t consistent with the principles of free trade and fair competition.”

The new law does have implications for Europe. It will, for instance, make it cheaper to produce low-carbon fuels, such as hydrogen and ammonia, in the United States than in nearly any other place, according to the consultancy BCG. Europeans are concerned this may encourage companies to shift investment plans to the United States or relocate energy-intensive industries, such as steel, to where the cheap low-carbon energy is.

It is understandable that Europeans are worried about a wave of deindustrialization.

But the culprit is Europe’s lack of competitiveness without cheap Russian gas, not America’s new climate law. After years of criticizing the United States for being a laggard on climate action, it is puzzling to see European leaders condemning the country for investing too much in clean energy. America’s new climate mandates can begin a cycle of competition in clean energy technologies that accelerate decarbonization rather than lead to protectionist policies that retard it.

Finally, European leaders fear the Inflation Reduction Act will disadvantage European companies. To qualify for the tax incentives, clean energy products often must be made in the United States or, in some cases, neighboring or ally nations. For example, the new climate law requires that electric vehicles be assembled in North America to qualify for the subsidies and that their batteries be made from an increasing percentage of components mined or processed in the United States or its free-trade partners. The European Union is not one of those partners.

Europeans are right to express concerns about protectionism. Industrial policy is back in vogue, and the Inflation Reduction Act is the latest action in a growing trend aimed at boosting domestic industries, creating jobs and securing supply chains — something the European Green Deal does too. China’s own protectionism and use of its industries for geopolitical influence have made Western governments favor trade with allies — so-called friend-shoring.

Yet Europe’s current energy crisis has nothing to do with the new U.S. clean energy subsidies. Moreover, the provisions Europeans find objectionable are far from universal; for example, commercial vehicles, such as delivery vans and trucks, have no domestic manufacturing requirements to receive subsidies. Still, U.S. officials should use what discretion they have in putting the law into effect and in trade negotiations to allay potential harms to Europe and other allies such as South Korea and Japan.

With deft trade diplomacy, the Inflation Reduction Act’s sweeping new climate provisions should create more opportunities for cooperation with the European Union than it creates risks to the trans-Atlantic relationship. For example, U.S. and E.U. officials can leverage strong climate action on both sides of the Atlantic to carry out a recent agreement to restrict steel and aluminum imports, notably from China, that do not meet certain emission standards and work together to create preferential trade terms for countries that do meet such standards or impose a carbon fee on imports that don’t.

Diplomacy was underway Thursday in a meeting between President Biden and Mr. Macron. The French president spoke of the need to “resynchronize” his nation’s economic partnership with the United States to “succeed together.” Mr. Biden said he makes “no apologies” for the Inflation Reduction Act but also acknowledged the law had “glitches” and said, “There’s a lot we can work out.”

This is a positive step. Trans-Atlantic cooperation will be required more than ever to accelerate the shift to clean energy and secure those new supply chains. It is also what’s required to hold firm against Russia. European leaders should tone down the rhetoric and work with their U.S. counterparts on collaborative approaches to accelerate climate action, enhance energy security and help Europe cope with its energy crisis."

 

Make, brothers, trucks to carry manure. It will come in handy, you have accumulated a lot of stinky manure. And you will also get a little bit of subsidies...

Moralinė FTX tuštybė

„Covid-19 pandemija JAV galėjo pasibaigti, tačiau vakcinos nuo šios šalies moralinės tuštybės pandemijos dar nėra. Paskutinė jos auka yra FTX įkūrėjas Samas Bankmanas-Friedas.

 

    Jo kriptovaliutų bendrovės vertei išaugus iki milijardų, J. Bankmanas-Friedas pasakė, kad jis ne dėl pinigų. Jis apibūdino save, kaip „veiksmingo altruizmo“ arba didelės grąžos labdaros, šalininką. Šios idėjos jis išmoko būdamas MIT iš filosofijos magistrantūros studento. 30 metų ponas Bankmanas-Friedas sakė, kad gali pasilikti 1% sau, o likusią dalį atiduoti per savo FTX fondą.

 

    Mane sudomino pono Bankmano-Friedo įsipareigojimas veiksmingam altruizmui – jo supratimas apie tai, kas yra tinkama. Kaip šis laikraštis pranešė apie FTX įkūrėjo filantropiją, „Samas Bankmanas-Friedas pasakė, kad nori užkirsti kelią branduoliniam karui ir sustabdyti būsimas pandemijas“. Tai suteikia naują prasmę mąstyti plačiai. Tai taip pat kliedesiai, kurie tapo politine jo kartos savybe.

 

    Kai Elonas Muskas bandė nupirkti „Twitter“, pono Bankmano-Friedo veiksmingo altruizmo mentorius Willas MacAskill'as pono Bankmano-Friedo vardu parašė M. Muskui žinutę, pagal kurią, pasak jo, „kurią laiką potencialiai domėjosi jo įsigijimu [Twitterio] ir tada padaryti jį geresniu pasauliui“.

 

    Ir tai yra svarbiausias dalykas – ne pagerinti socialinės žiniasklaidos platformą, o padaryti ją geresnę pasauliui.

 

    Buvo laikas, kai žmonės, užsiimantys geradarybe, spręsdavo problemas, dėl kurių, taip sakant, buvo galima susižavėti, pavyzdžiui, pagerinti mokyklos rezultatus, tiekti geriamąjį vandenį ar užkirsti kelią maliarijai. Tačiau tam tikru momentu impulsas daryti gera transformavosi į moralinio tendencingo ir grandioziškumo derinį.

 

    Prisimeni „išgelbėk banginius“? Tai peraugo į „išgelbėk planetą“. Nekaltinkite pono Bankmano-Friedo kartos dėl jos patiklumo. Neberimti mokytojai – vadinamieji suaugusieji kambaryje – ne kartą jiems sakė, kad reikia išgelbėti planetą. „Ford Foundation“ pagrindiniame puslapyje skelbiama: „Kuriame pasaulį, kuriame kiekvienas turi galią formuoti savo gyvenimą“. Nenuostabu, kad ponas Bankmanas-Friedas manytų, kad jo pelnas iš kriptovaliutų gali užkirsti kelią branduoliniam karui.

 

    Vis dėlto Bankmano-Friedo pasakos viduje yra mažesnis lūžio taškas, o tai rodo, kad jo karta nujaučia, kad pamokslaujantys vyresnieji galėjo nuvesti juos moraliniu sodo keliu.

 

    Keisdamasis info su ponu Bankmanu-Friedu, „Vox“ rašytojas tvirtina: „Tu tikrai gerai mokėjai kalbėti apie etiką“. Jis atsakė, kad „turėjau toks būti“ dėl „šio kvailo žaidimo, kuriame pažadintiems vakariečiams  sakome teisingas melagienass, todėl visiems mes patinkame“.

 

    Jis apibūdina tai, kas mūsų laikais tapo žinoma, kaip dorybės signalizacija, kuri yra dabartinė moralinės tuštybės versija – prielaida, kad gero darymas nusipelno visuomenės palaikymo ir pagarbos. Tačiau kodėl šis potraukis viešąsias dorybes itin dideliais būdais tvirtinti, tapo masiniu judėjimu? 

 

Žmonės, kurie padarydavo gera, buvo nuolankūs. Dabar jie neišnyksta iš mūsų akivaizdžio.

 

    Vienas neišvengiamai ciniškas atsakymas – politika. Politinė kairė priėmė techniką, žinomą, kaip „naratyvo valdymas“, o tai yra propagandos eufemizmas. Naujas mūsų laikų elementas yra tas, kad šie „pasakojimai“ visada apima plačius, jei neaiškius, teiginius apie moralinį tikrumą ir pranašumą.

 

    „Ekologizmas“ neatliko darbo, todėl tapo „klimato krize“. Rasinės nelygybės mažinimas užleido vietą „socialiniam teisingumui“. Covid-19 pandemijos metu „mokslo“ citavimas tapo moraliniu griebtuvu.

 

    Šio moralinio didingumo tikslas yra ne įtraukti savo oponentus, o juos marginalizuoti, išstumti juos už to, ką naujieji dorybės vartų sargai apibrėžia, kaip priimtiną diskursą.

 

    Gaila todėl, kad lieka daug gero nenuveikta, jei kairiųjų reikalavimas politizuoti dorybę diskredituoja idėją.

 

    Bankmano-Friedo sagoje nepastebėtas numanomas veiksmingo altruizmo idėjos pripažinimas, kad kapitalizmas – pelno siekianti įmonė – yra nepakeičiama priemonė geriems tikslams pasiekti. Tai pripažinimas, kad kapitalizmas yra dinamiškiausia jėga Amerikos gyvenime. Tai pažanga. Belieka diskutuoti apie mažiausiai dinamiško JAV sektoriaus – vyriausybės – vaidmenį.

 

    JAV yra didžiausia pasaulyje privati ​​ekonomika ir didžiausia vyriausybė. Reikia kažko naujo, pavyzdžiui, veiksmingesnių tarpininkaujančių institucijų, kad užpildytų erdvę tarp tų dviejų polių, kurios užpildo, atrodo, neišsprendžiamomis problemomis, tokiomis, kaip priklausomybė nuo opioidų, smurtiniai psichikos ligoniai ir lėtinis viešosios mokyklos nepakankamumas. Kalifornijos valstijoje gubernatorius Gavinas Newsomas kovoja su merais dėl to, ką daryti su benamystės epidemija valstijoje.

 

    JAV yra tūkstančiai šeimos fondų, dažnai remiančių konkrečius ne pelno projektus. Tradiciškai kritikuojamos tokios pastangos, nesvarbu, ar tai būtų užsakomosios mokyklos, ar privačios mokyklos kuponų programos, yra ta, kad per sunku jas padidinti iki tam tikro masto, pvz.  toks dalykas, kaip milijonų studentų švietimas. Jie sako, kad tik valdžia turi tokių galimybių.

 

     Pripažįstu šį argumentą, bet laikas jį apeiti. Chartijos ir pasirinkimas, kurie yra sėkmingi, turėtų būti vertinami, ne kaip grėsmė, o kaip natūrali evoliucija, nutolstant nuo senstančių viešųjų sistemų ir link verslesnių, orientuotų alternatyvų. Vadinkite tai efektyviu altruizmu. Tačiau laikykitės toliau nuo moralinės tuštybės." [1]

1. The Moral Vanity of FTX
Henninger, Daniel. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 01 Dec 2022: A.17.

The Moral Vanity of FTX

"The Covid-19 pandemic may have ended in the U.S., but there is no vaccine yet for this country's pandemic of moral vanity. Its latest victim is FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried.

As his cryptocurrency company's value soared into vaporous billions, Mr. Bankman-Fried said he wasn't in it for the money. He described himself as a proponent of "effective altruism," or high-return charity, an idea he learned while at MIT from a philosophy graduate student. Mr. Bankman-Fried, 30, said he might keep 1% for himself and give the rest away through his FTX Foundation.

What interested me about Mr. Bankman-Fried's commitment to effective altruism is his notion of what qualified. As this newspaper reported on the FTX founder's philanthropy, "Sam Bankman-Fried said he wanted to prevent nuclear war and stop future pandemics." It gives new meaning to thinking big. It's also delusional, which has become a political characteristic of his generation.

During Elon Musk's pursuit of Twitter, Mr. Bankman-Fried's effective-altruism mentor, Will MacAskill, texted Mr. Musk on behalf of Mr. Bankman-Fried, who he said "has for a while been potentially interested in purchasing it [Twitter] and then making it better for the world."

And that is the telling point here -- not make the social-media platform better, but make it better for the world.

There was a time when people engaged in doing good addressed problems that, so to speak, you could get your arms around, such as improving school performance, providing potable water or preventing malaria. But at some point, the impulse to do good transformed into a combination of moral tendentiousness and grandiosity.

Remember "save the whales"? That morphed into "save the planet." Don't blame Mr. Bankman-Fried's generation entirely for its credulousness. No-longer-serious teachers -- the so-called adults in the room -- told them repeatedly they needed to save the planet. The Ford Foundation's homepage announces, "We're building a world where everyone has the power to shape their lives." It's no surprise Mr. Bankman-Fried would think his cryptocurrency profits could prevent nuclear war.

Still, inside the Bankman-Fried fairy tale rests a smaller tipping point, which suggests his generation senses that their preachy elders may have led them down a moral garden path.

In an exchange with Mr. Bankman-Fried, a writer for Vox asserts, "You were really good at talking about ethics." He replied that "I had to be" because of "this dumb game we woke westerners play where we say all the right shibboleths and so everyone likes us."

He is describing what has come to be known in our time as virtue signaling, which is the current version of moral vanity -- the presumption that doing good deserves the public's support and esteem. But why has this urge to assert public virtue in outsize ways become a mass movement? People who did good used to be humble. Now they won't get out of our faces.

One inevitably cynical answer is politics. The political left embraced the technique known as "controlling the narrative," which is a euphemism for propaganda. The new element in our time is that these "narratives" always include sweeping, if vague, claims of moral certitude and superiority.

"Environmentalism" wasn't getting the job done, so it became "the climate crisis." Reducing racial inequality gave way to "social justice." During the Covid-19 pandemic, the citation of "science" became a moral cudgel.

The purpose of this moral grandiosity isn't to engage one's opponents but to marginalize them, to place them beyond the pale of what the new gatekeepers of virtue define as acceptable discourse.

The pity in this is that there remains much good to be done, if the left's insistence on politicizing virtue doesn't discredit the idea.

Overlooked in the Bankman-Fried saga is the implicit admission inside the idea of effective altruism that capitalism -- for-profit enterprise -- is the indispensable means to good ends. It's a recognition that capitalism is the most dynamic force in American life. That's progress. What is left to debate is the role of the U.S.'s least dynamic sector -- government.

The U.S. has the world's biggest private economy and biggest government. Something new is needed, such as more effective intermediating institutions, to fill the space between those two poles, which is filling up with seemingly unsolvable problems like opioid addiction, the violent mentally ill and chronic public-school underachievement. In California, Gov. Gavin Newsom is in a wheel-spinning battle with mayors over what to do about the state's epidemic of homelessness.

There are thousands of family foundations in the U.S., often supporting specific nonprofit projects. The traditional criticism of such efforts, whether charter schools or private-school voucher programs, is that it is too hard to scale them up to the magnitude of something like educating millions of students. Only government, they say, has the capacity.

I recognize that argument, but it's time to get past it. Charters and choice, which are succeeding, should be seen not as a threat but as a natural evolution away from aging public systems and toward more entrepreneurial, focused alternatives. Call it effective altruism. But hold the moral vanity." [1]

1. The Moral Vanity of FTX
Henninger, Daniel. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 01 Dec 2022: A.17.