"For a while, I’ve been meaning to
write a column about the phenomenon of young people saying that they don’t want
to have children because they fear raising them in a world laid waste by
climate change. As with any idea that you keep on the shelf too long, I’ve now
seen it executed by a colleague — in this case, Ezra Klein, who devoted his weekend column to
arguing for an optimistic, life-affirming response to the challenges of rising
temperatures.
I endorse my colleague’s argument
unreservedly, especially his reasonable historical perspective on how the risks
of a hotter future compare to the far more impoverished and brutal straits in
which our ancestors chose life for their children and, ultimately, for us. But
I want to use his column as an excuse to push a little further on the subject
and theorize a bit about the psychological roots of the
procreation-amid-climate-change anxiety.
First, since I noticed some
incredulous reactions from conservatives on Twitter, I can testify that the
anxiety Klein describes is real enough. I probably hear about the issue less
frequently than he does — he lives in the Bay Area, after all — but frequently
enough, especially from liberal baby boomer parents discussing their
still-more-liberal millennial offspring’s delay in having kids.
We can argue about whether climate
anxiety is a primary motivator for opting out of procreation or a kind of
secondary excuse — something grasped at by a youth culture struggling with
romance and marriage as a justification for those difficulties, something
invoked as a moralistic reason for avoiding the exhaustion of parental life.
But at a certain point, even as an
excuse, the idea becomes interesting. Why this, why now?
One answer is simple
misapprehension: People steeped in the most alarmist forms of activism and argument
may believe, wrongly, that we’re on track for the imminent collapse of human
civilization or the outright extinction of the human race.
Another answer is ideological: The
ideas of white and Western guilt are particularly important to contemporary progressivism,
and in certain visions of ecological economy, removing one’s potential kids
from the carbon-emitting equation amounts to a kind of eco-reparations. Here
there are cultural parallels to the overpopulation anxieties of the 1970s,
which often took a more overtly racist form (too many of them, over there,
in India or China) but which also wove in a version of today’s progressive
guilt. When my parents conceived me in Berkeley, Calif., in 1979, in a then
maximally liberal milieu, they had almost zero friends with kids, and they were
occasionally chided for pushing the earth closer to its carrying capacity. That
kind of fear receded somewhat over subsequent decades, but now, like astrology,
it has cycled back to prominence.
But the cycle also seems possibly
connected to trends in religious adherence and belief. Why, for instance, has
climate change seemingly yielding deeper procreative anxieties than the
Eisenhower-era threat of nuclear doom, which didn’t exactly impede the baby
boom? Perhaps because 1950s America was experiencing a religious
revival, whereas the ’70s were a period of rapid secularization or at least
de-Christianization; likewise the past two decades, which have yielded the
least-churched younger adults in modern American history.
Just as it makes sense that
superstitions like astrology would become more popular amid religious
disruption or decline, it isn’t surprising that such periods would generate
cultural anxieties about bringing children into the world. Framed as fears
about the death of modern civilization, they arguably partake of a more primal
fear of death itself.
When a person raised in a resolutely
secular milieu and taught to regard the consolations of religion as so much
wishful thinking says they don’t want to have kids because they’re afraid the
kids will suffer and die amid rising sea levels or wildfires or some other
ecological disaster, I don’t think they’re being insincere. But I still suspect
the fear of suffering and dying per se is more important than the kind of
suffering and death being envisioned — that it’s the general idea of bearing a
child fated to extinction that’s most frightening, not the specific perils of
climate change.
Global warming is clearly the
sharpener, the memento mori; like wartime or a
pandemic, it forces a focus on a reality that might otherwise stay out of mind.
But the reality itself — that all suffer, all die — seems more fundamental. In
worrying about hypothetical kids faring badly under climate change, the secular
imagination is letting itself be steered toward the harsh analysis of Blaise
Pascal:
Let us imagine a number of men in
chains and all condemned to death, where some are killed each day in the sight
of the others, and those who remain see their own fate in that of their fellows
and wait their turn, looking at each other sorrowfully and without hope. It is
an image of the condition of men.
Or, rather, an image of men in a
godless universe. Not that this pitiless conclusion is inevitable; certainly
many serious nonbelievers would find reasons to dispute it. But the problem of
meaning in a purposeless cosmos clearly hangs over the more secularized
precincts of our society, lending surprising resilience to all kinds of
spiritual impulses and ideas but also probably contributing to certain forms of
existential dread.
I am not suggesting that
secularization is the only factor in, say, rising rates of anxiety and
unhappiness and suicidality among American teenagers.
Explanations for the recent surge in teenage misery that focus on the effects
of social media, the impact of the pandemic, overprotective parenting and other
factors all make a lot of sense.
But religious shifts belong in that
conversation, too, especially since depression and anxiety appear sharpest
among the most liberal younger Americans. If some of the passions of
progressivism have their origins in spiritual
impulses and aspirations, the absence of ultimate religious hope may darken the
shadows of despair over young-progressive souls. And to the extent that every
child deliberately conceived is a direct wager against Pascal’s dire analysis,
it would make sense that under such shadows, anxieties about the ethics of
childbearing would be particularly acute.
Against these anxieties, my
colleague’s column urges a belief in a future where human agency overcomes
existential threats and ushers in a “welcoming” and even “thrilling” world.
This is a welcome admonition; I believe in those possibilities myself.
But the promise of a purposive,
divinely created universe — in which, I would stress, it remains more than reasonable
to believe — is that life is worth living and worth conceiving even if the
worst happens, the crisis comes, the hope of progress fails.
The child who lives to see the green
future is infinitely valuable; so is the child who lives to see the apocalypse.
For us, there is only the duty to give that child its chance to join the story;
its destiny belongs to God.”
Komentarų nėra:
Rašyti komentarą