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Even if the Strait of Hormuz Reopens, Shippers Will Seek Safety Assurances


Three groups of people are playing the Strait of Hormuz chess – Americans, Western Europeans and Iranians. Their ideas come in a simple sequence.

 

Americans say that they can go home, since the Strait of Hormuz will be opened automatically, because Iranians need to bring their oil to the market.

 

Iranians are saying, that is fine, the traffic will go, it will be paying a fee for crossing the waters between two Iranian islands though.

 

Americans then say to Western Europeans that it is the oil and gas of Western Europeans that is crossing the Strait of Hormuz, so Western Europeans should join the war, go and get their fuel.

 

Western Europeans don’t show eagerness to get London, Paris, and Berlin into Iranian missile and drone target areas. Staying alive is more important than cheap fuel even when their industry can’t compete because of sky high energy prices, and is going down the drain.

 

I think that Western Europeans are left holding the bag here. What do you think?

 

Other people can’t stop dreaming with ideas that do not fit drone/missile revolution time:

 

“President Trump has called on allied nations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, to allow a fifth of the world's oil to flow again through the passageway that Iran has effectively shut since the war started.

 

The problem: Naval escorts for tankers through such a narrow waterway in a war zone would be nearly impossible, say allied officials and military experts. Reopening the strait would more likely come after a cease-fire and through international pressure on Iran, they say.

 

Forcing open the strait militarily is unrealistic, French President Emmanuel Macron said Thursday. "It would take forever and would expose all those crossing the strait to risks" of attack, he said.

 

"Iran is trying to hold the global economy hostage in the Strait of Hormuz," U.K. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said Thursday after convening a meeting of more than 40 countries. They discussed political and diplomatic steps, including sanctions, she said. Military intervention wasn't on the list of options discussed.

 

On Wednesday, Trump said strikes on Iran would continue for more than two weeks. During that time, shippers are unlikely to risk sending commercial vessels through the combat zone, analysts say. The question is what level of assurance they need to resume sailing in large numbers.

 

U.S. and Israeli strikes have damaged Iran's naval assets. Yet the main threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz comes not from Iran's conventional navy but from its arsenal of land-based antiship missiles, drones, swarms of small attack craft, midget submarines and mines.

 

Geography complicates defending ships. The strait is roughly 20 miles wide at its narrowest point and divided into lanes to separate marine traffic, forcing merchant ships to travel along predictable routes. The warning time of a potential attack, and the chance to respond, would be exceedingly brief.

 

Iran has nearly 1,000 miles of coastline along the Persian Gulf, which it can use to launch attacks against ships, such as the drone strike that earlier this week struck a fully laden Kuwaiti oil tanker off the coast of Dubai. The coastline is dominated by mountains and coves, allowing Iranian forces to launch attacks with swarms of speed boats. Tunnels shelter boats that can be launched into the water.

 

Qeshm Island is particularly problematic. The largest island in the Persian Gulf, it shelters fast-attack craft, explosives-laden boats, drones and missiles for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

 

Due to the short distances in the strait, Iran can cause significant damage even with short-range weapons, said Farzin Nadimi, senior fellow with the Washington Institute think tank. Fast-attack boats armed with rocket-propelled grenades can blow a hole in a ship's hull, or mine the strait.

 

Such vessels can largely be deterred by the U.S. dominant air power, but "European powers will not be able, and probably not willing, to replace that capability," Nadimi said.

 

Military escorts, which shippers used in the Persian Gulf during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, can only provide protection for a limited number of ships at a time. In the Gulf of Aden, a multinational force provided protection against piracy with one warship for every dozen merchant ships, said Lars H. Bergqvist, a reserve officer in the Royal Swedish Navy and former United Nations military observer.

 

"The challenge isn't just whether it can be done -- it's whether it can be done consistently and at the level of presence needed to reassure commercial traffic and deter interference," said David Cattler, a former North Atlantic Treaty Organization assistant secretary-general for intelligence and a former U.S. Navy surface warfare and intelligence officer.

 

Even cargo vessels under naval protection can be vulnerable. Commercial ships transiting the Red Sea under escort have faced attacks from Houthis in Yemen since 2024. Iranian forces are potentially more dangerous, experts say.

 

As a result, shippers are likely to wait until fighting ceases and the international community acts. The first step in reopening the strait will likely be a U.N. resolution and a multinational force to oversee traffic, said Christian Bueger, a professor of political science at the University of Copenhagen who studies maritime security. "It would be a military presence that could respond to incidents and reassure the shipping industry," he said. "The point is not to do escorts."

 

Such a mission in the strait would likely take a "layered approach," drawing on lessons from the multinational mission formed in 2023 to respond to attacks by Yemeni Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, said Kevin Rowlands, a naval expert at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

 

Beginning with signals intelligence, and satellite and electronic surveillance of activity in the strait, such a mission would likely include maritime patrol aircraft and drones. The ability to respond to incidents such as mine hits or missile attacks would require close communication between all involved nations and merchant ships, possibly carrying liaison officers onboard.

 

"The challenge isn't naval," Rowlands said. "Putting a figure on how many warships is needed is not the right way to think about it. It's about looking at how many layers of protection are needed."

 

An unknown is whether Tehran will stop menacing ships. Iran has demanded reparations for destruction wrought in the five-week onslaught. If the U.S. and Israel don't agree to payments, Iran may continue to impose a toll on the world economy through its chokehold on the route for critical supplies of fuel, chemicals and fertilizer.

 

"It's up to Iran to say that the war is over," Rowlands said, cautioning that Iranian militia allies can threaten other chokepoints, such as the Bab al-Mandeb Strait off Yemen. "Even if Iran decides that trade can flow through the strait, there might still be a risk that proxies take a different view," he said.” [1]

 

1. World News: Even if the Strait of Hormuz Reopens, Shippers Will Seek Safety Assurances. Michaels, Daniel; Sune Engel Rasmussen.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 04 Apr 2026: A6.

Arrows Coming Out of Stone Age Caves: Iran Downs Two U.S. Warplanes, Triggering Frantic Rescue Mission

 

“Iran downed two U.S. warplanes on Friday, the first time Tehran has brought down American jets during the war, setting off a search-and-rescue effort that left two service members safe and one still missing.

 

Iran's downing of the warplanes is the most striking evidence yet that, despite enormous military losses, Tehran can still significantly raise the cost of continuing the conflict for the U.S. and Israel.

 

The shootdowns were the most successful demonstration of Iran's military strategy to inflict tactical defeats on the U.S. and its allies in hopes not of winning militarily but of surviving and sapping their will to continue the fight.

 

An F-15E fighter and A-10 attack plane were the first U.S. or Israeli aircraft to be downed by Iran in thousands of sorties flown in Iranian airspace over the month-plus of the war. A massive search-and-rescue effort extricated one crew member of the F-15E, but at least one additional crew member was unaccounted for.

 

The A-10 wasn't brought down in Iranian territory, people familiar with the incident said. The pilot of the twin-engine, single-seat attack jet was able to fly out of Iranian territory before ejecting from the aircraft and being rescued, they said.

 

The question is how much such blows weaken President Trump's resolve to continue -- and even to expand -- the war at a time when he already appeared determined to bring it to a rapid close.

 

"It definitely shows that Iran can win without winning," said Alan Eyre, a former State Department Iran expert and fellow with the Middle East Institute. "The U.S. narrative is, 'We've got everything in the bag.' This punctures that narrative."

 

Instead of seeking to fight the U.S. and Israel toe-to-toe, Iran has adopted an asymmetric strategy, targeting Arab Gulf states, knocking out radars and other facilities critical to air defenses and shutting down most tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. It is a tactic that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the powerful Iranian military organization running the war effort, used to kill thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq by arming proxy militias with improvised-explosive devices.

 

The air campaign has pounded Iranian missile bases and mobile launchers, but Tehran has been able to fire dozens of missiles and drones a day, prolonging the conflict, raising the economic costs on oil-exporting Gulf countries and in the U.S., and surviving to fight another day.

 

What it hadn't done until Friday was bring down any U.S. and Israeli warplanes over its territory. Iranian state television said Iranians would be rewarded for finding any U.S. crew members and turning them over alive.

 

Even with the U.S. rescue effort still under way and the fate of the U.S. crew member uncertain, Iran's parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, posted a mocking statement on social media, suggesting U.S. war aims had suffered a major blow.

 

"This brilliant no-strategy war they started has now been downgraded from 'regime change' to 'Hey! Can anyone find our pilots?'" he wrote. "Wow. What incredible progress. Absolute geniuses."

 

The successful attacks came on the same day that Iranian officials told mediators it isn't willing to meet U.S. officials in Islamabad in the coming days and that the White House's far-reaching demands for ending the war are unacceptable.

 

William Wechsler, a former Defense Department official who heads Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council think tank, said the incidents showed that "while we have achieved air superiority, we have not achieved air supremacy."

 

"The IRGC is a professional military organization with a proven capacity to learn and adapt, and obviously retains capabilities that put our airmen and other military personnel at risk," Wechsler said.

 

The war could quickly spiral out of control, even with the vast superiority of the U.S. military, he said. "The war will go on for some time, and further escalations are increasingly likely, either intentional or accidental," he said. "And nobody should be confused -- there are lots of ways that this war could escalate further very quickly."

 

The loss of the warplanes comes after 13,000 combat flights and five weeks of airstrikes. Former Air Force officials said that such an incident hasn't happened until now underscored the successful U.S. efforts to suppress Iran's air defenses early in the war.

 

"What's amazing about this story is that it hasn't happened sooner," said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula, who ran the air campaign for the 1990-91 Gulf War against Iraq. "There have been thousands of targets hit with thousands of sorties penetrating contested airspace. It's been an entire month and this is the first time we've had a combat loss? That's incredible."

 

Trump was briefed on the aircraft shootdowns, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said. He threatened in recent days to bombard Iran "back to the Stone Ages," and over the past 24 hours, the U.S. and Iran have been trading attacks on military and civilian infrastructure in the region.

 

Iran has scored other hits on the U.S., including a missile and drone attack last week on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia that heavily damaged or destroyed U.S. aircraft.” [1]

 

1. Iran Downs Two U.S. Warplanes, Triggering Frantic Rescue Mission. Cloud, David S; Holliday, Shelby.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 04 Apr 2026: A1.  

Strėlės, kylančios iš akmens amžiaus urvų: Iranas numušė du JAV karo lėktuvus, sukeldamas įnirtingą gelbėjimo misiją


„Penktadienį Iranas numušė du JAV karo lėktuvus – tai pirmas kartas, kai Teheranas karo metu numušė amerikiečių naikintuvus, pradėdamas paieškos ir gelbėjimo operaciją, kurios metu du kariai liko saugūs, o vienas vis dar dingo.

 

Irano numušti karo lėktuvai yra ryškiausias įrodymas, kad, nepaisant didžiulių karinių nuostolių, Teheranas vis dar gali gerokai padidinti konflikto tęsimo kainą JAV ir Izraeliui.

 

Numušimai buvo sėkmingiausia Irano karinės strategijos demonstracija, kuria siekiama sukelti taktinius pralaimėjimus JAV ir jos sąjungininkėms, tikintis ne laimėti kariškai, o išgyventi ir susilpninti jų valią tęsti kovą.

 

Naikintuvas F-15E ir atakos lėktuvas A-10 buvo pirmieji JAV arba Izraelio lėktuvai, kuriuos Iranas numušė per tūkstančius skrydžių, atliktų Irano oro erdvėje per daugiau nei mėnesį trukusį karą. Didelės paieškos ir gelbėjimo operacijos padėjo išlaisvinti vieną F-15E įgulos narį, tačiau bent vienas papildomas įgulos narys liko dingęs.

 

Su incidentu susipažinę šaltiniai teigė, kad A-10 nebuvo numuštas Irano teritorijoje. Dviejų variklių, vienviečio atakos lėktuvo pilotas spėjo išskristi iš Irano teritorijos, o tada katapultuotis iš lėktuvo ir būti išgelbėtas, teigė jie.

 

Klausimas, kiek tokie smūgiai susilpnina prezidento Trumpo ryžtą tęsti – ir netgi plėsti – karą tuo metu, kai jis jau atrodė pasiryžęs jį greitai užbaigti.

 

„Tai neabejotinai rodo, kad Iranas gali laimėti ir nelaimėdamas“, – sakė Alanas Eyre'as, buvęs Valstybės departamento Irano ekspertas ir Artimųjų Rytų instituto bendradarbis. „JAV naratyvas yra toks: „Mes turime viską, ko reikia“. Tai pažeidžia tą naratyvą.“

 

Užuot siekęs kovoti su JAV ir Izraeliu akis į akį, Iranas pasirinko asimetrinę strategiją, taikydamasis į arabų Persijos įlankos valstybes, išjungdamas radarus ir kitus oro gynybai svarbius įrenginius bei sustabdydamas didžiąją dalį tanklaivių eismo per Hormūzo sąsiaurį. Tai taktika, kurią Islamo revoliucijos gvardija, galinga Irano karinė organizacija, vadovaujanti karo pastangoms, naudojo tūkstančiams JAV karių Irake nužudyti, apginkluodama įgaliotinius sukarintus dalinius savadarbiais sprogstamaisiais įtaisais.

 

Oro kampanija apšaudė Irano raketų bazes ir mobiliuosius paleidimo įrenginius, tačiau Teheranas sugebėjo paleisti dešimtis raketų ir dronų per dieną, pratęsdamas konfliktą, padidindamas ekonomines išlaidas naftą eksportuojančioms Persijos įlankos šalims ir JAV, ir išgyvendamas, kad galėtų kovoti dar vieną dieną.

 

Ko jis nepadarė iki penktadienio, tai numušė visus JAV ir Izraelio karo lėktuvus virš savo teritorijos. Irano valstybinė televizija pranešė, kad iraniečiai bus apdovanoti už bet kurio JAV įgulos nario suradimą ir perdavimą gyvo.

 

Net ir JAV gelbėjimo pastangoms vis dar vykstant Kadangi JAV įgulos nario likimas neaiškus, Irano parlamento pirmininkas Mohammadas Bagheris Ghalibafas socialiniuose tinkluose paskelbė pašaipų pareiškimą, kuriame teigė, kad JAV karo tikslai patyrė didelį smūgį.

 

„Šis jų pradėtas genialus karas be strategijos dabar buvo sumažintas nuo „režimo pakeitimo“ iki „Ei! Ar kas nors gali rasti mūsų pilotus?“, – rašė jis. „Oho. Kokia neįtikėtina pažanga.“ Absoliutūs genijai.“

 

Sėkmingi išpuoliai įvyko tą pačią dieną, kai Irano pareigūnai tarpininkams pareiškė, kad artimiausiomis dienomis nenori susitikti su JAV pareigūnais Islamabade ir kad toli siekiantys Baltųjų rūmų reikalavimai nutraukti karą yra nepriimtini.

 

Williamas Wechsleris, buvęs Gynybos departamento pareigūnas, vadovaujantis Artimųjų Rytų programoms Atlanto tarybos analitiniame centre, teigė, kad incidentai parodė, jog „nors pasiekėme oro pranašumą, oro pranašumo nepasiekėme“.

 

„IRGC yra profesionali karinė organizacija, turinti įrodytą gebėjimą mokytis ir prisitaikyti, ir akivaizdžiai išlaiko pajėgumus, kurie kelia pavojų mūsų lakūnams ir kitam kariniam personalui“, – sakė Wechsleris.

 

Karas gali greitai tapti nekontroliuojamas, net ir turint didžiulį JAV kariuomenės pranašumą, sakė jis. „Karas tęsis dar kurį laiką, o tolesnė eskalacija, tyčinė ar atsitiktinė, yra vis labiau tikėtina“, – sakė jis. „Ir niekas neturėtų būti sumišęs – yra daug būdų, kaip šis karas gali labai greitai dar labiau eskaluotis“.

 

Karo lėktuvų praradimas įvyko po 13 000 kovinių skrydžių ir penkių savaičių. oro antskrydžių. Buvę oro pajėgų pareigūnai teigė, kad toks incidentas iki šiol nebuvo įvykęs, o tai pabrėžia sėkmingas JAV pastangas nuslopinti Irano oro gynybą karo pradžioje.

 

„Nuostabu tai, kad ši istorija neįvyko anksčiau“, – sakė atsargos oro pajėgų generolas leitenantas Dave'as Deptula, vadovavęs oro antskrydžių kampanijai prieš Iraką 1990–1991 m. Persijos įlankos kare. „Tūkstančiai taikinių buvo pataikyti, tūkstančiai lėktuvų skverbėsi į ginčijamą oro erdvę. Praėjo visas mėnuo, o tai pirmas kartas, kai patyrėme kovinių nuostolių? Tai neįtikėtina.“

 

Trumpas buvo informuotas apie lėktuvų numušimus, sakė Baltųjų rūmų spaudos sekretorė Karoline Leavitt. Pastarosiomis dienomis jis grasino bombarduoti Iraną “atgal į akmens amžių“ ir per pastarąsias 24 valandas JAV ir Iranas apkeitė atakomis prieš karinę ir civilinę infrastruktūrą regione.

 

Iranas taip pat sėkmingai atakavo JAV kitur, įskaitant praėjusią savaitę įvykdytą raketų ir dronų ataką prieš Princo Sultono oro bazę Saudo Arabijoje, kurios metu buvo smarkiai apgadinti arba sunaikinti JAV lėktuvai.“ [1]

 

 

 

1. Iran Downs Two U.S. Warplanes, Triggering Frantic Rescue Mission. Cloud, David S; Holliday, Shelby.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 04 Apr 2026: A1.  

How can Lithuania avoid ending up under the table, among the gnawed bones?

 


 

Yes, we are on the table of negotiations between the East and the West on security issues. Every reasonable person agrees, as does Jens Stoltenberg, that the East has a legitimate need for border security, just like the West. This fact is discussed all the time by both sides, often without us knowing about it. It is clear that no one will risk the destruction of New York, Paris, Washington or Berlin for the sake of Marijampolė, although our Marijampolė is very beautiful. So much so that all the guarantees for us are not worth the paper they are written on. Our army is a puppet theater. What to do? Ireland used to belong to the United Kingdom, like us, Lithuania to Russia. Now Ireland is neutral, it does not cause many problems for the British. Lithuania must also be neutral.

 

That Brits are somehow more “democratic”, than Russians, ask about it the British girls who were groomed and sexually exploited by immigrants, tolerated by British elite. If this is democracy, it is not clear, what despotic government could be.

 

I did not come up with these negotiations, today they are widely covered in the Lithuanian press. Here is an example:

 

“After the Estonian portal “The Baltic Sentinel” accused former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg of betraying the Baltic states and Poland, a lot of noise and discussion arose in Lithuania. It is alleged that the portal quoted J. Stoltenberg inaccurately, and diplomat Linas Linkevičius claims that he knows J. Stoltenberg, but does not remember that he ever informally considered giving us to the Russians as a “buffer zone”.

 

The outrage arose after “The Baltic Sentinel” published a review of J. Stoltenberg’s memoirs, which states that in a face-to-face meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, he, knowing the opposition of Poland and the Baltic states, proposed that the NATO-Russia Council discuss Russia’s idea of ​​creating a buffer zone in the border areas “and withdrawing allied forces to the positions that existed before 1997”.

 

True, the book does not specifically talk about the withdrawal of forces.

 

“I advocated for new meetings of the NATO-Russia Council to discuss the proposed buffer zones. I knew that countries such as Poland and the Baltic states were strongly opposed to the creation of such zones, because they believed that it would make their defense more difficult. However, at the same time, I knew that NATO and Russia had previously managed to agree on geographical military restrictions. If this were balanced and reformulated, it could help reduce tensions,” J. Stoltenberg wrote in his memoirs.

 

The information is inaccurate, it is dramatized

 

This was pointed out by communications specialist and author of the book “Front of Fear” Vytautas Matulevičius.

 

“Currently, Facebook is red with the news that former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg admits in his book “On My Watch” that he wanted to give the Baltic states and Poland to Russia. This is not true,” he writes on Facebook.

 

V. Matulevičius points out that the statement in the book “to withdraw allied forces to the positions they had before 1997,” although “The Baltic Sentinel” writes exactly that, is simply not there.

 

“The truth is that in 2021 the US and Europe tried to prevent a full-scale conflict by diplomatic means (although the Americans did not believe in them, Europe wanted it). At the end of 2021, Russia presented an ultimatum to NATO, which was immediately rejected <...> Mutual de-escalation and restrictions were proposed.”"


 

Kaip Lietuvai neatsidurti po stalu, tarp apgraužtų kaulų?

 


Taip, mes esame ant derybų tarp Rytų ir Vakarų saugumo klausimais stalo. Kiekvienas protingas žmogus sutinka, kaip ir Jensas Stoltenbergas, kad Rytai turi teisėtą poreikį pasienio saugumui, kaip ir Vakarai. Šį faktą visa laiką aptaria abi pusės, mums apie tai dažnai nežinant. Aišku, kad niekas nerizikuos Niujorko, Paryžiaus, Vašingtono ar Berlyno sunaikinimu vardan Marijampolės, nors mūsų Marijampolė labai graži. Taip, kad visos garantijos mums yra nevertos popieriaus, ant kurio jos surašytos. Mūsų kariuomenė yra lėlių teatras. Ką daryti? Airija anksčiau priklausė Jungtinei Karalystei, kaip ir mes, Lietuva – Rusijai. Dabar Airija yra neutrali, britams nekelia daug problemų. Lietuva irgi turi būti neutrali.

 

Kad britai kažkaip yra „demokratiškesni“, nei rusai, paklauskite apie tai britų mergaičių, kurias imigrantai treniravo ir seksualiai išnaudojo, o britų elitas juos toleravo. Jei tai yra demokratija, neaišku, kas galėtų būti despotiška valdžia.

 

Šias derybas ne aš sugalvojau, šiandien jos plačiai aptariamos Lietuvos spaudoje. Šati pavyzdys: 

 

“Estijos portalui „The Baltic Sentinel“ apkaltinus buvusį NATO generalinį sekretorių Jensą Stoltenbergą Baltijos šalių ir Lenkijos išdavyste, Lietuvoje kilo nemažai triukšmo ir diskusijų. Teigiama, kad portalas J. Stoltenbergą pacitavo netiksliai, o diplomatas Linas Linkevičius teigia pažįstantis J. Stoltenbergą, bet nepamenantis, kad jis kada nors būtų neformaliai svarstęs atiduoti mus rusams kaip „buferio zoną“.

 

Pasipiktinimas kilo „The Baltic Sentinel“ publikavus J. Stoltenbergo memuarų apžvalgą, kurioje teigiama, kad susitikime akis į akį su Rusijos užsienio reikalų ministru Sergejumi Lavrovu jis, žinodamas Lenkijos ir Baltijos šalių nepritarimą, pasiūlė NATO – Rusijos taryboje aptarti Rusijos idėją sukurti buferinę zoną pasienio teritorijose „ir atitraukti sąjungininkų pajėgas į iki 1997 metų buvusias pozicijas“.

 

Tiesa, knygoje konkrečiai apie pajėgų atitraukimą nėra kalbama.

 

„Aš pasisakiau už naujus NATO – Rusijos tarybos susitikimus, siekiant aptarti siūlomas buferines zonas. Žinojau, kad tokios valstybės kaip Lenkija ir Baltijos šalys griežtai priešinosi tokių zonų sukūrimui, nes manė, jog tai apsunkintų jų gynybą. Tačiau tuo pačiu žinojau, kad NATO ir Rusijai anksčiau buvo pavykę susitarti dėl geografinių karinių apribojimų. Jei tai būtų subalansuota ir iš naujo suformuluota, tai galėtų padėti sumažinti įtampą“, – memuaruose rašė J. Stoltenbergas.

 

Informacija yra netiksli, ji dramatizuojama

 

Į tai dėmesį atkreipė komunikacijos specialistas, knygos „Baimės frontas“ autorius Vytautas Matulevičius.

 

„Šiuo metu feisbukas raudonuoja nuo žinios neva buvęs NATO generalinis sekretorius Jens Stoltenberg savo knygoje „On My Watch“ pripažįsta norėjęs atiduoti Baltijos šalis ir Lenkiją Rusijai. Tai nėra tiesa“, – feisbuke rašo jis.

 

V. Matulevičius atkreipia dėmesį, kad knygoje teiginio „atitraukti sąjungininkų pajėgas į iki 1997 metų buvusias pozicijas“, nors „The Baltic Sentinel“ rašo būtent taip, tiesiog nėra.

 

„Tiesa yra ta, kad 2021 m. JAV ir Europa bandė užkirsti kelią pilno masto konfliktui diplomatinėmis priemonėmis (nors amerikiečiai jomis netikėjo, to norėjo Europa). Rusija 2021 m. pabaigoje pateikė ultimatumą NATO, kuris buvo išsyk atmestas <...> Buvo siūloma abipusė deeskalacija ir apribojimai”.”