Berlin-Paris versus Washington

“Germany defends the multipolar world and its power in a way that may raise concerns in Poland.

 

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the main direction of German strategy was to create a strong European pole, based on a united Germany. The strategy was based on the development of European integration, as well as making Berlin the center of geoeconomic gravity for Central Europe, the Balkan countries and the countries of Northern Europe and the Netherlands.

 

The power of Germany in Europe and the importance of the European Union in the world were to be based on Russian raw materials and access to markets and cheap workers in our region. Other flywheels were to be economic exchange with China and exports to the USA.

 

Germany's commercial power built its geopolitical potential over time. It was based on Germany's credibility among its allies, especially in the EU and the USA.

Troubles of military operation

 

The worst case scenario for Berlin would be a return to a bipolar system, i.e. in today's reality to two rival blocs: the American and the Chinese. This would mean reducing Germany's position on the international arena. Therefore, successive German governments supported the idea of strategic autonomy in the EU, which was primarily intended to build independence from Washington. At the same time, the best possible relations with China were cared for, primarily on the economic level. Even closer cooperation flourished with the Russian Federation.

 

The operation in Ukraine largely thwarted this strategy. In particular, it made it more difficult to cooperate with Moscow. In doing so, it severely hit the economy of Germany and other Member States. It caused an energy crisis and inflation, and cutting off from cheap raw materials worsened the competitiveness of German exports. The mistakes and omissions of the German leadership in the face of operation led to a loss of confidence among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It turned out that Germany was unable to guarantee the security of its neighbors in this region. Moreover, the intensifying economic crisis may make it more difficult for Germany to sponsor EU activities at the current level. All the more so that other problems may soon arise, for example in the eurozone.

 

Germany's dependence on the main export markets (US and Chinese) and on imports of raw materials necessary for the climate transformation (mainly Chinese) is also increasing.

 

Operation reduces the chances of realizing a multipolar order. It will be difficult for Russia to rebuild its sphere of influence, especially since its geoeconomic dependence on China is growing. Similar phenomena affected Germany. On the other hand, the importance of two other centers, i.e. Washington and Beijing, is growing. The world is therefore a little closer to returning to the bipolar order.

 

That is why the German elites are concerned about the effects of this operation. Olaf Scholz's November visit to Beijing showed a desire to maintain economic relations with China, even if this raised concerns about the possibility of Europe becoming dependent on an external rival again. The chancellor has also repeatedly spoken out against being drawn into the Sino-American rivalry.

But what he really doesn't want is two rival blocs, where Germany and the EU would only complement US power.

 

Retaliation instead of cooperation

 

There were accusations in Western Europe that the Americans benefited from the Ukrainian operation in three ways, and at the same time they did so at the expense of the Union. First, they increase arms exports, especially to so-called eastern flank of NATO. However, it is hard not to notice that this is also the result of decisions by some EU countries that are trying to increase their own security.

 

The year 2022 was marked by the operation in Ukraine, and it will be no different in 2023. And this means that the memory of the old world is finally becoming a thing of the past. What will be the new one - no one knows yet.

 

Secondly, Americans are accused of getting rich by exporting gas to Europe. What is overlooked is that the US administration has encouraged raw material suppliers to redirect their exports from Asian markets to the EU. In addition, the shortage of gas on the Old Continent is largely the result of earlier mistakes of the Europeans themselves.

 

Thirdly, the elites of Western Europe cannot forgive the US authorities for having decided to follow China's footsteps and sponsor the reconstruction of industry on a large scale. At the same time, they take advantage of the climate revolution that Europe has been promoting for years, in addition to putting pressure on the Americans not to linger in their commitments. Therefore, the purpose of Washington's subsidies (exceeding 200 billion dollars) is to produce parts and devices using green technologies in the USA, especially electric cars.

 

The EU discussion on the German fund (EUR 200 billion) to save the country's economy from the energy crisis, as well as on public aid from the French authorities, of a similar financial scale, faded away immediately. Paris and Berlin they do not heed the trade surplus of the EU in relation to the US, reaching 218 billion dollars in 2021. The US deficit in car trade with the EU alone amounted to 22 billion dollars.

Western Europe seems to underestimate America's efforts to defend Ukraine and its EU allies

 

Americans are disappointed with Western Europe's conduct, both because of its stance towards Ukraine and because it is unwilling to join US geoeconomic efforts against China. It's about, among others o an embargo on integrated circuits manufactured in the EU, especially equipment of their production manufactured by the Dutch company ASML.

 

So instead of taking steps against China's protectionism, Western Europe is planning retaliation against America. These include taking legal action before the World Trade Organization, changing the rules on state aid and tenders in the EU, incentives to buy only European products, and even introducing punitive tariffs on American goods. Ursula von der Leyen announced a new EU debt fund to support the biggest industrial champions in the EU.

 

Is it in our interest?

 

Western Europe seems to underestimate America's efforts to defend Ukraine and its EU allies. Building a common front against the US may be a chance to break the recent animosities between Paris and Berlin, but such plans should raise concerns in Warsaw.

 

Is it in Poland's interest to escalate the rivalry with the US at the moment? Should EU funds, and therefore also Polish taxpayers, primarily strengthen the largest corporations from Western Europe? Will the planned changes in the EU competition policy irreversibly destroy the liberal principles of economic exchange on the internal market?

 

A better support for European industry seems to be loosening some EU climate regulations. This would offset the effects of the energy crisis caused by the Russian Federation and the mistakes of German policy.”

 

Thus, the Poles propose to replace dependence on expensive American gas with dependence on more environmentally polluting Polish coal and do not want to spend money to save German and French companies on which the competitiveness of the whole of Europe depends. Whether this will end well for the Poles, we will soon see.