“"Our strategy in Taiwan is based on a faulty premise. You know what that premise is?" Mark Helprin asks. I don't.
"If you read all the studies and military journals on defending Taiwan, they all talk about penetrating bombers and missiles and so on to strike Chinese bases. Really? China is a nuclear-armed state, and we're going to attack Chinese bases on the country's mainland? . . . That would set up a nuclear standoff. We're not going to do that."
Were China to attack Taiwan, Mr. Helprin says, it would present a situation in which China can hit Taiwan because it's not the U.S., while the U.S. can't hit China. So what's the solution? Here Mr. Helprin launches into an explanation at once expansive and detailed, rather like one of his novels. The import: Since the area of operations would be disadvantageously confined to the sea and Taiwan itself, the U.S. will need to harden its Pacific bases against China's missiles, bombers and special forces; swell its Pacific fleet with ships both large and small (aircraft carriers and attack submarines, but also motor-torpedo boats, mine-sweepers, escort vessels, etc.); boost production of long-range aircraft, manned and unmanned; [1] upgrade its nuclear deterrent; and harden Taiwan to the extent possible.
"I don't think that we will meet the challenge," Mr. Helprin says after this catalog, "but with responsible leadership we could. That's the tragedy. Take a strong horse and give him one weak and clueless rider after another, and pretty soon the horse is no longer strong."
Perhaps the core of the problem is American policymakers' fear of risk and attendant accountability. If a U.S. administration tried to mount the sort of defense posture Mr. Helprin counsels, something might go wrong, someone would have to pay a political price, and no one at the moment seems inclined to pay any sort of price for anything. As soon as I use the phrase "fear of risk" he points out that "in 1940 Churchill sent all the tanks in Britain to North Africa to fight the Germans. That denuded Britain of tanks, and at the time it was still possible that Sea Lion" -- Hitler's plan to invade the U.K. -- "could have happened. The British would have had no tanks to use in defense. It was a risk. Churchill took it. War is about risk." [2]
1. Swarms of millions of autonomous Chinese drones and missiles will destroy
all these moving through water and air assets. Just leave the Chinese in Taiwan
to decide their own preferences. Don’t even think of going there. Lithuanian government attacked China diplomatically about the problem of Taiwan. This is a mistake.
2. The Weekend Interview with Mark Helprin: Are Americans Ready for War? Swaim, Barton. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 04 May 2024: A.11.
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