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2024 m. lapkričio 1 d., penktadienis

Postindustrial West: China's Advance Exposes U.S.'s Supply-Line Weakness


"SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, Ill. -- America's combat forces need a lift.

Every two weeks since late last year, officers here convene a classified intelligence briefing about fighting in the Red Sea. The attendees aren't politicians, policymakers or spies. They are private shipping executives.

The meetings are part of a push by the Pentagon's Transportation Command, or Transcom, to integrate shippers as crisis supply lines.

The policy stems from a dire need in an unloved but vital corner of America's military behemoth. A House select committee in February called Transcom's sea-cargo capacity "woefully inadequate."

The U.S. is investing heavily in new weapons systems, but missiles, warships and jet fighters are only a fraction of what the military worries about. Troops sent to battle also need food and water. Their equipment devours fuel and spare parts. Guns without ammunition are dead weight. Wounded fighters require evacuation.

Moving all of that -- and keeping supplies flowing for months or years -- demands vast and complex support infrastructure, broadly termed logistics. If it doesn't function, even a battle-proven force will grind to a halt.

"Logistics underwrites everything," said Jacqueline Van Ovost, who recently retired as Transcom's commander. "You can't outrun your logistics."

China's rise has exposed America's shipping weakness. Beijing isn't just Washington's biggest military rival. It is also by far the world's biggest logistics operation.

Within China's centrally directed economy, the government controls commercial shippers, foreign port facilities and a globe-spanning cargo-data network that in a conflict could be repurposed for military aims or to undermine the U.S., including on home soil.

Transcom's fleet of planes and cargo ships, meanwhile, is aging and insufficient.

In conflict with China, the Pentagon would send roughly 90% of its provisions by sea. Among 44 government-owned ships for moving vehicles that Transcom can tap, 28 will retire within eight years. Replacements have faced repeated delays.

"It's not as sexy as a B-1" bomber, said Van Ovost, who served in the Air Force for 36 years, of how officials in Washington set spending priorities. "It's just logistics," she said about the dismissive attitude of some in Washington.

But military logistics isn't "just logistics" because in wartime, supply lines are prime targets. Enemy can cripple your forces by destroying your provisions.

Robust logistics, in contrast, can deter attacks. If adversaries believe the U.S. can quickly mobilize a massive response, they are less likely to initiate hostilities. During the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies routinely made a show of flooding Europe with American troops and gear before exercises.

Transcom has guaranteed access to at most about 200 ships for a potential fight with China. Provisioning for the second Gulf War in 2003 required more than 165 ships, which crossed the peaceful Atlantic Ocean unimpeded.

War with China wouldn't only require far more equipment to be transported under more dangerous conditions. The Pacific is also far larger than the Atlantic, meaning each ship takes longer to move the same volume, which in turn adds to the number of ships needed. Planners refer to this as "the tyranny of distance."

Transcom aims to offset its shortfall by tapping commercial shippers to handle military cargo outside war zones, potentially shouldering 80% of military freight. That could mean hundreds of ships. The Pentagon would handle the rest, usually closest to front lines.

Coordinating huge fleets of commercial ships and planes with military equipment during wartime would be daunting. Transcom uses around 280 software systems for buying, warehousing and moving provisions.

To smooth that integration, Van Ovost worked to lock in commercial shippers for a wartime role by capitalizing on their hunger for Pentagon peacetime contracts. Her initiative has won industry plaudits.

"The more we talk to each other, the more we understand each other's problems," said Stephen Carmel, president of U.S. Marine Management, a ship operator that works extensively with the military.

"We're light years from where we need to be," Carmel said, citing Transcom's fleet of fuel-transport ships. In a war, Transcom could need more than 100, some analysts say. It has guaranteed access to 10.

In peacetime, most Pentagon ocean cargo -- such as for deployments and exercises -- travels on roughly 60 ships operated by Military Sealift Command, a Transcom component. Much also goes on commercial ships.

In a crisis, Transcom can activate another 48 government ships kept on standby, known as the Ready Reserve Force, run by the Transportation Department's Maritime Administration.

For a big mobilization, Transcom can tap another 95 private ships enrolled in a government program, ideally by contracting with their owners. If that falls short, Transcom can essentially requisition their use.

In 1990, at the Cold War's end, the U.S. had roughly 600 available merchant ships. In 1960, it had more than 3,000.

China today has over 7,000 commercial ships. Chinese entities own every sixth commercial vessel on the seas -- including ships flying other countries' flags -- a share comparable only to Greece.

Congress, seeking to redress that imbalance, has given the Maritime Administration permission to buy secondhand foreign-made ships and convert them for its use. The number budgeted so far: nine.

"It's a bandage for a cancer patient," said Seth Cropsey, a former Navy officer and deputy undersecretary in the 1980s.” [1]

World News: China's Advance Exposes U.S.'s Supply-Line Weakness. Michaels, Daniel; Youssef, Nancy A. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 01 Nov 2024: A.8. 

 

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