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2026 m. sausio 3 d., šeštadienis

How Long the New War Could Last? China Won't Cede Power To U.S. in Latin America


“China intends to keep playing in the U.S. backyard, Latin America.

 

The Trump administration took veiled swipes at China in its national-security strategy with the vow to "restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere" and "deny non-Hemispheric competitors."

 

Less than a week after the release of the U.S. strategy in December, Beijing issued a little-noticed policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean that geopolitical analysts say foreshadows more U.S.-China jostling for regional influence.

 

"China has always stood in solidarity through thick and thin with the Global South, including Latin America and the Caribbean," said the 6,700-word policy paper, China's first on the region in nearly a decade. The paper cites how a "significant shift is taking place in the international balance of power," terminology Chinese leader Xi Jinping uses to allege that the era of U.S. global supremacy is ending.

 

China shadows each major challenge President Trump has taken on in Latin America, from degrading the Venezuelan regime to reasserting U.S. dominance at the Panama Canal. It is a counterpoint -- albeit a moderate one -- to what Beijing considers encirclement of its territory by the U.S. system of military alliances throughout Asia.

 

"Great power competition in the region has only just begun," according to an analysis of China's Latin American stance by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

 

The Washington-based think tank said Beijing's policy plan demonstrated its intention to expand diplomatic and economic ties in Latin America, and position itself as an alternative to the U.S.

 

China is gaining political leverage in the region by spending money on infrastructure projects and extracting critical minerals, energy and other natural resources. Meanwhile, its diplomats are engaging local political power brokers via its embassies.

 

Beijing claims 24 signatories in the region to its Belt and Road Initiative, compared with none before 2017. It has displaced the U.S. as the biggest trading partner with many Latin American countries.

 

"China's strategy is basically not giving an inch," said Ryan Berg, a co-author of the CSIS analysis.

 

Trump's muscle-flexing at the Venezuelan regime of Nicolas Maduro is providing an early test of China's priorities and its claim that it has an "all-weather strategic partnership" with the country. Beijing has denounced as illegal hegemony and "unilateral bullying" the U.S. military buildup around Venezuela.

 

China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, Sun Lei, thundered against the U.S. in Venezuela's defense at a Dec. 23 Security Council meeting. "We stand against any move that violates the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and infringes upon other countries' sovereignty and security," he said.

 

Most of Beijing's support for the Maduro regime and other governments that fall into Trump's crosshairs is likely to remain rhetorical. No one expects China to risk a direct military confrontation with the U.S.

 

Still, Beijing recently sent a provocative message when state media showed a wargame simulation in the Western Hemisphere. Government broadcaster China Central Television said the computer-based wargames were meant to demonstrate human-machine collaboration strategies, but they also showed Chinese "red" forces facing off against "blue" ships and aircraft around Cuba and Mexico.

 

Even if Chinese military action in the region is unlikely in the near term, such signals are a reminder that Beijing's ambitions are no longer purely economic, said Leland Lazarus, a Miami-based risk consultant.

 

The former U.S. diplomat, who has advised the Defense Department on Latin America and China, said Washington is concerned about Chinese efforts to develop a global network of "strategic support points" that would turn ports into logistics hubs for its military, including a node in Cuba.

 

In an unclassified annual report to Congress from December, the Defense Department cited Cuba as the only nation in the Americas where China might have considered putting a military base.

 

The Trump administration's China policy has featured efforts to sustain trade in agriculture and rare-earth minerals, while limiting U.S. technology exports that might strengthen its military.

 

In response to questions about China's Latin America stance, White House deputy press secretary Anna Kelly said the administration has moved "with historic speed to restore American strength at home and abroad."

 

China hasn't said why it published the Latin American strategy paper now. It significantly expands on the previous official policy unveiled in 2016 to include security and governance initiatives since then.

 

The Trump administration doesn't explicitly mention China in its national-security strategy's outline of a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine -- the 19th-century warning to European colonial powers that the U.S. is pre-eminent in the Western Hemisphere. But China is the obvious challenger when it references the "hidden costs" of foreign assistance that appear in the form of "espionage, cybersecurity, debt-traps."

 

America wants to "make ourselves the partner of first choice" in the region, according to Trump's strategy. China in turn is "trying to draw a stark contrast with the Trump administration's revival of the Monroe Doctrine," said Lazarus, who called the neocolonial language a "narrative gift" to Beijing.” [1]

 

1. World News: China Won't Cede Power To U.S. in Latin America. Areddy, James T.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 02 Jan 2026: A8.  

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