Sekėjai

Ieškoti šiame dienoraštyje

2022 m. balandžio 11 d., pirmadienis

Fields of gold; Farming.

 

 “Why an agricultural boom does not help rural America

F OR A PICTURE of the evolution of modern agriculture, you could do worse than visit the barn on Philip Volk's farm, near the city of Rugby in North Dakota. Inside the ageing building is hundreds of thousands of dollars-worth of equipment. A huge red combine harvester sits next to the green "air seeder", which looks a little like a bread slicer, and a tractor larger than a tank. Pulled by the tractor, which follows a GPS-guided map automatically, the air seeder cuts through the soil and, in just a week or so, sows the entire crop, which on Mr Volk's farm is mostly spring wheat. Five to six months later, the combine harvester picks it all up almost as quickly, and then trucks take it down the road to a grain elevator, where it is graded and loaded onto trains that carry it out to the west coast, mostly to be shipped to Japan.

With a team of four (and a few more relatives and neighbours roped in at harvest time) Mr Volk is able to farm 5,000 acres (2,000 hectares) of land. His great-grand father, who immigrated to America from Germany, had to plough the land with horses, then sow it manually, with dozens, if not hundreds of workers. The farm's first tractor, purchased by Mr Volk's grandfather almost a century ago, still sits in the barn. It is dwarfed by the modern contraptions next to it, and would not be much use on the farm now. "I would not want to go back and sit on an open-cab tractor and have the toil my grandfather had," says Mr Volk.

America's farmers face interesting times. On the plains of North Dakota and Montana, as across the border in Saskatchewan in Canada, the biggest crop is spring wheat, which is planted in April and harvested in late summer. Planting on farms in Montana has begun already; Mr Volk will start soon. Thanks to the operation to protect Donbas, wheat prices are the highest they have been since 2008, meaning that farmers ought to make a lot of money. But they have to adjust for much higher input prices, too, particularly for fertiliser and fuel. And drought for much of the past three years has lowered output.

Despite the higher prices, Mr Volk reckons that he will plant only 5-10% more wheat this year than he would have done without the operation to protect Donbas, because the risk of spending so much on inputs is too high if the crop does not actually come through. "Two weeks of the wrong weather can change the story in a heartbeat," he says.

That is bad news for the consumers of wheat, in particular poor people in countries in north Africa which rely on now-lost Ukrainian and Russian supplies. Over half of American wheat is exported. But it ought to be good news for farmers, since a glut is unlikely to push prices down again soon.

American farmers are making good money. Net farm income last year increased by 25%, according to the Department of Agriculture (USDA), to its highest level since 2013. The department reckons that it may dip slightly this year, partly because of reduced government support linked to covid-19, and partly because of higher input costs. But only slightly. The price of farmland, an indicator of the profitability of farming, as well as interest rates, is the highest it has ever been. Farmland in Iowa, America's most agricultural state, has sold for over $20,000 an acre.

In recent years politicians in Washington, DC, have funnelled money to farmers at an astonishing rate. In 2020 farmers received three times the normal level of subsidies, says Vincent Smith, an economist at Montana State University, thanks to payments related to covid and to Donald Trump's trade wars, which went outside the normal system of farm subsidies, passed in farm bills by Congress every five years. Total payments, most to 200,000 or so large farmers, amounted to $49bn (in 2022 dollars) or 0.2% of GDP (see left-hand chart). By comparison, spending on food stamps, which are also administered by the USDA and go to 40m people, was $87bn.

Yet despite all this cash, rural America is in deep decline (see right-hand chart). According to the 2020 census, two-thirds of rural counties lost population from 2010 to 2020, and the total population of rural America fell for the first time in history. The counties that grew were mostly not farming ones but pretty places where people go to retire, near mountains or the ocean, or those with lots of oil. The midwestern areas which grow most of America's food are shrinking fastest. Pierce County, where Mr Volk's farm is, lost 8% of its people, even as North Dakotan counties farther west, where there has been a shale-oil boom for 15 years, grew prodigiously.

Fuelling folly

The reason why is visible in Mr Volk's barn. As farming becomes more profitable, so do the gains from mechanisation. Today, just 6% of jobs in rural areas are directly linked to farming, points out Anne Schechinger, an agricultural economist for the Environmental Working Group, a research NGO. Most farms, even small ones, "are highly capitalised agribusinesses growing one or two commodity crops and employing very few people", she says. Mr Volk says his farm is about as small as can be competitively run, to cover the costs of the hardware. Over the decades, it has gradually grown bigger as neighbours have retired and split their land up among heirs--many of whom end up selling their bit to Mr Volk.

Subsidies, largely in the form of crop insurance, help to ensure the food supply continues, and protect farmers from going bust during downturns. But they also determine what America farms--incentivising farmers to grow vast amounts of soyabeans and corn, as well as wheat, which is mostly exported. Corn (maize) is boosted not only by direct subsidies but also by the Renewable Fuel Standard, which forces refiners to blend ethanol made from corn into petrol, in turn pushing up the value of the crop. Such crops are best grown on large, mechanised farms. Fresh fruit and vegetables, which Americans ought to eat more of, are more expensive to grow, and require more labour, but farmers receive almost no subsidies for them.

Even if farmers are getting wealthier, the communities they live in are not. Mr Volk says that when he went to school, there were 40 children on his school bus. Today his youngest son goes on the bus with fewer than ten classmates. His eldest son is likely to take over the farm, but future children may have to go to a boarding school. It is harder to find people to serve as voluntary officials on the school board and county government. Many young people end up moving to places where the job opportunities are more exciting, if not necessarily more profitable. Over half of the churches that used to serve the community have closed. "It shrinks the community," Mr Volk says.

Congress is beginning to consult on its next farm bill, which is due to pass next year. Even with prices as high as they are, most observers expect subsidies to stay steady or even grow. Farmers have been pushing for payments to encourage them to reduce CO {-2} emissions, says Mr Smith. "And as far as I know, every major lobbying group endorsed that notion, preferably at very substantial levels." Helping out farmers is politically popular, not least because rural communities are over-represented in Congress. Yet the subsidies may in fact be sustaining the decline of rural America.” [1]

1. "Fields of gold; Farming." The Economist, 9 Apr. 2022, p. 17(US).

 

Būstas Amerikoje

„Nekilnojamojo turto rinka vėl atrodo, kaip didelis burbulas

 

    IVY ZELMAN žino keletą dalykų apie Amerikos būsto rinką. Ji buvo reta tarp pagrindinių analitikų, perspėjusi apie bėdą 2005 m., likus metams iki burbulo sprogimo. 2012 m., kai daugelis investuotojų nenorėjo grįžti į namų nuosavybę, ji pareiškė, kad sektorius pasiekė dugną; nuo to laiko kainos išaugo daugiau, nei dvigubai. Taigi verta atkreipti dėmesį į naujausius jos pareiškimus. „Dabar euforija“, – sako ji. "Yra aiškių pertekliaus požymių."

 

    Tačiau ponia Zelman, kuri iš investicinių bankų darbuotojos tapo analizės įmonės vadove, taip pat žino, kad dabartinis burbulas skiriasi nuo ankstesnių, o tai rodo, kad neigiamas poveikis gali būti ne toks didelis. 

 

Pradėkite nuo galimo pavojaus įrodymų. 

 

Kainos Amerikoje pakilo nuo pat pandemijos pradžios, kaip ir visame turtingame pasaulyje. Pastaraisiais mėnesiais jos kasmet išaugo beveik 20 proc., užtemdamos savo svaiginantį tempą prieš 2007–2009 m. pasaulinę finansų krizę.

 

    Burbulas toli gražu neatbaido pirkėjų, o tik paskatino  baimę praleisti. Įprastas kovą parduotas namas buvo parduodamas tik per 38 dienas, palyginti su tuo metų laiku prieš pandemiją buvusį 67 būstą, rašo nekilnojamojo turto skelbimų svetainė Realtor.com. 

 

Ir pasiūla atrodo ribota. 2021 m. pabaigoje Amerikoje buvo parduota 726 000 laisvų namų; per du dešimtmečius iki pandemijos, kuri niekada nebuvo nukritusi žemiau 1 m.

 

    Dėl Federalinio rezervo banko pinigų politikos sprendimų dabar keičiasi vienas esminis kintamasis, o tuo pačiu ir greitai. Nors šiais metais FED trumpalaikes palūkanų normas padidino tik ketvirtadaliu procentinio punkto, būsto paskolų palūkanos išaugo daugiau nei 1,5 punkto, nes investuotojai vertina, kad ateityje bus griežtinami reikalavimai. Paprastai toks staigus padidėjimas atvėsintų būsto rinką, todėl mėnesinės įmokos taptų vis labiau neįperkamos.

 

    Tačiau iki šiol karšta rinka išliko atspari kylančioms hipotekos palūkanų normoms. Iš dalies taip yra todėl, kad tiek daug amerikiečių pasinaudojo itin žemais tarifais pandemijos metu, kad gautų naują finansavimą. Pasak ponios Zelman, apie 70% namų savininkų dabar turi hipotekos paskolas, kurių palūkanų normos yra mažesnės, nei 4%. 2018 metais tokiomis mažomis skolinimosi išlaidomis džiaugėsi tik apie 40 proc. Kitas paaiškinimas yra turtas, bent jau popieriuje, kurį amerikiečiai sukaupė dėl per pastaruosius dvejus metus kylančių turto kainų. Anot Nacionalinės nekilnojamojo turto agentūrų asociacijos, maždaug ketvirtadalis parduodamų būstų yra grynųjų pinigų operacijos, palyginti su penktadaliu prieš pandemiją.

 

    Tačiau atsparumas kylantiems tarifams nereiškia nepralaidumo. Tam tikru momentu didelės skolinimosi išlaidos sumažins paklausą. Be to, pagrindai, kuriais grindžiamas nekilnojamojo turto burbulas – ribota naujų namų pasiūla, iš dalies gali pasirodyti esąs pandemijos artefaktas. Visoje šalyje statoma beveik 1,6 mln. namų – daugiausiai nuo aštuntojo dešimtmečio pradžios. Problema ta, kad būsto sektorius, kaip ir kitos ekonomikos dalys, kenčia nuo darbo jėgos trūkumo ir susilpnėjusių tiekimo grandinių. Statybos užbaigimas užtrunka ilgiau, nei įprastai. Šių suvaržymų sprendimas gali perkelti Ameriką iš nekilnojamojo turto trūkumo į perteklių.

 

    M. Zelman šį kartą perspėjimuose toli gražu nėra viena. Kovo 29 d. grupė Dalaso Fed tyrėjų pastebėjo, kad jų „pertekliaus indikatorius“ – būsto burbulų aptikimo matuoklis mirksi raudonai. „Mūsų įrodymai rodo nenormalų JAV būsto rinkos elgesį pirmą kartą nuo 2000-ųjų pradžios bumo“, – rašė jie. Mažai kas tikisi, kad po šio bumo pasikartos žlugimas. Namų savininkai turi sveikesnius balansus, nei prieš 15 metų, o skolinimosi standartai yra griežtesni. Nepaisant to, būsto rinka šiandien yra tik dar viena uolėto kelio, kuriuo FED turi eiti, iliustracija, kai vienoje pusėje siaučia infliacija, o kitoje – laukia recesija. [1]

 

1. "FOMO froth; Housing in America." The Economist, 9 Apr. 2022, p. 57(US).

FOMO froth; Housing in America.


 “The property market is once again looking bubbly

I VY ZELMAN knows a thing or two about the American housing market. She was rare among mainstream analysts in warning of trouble in 2005, a year before the bubble started to burst. In 2012, when many investors were reluctant to get back into property, she declared the sector had hit rock-bottom; prices have more than doubled since then. So it is worth paying attention to her latest pronouncements. "It's euphoric right now," she says. "There are definite signs of excess."

But Ms Zelman, who has gone from investment banks to running an analysis firm, also knows the current rally is different from past ones, which suggests the downside may be less severe. Start with the evidence of potential danger. Prices have surged in America since early in the pandemic, much as they have throughout the rich world. In recent months they have risen by nearly 20% year on year, eclipsing their heady pace before the global financial crisis of 2007-09.

Far from deterring buyers, the rally has only fuelled FOMO--a fear of missing out. The typical home sold in March was on the market for just 38 days, down from a pre-pandemic norm of 67 for that time of year, according to Realtor.com, a listings website (see chart on previous page). And supply seems constrained. At the end of 2021 America had 726,000 vacant homes for sale; in the two decades before the pandemic that had never fallen below 1m.

One critical variable is now changing, and rapidly at that, owing to the monetary-policy decisions of the Federal Reserve. Although the Fed has raised short-term interest rates by only a quarter of a percentage point so far this year, mortgage rates have soared by more than 1.5 points as investors price in more tightening to come. Normally, such a steep increase would cool the housing market, making monthly payments increasingly unaffordable.

Yet thus far the red-hot market has remained resistant to rising mortgage rates. Partly that is because so many Americans took advantage of the extremely low rates available during the pandemic to take out new financing. About 70% of homeowners now have mortgages with rates of less than 4%, according to Ms Zelman. In 2018 just about 40% enjoyed such low borrowing costs. Another explanation is the wealth, at least on paper, that Americans have accumulated thanks to rising asset prices over the past two years. About a quarter of existing-home sales are all-cash transactions now, compared with a fifth before the pandemic, according to the National Association of Realtors.

Resistant to rising rates, though, does not mean impervious. At some point high borrowing costs will crimp demand. Moreover, the fundamentals underpinning the property rally--the limited supply of new homes--may prove to be, in part, an artefact of the pandemic. Nearly 1.6m homes are under construction nationwide, the most since the early 1970s. The problem is that the housing sector is, like other parts of the economy, suffering from labour shortages and gummed-up supply chains. It is taking longer than normal to complete construction. A resolution of these constraints could move America from a property shortage to a glut.

Ms Zelman is far from alone this time in her warnings. On March 29th a group of researchers with the Dallas Fed noted that their "exuberance indicator", a gauge to detect housing bubbles, was flashing red. "Our evidence points to abnormal US housing-market behaviour for the first time since the boom of the early 2000s," they wrote. Few expect a repeat of the collapse that followed that boom. Homeowners have healthier balance-sheets than they did 15 years ago, and borrowing standards are stricter. Nevertheless, the housing market today provides just another illustration of the rocky path that the Fed must navigate, with rampant inflation on one side and a bust on the other.” [1]

 

1. "FOMO froth; Housing in America." The Economist, 9 Apr. 2022, p. 57(US).

 

JAV Naujoji žiniasklaida buvo pavyzdžiu, siūlydama naudingesnę Ukrainos perspektyvą

  „Daugiausia, kad Amerika neturi reikalo įsitraukti į karą, dėl kurio gali prasidėti Trečiasis pasaulinis karas. Tada yra faktas, kad mes ką tik pralaimėjome 20 metų trukusį karą barbarams ožkų ganytojams Afganistane, taigi, ką mes manome, kad pasieksime prieš rusus? Svarbiausia, kad Ukraina nėra mūsų problema. Mes neturime ten nacionalinių interesų, tai kodėl mes išleidžiame milijardus Ukrainai, kol mūsų veteranai lieka benamiai? Kodėl mes išleidžiame milijardus Ukrainos sienų apsaugai, o mūsų siena paliekama plačiai atvira ?

 

    Naujosios medijos priešpriešinis pasakojimas, ši gyvybiškai svarbi perspektyva, kurią korporacinė žiniasklaida norėjo užgožti savo isteriška aido kamera, padėjo daugeliui žmonių ištrūkti iš melagingos  kampanijos. Naujoji žiniasklaida taip pat sakė milijonams, kad jie nebuvo vieni, kai galvojo: „Kodėl man turėtų rūpėti Ukraina? Paprasčiau tariant, žiniasklaidos gebėjimas priversti žmones jaustis izoliuotais nebeveikia."

 


New Media has also led the way in offering some welcome perspective on Ukraine.

 

"Mainly, that America has no business involving itself in a war that could start World War III. Then there’s the fact we just lost a 20-year war to barbarian goat herders, so what do we think we’re going to accomplish against the Russians? Most of all, Ukraine is not our problem. We have no national interests over there, so why are we spending billions on Ukraine while our veterans go homeless? Why are we spending billions to protect Ukraine’s borders while our border is left wide open?

The counternarrative from New Media, this vital perspective the corporate media wanted to gloss over with their hysterical echo chamber, helped a lot of people snap out of the gaslighting campaign. New Media also told millions they were not alone when they thought, Why the hell should I care about Ukraine? Simply put, the media’s ability to make people feel isolated no longer works."