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Science of Success: 99% of Big Projects Fail. Lego Is the Fix. --- An economist who studies 'megaprojects' says: Think slow, act fast and build brick by tiny plastic brick

"One way to learn how the world's biggest building projects work -- or don't -- is to start with some of the smallest building blocks: Legos.

In the 1950s, when Lego decided to make one product the centerpiece of its business, the Danish company went looking for a single toy that could be the foundation of an empire. It picked the colorful plastic bricks that have captured the imagination of children ever since. It was a wise choice. It was also a fitting corporate strategy: Lego turned a small thing into something much bigger.

"That's the question every project leader should ask: What is the small thing we can assemble in large numbers into a big thing?" says University of Oxford economist Bent Flyvbjerg. "What's our Lego?"

He understands the power of Legos better than anybody, and not just because he is also Danish. Bent Flyvbjerg is an expert in the planning and management of "megaprojects," his name for huge efforts that require at least $1 billion of investment: bridges, tunnels, office towers, airports, telescopes and even the Olympics. He's spent decades wrapping his mind around the many ways megaprojects go wrong and the few ways to get them right, and he summarizes what he's learned from his research and real-world experience in a new book called "How Big Things Get Done."

Spoiler alert! Big things get done very badly.

They cost too much. They take too long. They fall too short of expectations too often. This is what Dr. Flyvbjerg calls the Iron Law of Megaprojects: "over budget, over time, under benefits, over and over again."

The Iron Law of Megaprojects might sound familiar to anyone who has survived a home renovation. But when Dr. Flyvbjerg dug into the numbers, the financial overruns and time delays were more common than he expected. And worse. Much worse.

His seminal work on big projects can be distilled into three pitiful numbers:

-- 47.9% are delivered on budget.

-- 8.5% are delivered on budget and on time.

-- 0.5% are delivered on budget, on time and with the projected benefits.

It's brutal enough that 99.5% miss the mark in one way or another. But even those stats are misleading. The outcomes are bleaker than they look. Dr. Flyvbjerg has found that the complexity, novelty and difficulty of megaprojects heighten their risk and leave them unusually vulnerable to extreme outcomes.

"You shouldn't expect that they will go bad," he says. "You should expect that quite a large percentage will go disastrously bad."

His quest to understand megaprojects began close to home in the 1990s. Denmark was busy with the most expensive construction undertaking in the country's history, the Great Belt megaproject, which consisted of two bridges and a tunnel connecting the nation's most populous islands. It was a big thing that went badly. Deadlines were blown. Plans were obliterated.

Dr. Flyvbjerg was inspired.

But when he asked a basic question about megaprojects, he couldn't find a satisfactory answer. "Despite the fact that trillions of dollars had been spent around the world on projects like this," he said, "nobody knew if they stayed on schedule or budget." The only way to find out was to gather the data for himself.

Over the next five years, he compiled a list of 258 major infrastructure projects, including the Holland Tunnel in New York, the Bay Area Rapid Transit system in California and the Channel Tunnel connecting England and France. What he learned was enough to convince him that Denmark was not an outlier. It turned out that awful performance was perfectly normal.

He wasn't done with the subject after publishing one paper. Dr. Flyvbjerg's unanswered question became an obsession. That first study became dozens. The original 258 became 16,000 skyscrapers, airports, museums, concert halls, nuclear reactors, roads and hydroelectric dams across 136 countries -- not just megaprojects, but projects of all shapes and sizes.

He was eager to put his findings into practice when project leaders consulted him for help.

"I didn't want to be the type of scholar who only writes for academic journals," Dr. Flyvbjerg said. "I wanted that research to be out there in the real world."

What he tells them is that people struggle with megaprojects for a simple reason: They're people.

Humans are optimistic by nature and underestimate how long it takes to complete future tasks. It doesn't seem to matter how many times we fall prey to this cognitive bias known as the planning fallacy. We can always ignore our previous mishaps and delude ourselves into believing this time will be different. We're also subject to the power dynamics and competitive forces that complicate reality, since megaprojects don't take place in controlled environments, and they are plagued by politics as much as psychology. Take funding, for example. "How do you get funding?" he said. "By making it look good on paper. You underestimate the cost so it looks cheaper, and you underestimate the schedule so it looks like you can do it faster."

So how do big things get done?

The only thing that fascinates him more than the failings of the 99.5% is why the 0.5% succeed. Dr. Flyvbjerg's lessons that apply to any kind of project, mega or not, include two especially valuable pieces of advice.

The first one: Think slow, act fast.

The irony of megaprojects is that many are late because not enough time is spent planning, which is the most efficient way to minimize uncertainty and shrink risk. You don't want to start digging before you know exactly what you're doing. After he landed the job of building the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao in Spain, Frank Gehry experimented with designs and tinkered with models in his studio for two years. Dr. Flyvbjerg says that meticulous planning was the reason the architectural wonder opened in 1997 on time and under its $100 million budget.

But doing big things doesn't require Frank Gehry poring over blueprints. You could just play with Legos.

"It's remarkable what you can do with blocks of Lego," Dr. Flyvbjerg writes. "A block of Lego is a small thing, but by assembling more than 9,000 of them, you can build one of the biggest sets Lego makes."

That's his second piece of advice: Find the Lego that simplifies your work and makes it modular.

"Modularity is a clunky word for the elegant idea of big things made from small things," he writes. "Look for it in the world, and you'll see it everywhere." Everywhere includes "software, subways, hardware, hotels, office buildings, schools, factories, hospitals, rockets, satellites, cars and app stores," he writes. "They're all profoundly modular, built with a basic building block. They can scale up like crazy, getting better, faster, bigger and cheaper as they do."

Tesla's so-called gigafactories and Apple's headquarters are good examples of modular design, Dr. Flyvbjerg says, but the more delicious one is a wedding cake. Bake one layer. Then another. Then another. Then stack them -- just like Legos.

"Repeat, repeat, repeat," he writes. "Click, click, click."

One person who saw the promise of modularity before there was a word for it was Godtfred Kirk Christiansen, who ran Lego between 1957 and 1973, a period when the business founded by his father patented the classic block that became an international sensation.

Lego was known for its 265 toys at the time. Mr. Christiansen felt that was 264 too many. He wanted to concentrate Lego's resources and create a system around one toy. "One product that was unique and lasting, that could be developed into a wider range of toys that were easy to play with, easy to produce and easy to sell," writes Jens Andersen in another recent book, "The Lego Story." And he knew just the one.

Lego's bricks were modular. Lego's business would be, too.

Dr. Flyvbjerg was a child in Denmark whose life was changed by that decision. In fact, whenever he needs to buy a baby gift today, he always looks for the same present.

It's a small thing to welcome people into a world where they can do big things. "I want to be the first person in their life to give them Lego," he said.” [1]

1.  EXCHANGE --- Science of Success: 99% of Big Projects Fail. Lego Is the Fix. --- An economist who studies 'megaprojects' says: Think slow, act fast and build brick by tiny plastic brick.
Cohen, Ben.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 04 Feb 2023: B.5.  

 

Mūsų politinėms partijoms sunku

„Žvilgsnis iš 30 000 pėdų į abi JAV partijas:

 

     Demokratai daro istorinę klaidą. Kadangi sudėtinga abortų problema perkeliama į valstijas ir per ateinančius kelerius metus pereina prie vietos gyvenvietės, nacionalinė partija gali laisvai suprasti save ir pristatyti save visuomenei kitaip. Pusę šimtmečio demokratai naudojosi rinkimų ir politiniais pranašumais, kuriuos jie palaikė – jie buvo už moterų teises ir reprodukcinę laisvę. Tačiau ši pozicija taip pat buvo su stigma – tai buvo beširdiško absoliutizmo partija, slepianti paramą vėlyvam abortui. Negalėjo būti jokių gradacijų, kiekvienas reikalavimas buvo maksimalistinis. Tai neleido daugeliui žmonių jaustis galį įstoti į partiją ar ją paremti, nes palaikymas atrodė, kaip bendrininkavimas.

 

     Dabar nacionaline prasme didelis jaudinantis klausimas nuimamas iš lentos. Demokratai gali vėl būti normalia partija, pasisakydami už dalykus, kurie yra įprasti partijų rūpesčiai (ekonomika, karas ir taika). Daugiau rinkėjų mielai prisijungtų.

 

     Užuot tai matę, jie vieną stigmą pakeitė kita. Bent jau nuo 2020 m. jie lygiuojasi į kitą giliai jaudinantį kultūros klausimą – tapatybės politikos pažadinimo režimą – arba leido sau būti siejami su ja. (Nuostabu, kad vis dar neturime sutarto žodžio ar frazės, kuri visiškai atspindėtų šią programą.) Michaelas Lindas planšetinio kompiuterio kūrinyje mano, kad ji sudaryta iš trijų dalių, kurios visos pateiktos klaidingai. „Kvotos projektas“ naudoja antirasizmą, siekdamas „socialinės rekonstrukcijos“. „Androgynijos projektas“ peržengia pilietinių teisių ribas ir ignoruoja gėjų teises, siekdamas „iš naujo apibrėžti visus vyrus ir moteris, kaip bendrinius, androginiškus humanoidus, kurių lytis priklauso nuo subjektyvaus savęs apibrėžimo“. „Žaliasis projektas“ naudoja klimato kaitą, kaip dingstį „radikaliai pertvarkyti JAV ir kitų pažangių pramoninių demokratijų visuomenę“.

 

     Šie judesiai yra iš kairės ir iš jos varomi. Demokratai yra kairiųjų partija. Progresyvios patologijos virsta demokratinėmis ideologijomis, pažymint partiją, kaip radikalią. Kodėl demokratai leidžia tai tęsti? Kodėl jie nesitraukia, kaip partija? Dauguma jų išrinktų pareigūnų iš tikrųjų nesusiję su šiais dalykais; daugelis to nekenčia. Jie žino, kad tai riboja jų politines perspektyvas. 

 

Amerika tokia, kokia ji yra dabar, niekada nepriims režimo, niekada nesusitaikys su juo, nes amerikiečiai tai vertina, kaip grėsmę jų vaikams ir įžeidimą jų tikrovės ir teisingumo jausmui.

 

     Ginčai dėl pabudimo – mokyklose, teisės aktuose, mūsų, kaip tautos, viešajame gyvenime – tęsis dar ilgai. Demokratai yra neteisingoje pusėje ir daro istorinę klaidą, nes viešai ir reguliariai nepalaužia savo pakraščio.

 

     Respublikonai – nuo ko pradėti? Juos slegia politiniai nesutarimai, kai kurie iš jų kyla iš filosofinių nesutarimų dėl to, kas yra ir turi būti konservatizmas XXI amžiuje. Keista, kadangi politika yra žodžių verslas, jų Vašingtono vadovybė neranda žodžių apie tai kalbėti. Jie nežino, kaip kalbėti apie viešąją politiką. Diskusijose dėl skolų lubų, jei tai tinkamas žodis, jie leidžiasi būti ženklinami, kaip partija „Sunaikinkime teisę į pensijas ir medicininį aprūpinimą senatvėje“ arba bent jau kaip žmonės, kurie slapta norėtų tai padaryti, bet negali to pripažinti, bet kai jie yra valdžioje, jie stengsis.

 

     Jei jie tai padarys, jie niekada daugiau nelaimės nacionalinės valdžios ar bent jau prezidento valdžios. Ką jie savotiškai žino. Bet jie vis tiek tai daro. Nes jie nenusprendė, ar jie yra „ribotos vyriausybės“ partija, ar partija, kuri, kaip turėtų, sutinka, kad federalinė vyriausybė niekada mūsų gyvenime nebus maža, o būti subrendusiam reiškia tai pamatyti ir nukreipti partijos dėmesį į konservatyvesnių tikslų siekimą, pvz., . . . padėti šeimoms? Valdykite vyriausybę, neišlaidaukite, kaip bepročiai, siekite augimo, skatinkite dinamiškumą, mąstykite ilgalaikėje perspektyvoje.

 

     Bet kokiu atveju jie turėtų nustoti sakyti: „ribota“ valdžia. Žmonės mano, kad federalinė vyriausybė jau yra ribota, kaip lėta ir kvaila. Jie norėtų, kad tai būtų įmanoma ir efektyvu. Galbūt, paspauskite vyriausybę, kad ji mūsų nestumtų, nereikalautų daugiau, nei priklauso. Visi to nori.

 

     Iš 30 000 pėdų akivaizdu, kad su tuo susijusi problema yra ta, kad GOP nesugebėjo nacionaliniu lygmeniu prisistatyti, kaip valdančioji partija – rimtas politinis subjektas, į kurio tvirtas rankas Amerikos žmonės gali patikėti savo vyriausybę. Tai matėme Kongreso rūmų salėje per balsavimą dėl pirmininko.

 

     Abiem partijoms trūksta kažko didelio. Demokratams tai nesugebėjimas priimti istorijos dovanos ir vėl tapti normalia partija. Respublikonams tai nesugebėjimas susitarti dėl to, už ką jie kovoja šiame amžiuje, ir nesugebėjimas kalbėti apie dalykų prasmę.“ [1]

 

1. Declarations: Our Political Parties Are Struggling
Noonan, Peggy.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 04 Feb 2023: A.15.

Our Political Parties Are Struggling

"A look, from 30,000 feet, at both parties:

The Democrats are making a historic mistake. With the fraught issue of abortion devolving to the states and moving, in the next few years, toward local settlement, the national party is free to understand itself, and present itself to the public, in a different way. For half a century Democrats enjoyed the electoral and political benefits of their pro-choice stand -- they were for women's rights, reproductive freedom. But that stand also came with a stigma -- it was the party of heartless absolutism, of slippery-slope support for late-term abortion. There could be no gradations, every demand was maximalist. This stopped a lot of people from feeling they could join the party or support it, because support felt like complicity.

Now, in a national sense, the great agitating question is being taken off the board. The Democrats are free to be a normal party again, standing for things that are the normal concerns of parties (economics, war and peace). More voters would feel free to join.

Instead of seeing this they've replaced one stigma with another. Since at least 2020 they have aligned with or allowed themselves to be associated with another deeply agitating cultural question, the identity politics-wokeness regime. (It's amazing we still don't have an agreed upon word or phrase that fully captures this program.) Michael Lind, in a piece in the Tablet, sees it as composed of three parts, all falsely presented. The "Quota Project" uses anti-racism to pursue "social reconstruction." The "Androgyny Project" goes beyond civil rights and ignores gay rights to "redefine all male and female human beings as generic, androgynous humanoids whose sex is a matter of subjective self-definition." The "Green Project" uses climate change as an excuse to "radically restructure the society of the U.S. and other advanced industrial democracies."

These movements are of, from and driven by the left. The Democrats are the party of the left. Progressive pathologies morph into Democratic ideologies, tagging the party as radical. Why do the Democrats allow this to continue? Why don't they push back, hard -- as a party? Most of their elected officials aren't really on board with this stuff; many hate it. They know it limits their political prospects. America as it is currently constituted will never accept the regime, never be at peace with it, because Americans see it as a threat to their children and an insult to their sense of reality and fairness.

Arguments over wokeness -- in the schools, in legislation, in our public life as a nation -- will continue a long time. Democrats are on the wrong side, and making a historic mistake in not publicly and regularly beating back their fringe.

The Republicans -- where to start? They're riven by policy disagreements, some of which stem from philosophical disagreements regarding what conservatism is and must be in the 21st century. Weirdly, since politics is a word business, their Washington leadership can't find the words to talk about this. They don't know how to talk about public policy. In the debt-ceiling debate, if that's the right word, they're allowing themselves to be tagged as the Axe the Entitlements party, or at least as people who'd secretly like to do it but can't admit it, but when they're in power they'll try.

If they do that they will never win national power, or at least presidential power, again. Which they kind of know. But they do it anyway. Because they haven't decided if they're a "limited government" party or a party that accepts, as it should, that the federal government will never be small in our lifetimes, and being mature means seeing that and turning the party's focus toward the pursuit of more conservative ends, such as . . . helping families? Police the government, don't spend like nuts, aim for growth, encourage dynamism, think long term.

In any case they should stop saying "limited" government. People think the federal government is already limited, as in slow and stupid. They'd like it to be able and efficient. Maybe lean into a government that doesn't push us around, demanding more than it's due. Everybody wants that.

From 30,000 feet it's obvious that an attendant problem is that the GOP hasn't been able, on the national level, to present itself as a governing party -- a serious political entity into whose steady hands the American people can entrust their government. We saw this on the floor of the House during the vote for Speaker.

Both parties are missing something big. For the Democrats it's an inability to accept a gift from history and become a normal party again. For the Republicans, it's an inability to agree on what they stand for in this century, and an inability to talk about the meaning of things." [1]

1. Declarations: Our Political Parties Are Struggling
Noonan, Peggy.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 04 Feb 2023: A.15.

 

What you are asking for by trying to ignite World War III?


"Any conflict with China could feature cyber attacks on the U.S. electric grid, electromagnetic attacks, hypersonic vehicles, and soon perhaps weapons run by artificial intelligence. Vladimir Putin mentioned this vulnerability this week, rattling that "a modern war with Russia will be very different" for the West than the tank and artillery fight in Ukraine. Most Americans aren't aware of these dangers, and our political leaders aren't telling them." [1]


1. China Floats a Trial Balloon
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 04 Feb 2023: A.14.