Scolding Isn't a Foreign Policy

"Internationally, it was another grim week for the Biden administration, the United States of America, and world peace. 

Brazil, the country with the largest population, economy and landmass in Latin America, reinforced its alignment with China as its president Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva pledged to work with Xi Jinping to build a new global order and called on the European Union and the U.S. to stop shipping weapons to Ukraine. 

Indian officials reported that China is supporting the development of a military listening post on Myanmar's strategic Great Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal.

 Saudi Arabia, which flirted a few weeks ago with opening diplomatic relations with Israel, is intensifying its oil cooperation with Russia and now seeks a meeting with Hamas. 

Farther south, a Sudanese military faction backed by Russia's Wagner Group battles for control of Africa's third-largest nation.

The usual spinners and makeup artists are doing their best to make the disorderly unraveling of the American-led world order look like a visionary triumph of enlightened foreign policy, but former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers expressed a more cogent view. 

Describing America's increasing loneliness on the world scene, Mr. Summers said, "Somebody from a developing country said to me, 'What we get from China is an airport. What we get from the United States is a lecture.'"

When the Biden administration steps down from the bully pulpit, good things can still happen. A year ago, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. -- son of the U.S. Cold War ally and Philippine strongman whose 1986 overthrow was hailed by democracy activists as a milestone in world history -- ascended to his father's former office after a decisive victory in a less-than-pristine election. 

The democracy lobby was appalled. Six Democratic senators, including three members of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken warning him to prioritize democracy and rule-of-law issues. Their core prescription for managing the Filipino leader was the same one they prescribe for almost every American bilateral relationship: Lecture more, and when that fails, use sanctions.

Fortunately, the administration was smarter than this. While the Philippines ranks low on the Freedom House global freedom index and ranks high on Transparency International's measurement of perceived corruption, its location makes the country's cooperation vital for any serious attempt to deter China from an invasion of Taiwan. Stroking and petting the democracy lobbyists while insulating the relationship from their ill-counseled meddling, Team Biden persuaded Mr. Marcos to allow the U.S. access to four new strategically important bases on its territory as the two countries launched their largest joint military exercise in three decades.

This is surely a better outcome than anything the Biden administration has accomplished by the impassioned stream of moralistic lectures it unleashed against the crown prince of Saudi Arabia.

On Mr. Blinken's recent visit to Vietnam, he again chose morality over moralism, refraining from criticizing the Communist Party of Vietnam for its many policies that displease the democracy lobby in the interest of shoring up the coalition of states aiming to prevent Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.

Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman's secretary of state, thought deeply about the place of morality in foreign policy. "The righteous who seek to deduce foreign policy from ethical or moral principles are as misleading and misled as the modern Machiavellis who would conduct our foreign relations without regard to them," he said in 1964.

America's Cold War policy aimed at stopping the spread of Soviet tyranny was, Acheson rightly believed, deeply moral. Today, the Chinese Communist Party has become an expansionist, tyrannical power whose inordinate ambition endangers freedom world-wide. America's interests and values both lead us to oppose that ambition, even as we seek to avoid the catastrophe of another great-power war.

Too many self-described democracy activists want the U.S. to dissipate its diplomatic energy in moralistic posturing. They would rather we prioritized sermons and sanctions over building a multilateral coalition to check Chinese expansion. Their problem is not that they love righteousness too much. It is that they have thought too little and too superficially about what righteousness really demands.

Moral foreign policy often requires pragmatism. Defeating Nazi Germany required an alliance with the equally evil Soviet Union. And President Nixon's rapprochement with Mao's China, then at the horrifying acme of the Cultural Revolution, similarly was driven by the need to counter the greater threat posed at that time by the Soviet Union.

After the Cold War, many Americans thought that global moral improvement had replaced national security as the principal goal of American foreign policy and that pragmatic calculation was a form of moral cowardice.

Those illusions can no longer be sustained.

America needs friends now, and nobody likes or trusts the village scold." [1]

"Ferdinand Marcos Jr. -- son of the U.S. Cold War ally and Philippine strongman whose 1986 overthrow was hailed by democracy activists as a milestone in world history -- ascended to his father's former office after a decisive victory in a less-than-pristine election."

  Where is the outrage of Lithuanian democracy fighters? Where are the Lithuanian sanctions? The world sees that you, people, are hypocrites.

1. Scolding Isn't a Foreign Policy
Walter Russell Mead.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 18 Apr 2023: A.13.

 

Kodėl sankcijos Rusijai neveikia?

„Kai Rusija ieško savo energetikos produktų pirkėjų visame pasaulyje, ji randa norinčių prekybos partnerių mažai tikėtinoje vietoje: Persijos įlankos naftos turtingose naftos šalyse.

 

     Pasak naftos vadovų ir pramonės analitikų, kai Vakarų sankcijos dėl konflikto Ukrainoje atkirto Rusiją nuo daugelio jos įsitvirtinusių prekybos partnerių, Saudo Arabijos ir Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų valstybinės įmonės ėmėsi priemonių pasinaudoti nuolaidomis Rusijos gaminiams.

 

     Nepaisydamos JAV prieštaravimų, Persijos įlankos šalys savo viduje naudoja rusiškus produktus su nuolaida, įskaitant vartojimo ir rafinavimo tikslais, ir eksportuoja savo statines rinkos kainomis, didindamos savo pelną.

 

     Persijos įlankos šalys, ypač JAE, taip pat tapo pagrindiniais Rusijos energijos produktų saugojimo ir prekybos centrais, kurie dėl sankcijų negali būti taip lengvai gabenami visame pasaulyje.

 

     Kontraintuityvus pokytis, kai šalys, turinčios didžiausius pasaulyje naftos rezervuarus, noriai perka daugiau naftos, yra netikėtų Vakarų sankcijų pasekmių iliustracija ir dar vienas JAV įtakos Artimuosiuose Rytuose mažėjimo pavyzdys.

 

     Rusijos naftos eksportas į JAE Duomenų prekių tiekėjo „Kpler“ duomenimis, pernai išaugo daugiau nei tris kartus iki rekordinių 60 mln. barelių. Priešingai, Rusijos naftos eksportas į Singapūrą, kitą prekybos centrą, 2022 metais išaugo 13% iki 26 mln. barelių, teigia Kpler.

 

     Pasak rinkos duomenų tiekėjos „Argus Media“, rusiškas gazolis dabar sudaro daugiau, nei vieną iš 10, barelių produkto, laikomo Fudžeiros mieste, pagrindiniame JAE naftos saugojimo centre, nusileidžiant tik Saudo Arabijos gazoliui.

 

     Pasak Kplerio, Rusija į Saudo Arabiją gabena po 100 000 barelių per dieną, o iki sankcijų beveik nebuvo. Tai prilygtų daugiau, nei 36 mln. barelių per metus.

 

     JAV pareigūnai teigė, kad Saudo Arabijos ir Emyratų prekyba Rusijos nafta ir degalų produktais kenkia Vakarų pastangoms sugriežtinti Kremliaus pajamų srautus.

 

     Iždo sekretoriaus pavaduotojas Brianas Nelsonas vasarį išvyko į Artimuosius Rytus, siekdamas įtikinti tokias šalis, kaip Saudo Arabija, JAE. ir Turkija, kad būtų įgyvendintos Vakarų sankcijos Rusijai.

 

     JAV iždas ir Saudo Arabijos karališkasis teismas nepateikė atsakymų į daug prašymų komentuoti.

 

     Emyratų pareigūnas sakė, kad šalis laikosi Jungtinių Tautų sankcijų ir turi „tvirtus procesus susidoroti su subjektais, kuriems taikomos sankcijos“. „Emyratai ir toliau atvirai ir sąžiningai prekiaus su savo tarptautiniais partneriais“, – sakė pareigūnas.

 

     Saudo Arabija vis labiau vykdo nacionalistinę energetikos politiką, kuri turi viršenybę prieš JAV rūpesčius. Saudo Arabija ir jo sąjungininkai šį mėnesį paskelbė apie naftos gavybos mažinimą, kuriuo siekiama padidinti kainas, o tai prieštarauja JAV rūpesčiams, kad didesnės kainos padeda rusams.

 

     JAE laikėsi neutralios pozicijos konflikte, nepaisant ilgalaikės partnerystės saugumo srityje su JAV. Prasidėjus Ukrainos konfliktui Dubajus ir kiti emyratai tapo tarptautiniu pasirinkimo centru daugeliui Rusijos įmonių ir turtingų asmenų, norinčių valdyti savo verslą ir apsaugoti savo verslo pinigus, išvengiant sankcijų. Tačiau prekyba nafta yra bene jautriausias besiplečiančių dvišalių santykių aspektas.

 

     Dėl kainų viršutinės ribos ir kitų sankcijų Rusijos flagmano „Urals“ naftos kaina pastaraisiais mėnesiais paprastai buvo didesnė, nei 30%, palyginti su „Brent“ lyginamuoju indeksu.

 

     Persijos įlankos šalyse taikomas arbitražas ypač ryškus rafinuotų produktų, tokių, kaip benzinas, mazutas ir dyzelinas. Jų Persijos įlankoje gausu, „todėl vienintelė priežastis importuoti iš Rusijos – pasinaudoti kainų skirtumu“, – sakė Arguso Vidurio Rytų įlankos produktų skyriaus vadovas Elshanas Alijevas. Pasak jo, rusiško pirminio benzino ir dyzelino už toną parduodama atitinkamai 60 ir 25 doleriais pigiau, nei Persų įlankoje pagaminta suma.

 

     Praėjusiais metais Saudo Arabija padidino dyzelino eksportą į Prancūziją ir Italiją – dvi šalis, kurios anksčiau daugiausia rėmėsi Rusija, rodo Kpler duomenys. Maskva „gana prisotina [Saudo Arabijos] vidaus rinką su nuolaidomis transporto degalais ir atlaisvina kiekius vėlesniam dyzelino eksportui kitur“, sakė Viktoras Katona, „Kpler“ analitikas, orientuotas į Rusiją.

 

     Kovo 12 d. nacionalinė naftos bendrovė „Saudi Arabian Oil Co.“ arba „Aramco“ pranešė apie rekordinį 2022 m. metinį pelną – 161 mlrd. dolerių. Tai apėmė 27% padidintą pelną valstybės valdomo milžino perdirbimo padaliniui. Aramco atsisakė komentuoti.

 

     Tuo tarpu JAE tapo pagrindiniu Rusijos naftos produktų saugojimo ir reeksporto centru, o kai kurie prekybininkai aktyviai veža Maskvos krovinius į kitas paskirties vietas, naudodamiesi Persijos įlankos valstybe ir jos finansų sistema.

 

     Privačios prekybos įmonės importuoja iš Rusijos į JAE daugiausia reeksporto į Pakistaną ir Šri Lanką arba Rytų Afriką tikslais, – sakė M. Alijevas. Kai kuriuos Rusijos naftos krovinius su nuolaida surenka Emyratų valstybinės įmonės, įskaitant penkias benzino siuntas, Dubajuje įsikūrusiai, Emirates National Oil Co. nuo gruodžio mėn. Lapkričio mėnesį Rusijos vyriausybės milžino „Gazprom PJSC“ pakrautas 700 000 barelių arktinės žalios naftos krovinys buvo pristatytas į emyratui priklausančią Abu Dabio nacionalinės naftos perdirbimo gamyklą, rodo „Kpler“ duomenys.

 

     ENOC ir ADNOC nepateikė atsakymų į daug prašymų komentuoti.“ [1]

 

 

Kadangi sankcijos Rusijai neveikia, o sankcijos kelia kainas ir didina recesijos riziką Vakaruose, sankcijas sukūrę Vakarų pareigūnai turi būti nubausti. Vakaruose rinkėjai į tai atkreipia dėmesį (žr. D. Trumpą).

1.  World News: Saudis, U.A.E. Grab Russia's Oil Products at Big Discounts
Faucon, Benoit; Said, Summer.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 18 Apr 2023: A.7.

 

Why the sanctions on Russia don't work?

"As Russia scours the globe for buyers of its energy products, it is finding eager trade partners in an unlikely place: The oil-rich petrostates of the Persian Gulf.

Since Western sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine cut off Russia from many of its established trading partners, state companies from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have stepped in to take advantage of discounted prices for Russian products, according to oil executives and industry analysts.

Despite U.S. objections, the Gulf countries are using the discounted Russian products internally, including for consumption and refining purposes, and exporting their own barrels at market rates, boosting their profits.

The Gulf countries, especially the U.A.E., have also become key storage and trading hubs for Russian energy products that can't be as easily shipped around the globe because of the sanctions.

The counterintuitive shift, in which countries with the world's largest reservoirs of oil are eager buyers of more, is an illustration of the unexpected consequences of Western sanctions and another example of the U.S.'s waning influence over the Middle East.

Russian oil exports to the U.A.E. more than tripled to a record 60 million barrels last year, according to data-commodity provider Kpler. By contrast, Russian oil exports to Singapore, another trading hub, rose 13% to 26 million barrels in 2022, according to Kpler.

Russian gas oil now accounts for more than one in 10 barrels of the product stored in Fujairah, the U.A.E.'s main oil-storage hub, second only to Saudi Arabian gas oil, according to Argus Media, a market-data provider.

Russia is shipping 100,000 barrels a day to Saudi Arabia, according to Kpler, compared with virtually none before the sanctions. That would equate to more than 36 million barrels annually.

U.S. officials have said the Saudi and Emirati trade in Russian oil and fuel products undermines Western efforts to tighten the screws on the Kremlin's revenue streams.

Treasury Undersecretary Brian Nelson toured the Middle East in February to try to persuade countries such as Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Turkey to enforce the Western sanctions against Russia.

The U.S. Treasury and Saudi royal court didn't return requests to comment.

An Emirati official said the country abides by United Nations sanctions and has "robust processes in place to deal with sanctioned entities." "The U.A.E. will continue to trade openly and honestly with its international partners," the official said.

Saudi Arabia is increasingly pursuing a nationalist energy policy that takes precedence over U.S. concerns. Saudi and its allies this month announced an oil-production cut aimed at boosting prices, going against U.S. objections that higher prices aid the Russians.

The U.A.E. has adopted a neutral stance in the conflict, despite its longstanding security partnership with the U.S. After start of the Ukraine conflict, Dubai and other emirates have become an international hub of choice for many Russian companies and wealthy individuals seeking to run their businesses and protect their money while avoiding sanctions. But the oil trade is perhaps the most sensitive aspect of the burgeoning bilateral relationship.

Because of price caps and other sanctions, Russia's flagship Urals crude has typically traded at a discount of over 30% to benchmark Brent in recent months.

The arbitrage available for Gulf countries is especially pronounced in refined products such as naphtha, fuel oil and diesel. They are abundant in the Gulf "so the only reason for importing from Russia is to capitalize on the price difference," said Elshan Aliyev, head of the Mideast Gulf product department at Argus. Russian naphtha and diesel respectively sell $60 and $25 a ton below their equivalent produced in the Persian Gulf, he said.

In the past year, Saudi Arabia has ramped up its diesel exports to France and Italy, two countries that previously relied largely on Russia, Kpler data show. Moscow is "pretty much satiating the [Saudi] domestic market with discounted transportation fuels and freeing up volumes for subsequent diesel exports elsewhere," said Viktor Katona, a Russia-focused analyst at Kpler.

On March 12, national oil company Saudi Arabian Oil Co., or Aramco, reported record annual profit of $161 billion for 2022, the largest ever by an energy firm. That included a 27% boost to profits for the state-run giant's refining unit. Aramco declined to comment.

Meanwhile, the U.A.E. has become a major storage and re-export hub for Russian oil products, while some traders are making a brisk business shipping Moscow's cargoes to other destinations using the Gulf nation and its financial system as a base.

Private trading firms import from Russia to the U.A.E. mostly for re-export purposes to Pakistan and Sri Lanka or East Africa, Mr. Aliyev said.

Some of Russia's discounted oil cargoes are scooped up by Emirati state-run companies, including five shipments of gasoline to the Dubai-based Emirates National Oil Co. since December. In November, a cargo of 700,000 barrels of Arctic crude oil loaded by Russian government giant Gazprom PJSC was delivered to a refinery of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Co., which is owned by the emirate, Kpler data show.

ENOC and ADNOC didn't return requests to comment." [1]

Since the sanctions don't work on Russia, and the sanctions are raising prices and increasing recession risk in the West, the Western officials that created the sanctions have to be punished.  The voters in the West are paying close attention to this (see D. Trump).

1.  World News: Saudis, U.A.E. Grab Russia's Oil Products at Big Discounts
Faucon, Benoit; Said, Summer.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 18 Apr 2023: A.7.

A. Bilotaitė: the law on the pushing out of migrants is a necessary instrument for defense

 They all go to Germany. Why should you defend yourself from them? Maybe you should look for a more serious job? Human rights defenders will punish you, as they once punished fascists.

A. Bilotaitė: migrantų kankinimo įstatymas yra būtinas instrumentas gynybai

 Jie visi išeina į Vokietiją. Kam Tau nuo nuo jų gintis? Gal paieškotum rimtesnio darbo? Juk nubaus Tave žmogaus teisių gynėjai, kaip kadaise nubaudė fašistus.