Data Economy: Where Is the Strategy? Europe Locks Out America and China from European Data Market At Last

   "Is politics getting lost in unfinished nonsense, or is there hope? About the opportunities and concepts of the European data economy.

 

     These days, the impression often arises that political concepts have not been fully thought through:

 

     First example: They want to bring skilled workers to Germany, as many as possible, because the skills gap is currently over 533,000. At the same time, there is a lack of 1.4 million affordable apartments under 45 square meters for single households in Germany. Where should the skilled workers actually live?

 

     Second example: There are still 842 wind turbines missing to meet the wind power expansion target by 2024, which would have to be built very quickly. At the same time, 16,000 bridges in Germany are in need of renovation so that they cannot be used by heavy transport, such as is typical for the construction of wind turbines. As a result, many wind turbines only reach their destination via long detours. Not to mention the previous complex and slow approval processes. Not exactly tailwind for the wind industry and the ambitious energy transition. Don't the responsible ministries speak to each other? Or does the Chancellor lack a strategic overview? The impression is of an incompatible patchwork quilt and of well-thought-out but poorly executed individual activities.

 

     People are happy about concepts that are coherent and are even supposed to have positive economic effects. We're talking about the data economy, which is based on a big, strategically thought-out picture and comes not from Berlin, but from Brussels. The EU expects no less than 270 billion euros in additional gross domestic product in the next five years. In order to bring the data economy to life, it has launched the EU Data Act, which will apply across Europe in a few months.

 

     For a country like Germany, which has few natural resources and is running out of skilled workers, the data economy is a glimmer of hope. Because it provides a framework in which data becomes tradable assets that can be used to generate sales that previously did not exist. This requires, above all, software, smart tech minds and innovative business models. A very important and Europe-wide recognized component of the data economy is the so-called data space.

 

     This is based on an invention by the Fraunhofer Society and generates at least as much imagination as the audio format MP3, which also came from the Fraunhofer Society and which has permanently changed the music industry. The data space is now part of the data and IT strategy of the federal government as well as the European Union and other European countries. Its big advantage is that data exchange works according to certain, clearly defined rules and leaves the data provider with a certain degree of sovereignty over this data.

 

     In order for the data economy to flourish, the European Union has initially outlined nine data space projects, including data space compartments for industry, energy, mobility and health. In Germany, projects such as Catena-X or Manufacturing-X were started on this basis, which use data space technology in the context of collaboration across the entire value chain in automobile manufacturing or in the equipment industry. This means that not only individual machines at a production site make their data available via a data space, but that this happens across locations.

 

     The EU Data Act aims to make as much data as possible available for the data economy. Therefore, he will establish the obligation that network-capable machines must make the data that is created during their use available for the data economy. What is particularly noteworthy is that the Data Act places machine users at the center of the data economy. They receive the sole right to market such data. In concrete terms, this means: It is not the wind turbine manufacturers who have wind power data, but the owners or operators of the wind turbines - and they can sell this to start-ups or other innovative tech companies, for example.

 

     However, this sharing option is not unlimited. The European Union has installed a brake with the Digital Markets Act and introduced the term gatekeeper. These are companies that have a particularly strong economic position and have large numbers of users. These gatekeepers will not receive any data from the machine owners; they are explicitly excluded. So far, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Byte Dance, Meta, Microsoft and Samsung have been classified as gatekeepers. At this point it becomes clear: The EU wants the data economy to benefit primarily European companies, and at the same time it wants to limit the influence of the large and powerful tech companies from the USA and Asia. Their business models are also based on collecting data, processing it and using it to build products and services that generate high sales.

 

     So the ground is prepared: a new market with strategic vision is emerging in which European companies can take pole position. The big question remains: How do you as a company get a piece of the pie, i.e. the above-mentioned 270 billion euros? The answer is not entirely simple because such a market did not exist before and it initially appears in front of us like a blank sheet of paper. But here too, the creators of the Data Act have already thought a little ahead. 

 

In this context, Web3 technologies such as smart contracts and blockchains play a noticeable role. Such technologies can, for example, inspire the concept that machines will evolve into customers in the future who can make their own purchasing decisions. According to the Gartner Group, "machines as customers" represent one of the biggest new growth opportunities of the decade. There are now more machines, more than 9.7 billion installed IoT devices, with the potential to act as buyers, than people on the market.

 

     But that is just one idea out of an infinite number. The data economy is for entrepreneurs, for visionaries, for courageous investors. It remains to be seen which European country generates the best ideas. In France there is already a marketplace for agricultural data based on data space technology. The idea of the data marketplace is also an impressive business model with great potential. 

 

A single owner of a few machines, such as a carpentry shop, will hardly be able or interested in marketing the machine data to which he is entitled under the Data Act. But a marketplace that collects, aggregates and processes the data of many carpenters and makes it available via a platform is a completely different matter. This data will be of interest to a whole range of potential customers, starting with the manufacturers of woodworking machines themselves.

 

     Are there no criticisms of the data economy or the EU Data Act? Yes, of course - manufacturers of machines, for example, fear that the obligation to pass on data could lead to trade secrets being stolen. Such legitimate concerns need to be addressed, but smart minds are already at work here too. The first technical solutions are already on the market and must be tested and verified.

 

     In the end, one question remains: How is a data economy supposed to flourish if there is a lack of skilled workers in IT? 

 

After all, the data economy is above all one thing: software. 

 

At this point it becomes clear that the IT industry has a particular advantage: ultimately, it doesn't matter where a software developer, data scientist or cloud architect is located. The needs in Germany and Europe could be at least partially met in other countries. And this even in countries that are not necessarily the first thing on your radar. But if we look at Africa, there are around 1.4 billion people there, more than 50 percent of whom are 20 years old and younger. 

 

In Ghana, Africa's IT capital, there are many graduates of computer science departments who cannot find a job locally. 

 

No wonder, then, that there are already specialized service providers who have made matching the needs in Europe with the opportunities in Africa their core business.

 

     The data economy needs no bridges for transport and no apartments in Germany. It uses a commodity that is available in great abundance. And thanks to a well-thought-out strategy, it has the potential to preserve prosperity in Germany, even if the number of employees continues to decline. It is up to entrepreneurs, start-ups and investors to seize this opportunity and make Germany a pioneer in the data economy. The conditions for this have been created." [1]

 

1.  Datenökonomie: Wo bitte ist die Strategie? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH. Oct 17, 2023. Von Christoph Herr

What was Miss Grybauskaitė's plan in Ukraine?

Ukraine was governed by a democratically elected president, Mr. Yanukovych. A large community of Russians living in Ukraine helped to elect him. Miss Grybauskaitė's plan was to attack Russians in Ukraine, thus cutting off Russian voters from the opportunity to elect the government in Kyiv.

 

Everything was suitable for this, including bans on the Russian language, attempts toban the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with its patriarch in Moscow, attacks by gunmen armed with Western weapons. They tried to turn Ukrainian Russians into Ukrainian Palestinians.

 

The plan failed. Ukrainian Russians resisted. As the river of weapons from the West began to flow to Kiev, the Ukrainian Russians were joined by Russia. Russia was supported by China and the Global South. Faced with such forces, Miss Grybauskaitė's plan stalled.

Koks buvo panelės Grybauskaitės planas Ukrainoje?

Ukrainą valdė demokratiškai išrinktas prezidentas ponas Janukovičius. Jį išrinkti padėjo gausi rusų, gyvenančių Ukrainoje, bendruomenė.Panelės Grybauskaitės planas buvo atakuoti rusus Ukrainoje, tokiu būdu atkirsti  rinkėjus rusus nuo galimybės išrinkti valdžią Kijeve. 

Tam tiko viskas: rusų kalbos draudimai, bandymai uždrausti Ukrainos ortodoksų bažnyčią su patriarchu Maskvoje, Vakarų ginklais ginkluotų smogikų atakos. Ukrainos rusus pabandė paversti Ukrainos palestiniečiais.

Planas nepavyko. Ukrainos rusai pasipriešino. Pradėjus plaukti į Kijevą ginklų upei iš Vakarų, prie Ukrainos rusų prisijungė Rusija. Rusiją parėmė Kinija ir globalieji Pietūs. Susidūręs su tokiomis jėgomis, panelės Grybauskaitės planas užstrigo.

Bidenas keliauja į Izraelį, o Putinas – į Kiniją

„Tvirta Vašingtono parama Izraeliui prieš „Hamas“ yra kontrastuojama su Rusijos ir Kinijos pastangomis prisiderinti prie Palestinos kovos.

 

     Kai prezidentas Bidenas trečiadienį lankėsi Izraelyje, siekdamas parodyti tvirtą Amerikos paramą šaliai, Rusijos prezidentas Vladimiras V. Putinas buvo Pekine, siekdamas parodyti jo „be ribų“ partnerystę su aukščiausiu Kinijos lyderiu Xi Jinpingu.

 

     Dvi kontrastingos kelionės parodo, kaip pasaulinį politinį kraštovaizdį smarkiai perpiešė įvykiai Ukrainoje ir kaip šis pasikeitęs kraštovaizdis visapusiškai atsispindi kare Gazoje.

 

     Rusija, Kinija ir Iranas jau formavo naują ašį dėl Ukrainos, ašį, kurios jie siekė diplomatiškai, ekonomiškai, strategiškai ir net ideologiškai. Rusija, kovodama Ukrainoje, remiasi ginklais iš Irano ir diplomatine Kinijos parama. Iranas buvo izoliuotas ir labai džiaugiasi, kad turi naujų prekybos partnerių ir tam tikrą tarptautinio teisėtumo šaltinį. Kinija, kurios ekonomika kenčia, sutaupė milijardus dolerių, importuodama rekordinius kiekius naftos iš šalių, kurioms taikomos Vakarų sankcijos, pavyzdžiui, Rusijos ir Irano.

 

     Kartu jos randa bendrą ideologinę priežastį, smerkdami ir nepaisydami JAV, vardan esamos tarptautinės tvarkos, kurioje Vakarai dominavo nuo Antrojo pasaulinio karo, reformavimo.

 

     Taip elgdamiesi jie neslėpė nuoskaudų dėl to, kaip praeityje Vakarai elgėsi. Tačiau kiekviena pusė kitoje mato veidmainystę, vis labiau verčiančią tautas rinktis puses.

 

     Izraelio ir „Hamas“ karas ir stiprėjanti krizė po mirtino sprogimo ligoninėje pabrėžė didėjančius skirtumus tarp Vakarų ir Rusijos bei Kinijos, iš kitos pusės. Tie skirtumai kyla ne tik dėl to, kas kaltas dėl didėjančio smurto. Jie taip pat susiję su konkuruojančiais požiūriais į taisykles, kuriomis grindžiami pasauliniai santykiai, ir apie tai, kas gali jas apibrėžti.

 

     „Tai dar vienas konfliktas, skatinantis poliarizaciją tarp Vakarų demokratijų ir Rusijos, Kinijos bei Irano stovyklos“, – sakė vokiečių analitikas Ulrichas Speckas. „Tai dar vienas geopolitinio išaiškinimo momentas, kaip ir Ukraina, kur šalys turi išsidėstyti“.

 

     Rusija, remiama Kinijos, savo veiksmus Ukrainoje pavaizdavo, kaip gynybą nuo Vakarų organizuojamo tradicinės Maskvos kultūrinės ir politinės egzistencijos sferos griovimo.

 

     Kalbant apie Artimuosius Rytus, galbūt, nėra regiono, kuriame konkuruojančių Rytų ir Vakarų požiūrių pobūdis būtų akivaizdesnis.

 

     Rusija ir Kinija atsisakė pasmerkti „Hamas“. Vietoj to jie kritikavo Izraelio elgesį su palestiniečiais, ypač jo sprendimą atjungti vandenį ir elektrą Gazos ruože ir ten žuvusių civilių skaičių. Jie paragino tarptautinį tarpininkavimą ir paliaubas, kol Izraelis nenusprendžia, kad jo karas jau visiškai prasidėjęs.

 

     Po siaubo antradienio vakarą, kai pranešama, kad per smūgį žuvo šimtai palestiniečių, kurie ieškojo prieglobsčio nuo Izraelio bombardavimo Gazos ligoninėje, Rusija ir Kinija turėtų suintensyvinti jų raginimus priimti JT rezoliuciją ir nedelsiant nutraukti ugnį. Anot Rusijos valstybinės naujienų agentūros RIA Novosti, Rusijos užsienio reikalų ministras Sergejus V. Lavrovas pavadino sprogimą „nusikaltimu“ ir „nužmogėjimo aktu“ ir pareiškė, kad Izraelis turės pateikti palydovines nuotraukas, kad įrodytų, kad jis neatakavo.

 

     Nepaisant to, kad Izraelis neigė atsakomybę už sprogimą, dėl nuožmios palestiniečių ir paprastų arabų reakcijos J. Bideno kelionė tapo žymiai keblesnė.

 

     Bideno planai susitikti su Izraelio ir arabų lyderiais, įskaitant Palestinos savivaldos prezidentą Mahmoudą Abbasą, žlugo, todėl jam buvo sunkiau elgtis, kaip sąžiningam brokeriui, nors jis paskelbė apie 100 mln. dolerių pagalbą palestiniečiams.

 

     J. Bidenui buvo daromas didesnis spaudimas įtikinti Izraelį leisti humanitarinę pagalbą, įskaitant vandenį ir elektrą, į Gazą. Taip pat tikimasi, kad jis stengsis neleisti politiškai sužeistam Izraelio ministrui pirmininkui Benjaminui Netanyahu pernelyg reaguoti taip, kad būtų pakenkta didesniems Amerikos regioniniams interesams, jau nekalbant apie Izraelio interesus, sakė Izraelio pareigūnai.

 

     V. Putinui karas suteikė dar vieną galimybę pasidžiaugti, nes jis dėl konflikto kaltina Vašingtoną. „Manau, kad daugelis žmonių sutiks su manimi, kad tai yra ryškus Jungtinių Valstijų politikos Viduriniuose Rytuose žlugimo pavyzdys“, – anot jo, kai nepaisoma palestiniečių interesų.

 

     Kinija jau pademonstravo siekį išplėsti savo įtaką Artimuosiuose Rytuose netikėtu Irano ir Saudo Arabijos suartėjimu šiais metais; Pekinas, palyginti su Vašingtonu, siekia parodyti save, kaip sąžiningą brokerį.

 

     Kinijos užsienio reikalų ministras Wang Yi pareiškė, kad Izraelio veiksmai jau neapsiriboja savigyna ir siekia kolektyviai nubausti palestiniečius Gazoje. Rusija ir Kinija laikosi palestiniečių, siekiančių išsivadavimo ir apsisprendimo, pusėje.

 

     Tačiau nenorėdamos kaltinti „Hamas“ ir stengdamosi susieti save su Palestinos reikalu, Rusija ir Kinija apeliuoja į platesnes nuotaikas vadinamuosiuose globaliuose Pietuose, taip pat didelėse Europos dalyse. Jų nuomone, būtent Izraelis vykdo kolonialistinę politiką, okupuodamas Vakarų Krantą, skatindamas žydų naujakurius Palestinos žemėje ir izoliuodamas 2,3 mln. Gazos gyventojų, kuriems net įprastais laikais taikomi griežti apribojimai.

 

     Pasauliniai Pietūs, besivystančių šalių terminas, yra gyvybiškai svarbi naujos konkurencijos tarp Vakarų ir Kinijos bei Rusijos alternatyvos sritis, sakė Jameso Martino Neplatinimo studijų centro Eurazijos programos direktorė Hanna Notte.

 

     Daugelio pasaulio Pietuose gyvenančių žmonių požiūriu, ji sakė: „Kalbant apie Izraelį, JAV yra okupanto pusėje, o Rusija į tai kreipiasi“.

 

     Rusija taip pat mato naudą kreipimasis į didesnę arabų visuomenę palestiniečių vardu tokiose šalyse kaip Egiptas, Jordanija ir Persijos įlankos šalyse, kurios nemyli Hamaso ar Musulmonų brolijos, kurios palaiko gerus santykius su Vašingtonu ir Izraeliu. ir kurios nelabai nori priimti palestiniečių pabėgėlius iš Gazos.

 

     Tie sąjungininkai gali tylėti, kai Izraelis bombarduoja Gazą, bet dabar, po sprogimo ligoninėje ir pykčio tarp jų pačių visuomenės, tai padaryti bus daug sunkiau.

 

     Rusija visada piktinosi Vašingtonu dėl dominavimo Artimuosiuose Rytuose ir taikos procese, ir Rusijai būtų naudinga, jei karas su Hamas sulėtintų ar net sunaikintų Bideno pastangas sutvirtinti santykius su Saudo Arabija, įskaitant galimą abipusės gynybos sutartį, mainais į santykių normalizavimą tarp Saudo Arabijos ir Izraelio, sakė p. Notte.

 

     „Jungtinės Valstijos paliko Rusiją nuošalyje, palaikydamos Abraomo susitarimus“ tarp Izraelio ir Persijos įlankos valstybių, „ir Rusijai nepatinka būti nušalinta“, – sakė ji. „Jei normalizavimas žlugs nuo bėgių, Maskvos požiūriu tai būtų dar viena nauda“.

 

     Jau sąjungininkė su Sirija ir įtakinga Libijoje Rusija taip pat priartėjo prie pagrindinio „Hamas“ rėmėjo Irano, o Rusija ieško Irano ginklų, raketų ir bepiločių orlaivių. Tačiau Irano ir Rusijos interesai regione nėra vienodi.

 

     Rusija nelinkusi matyti, kad karas Gazoje peraugtų į regioninį karą, nes tai neišvengiamai pakenktų, jei ne apimtų, Libaną ir Siriją, kur Rusija turi karines bazes, kurios yra svarbios jos galios projekcijai.

 

     „Rusai tam neturi pralaidumo“, – sakė p. Notte. „Jei kils platesnis regioninis karas, o Jungtinės Valstijos smarkiai nusileis Izraelio pusėje, Rusija turėtų dar labiau nukrypti į Irano pusę, ir aš nematau, kad Rusija norėtų pasirinkti puses regione.

 

     Žinoma, jei Izraelio ir „Hamas“ karas atitraukia Vašingtono dėmesį nuo įvykių Ukrainoje ir nukreipia jau įtemptus Amerikos ginkluotės srautus, pavyzdžiui, priešraketinę gynybą ir artilerijos amuniciją, iš Ukrainos į Izraelį, tai tik papildoma nauda Maskvai.

 

     Kinija taip pat prisidėjo prie pakvietimo Iranui prisijungti prie besivystančių šalių klubo, žinomo kaip BRICS, kuris nori tapti savotišku aljansu prieš Vakarų hegemoniją tarptautinėje sistemoje.

 

     Tačiau šis karas taip pat išryškina „Irano hegemoninį projektą regione“, – sakė J. Speckas – dominavimo siekį, kuris nebūtinai atitinka nei Rusijos, nei Kinijos interesus ir kuris atneša vis stipresnį Izraelio ir Jungtinių Valstijų atsaką.

 

     Dėl šios priežasties „Esu įsitikinęs, kad Iranas šiuo metu nenori karo“, – sakė Reichmano universiteto Lauderio vyriausybės, diplomatijos ir strategijos mokyklos Irano ekspertas Ori Goldbergas.

 

     „Iranas mėgsta apgaulę, partizanų kampanijas ir įgaliotinius, bet nemėgsta karų“, – sakė jis. „Jie nori palaikyti arabų kovotojus, bet nenori eiti kovoti patys.“" [1]

 

1. New Divisions on View as Biden Goes to Israel and Putin to China: [Foreign Desk]. Erlanger, Steven. 
New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y.. 19 Oct 2023: A.10.

New Divisions on View as Biden Goes to Israel and Putin to China.

"Washington's strong support for Israel against Hamas is contrasted with Russian and Chinese efforts to align with the Palestinian struggle.

As President Biden visited Israel on Wednesday, seeking to display steadfast American support for the country, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia was in Beijing, seeking to display his "no limits" partnership with China's top leader, Xi Jinping.

The two contrasting trips show how vastly the global political landscape has been redrawn by events in Ukraine, and how that changed landscape is on full display in the war in Gaza.

Russia, China and Iran were already forming a new axis over Ukraine, one they have pursued diplomatically, economically, strategically and even ideologically. Russia relies on weapons from Iran and diplomatic support from China to fight in Ukraine. Iran has been isolated and only too happy to have new trading partners and some source of international legitimacy. China, whose economy is ailing, has saved billions of dollars by importing record amounts of oil from countries under Western sanctions, like Russia and Iran.

Together, they find a common ideological cause in denouncing and defying the United States in the name of reforming the existing international order dominated by the West since World War II.

As they do, they have made no secret of the grievances they harbor over the way things were done by the West in the past. Yet each side sees hypocrisy in the other, increasingly forcing nations to choose sides.

The Israel-Hamas war, and the intensifying crisis there after a deadly explosion at a hospital, have underscored the widening differences between the West on one side and Russia and China on the other. Those differences are not only over who is to blame for the escalating violence. They are also about competing views of the rules that underpin global relations -- and who gets to define them.

"This is another conflict that drives polarization between the Western democracies and the camp of Russia, China and Iran," said Ulrich Speck, a German analyst. "This is another moment of geopolitical clarification, like Ukraine, where countries have to position themselves."

Russia, with China's support, has portrayed its actions in Ukraine as a defense against Western subversion of Moscow's traditional sphere of cultural and political existence.

When it comes to the Middle East, there is perhaps no region where the through-the-looking-glass nature of these competing views is more apparent.

Russia and China have refused to condemn Hamas. They have instead criticized Israeli treatment of Palestinians, especially its decision to cut off water and electricity to Gaza and the civilian death toll there. They have called for international mediation and a cease-fire before Israel considers that its war has fully begun.

After the horror Tuesday night, when hundreds of Palestinians were reportedly killed in a strike after seeking shelter from Israeli bombing at the Gaza hospital, Russia and China are expected to intensify their calls for a U.N. resolution and an immediate cease-fire. According to RIA Novosti, a Russian state news agency, Russia's foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, called the explosion a "crime" and an "act of dehumanization," and said Israel would have to provide satellite images to prove it was not behind the attack.

Despite Israeli denials of responsibility for the blast, the fierce reactions among Palestinians and ordinary Arabs have made Mr. Biden's trip considerably more awkward.

Mr. Biden's plans to meet with both Israeli and Arab leaders, including Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, were dashed, and it was harder for him to act as an honest broker, even as he announced $100 million in aid to the Palestinians. 

There was more pressure on Mr. Biden to persuade Israel to allow humanitarian aid, including water and electricity, into Gaza. He was also expected to try to keep Israel's politically wounded prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, from overreacting in a way that would harm America's larger regional interests, let alone Israel's, Israeli officials said.

For Mr. Putin, the war has presented another opportunity for gloating, as he blames Washington for the conflict. "I think that many people will agree with me that this is a vivid example of the failure of United States policy in the Middle East," which ignores, he said, Palestinian interests.

China has already demonstrated an ambition to extend its influence in the Middle East by the surprise rapprochement it brokered between Iran and Saudi Arabia this year; Beijing is seeking to portray itself as an honest broker compared with Washington.

China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, has said that Israel's actions have already extended beyond self-defense toward collective punishment of the Palestinians in Gaza.

Russia and China are siding with a Palestinian people seeking liberation and self-determination.

But in their reluctance to blame Hamas and effort to associate themselves with the Palestinian cause, both Russia and China are appealing to a wider sentiment in the so-called Global South -- and in large parts of Europe, too. For them, it is Israel that is conducting a colonialist policy by its occupation of the West Bank, its encouragement of Jewish settlers on Palestinian land and its isolation of the 2.3 million people of Gaza, who are subjected even in normal times to sharp restrictions on their freedoms.

The Global South, a term for developing nations, is a vital area of the new competition between the West and the Chinese-Russian alternative, said Hanna Notte, the director of a Eurasia program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

From the point of view of many in the Global South, she said, "when it comes to Israel, the U.S. is on the side of the occupier, and Russia taps into that."

Russia also sees the benefit of appealing to the larger Arab public in the name of the Palestinians in countries like Egypt, Jordan and those in the Persian Gulf that have no love for Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood, that have decent relations with Washington and Israel, and that have little desire to accept Palestinian refugees from Gaza.

Those allies may be keeping relatively quiet as Israel bombs Gaza, but that will be much harder now after the hospital explosion and the anger among their own publics.

Russia has always resented Washington for dominating the Middle East and the peace process and would see benefits if the war against Hamas slows or even destroys Mr. Biden's effort to solidify relations with Saudi Arabia, including a possible mutual defense treaty, in exchange for normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, Ms. Notte said.

"The United States has sidelined Russia with its support for the Abraham Accords" between Israel and Gulf States, "and Russia does not like being sidelined," she said. "If normalization gets derailed, that would be another side benefit from Moscow's point of view."

Already allied with Syria and influential in Libya, Russia has also moved closer to Iran, Hamas's main sponsor, and Russia has sought Iranian arms, missiles and drones. But the interests of Iran and Russia in the region are not the same.

Russia is reluctant to see the war in Gaza spread to a regional war, because it would inevitably harm, if not engulf, Lebanon and Syria, where Russia has military bases that are important for its power projection.

"The Russians don't have the bandwidth for that," Ms. Notte said. "If there is a broader regional war, and the United States comes down hard on the side of Israel, Russia would have to drift even further to the Iranian side, and I can't see Russia wanting to pick sides in the region."

Of course if the Israel-Hamas war takes Washington's attention away from events in Ukraine, and diverts already strained American armaments like missile defense and artillery ammunition from Ukraine to Israel, that is just an extra benefit to Moscow.

China was also instrumental in inviting Iran to join the club of developing nations known as the BRICS, which wants to be a kind of alliance against Western hegemony in the international system.

Yet this war also highlights "Iran's hegemonic project in the region," Mr. Speck said -- a reach for domination that does not necessarily serve the interests of either Russia or China, and which is bringing an increasingly forceful response from both Israel and the United States.

For that reason, "I am convinced that Iran does not want war right now," said Ori Goldberg, an expert on Iran at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at Reichman University.

"Iran likes deceptions, guerrilla campaigns and proxies but does not like wars," he said. "They are willing to support Arab fighters, but unwilling to go to combat themselves."" [1]

1. New Divisions on View as Biden Goes to Israel and Putin to China: [Foreign Desk]. Erlanger, Steven. 
New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y.. 19 Oct 2023: A.10.