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2024 m. birželio 10 d., pirmadienis

The Success Narratives of Liberal Life Leave Little Room for Having Children


"For young, secular, politically progressive men and women, having children has become something of an afterthought. 

Liberal conventional wisdom encourages people to spend their 20s on journeys of personal and professional self-discovery and self-fulfillment. Children are treated as a bonus round, something to get to only after completing a long list of achievements: getting a degree, forging a satisfying and well-established career, buying a house, cultivating the ideal romantic partnership.

The standards of readiness for family are at once so high and so vague that it’s hardly a surprise when people fail to reach them. Indeed, the data suggest that people are having children later than they used to and are having fewer than they’d like.

For progressives, waiting to have children has also become a kind of ethical imperative. Gender equality and female empowerment demand that women’s self-advancement not be sacrificed on the altar of motherhood. Securing female autonomy means that under no circumstances should a woman be rushed into a reproductive decision — whether by an eager partner or tone-deaf chatter about ticking biological clocks. Unreserved enthusiasm for having children can come across as essentially reactionary.

Over the past four years, we’ve conducted interviews and surveys with hundreds of young Americans about their attitudes toward having children. These conversations revealed that the success narratives of modern liberal life leave little room for having a family. Women who want kids often come to that realization belatedly, at some point in their early 30s — the so-called panic years. If they are lucky, their partner (if they have one) will fall in line. If they are not, they face a choice of returning to the dating pool, freezing their eggs (if they haven’t done so already), single parenting or giving up their hope of having kids of their own.

In this way, the logic of postponement that has been promoted by liberals and progressives — and bolstered by overblown optimism about reproductive technologies — robs young people of their agency. How many children they have, and even whether they have them at all, is increasingly a decision made for them by circumstance and cultural convention.

This is not just a recipe for unhappiness; it also reflects a deep confusion. There is nothing inherently unprogressive about embracing the prospect of children. Even Simone de Beauvoir, the philosopher who was among the first to critique reproduction and family as instruments for the oppression of women, acknowledged that shaping the character and intellect of another human being was “the most delicate and the most serious undertaking of all.” 

While certain conservative visions of family life — such as “trad wives” and Silicon Valley pronatalism — no doubt have little to offer those on the left, our fellow progressives need to stop thinking of having children as a conservative hobbyhorse and reclaim it for what it is: a fundamental human concern.

No doubt, the family — recognized as the seat of customs and traditional values — has long been central to the appeal of conservatism. Yet it wasn’t that long ago that Republicans and Democrats fought over who could rightfully claim to be the party of “family values.” Bill Clinton, while campaigning for president against George H.W. Bush in 1992, assailed the Republican Party’s commitment to families as little more than hypocrisy. “Where are they,” he asked, “when there is no health care for pregnant women? When too many children are born with low birth weights?” Mr. Clinton went on to announce a 14-point “American Family Values Agenda.”

But in time, liberals and progressives came to shy away from publicly embracing the American family as a symbol and an ideal. After Mr. Clinton was impeached in the wake of his own family-values hypocrisy and George W. Bush was elected with the help of energized evangelical voters, family-friendly rhetoric became anathema to liberals — perceived as phony, intrusive and toxic. 

 Today, the left proudly defends the sacrosanct right to abortion and reproductive justice while almost entirely sidestepping the question of whether having children is a worthy project to begin with.

The stark polarization of today’s public discourse has only heightened the left’s wariness of children, both privately and politically. Progressive policy defeats are often met with anti-natalist grandstanding. Members of the ecological activist group BirthStrike, founded in 2018, declared that they were protesting climate inaction by refusing to have kids. The following year, shortly after proposing legislation for a Green New Deal, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York broadcast progressives’ hesitancy to reproduce in the face of climate change to her 2.5 million Instagram followers when she said, “It does lead young people to have a legitimate question: Is it OK to still have children?”

The Supreme Court’s Dobbs decision, which overturned the constitutional right to abortion in 2022, has also made liberals and progressives more uneasy with the idea of starting a family. A year after Dobbs, the reproductive-rights journalist Andrea González-Ramírez wrote that she had been contemplating having children in her early 30s, before the Supreme Court’s decision put an end to all that: “I have never been sure that I desire to be a mom, let alone that I desire it enough to assume the risks. These days, however, that door is shut. I choose myself.”

That choice is not uncommon. In a recent study, 34 percent of women ages 18 to 39 reported that they or someone they know had “decided not to get pregnant due to concerns about managing pregnancy-related medical emergencies.” That might sound like a worry about abortion access, but the study suggested that Dobbs intensified ambivalence about having children more generally. Indeed, of the women who said they were forgoing having children because of the Dobbs ruling, about half lived in states where abortion rights were still protected.

One can’t help noting the irony: In permitting the conservative movement to alienate them from the question of whether they want to have and raise children, these liberals and progressives are allowing the right to shape their reproductive agendas in yet another way.

But the partisan framing of the issue is flawed at a more fundamental level. The question of children ultimately transcends politics. In deciding whether to have children, we confront a philosophical challenge: Is life, however imperfect and however challenging — however fraught with political disagreement and disaster — worth living?

To be sure, having children is not the only way to address this question. But having children remains the most basic and accessible way for most of us to affirm the value of our lives and that of others. This is in part because becoming a parent represents one of the greatest responsibilities one human being can assume for another. And it is also because the perpetuation of human life is the condition of possibility for every other thing we care about.

Committing oneself to long-term leftist causes like economic, environmental, racial and social justice is more than just compatible with embracing children and family life. It presupposes a willingness to take personal and collective responsibility for the next generation — raising, nurturing and educating those who will decide the fates of our country and our planet.

Surely, progressives and conservatives will give as vastly different answers to the question of what raising children ought to look like as they will to the question of how American society ought to be governed. But progressives must not let partisan loyalties stop them from thinking about the ways in which having children does or does not express their values, and what shape they really want their lives to take. Children are too important to allow them to fall victim to the culture wars.

Anastasia Berg (@a_n_a_berg) is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of California, Irvine, and an editor of the magazine The Point, where Rachel Wiseman (@rachelcwiseman) is the managing editor. They are the authors of the forthcoming book “What Are Children For?: On Ambivalence and Choice.”" [1]

1. The Success Narratives of Liberal Life Leave Little Room for Having Children: Guest Essay. Berg, Anastasia; Wiseman, Rachel.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 10, 2024.

Europos Parlamento rinkimai: pagrindiniai dalykai

„27 Europos Sąjungos narių balsavimas buvo populiarios politinės nuotaikos matuoklis, nerimą keliančiu, momentu žemyne. Dešiniesiems sekėsi gerai, bet centras išsilaikė.

 

 27 Europos Sąjungos valstybių narių rinkėjai išsiuntė griežtą įspėjimą pagrindinėms politinėms galioms, pridarydami sumaištį Prancūzijos ir, kiek mažesniu mastu, Vokietijos politikai ir apdovanodami griežtos linijos nacionalistines partijas daugelyje šalių.

 

 Nepaisant to, radikali dešiniojo sparno banga, kurios bijojo Europos politinis isteblišmentas, iki galo nepasitvirtino; išbuvo Europos Sąjungos politikos centras.

 

 Štai svarbiausios tendencijos, išryškėjusios po rinkimų.

 

 Dominuoja konservatoriai

 

 Pagrindinė centro dešiniųjų frakcija, Europos liaudies partija, pasirodė stipriai ir užėmė pirmąją vietą, ne tik išlaikydama savo dominavimą Europos Parlamente, bet ir pridėdama keletą vietų. Tai buvo ženklas, kad jos strategija per pastaruosius dvejus metus integruoti labiau dešiniosios pakraipos politiką, kad rinkėjai nepasiduotų tolesniems dešiniesiems varžovams, buvo sėkmingai įgyvendinta.

 

 Politinė grupė per pastaruosius penkerius metus vadovavo Žaliajam susitarimui, vienai ambicingiausių pasaulyje klimato kaitos politikos priemonių; tačiau visai neseniai sušvelnino kai kurias ES priimtas politikos kryptis, atsižvelgus į svarbių rinkėjų spaudimą, balsuojant kaimo vietovėse. Tai taip pat paskatino reikšmingą Europos Sąjungos migracijos politikos sugriežtinimą, iš dalies, bet ne iki galo, numalšinant rinkėjų, norinčių greitai sustabdyti neteisėtą migraciją, susirūpinimą.

 

 Kraštutinių dešiniųjų sukeltas sutrikimas

 

 Konservatorių griaustinį pavogė Marine Le Pen ultranacionalistinio nacionalinio mitingo Prancūzijoje pasirodymas. Jie sulaukė dvigubai daugiau prezidento Emmanuelio Macrono Renesanso partijos palaikymo, paskatino jį paleisti Nacionalinę Asamblėją ir surengti pirmalaikius įstatymų leidžiamosios valdžios rinkimus.

 

 Ultranacionalistų partija „Alternatyva Vokietijai“ arba AfD, kurią Vokietijos valdžia pavadino „įtariama“ ekstremistine grupe, rinkimuose pakilo į antrąją vietą, nors ir gerokai atsiliko nuo nugalėtojo – konservatorių. Tai pralenkė kanclerio Olafo Scholzo socialdemokratus, todėl jis dar labiau susilpnėjo, nes jis ir toliau kovoja svyruojančios koalicijos priešakyje.

 

 Centras laikosi, vos vos

 

 Stiprus centro dešinės pasirodymas nebuvo atkartotas kitose dviejose pagrindinėse Europos Parlamento centristinėse grupėse. Socialistų ir demokratų pažangusis aljansas, tradiciškai antras pagal dydį valdžioje namuose, išlaikė savo jėgą ir daugiau ar mažiau vietų skaičių.

 

 Tačiau liberalai smarkiai pralaimėjo, susilpnindami neformalią centristinę proeuropietiškų galių koaliciją, kuri apskritai yra Europos Parlamento teisės aktų priėmimo pagrindas, nepaisant jų skirtumų.

 

 Kartu jie valdys daugiau, nei 400 vietų naujajame Parlamente, kuris bus atidarytas liepos 16 d. Tai atrodo patogi dauguma, tačiau disciplina, balsuojant frakcijose, kartais gali būti silpna ir gali prireikti taktinių aljansų, kad užtikrinti, jog įstatymai būtų priimti. Pirmasis naujosios, silpnesnės parlamentinės daugumos išbandymas bus Europos Komisijos pirmininko, aukščiausio bloko pareigūno, patvirtinimas liepos 18 d.

 

 Žvelgiant iš politikos perspektyvos, centristinių jėgų atsparumas rinkimams pasireikš tam tikru tęstinumu, ypač išsaugant Europos Sąjungos paramą Ukrainai.

 

 Žaliųjų katastrofa, bet vis tiek jie dar svarbūs

 

 Žalieji buvo didžiausi šios nakties pralaimėtojai: 2019 m. puikiai pasirodę ir parlamente tapę svarbia progresyvia galia, naujuose rinkimuose jie prarado ketvirtadalį savo vietų.

 

 Tai buvo iš esmės numatyta: rinkėjai pasitraukė iš aplinkosaugos partijos dėl dviejų pagrindinių priežasčių. Aplinką tausojantys rinkėjai pastebėjo, kad Žalioji darbotvarkė buvo labai integruota į kitas didesnes pagrindines partijas. Tam tikra prasme žalieji prarado savo unikalų pardavimo tašką.

 

 Tačiau kiti rinkėjai manė, kad žalioji darbotvarkė Europoje nuėjo per toli ir pakenkė ūkininkams ir, apskritai, kaimo rinkėjams.

 

 Nepaisant to, žalieji galėtų tapti rezerviniu trijų centristų paramos fondu, nepaisant sumažėjusių vietų.

 

 Kingmakerio nebėra?

 

 Konservatoriai prieš rinkimus iškėlė idėją susiburti į Europos konservatorius ir reformistus – kitą dešiniųjų grupę, kurioje dominuoja Italijos ministras pirmininkė Giorgia Meloni. Tai būtų buvęs didelis „ne“ kitiems konservatorių centristams sąjungininkams, ypač kairiųjų ir centro kairiųjų, kurie grupę ir p. Meloni laiko radikalais, apsirengusiems įprastais drabužiais.

 

 Centristų daugumos valdžioje poreikis kreiptis į M. Meloni ir jos valdomus Europos Parlamento narius, panašu, kol kas dažniausiai išgaravo. Nors konservatoriams vis tiek gali tekti taktiškai bendradarbiauti su šia grupe Parlamente, mažai tikėtina, kad jie reikės ja pasikliauti.

 

Nepaisant to, ponia Meloni tebėra pagrindinė Europos Sąjungos valstybių narių lyderė, turinti nedidelį vaidmenį, kuris turėjo įtakos politiniam kraštovaizdžiui ir jau paskatino daugelį politikos krypčių. Namuose ji pasirodė labai gerai, visiškai kitaip, nei kitų pagrindinių E.S. lyderių. šalyse, dar kartą patvirtindama savo dominavimą.“ [1]

 

1. European Parliament Elections: Key Takeaways. Stevis-Gridneff, Matina.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 10, 2024.

 

European Parliament Elections: Key Takeaways

"The voting across 27 members of the European Union was a gauge of popular political sentiment at an unsettling moment on the continent. The right did well, but the center held.

Voters in the 27 European Union member states sent a stern warning to mainstream political powers, wreaking havoc on French and, to a lesser degree, German politics and rewarding hard-line nationalist parties in a number of countries.

Even so, the radical right-wing wave dreaded by the European political establishment did not fully materialize; the center of European Union politics held.

Here are the most important trends emerging from the elections.

Conservatives dominate

The mainstream center-right group, the European People’s Party, performed strongly and finished first, not only maintaining its dominance in the European Parliament but adding a few seats to boot. It was a sign that its strategy over the past two years, to integrate more right-leaning policies in order to stop voters from abandoning for further-right rivals, delivered.

The political group spearhead over the past five years, the Green Deal, one of the world’s most ambitious climate change policies; but more recently watered down some of the policies adopted at E.U. level, heeding pressure from important constituents in the rural vote. It also led a significant tightening of the European Union’s migration policy, going some, but not all the way, in assuaging concerns of voters who want to put a quick stop to irregular migration.

Far-right disruption

The conservatives’ thunder was stolen by a blockbuster performance by Marine Le Pen’s ultranationalist National Rally in France. They scored twice the support of President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party, prompting him to dissolve the National Assembly and call for snap legislative elections.

The Alternative for Germany, or AfD, an ultranationalist party that has been designated a “suspected” extremist group by the German authorities, soared to second place in the polls there, although trailing far behind the winner, the conservatives. It trumped Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats, leaving him further weakened as he continues to struggle at the head of a shaky coalition.

The center holds, just

The center-right’s strong performance was not replicated in the two other major European Parliament centrist groups. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, traditionally the second-biggest power in the house, maintained its strength and, more or less, the number of its seats. 

But the Liberals lost big, weakening the informal centrist coalition of pro-European Union powers that generally underpins the passage of legislation in the European Parliament, despite their differences.

Together, the three will control more than 400 seats in the new Parliament, which will be inaugurated on July 16. That seems a comfortable majority, but discipline in political group voting can at times be weak, and tactical alliances may be necessary down the line to ensure laws are passed. The first test of the new, weaker parliamentary majority, will be the confirmation of the European Commission president, the bloc’s top official, penciled in for July 18.

From a policy perspective, the electoral resilience of the centrist powers will translate into some continuity, particularly in preserving the European Union’s support of Ukraine.

Greens crater but still matter

The Greens were the night’s biggest losers: having performed well in 2019 and emerged as an important progressive power in the Parliament, they lost a quarter of their seats in the new elections.

This was largely foreseen: Voters switched out of the environmentally focused party for two key reasons. Environmentally minded voters found that the Green agenda had been, to a high degree, integrated in other bigger mainstream parties. In a way, the Greens had lost their unique selling point.

But other voters felt that the green agenda in Europe has gone too far, hurting farmers and more broadly rural voters.

Even so, the Greens could emerge as a reserve pool of support for the three centrists, despite their diminished seats.

Kingmaker no more?

The conservatives had, before the elections, floated the idea of roping in the European Conservatives and Reformists, a further right-wing group dominated by Italy’s prime minister, Giorgia Meloni. This would have been a big no-no for the conservatives’ other centrist allies, especially those on the left and center left who view the group and Ms. Meloni as radicals in mainstream clothes.

With the centrist majority holding, the need to turn to Ms. Meloni and the members of European Parliament she controls, seems to have mostly evaporated for now. While the conservatives may still need to partner with this group in Parliament on a tactical basis, it appears unlikely that they will need to rely on them.

That said, Ms. Meloni remains a key European Union member state leader, with an outsize presence that has influenced the political landscape and already pulled many policies her way. She performed very well at home, quite unlike the leaders of the other major E.U. countries, reasserting her dominance." [1]

1. European Parliament Elections: Key Takeaways. Stevis-Gridneff, Matina.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 10, 2024.