When Did Liberals Become So Comfortable With War?

"“Give war a chance,” the maverick strategist Edward Luttwak implored at the tail end of the Clinton administration. The quest for durable peace, he thought, was habitually interrupted by those liberal do-gooders who refused to let wars “burn themselves out.”

Spool forward some 25 years and war is being given a whole lot of chances, from Israel’s onslaught on Gaza and Lebanon to weaponized famine in Sudan to the long, grinding war in Ukraine. 

Amid this devastation, Western leaders have in the past years showed a unified front, largely supporting Ukraine and Israel and ignoring Sudan. 

But a new dynamic has underpinned this informal coalition: the growing penchant for war — and the tolerance of its costs — among the Western liberal-left establishment once lampooned by Mr. Luttwak.

When did the left become so comfortable with war? We need to ask this question with some urgency — not least because Donald Trump repeatedly played on fears of global war in his election campaign before promising to “stop wars” in his victory speech. 

The standard explanation is that terrorists and an axis of autocracies are threatening the world order, and Western leaders — whatever their political affiliation — must act. Certainly, the world looks more dangerous than it has for a long time. 

But this does not fully explain the way that the Biden administration has so single-mindedly been arming Ukraine and Israel while also letting allies in the Persian Gulf wage a devastating proxy war in Sudan. 

Nor does it quite explain the enthusiasm for the remilitarization of Europe coming from liberal commentators, Nordic social democrats and German greens alike, who will now be looking worriedly across the Atlantic.

Two other explanations stand out. First, history has shown that governments and bureaucracies tend to become addicted to a war footing, with failure sucking them in further — think of America’s war on terror, or Vietnam. War encourages a perverse cycle of escalation in which huge financial and political gains accrue for governments and the military-industrial complex while the costs tend to be borne by weaker parties — before they start to come home in some shape or form.

We’ve called this bipartisan pattern “wreckonomics” and have found it especially present in wars or conflicts with costs that Western politicians can largely outsource — from fighting terrorism, drugs and smugglers to quasi-colonial interventions during the Cold War. Traditionally, the political right has been the dominant actor in these forays, including Richard Nixon’s war on drugs and George W. Bush’s war on terror. That last effort proved a savior for the military-industrial complex while inflicting relatively limited American fatalities as instability, terrorism attacks and mass displacement accumulated elsewhere. 

Today, the war in Ukraine is once again offering a supercycle of vastly increased military spending, this time without the risk of any Western combat deaths.

There’s an important difference between invading Iraq and Afghanistan, on the one hand, and defending Ukraine against Russians on the other. Yet where war involves a skewed distribution of costs and gains, it tends to incentivize further escalation. Notably, Western leaders, such as Britain’s Keir Starmer, France’s Emmanuel Macron and NATO’s former head Jens Stoltenberg, have suggested that the Ukraine war is winnable, without having a clear road map beyond sending more weapons — to the point of potentially allowing long-range Storm Shadow missiles to be fired into Russia itself.

The second and crucial factor is that moral righteousness blinds us to the costs of war and the faults of friends. Until quite recently, that fire tended to burn strongest on the right, while center-left governments in the United States and Europe have frequently offered some kind of “lesser evil” to temper the worst costs of war. Consider Tony Blair’s claim that he could tame the war on terror by joining it, or left-leaning politicians’ habit of playing catch-up with the right on border security. The end result has still in many cases involved more military solutions. Barack Obama, for instance, distanced himself from Mr. Bush’s war on terror when he was president, but he waged what some called “drone wars” while failing to bring military spending below Cold War levels. 

In the political marketplace, liberals have tended to be insecure consumers of the war fix rather than its principal peddlers.

That has been changing. In the past years, the sense of righteousness that has so often infused right-wing war fever has been increasingly evident on the left, with a moral crusade to defend democracy and fight existential threats becoming a crucial part of its case for power. Though this tendency did not start with the U.S. election of 2016, Mr. Trump gave it a very significant boost in America.

The Democrats’ defeat was partly explained by accounts of Mr. Trump and Mr. Putin conspiring to undermine democracy, and later, the Jan. 6 riot in Washington added further urgency to the fight for democracy. During the pandemic, liberals saw themselves as being on the right side of history in an existential fight against a virus and the populist authoritarians who were recklessly ignoring it.

Right-wing wreckonomics has tended to drum up existential threats against the nation, such as migration, terrorism and drugs.

A different kind of existential angst — focused on rising authoritarianism, global emergencies and vulnerable groups — has typically animated liberal righteousness. When this means protecting democracy or victims of violence, for instance, it has an obvious good side. But center-left leaders have increasingly been harnessing these protective instincts to the war machine while shutting down spaces for frankly debating the costs incurred in cranking it up.

Over Ukraine, Mr. Starmer, then leader of the British opposition, told his lawmakers that anyone assigning blame to NATO for the war would be kicked out of the Labour Party. 

Legitimate questions around the causes of conflict or concerns around military escalation — including nuclear war — have been routinely dismissed in ways that brook no dissent. We have seen a wide array of critics accused of apologism, misinformation or not caring about democracy, from the realist scholar John Mearsheimer to the populist British leader Nigel Farage and Pope Francis. Amid such accusations, the danger of groupthink has grown.

A similar shutting down of debate has been underplaying the costs of war in the Middle East. Amid evidence of multiple war crimes, criticism of Israel’s devastating military campaign has been suppressed under liberal or center-left governments — whether in German political debates, on U.S. campuses or in French streets. The Biden administration and key European allies have been providing arms and military support to Israel as the Palestinian death toll has risen past 43,000, according to the Gazan health ministry. And public debate has been practically nonexistent over the Biden administration’s warm support for the United Arab Emirates, which was recently rewarded with “major defense partner” status and praised as an ally against terrorism despite credible evidence it has been arming the Rapid Support Forces rampaging through Sudan. (The United Arab Emirates has denied this.) Rather than going away, the righteous legacy of the war on terror is still adding fuel to the fire in these catastrophes.

If liberals cannot honestly discuss these devastating human costs, who will?

Worryingly, it is hard-right politicians who are selectively trying on the peace mantle. So we have JD Vance standing in as one of America’s most visible Ukraine war skeptics; in Europe, criticism comes mainly from outfits such as the populist Reform U.K. party and the far-right Alternative for Germany. Meanwhile, the upstart Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany has offered a rare left-wing challenge to the Ukraine war consensus. Although condemned by liberals, the party’s growing popularity is a warning to Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s collapsing coalition of greens, liberals and social democrats.

 It remains striking that it has fallen to a motley band of challengers to highlight the kinds of major problems that only intensify when righteousness feeds enthusiasm for war: Costs end up coming home, conflicts develop a life of their own, bureaucracies bloat, and the risks of escalation and mission creep grow.

Meanwhile, right-wing politicians haven’t precisely abandoned their war fix. Rather, they are more cynically picking their battles and selectively stoking the fires. Republicans have wholeheartedly supported Israel’s actions while Mr. Trump has once again been bringing war rhetoric home with talk of a migrant “invasion” and the “enemy from within.”

Paradoxically, the outcome of the U.S. election may open up space for a rethink. Politicians must now find a way to address serious crises and genuine threats without ignoring the steep costs of one-dimensional war fixes. 

The appeal of an “antiwar" message from the hard right on Ukraine should make center-left parties — and not just the Democrats — pause for breath. 

Given their history, center-left parties in particular should be well placed to think and speak clearly about paths to peace that do not involve waging unwinnable wars indefinitely. Failing to confront those with a vested interest in militarism, they have left the door open for the right’s calculating mix of war and peace. Framing the choice as one between all-out war and capitulation is unhelpful, and framing peace advocates as conspiracists or traitors is an Orwellian turn that only digs us deeper into the mire.

When liberals compete to give war a chance — and when speaking the unspeakable comes down to fringe and hard-right politicians — we are in serious trouble. Unless we can open up political space for dissent and confront the true costs of conflict, wars will not burn themselves out. They will simply burn.

Ruben Andersson and David Keen are the authors of “Wreckonomics: Why It’s Time to End the War on Everything.”" [1]

1. When Did Liberals Become So Comfortable With War?: Guest Essay. Andersson, Ruben; Keen, David.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Nov 10, 2024.

Missing in Europe: A Strong Leader for a New Trump Era

 

"Internal political squabbles — and the fallout from a global backlash to inflation, immigration and ruling elites — are hobbling Germany and France.

Donald J. Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency could spell a lonely and dangerous stretch for Western Europe, which is already mired in economic stagnation and rattled by conflict on its eastern doorstep. It is a moment that European leaders agree demands renewed and forceful leadership from the continent’s two largest economies.

But France and Germany, which are also the European Union’s most important countries, are struggling to answer the call. They themselves are falling victim to the same political forces that helped Mr. Trump gain popularity among conservatives and swing voters in the United States. Among them: backlash against rapid consumer price increases; anxiety and anger over increased immigration; and the rapid erosion of public trust in political elites.

Mainstream political parties have bled support. Populists and nationalists, including once-fringe parties on the far right, have surged.

After months of infighting over taxes, spending and how best to reinvigorate Germany’s economy, Chancellor Olaf Scholz scuttled his governing coalition this past week by firing his wayward finance minister. The country appears headed toward early elections, which seem likely to oust Mr. Scholz from power.

A far-right party and a new populist party gained ground in recent regional elections, and Mr. Trump’s victory could further boost their credibility against mainstream parties in the coming federal election.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron has seen his power wane in the aftermath of a calamitous decision to call snap elections this year. It took France months to form a government after that vote, which left the lower house of Parliament in near deadlock and yielded a shaky coalition clinging to power against the far-right and the left.

The uncertainty from Paris to Berlin has created a continental power vacuum that may embolden Russia in its conflict in Ukraine. 

It threatens to hobble Europe’s ability to respond to a global trade war if Mr. Trump moves quickly next year to impose hefty taxes on imports to the United States.

It is likely to further muddle European leaders’ efforts to forge a common industrial policy to shield their industries from a surge of low-cost Chinese imports, including electric cars and other clean-energy technologies.

And it could complicate the already difficult political task of ratcheting up European spending on the military, which leaders and analysts agree will take on new urgency amid Mr. Trump’s intermittent threats to pull out of NATO or otherwise pull back American security guarantees for European allies.

There are other, more stable leaders whose roles in Europe could grow to meet the crisis. But they have complications of their own.

Keir Starmer, who was elected prime minister of Britain this summer, has already been bruised by public outcry over gifts he and his wife accepted — and his country is not in the European Union.

Giorgia Meloni, the Italian prime minister, is a populist who could forge a close relationship with Mr. Trump — or who could find her relatively centrist approach to international affairs and support for Ukraine at odds with Mr. Trump’s own positions.

Analysts agree the most natural fits to lead a more independent, muscular Europe would need to come from Berlin or Paris, the very places now most troubled.

“There is a very clear crisis of Franco-German leadership that is intensifying with the collapse of the German coalition, and with France self-absorbed by its own internal political divisions,” said Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, the president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Paris. “And that’s a handicap on the European and international stage.”

Jörn Fleck, a senior director with the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, said France and Germany were suffering from “self-inflicted” political crises just as Mr. Trump’s election added large new uncertainties to Europe’s future.

“We’re looking at a much more challenging relationship,” he said. “Things might get worse quickly before they get better.”

Mr. Macron and Mr. Scholz acknowledged that difficulty this past week, but offered few clues for how they might rise to meet it.

Mr. Trump “was elected by the American people, and he’s going to defend the interests of the American people — that’s legitimate and a good thing,” Mr. Macron said on Thursday, at the opening of a summit of European leaders in Budapest. “The question is, are we ready to defend the interests of Europeans?”

The world is made of herbivores and carnivores, he added, and “if we decide to remain herbivores, the carnivores will win.”

Mr. Scholz, addressing reporters on Thursday, acknowledged the challenging timing of his decision kill his coalition by expelling his finance minister, Christian Lindner, who had begun to undercut the government’s economic agenda.

Instead of staying in office through next fall’s regularly scheduled elections, Mr. Scholz and his coalition will now probably face voters in March — and Mr. Scholz appears likely to lose the chancellorship.

“I would have liked to have spared you this difficult decision, especially in times like these when uncertainty is growing,” Mr. Scholz said.

But, he added: “We must stick together in Europe more than ever and continue to invest together in our own security and strength. Because the situation is serious.”

For years, Mr. Macron has repeatedly urged Europe to be more united and more independent militarily, economically and technologically — less tethered to the whims of successive U.S. administrations and better equipped to compete with China’s industrial and commercial dominance.

But he is now in a much weaker position than he was during his first term — a near lame duck who no longer has much control over domestic policy and who is term limited, as he cannot run for office again in 2027.

The French government is mired in parliamentary debates over a budget that is badly needed to rein in ballooning deficit and debt that are some of the worst in Europe. It is still unclear whether the government will be able to secure the deep spending cuts and higher taxes it is seeking by the end of the year without collapsing.

A different, but no less divisive, budget debate looms this week in Germany. Leaders will need to agree on steps to plug a budget hole and comply with what is essentially a constitutional mandate for balanced budgets outside of times of emergency.

Disagreement over how to do that — and how to best use fiscal policy to shock the German economy out of recession — helped drive the split in Mr. Scholz’s coalition.

An even bigger fight could be just around the corner. Mr. Trump has pushed for Germany to spend more on its military, which would require Berlin to increase its defense budget and which would come with its own risks.

That would force leaders to take new steps to borrow money — or to ponder politically painful domestic spending cuts to free up more money for the military, which could stoke voter outrage and help “Germany first” parties, like the far-right Alternative for Germany, at the polls.

Mr. Scholz has expressed a preference for borrowing and rejected spending trade-offs.

 The heavy favorite to lead the next government is the major mainstream alternative to Mr. Scholz’s Social Democrats: the more conservative Christian Democrats. They would change some policies, but remain strong Ukraine supporters. 

If they or another mainstream party is able to form a government, analysts say, that may end Berlin’s policy paralysis — at least for a while." [1]

  Enough for Germany to dance with the danger of a nuclear WWIII. Germans hate radioactivity. They killed their nuclear power stations already. Alternative for Germany is the only Trump-like solution for the EU.

1. Missing in Europe: A Strong Leader for a New Trump Era: News Analysis. Tankersley, Jim; Breeden, Aurelien.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Nov 10, 2024.

Dingo Europoje: stiprus naujosios Trumpo eros lyderis

 „Vokietiją ir Prancūziją kliudo vidaus politiniai kivirčai ir pasaulinės reakcijos pasekmės dėl infliacijos, imigracijos ir nevykusio valdančiojo elito.

 

 Donaldo J. Trumpo grįžimas į JAV prezidento postą gali reikšti vienišą ir pavojingą atkarpą Vakarų Europai, kuri ir taip yra įklimpusi į ekonominį sąstingį ir barškinama dėl konflikto prie rytinių slenksčių. Tai momentas, kai Europos lyderiai sutaria, kad iš dviejų didžiausių žemyno ekonomikų reikia atnaujinto ir tvirto vadovavimo.

 

 Tačiau Prancūzija ir Vokietija, kurios taip pat yra svarbiausios Europos Sąjungos šalys, sunkiai atsiliepia į skambutį. Jos pačios tampa tų pačių politinių jėgų aukomis, kurios padėjo D. Trumpui išpopuliarėti tarp konservatorių ir svyruojančių rinkėjų JAV. Tarp jų: ​​atsakas prieš greitą vartotojų kainų augimą; nerimas ir pyktis dėl padidėjusios imigracijos; ir spartus visuomenės pasitikėjimo nevykusiu politiniu elitu erozija.

 

 Pagrindinės politinės partijos sulaukė paramos nukraujavimo. Populistai ir nacionalistai, įskaitant kadaise buvusias kraštutinių dešiniųjų partijas, išaugo.

 

 Po, ilgus mėnesius trukusios, kovos dėl mokesčių, išlaidų ir kaip geriausiai atgaivinti Vokietijos ekonomiką, kancleris Olafas Scholzas praėjusią savaitę sužlugdė jo valdančiąją koaliciją, atleisdamas jo užkietėjusį finansų ministrą. Panašu, kad šaliai artėja pirmalaikiai rinkimai, kurie, regis, nuvers p. Scholzą iš valdžios.

 

 Kraštutinių dešiniųjų partija ir nauja populistinė partija (Sahros Wagenknecht) įsitvirtino neseniai vykusiuose regioniniuose rinkimuose, o D. Trumpo pergalė gali dar labiau sustiprinti jų patikimumą prieš pagrindines partijas ateinančiuose federaliniuose rinkimuose.

 

 Prancūzijoje prezidento Emmanuelio Macrono galia nyksta po nesėkmingo sprendimo šiais metais skelbti pirmalaikius rinkimus. Prancūzijai prireikė mėnesių suformuoti vyriausybę po šio balsavimo, dėl kurio parlamento žemieji rūmai beveik atsidūrė aklavietėje ir tai lėmė netvirtą koaliciją, įsikibusią į valdžią prieš kraštutinius dešiniuosius ir kairiuosius.

 

 Nežinomybė nuo Paryžiaus iki Berlyno sukūrė žemyninį galios vakuumą, kuris gali paskatinti Rusiją jos konflikte Ukrainoje.

 

 Tai gali pakenkti Europos gebėjimui reaguoti į pasaulinį prekybos karą, jei D. Trumpas kitais metais greitai imsis didelių mokesčių importui į Jungtines Valstijas.

 

 Tikėtina, kad tai dar labiau sujauks Europos lyderių pastangas sukurti bendrą pramonės politiką, siekiant apsaugoti savo pramonę nuo pigaus Kinijos importo, įskaitant elektromobilius ir kitas švarios energijos technologijas, antplūdžio.

 

 Ir tai gali apsunkinti ir taip sudėtingą politinę užduotį didinti Europos išlaidas kariuomenei, kuri, kaip teigia lyderiai ir analitikai, imsis naujos skubos, kai D. Trumpas nuolat grasina pasitraukti iš NATO ar kitaip atšaukti Amerikos saugumo garantijas Europos sąjungininkams.

 

 Yra ir kitų, stabilesnių lyderių, kurių vaidmuo Europoje galėtų padidėti, kad būtų galima įveikti krizę. Tačiau jie turi savo komplikacijų.

 

 Šią vasarą Didžiosios Britanijos ministru pirmininku išrinktas Keiras Starmeris jau buvo sumuštas visuomenės pasipiktinimo dėl dovanų, kurias jis ir jo žmona priėmė, o jo šalis nėra Europos Sąjungos narė.

 

 Italijos ministrė pirmininkė Giorgia Meloni yra populistė, galinti užmegzti glaudžius santykius su D. Trumpu – arba kuri gali pastebėti, kad jos gana centristinis požiūris į tarptautinius reikalus ir parama Ukrainai prieštarauja paties D. Trumpo pozicijoms.

 

 Analitikai sutaria, kad, norint vadovauti nepriklausomai, raumeningesnei Europai, natūraliausias tikėjimas turėtų kilti iš Berlyno ar Paryžiaus, tų vietų, kuriose dabar daugiausia problemų.

 

 „Yra labai aiški Prancūzijos ir Vokietijos lyderystės krizė, kuri stiprėja žlugus Vokietijos koalicijai, o Prancūzijai pasineriant į savo vidaus politinį susiskaldymą“, – sakė Vokietijos Maršalo fondo prezidentė Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer. JAV Paryžiuje. „Ir tai yra kliūtis Europos ir tarptautinėje arenoje."

 

 Jörnas Fleckas, Atlanto tarybos Vašingtone Europos centro vyresnysis direktorius, sakė, kad Prancūzija ir Vokietija kenčia nu „pačių sukeltų politinių krizių kaip tik tuo metu, kai D. Trumpo išrinkimas pridėjo naujų didelių neaiškumų Europos ateičiai.

 

 „Mes žiūrime į daug sudėtingesnius santykius“, - sakė jis. „Viskas gali greitai pablogėti, kol nepagerės."

 

 E. Macronas ir Scholzas pripažino šį sunkumą praėjusią savaitę, tačiau pasiūlė nedaug užuominų, kaip jie galėtų jį įveikti.

 

 D. Trumpą „išrinko Amerikos žmonės ir jis gins Amerikos žmonių interesus – tai yra teisėta ir gerai“, – sakė E. Macronas ketvirtadienį atidarydamas Europos lyderių susitikimą Budapešte. „Kyla klausimas, ar esame pasirengę ginti europiečių interesus?"

 

 Pasaulis sudarytas iš žolėdžių ir mėsėdžių, pridūrė jis, ir „jei nuspręsime likti žolėdžiais, mėsėdžiai laimės“.

 

 P. Scholzas, ketvirtadienį kreipdamasis į žurnalistus, pripažįsta, kad  pasirinko sudėtingą savo sprendimo laiką, nužudydamas savo koaliciją, pašalindamas savo finansų ministrą Christianą Lindnerį, kuris ėmė menkinti vyriausybės ekonominę darbotvarkę.

 

 Užuot likęs savo pareigas per ateinantį rudenį reguliariai numatytus rinkimus, M. Scholzas ir jo koalicija, tikriausiai, susidurs su rinkėjais kovo mėnesį – ir atrodo, kad p. Scholzas neteks kanclerio pareigų.

 

 „Norėčiau jūsų pasigailėti dėl šio sunkaus sprendimo, ypač tokiais laikais, kai auga netikrumas“, – sakė p. Scholzas.

 

 Tačiau jis pridūrė: „Privalome laikytis kartu Europoje labiau, nei bet kada ir toliau kartu investuoti į savo saugumą ir stiprybę. Nes padėtis rimta“.

 

 Daugelį metų E. Macronas ne kartą ragino Europą būti vieningesne ir labiau nepriklausoma kariniu, ekonominiu ir technologiniu požiūriu – mažiau pririštą prie nuoseklių JAV administracijų užgaidų ir geriau pasirengusią konkuruoti su Kinijos pramonės ir prekybos dominavimu.

 

 Tačiau dabar jis yra daug silpnesnėje padėtyje, nei buvo per pirmąją kadenciją – beveik luoša antis, nes jis nebegali daugiau kontroliuoti vidaus politikos ir kurio kadencija yra ribota, nes 2027 m. vėl negali kandidatuoti.

 

 Prancūzijos vyriausybė yra įklimpusi į parlamento debatus dėl biudžeto, kurio labai reikia, norint suvaldyti didėjantį deficitą ir skolą, kas yra vieni iš didžiausių Europoje. Vis dar neaišku, ar vyriausybei pavyks iki metų pabaigos užsitikrinti didelius išlaidų mažinimus ir didesnius mokesčius be žlugimo.

 

 Kitokios, bet ne mažiau prieštaringos diskusijos dėl biudžeto šią savaitę siautėja Vokietijoje. Lyderiai turės susitarti dėl žingsnių, kaip užkamšyti biudžeto skylę, ir laikytis konstitucinio subalansuoto biudžeto mandato nekritinėms sąlygoms.

 

 Nesutarimai dėl to, kaip tai padaryti – ir kaip geriausiai panaudoti fiskalinę politiką, siekiant išmušti Vokietijos ekonomiką iš recesijos – padėjo paskatinti p. Scholzo koalicijos skilimą.

 

 Dar didesnė kova gali būti visai šalia. D. Trumpas ragino Vokietiją daugiau išleisti jos kariuomenei, o tai pareikalautų Berlynui padidinti gynybos biudžetą, o tai sukeltų savo riziką.

 

 Tai priverstų lyderius imtis naujų žingsnių skolintis pinigų arba mąstyti apie politiškai skausmingus vidaus išlaidų mažinimus, kad būtų galima atlaisvinti daugiau pinigų kariuomenei, o tai gali sukelti rinkėjų pasipiktinimą ir padėti partijoms „Vokietija pirmiausia“, pavyzdžiui, kraštutinių dešiniųjų partijai „Alternatyva Vokietijai“ rinkimų metu.

 

 P. Scholzas išreiškė pirmenybę skolinimuisi ir atmetė išlaidų kompromisus.

 

 Didžiausias favoritas vadovauti kitai vyriausybei yra pagrindinė alternatyva p. Scholzo socialdemokratams: konservatyvesni krikščionys demokratai. Jie pakeis kai kurias politikos kryptis, bet išliks tvirtais Ukrainos rėmėjais.

 

 Jei jie ar kita pagrindinė partija sugebės suformuoti vyriausybę, analitikai teigia, kad Berlyno politikos paralyžius gali baigtis – bent jau kuriam laikui." [1]

 

 Vokietijai pakaks koketuoti su III pasaulinio atominio karo pavojumi. Vokiečiai nekenčia radioaktyvumo. Jie jau nužudė jų atomines elektrines. "Alternatyva Vokietijai" yra vienintelis į Trumpą panašus sprendimas ES gyvenime.

 

1. Missing in Europe: A Strong Leader for a New Trump Era: News Analysis. Tankersley, Jim; Breeden, Aurelien.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Nov 10, 2024.