Cocky Talk of Empty Handed Person: "Two Years to Prevent World War III". Really?

"Xi Jinping has ordered the People's Liberation Army to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027. Whether he launches an invasion may depend on President Trump's defense secretary. If confirmed by the Senate, Army National Guard veteran and Fox News host Pete Hegseth, Mr. Trump's nominee, will have to confront the collapse of deterrence in Europe and the Middle East, resource constraints on Capitol Hill, recruitment challenges, and a deteriorating balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The only way to promote peace is to go to war on day one -- not with China, Russia or Iran but with the Pentagon bureaucracy.

The first task is to fix the U.S. Navy. America needs a maritime industrial base that can counter China's. Pentagon requirements for building maritime assets involve too many uncoordinated stakeholders. The Pentagon establishes war-fighting requirements -- such as the number of missiles on a ship -- without regard to interdependent technical specifications such as that ship's center of gravity. When those technical specifications aren't tightly linked to war-fighting requirements, the mismatch can cause underperformance or unplanned costs and time. The Defense Department should return to the board model that served the Navy well until the 1960s. The Navy would have a forum of senior stakeholders with a chairman empowered to decide both requirements and specifications, ensuring that these work in harmony.

The Navy should also create an office focused on expediting the development and deployment of certain war-fighting technologies, similar to the Rapid Capabilities Office at the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force. The next secretary should insist on more flexible processes to deliver unmanned surface, aerial and underwater vehicles with speed and at scale. He must also work with Congress to help shipyards attract and retain talent.

Rebuilding the maritime industrial base can also help save Aukus -- the security partnership between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. -- which is in danger of stalling. Under the Aukus agreement, the U.S. Navy intends to sell Australia at least three Virginia-class attack submarines by the early 2030s. To realize this goal, the Navy needs to build more than today's 1.2 hulls a year and shrink maintenance backlogs that have sidelined nearly 40% of the fleet. Addressing these challenges will demand consistent funding, which will come only if the defense secretary articulates the importance of sea power and presents a coherent shipbuilding plan. The secretary can get Aukus off life support by accelerating U.S. submarine deployments to western Australia, bringing more Australian sailors onto U.S. boats, and establishing a naval reactors organization in Canberra.

The secretary must also confront the West's depleted arsenal of critical munitions, especially air-defense missiles. In a conflict with China, the U.S. could run out of some munitions within a week. The next secretary must rebuild America's arsenal by moving to maximum production rates of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (Extended Range), Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, Harpoon, Standard Missile 6 and other munitions. Wherever possible, these systems should be equipped with advanced energetic materials to extend their range and destructive power.

Ships, submarines and missiles are all expensive. To save money, the next secretary must enforce fixed-price contracting and force private-sector contractors to acquire products and services that are researched and developed on their dime, not the U.S. taxpayer's. The Defense Department's cost-plus contracting model has destroyed competition and innovation while exploding costs. Sen. John McCain mandated fixed-price commercial contracts in 2016, but Congress repealed that mandate five years later, after his death. Lawmakers should rectify this mistake by re-establishing fixed-price contracting and requiring the defense secretary to sign off on any cost-plus contract.

To free up more money, the secretary can reduce the civilian workforce, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the general and flag officer corps, and the diversity, equity and inclusion bureaucracy. He can sell non-war-fighting assets such as golf courses and resurrect a 2015 Pentagon study that outlined a path to save $125 billion over five years.

Congress can help by ensuring the Defense Department complies with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. This statute, which the Pentagon violates frequently, aims to prevent the government from wasting money on developing capabilities that can be purchased from the commercial sector. NASA predicted it would have cost $4 billion to build the Falcon 9 rocket, much more than the $400 million it cost Elon Musk's SpaceX to build it. It stands to reason, then, that by adhering to the law's commercial-preference provision, the Defense Department can save tens of billions annually. Additionally, Congress can give the Pentagon authority to use appropriated but unspent funds of between $10 billion and $15 billion per year.

Assuming China sticks to its Taiwan timeline, the next secretary has two years to prevent World War III. To do so, he must put the Pentagon on a war footing, firing any bureaucrat unable or unwilling to work at a wartime pace. The lack of accountability at the Defense Department -- after the shameful Afghanistan withdrawal, the failure to prevent events in Ukraine, and the current secretary's disappearance without informing the White House -- has undermined confidence in military leadership. Armed with a bold agenda, the next secretary can regain the trust of the American people and the fear of America's enemies.

---

Mr. Gallagher, a Journal contributor, is head of defense for Palantir Technologies and a distinguished fellow at the Hudson Institute. He represented Wisconsin's Eighth Congressional District (2017-24) and was chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party." [1]

  There has been no talent for a long time, there is not now and there will not be in the future. They are all in fintech, making billions of dollars, or at least they hope so.

We don't have means invented to defeat a major nuclear power. Ours are empty brave talks produced by empty-handed. 

1.  Two Years to Prevent World War III. Gallagher, Mike.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 14 Nov 2024: A.17.   
 

 

Pasauliniai Pietai yra pakankamai stiprūs, kad nuspręstų mūsų gyvenimo kryptį: Lotynų Amerikos prekyboje dominuoja Kinija

 Buvęs JAV prezidentas Klintonas teisus: kvailutė ekonomika nulems mūsų gyvenimą, o ne artilerijos sviedinių kiekis mūsų sandėliuose. Baroną Miunhauzeną artilerijos sviedinys pakėlė aukštai ir nunešė toli. Mums gi neverta apie tai svajoti. Tai nerealu, tai tik sviedinių gamintojų reklama.

 

 „Į pietus nuo JAV sienos Kinija yra kylanti.

 

 Kinijos lyderis Xi Jinping šią savaitę atvyksta į regioną, kuriame Kinija pakeitė JAV, kaip dominuojančią prekybos partnerę daugumai didelių ekonomikų, išskyrus Meksiką ir Kolumbiją. Pekinas pasirašė didžiąją dalį Lotynų Amerikos ir Karibų jūros regiono prie infrastruktūros programos, kuri neapima JAV. Peru Xi atidarys megauostą, kad paspartintų prekybą su Azija.

 

 Kinija yra aistringa ličio pirkėja iš Argentinos, Venesuelos žalios naftos ir Brazilijos geležies rūdos bei sojų pupelių. 286,1 mlrd. su nauju skolinimo modeliu ir mažesne atotrankos reakcija.

 

 Xi lankosi Pietų Amerikoje, kad dalyvautų vadovų susitikimuose, įskaitant Azijos ir Ramiojo vandenyno ekonominio bendradarbiavimo forumą šią savaitę Limoje, Peru, ir 20 šalių viršūnių susitikimą kitą savaitę Rio de Žaneire. Tikėtina, kad abu jie iliustruoja tai, ką kai kurie vadino Kinijos ekonominiu JAV marginalizavimu regione. Nors laukiama ir prezidento Bideno, jo ūgis sumažės po Donaldo Trumpo perrinkimo – Xi aplankė regioną daugiau kartų, nei abu JAV prezidentai.

 

 Nedaugelis laiko Lotynų Ameriką, kaip JAV „kiemą“.

 

 Regiono tautos paprastai džiaugiasi šiltais santykiais su JAV, tačiau Vašingtone jos dažnai laikomos antraeiliu prioritetu. Tuo tarpu Pekino diplomatai ir vadovai aktyviai bendradarbiauja su vietos ir nacionalinėmis vyriausybėmis, beveik nepaisant jų politinių pažiūrų.

 

 „Tai labai apmaudu, nes šiame regione yra viskas, ko, jūsų manymu, norėtų Amerikos įmonės“, – sako Ryanas Bergas, Vašingtono Strateginių ir tarptautinių studijų centro Amerikos programos direktorius.

 

 Be ekonominių ryšių gilinimo, Xi propaguoja valdymo modelį, laužantį JAV vadovaujamą pokario tvarką, kuri, jo nuomone, yra pasenęs kolonializmo reliktas. 

 

Nuolatinis Xi dėmesys regionui „yra simbolinis, o Pasaulinių Pietų šalims reikia to pripažinimo“, – sakė Alvaro Mendezas, Londono ekonomikos ir politikos mokslų mokyklos padalinio, tiriančio Kinijos įtaką, direktorius.

 

 Trumpas, kuris per pirmąją kadenciją daugiausia dėmesio skyrė regionui, kaip nepageidaujamos imigracijos šaltiniui, gali priversti kai kurias jo šalis priimti sunkų pasirinkimą, jei pastūmės jas apriboti ryšius su Kinija.

 

 „Daugelis Lotynų Amerikos gyventojų nerimauja dėl to, kas jų laukia per ateinančius ketverius metus šiuo svarbiu klausimu“, – sakė Michaelas Shifteris, Lotynų Amerikos tyrinėtojas iš Amerikos dialogo politikos grupės Vašingtone.

 

 Tuo tarpu didesni Trumpo tarifai kai kurias tautas gali priartinti prie Pekino.

 

 Kinijos prekyba ir investicijos išaugo maždaug 40 Lotynų Amerikos ir Karibų jūros šalių, kuriose gyvena daugiau, nei 660 milijonų, žmonių nuo Meksikos iki Čilės ir Argentinos, taip pat tokiose salose kaip Jamaika ir Kuba.

 

 Kinijos infrastruktūros statyba, įskaitant uostus, skirtus prekėms gabenti, atspindi, kaip visoje Azijoje ir Afrikoje Xi valdoma Kinija sustiprino savo buvimą statydama tiltus, elektrines ir stadionus. Kinija taip pat turi mažiau skolų išieškotojos įvaizdžio Lotynų Amerikoje, nei kitose besivystančiose pasaulio šalyse, iš dalies dėl to, kad Pekinas sulėtino naujų projektų įsipareigojimus ir pakoregavo kai kurių darbų finansavimą.

 

 Pekino stambumas ne visada yra naudingas. Ar kapitalo ir vartojimo prekių eksportas, be cheminių medžiagų ir mašinų, suteikia Kinijai prekybos perteklių su regionu?

 

 Kinija grumiasi, eksportuodama gaminius, tokius, kaip „Huawei Technologies“ telekomunikacijų įranga ir elektrinės transporto priemonės iš BYD, kuri perėmė apleistą „Ford“ gamyklą Brazilijoje. Kinijos plieno antplūdis neseniai privertė uždaryti didelę Čilės gamyklą.

 

 Kai kurios šalys didina muitus kiniškoms prekėms, o kitos į tradicinius sektorius, pavyzdžiui, žvejybą, gresia dideli Kinijos rinkos dalyviai. Kinijos įvaizdį taip pat suteršė nekokybiškos statybos, pavyzdžiui, hidroelektrinės projektas Ekvadore, ir ribotas dėmesys aplinkai ir vietiniams žmonėms, pavyzdžiui, aplink vario kasyklas Peru.

 

 Kiniją traukia tie patys bruožai, kurie turėtų paskatinti JAV tarptautines įmones trokšti konkuruoti iš esmės demokratiniame regione: gausūs gamtos ištekliai, įskaitant svarbias mineralines medžiagas, žmogiškasis kapitalas, skirtas gaminti tokius produktus, kaip vaistai, didėjanti vartotojų bazė ir teisinė valstybė.

 

 Prekyba padidino Pekino įtaką regione, kuris tradiciškai yra sąjungininkas su JAV, Brazilija neseniai prisijungė prie Kinijos, pateikdama Ukrainos konflikto užbaigimo planą, ir išreiškia savo Globalių Pietų viziją, kad mestų iššūkį tradicijai ir JAV vadovaujamai tvarkai.

 

 Argentina leidžia Kinijai valdyti palydovinę sekimo stotį savo kosmoso programai, kuri yra viena iš augančių beveik karinių ryšių. O Vašingtono priešai regione – Kuba ir Venesuela – laiko Pekiną draugu ir gynėju.

 

 Vašingtonas nerimauja, kad didėjanti Kinijos ekonominė įtaka suteiks Pekinui didelę įtaką Lotynų Amerikos vyriausybėms. JAV Pietų vadovybės vadovė generola Laura Richardson perspėjo dėl Pekino įsiveržimo į regioną. Reaguodami į Kinijos pažangą, Baltieji rūmai siekė sukurti ilgalaikes institucijas besivystančiose šalyse, kad pritrauktų investicijas.

 

 „Ši administracija daug dėmesio skyrė tam, kaip mes stengiamės privataus sektoriaus investicijas perkelti į užsienį, svarbų poveikį, kuris gali turėti aukštus standartus ir užtikrinti, kad sutarčių sąlygos būtų tokios, kad jos prisidėtų prie ilgesnio priimančiosios šalies stabilumo ar ilgalaikio  fiskalinio stabilumo“, – sakė aukšto rango administracijos pareigūnas, pažymėdamas, kad Kinija sulėtino savo įsipareigojimus, kilus priešpriešiniams vėjams ir problemų, susijusių su kai kuriais užsienio projektais.

 

 Pagrindinė Xi dėmesio regionui motyvacija yra demokratiškai valdomos Taivano salos izoliavimas: septynios iš 11 pasaulio valstybių, palaikančių diplomatinius santykius su Taipejumi, yra regione, įskaitant Gvatemalą, Paragvajų ir Haitį. Penkios šalys, kurios, vadovaujant Xi, perėjo pripažinimą į Pekiną, įskaitant Hondūrą ir Panamą, sulaukė daug Kinijos sandorių.

 

 Pekinas sudarė mineralų ir maisto produktų pirkimo sutartis, taip pat sandorius dėl uostų eksploatavimo tokiose vietose, kaip Peru ir prekybos juaniais, kad sustiprintų tiekimo linijas nuo rizikos, kurią vieną dieną Kinijos militarizmas paskatins Vakarų valstybių raginimus paskelbti embargą. Remiantis nauja Rodžio grupės ir Atlanto tarybos ataskaita, pagal tokį scenarijų galima tikėtis, kad Pekinas pasiūlys teigiamų paskatų G-20 šalims, tokioms, kaip Brazilija, kad išsklaidytų tokį atsiejimo spaudimą, su kuriuo Rusija susidūrė po Ukrainos įvykių.

 

 Ne viskas trukdo Pekinui: prieš pat Xi kelionę Brazilija, regis, atmetė savo ketinimus oficialiai prisijungti prie iniciatyvos „Juostas ir kelias“, o tai buvo smūgis programai, kuri, CSIS duomenimis, apima 22 iš 26 Lotynų Amerikos ir Karibų jūros šalių, galinčių dalyvauti.

 

 Šiandien JAV politikos formavimas regiono atžvilgiu yra labai nukreiptas į nelegalią imigraciją ir narkotines medžiagas, o ne į tai, kaip naujesnis jos bendras politinis stabilumas ir augančios vidurinės klasės galėtų būti naudingais Amerikai." [1]

1. World News: Latin American Trade Is Dominated by China. Areddy, James T; Dube, Ryan; Ruiz, Roque.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 14 Nov 2024: A.8.

Global South Is Strong Enough to Decide the Direction of Our Life: Latin American Trade Is Dominated by China

Former US President Clinton is right: the stupid economy will determine our lives, not the amount of artillery shells in our warehouses. Baron Munchausen was lifted high by an artillery shell and carried far away. We should not dream about it. This is not realistic, this is just an ad from producers of the shells.  

"South of the United States border, China is ascendant.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week arrives in a region where China has replaced the U.S. as the dominant trading partner for most big economies, with the exceptions of Mexico and Colombia. Beijing has signed up most of Latin America and the Caribbean to an infrastructure program that excludes the U.S. In Peru, Xi will inaugurate a megaport to speed trade with Asia.

China is a voracious buyer of lithium from Argentina, Venezuelan crude oil and Brazilian iron ore and soybeans. The $286.1 billion in Chinese projects in the region tallied by the AidData research lab at William and Mary in Virginia -- such as metro lines in Bogota and Mexico City and hydroelectric dams in Ecuador -- is approaching the value of China's work in Africa, but with a new lending model and less backlash.

Xi is visiting South America to take part in leadership summits, including an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum this week in Lima, Peru, and a Group of 20 summit next week in Rio de Janeiro. Both are likely to illustrate what some have called China's economic marginalization of the U.S. in the region. While President Biden is expected, too, his stature will be diminished in the wake of Donald Trump's re-election -- and Xi has visited the region more than both of them.

Few see Latin America as the U.S.'s "backyard" anymore.

The region's nations generally pine for warm relations with the U.S., but often are seen as a secondary priority in Washington. Beijing's diplomats and executives, meanwhile, actively engage with local and national governments almost regardless of their political leanings.

"It's super frustrating because this region has everything you'd think American companies would want," says Ryan Berg, director of the Americas program at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In addition to deepening economic ties, Xi promotes a governance model that breaks with the U.S.-led postwar order that he suggests is an outdated relic of colonialism. Xi's sustained attention to the region "is symbolic, and countries of the Global South need that recognition," said Alvaro Mendez, director of a unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science that studies China's influence.

Trump, who in his first term mostly focused on the region as a source of unwanted immigration, could force some of its countries into difficult choices if he pushes them to limit their China ties.

"Many Latin Americans are apprehensive about what's in store for them over the next four years on this critical issue," said Michael Shifter, a scholar of Latin America at the Inter-American Dialogue policy group in Washington. 

Meanwhile, higher Trump tariffs could drive some nations closer to Beijing.

Chinese trade and investment has boomed across the roughly 40 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, home to over 660 million people stretching from Mexico to Chile and Argentina, plus island-nations like Jamaica and Cuba.

China's construction of infrastructure including ports to move commodities mirrors how, all over Asia and Africa, China under Xi has cemented its presence by building bridges, power plants and stadiums. China also has less of the debt-collector image in Latin America than it has in other developing parts of the world, in part because Beijing has slowed new project commitments and adjusted how it has financed some work.

Beijing's largess isn't always beneficial. Is exports of capital and consumer goods in addition to chemicals and machinery give China a trade surplus with the region overall.

China is crowding in with manufactured exports such as Huawei Technologies telecommunication hardware and electric vehicles from BYD, which has taken over an abandoned Ford plant in Brazil. An influx of Chinese steel recently forced the closure of a large Chilean mill.

Some countries are raising tariffs on Chinese goods, and others see threats from big Chinese entrants to traditional sectors, like fishing. China's image also has been tarnished by shoddy construction, such as on a hydroelectric project in Ecuador, and limited regard for the environment and indigenous people, such as around copper mines in Peru.

China is attracted by the same attributes that should make U.S. multinationals eager to compete in the largely democratic region: abundant natural resources including critical minerals, human capital to deploy for manufacturing products like pharmaceuticals, growing consumer bases and rule of law.

Trade has given a lift to broader Beijing influence in a region that traditionally has allied itself with the U.S. Brazil recently joined China in putting forward a plan for ending the Ukraine conflict, and gives voice to its vision of a Global South to challenge the traditional U.S.-led order.

Argentina allows China to run a satellite tracking station for its space program, one of a growing number of quasi-military linkages. And Washington's nemeses in the region -- Cuba and Venezuela -- consider Beijing a friend and protector.

Washington worries that China's growing economic clout will provide Beijing deep influence over Latin American governments. The head of the U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Laura Richardson, has warned about Beijing's encroachment in the region. In response to China's advances, the White House has sought to build lasting institutions in developing nations to attract investment.

"This administration has focused very much on how we try to bring private-sector investment overseas, the important impact that can have in high standards and ensuring that the terms of agreements are such that they are contributing to host countries' longer stability or long-term fiscal stability," a senior administration official said, noting that China has slowed its commitments amid headwinds at home and problems with some overseas projects.

A leading motivation for Xi's attention to the region is isolating the democratically governed island of Taiwan: Seven of the 11 nations worldwide that maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei are in the region, including Guatemala, Paraguay and Haiti. Five that switched recognition to Beijing under Xi's watch, including Honduras and Panama, got showered with Chinese deals.

Beijing has locked in mineral and foodstuff purchase agreements, plus deals to operate ports in places like Peru and trade in yuan, to fortify supply lines against risks that Chinese militarism one day sparks calls among Western powers to embargo it. In such a scenario, Beijing could be expected to offer positive inducements toward G-20 nations like Brazil to diffuse the kind of decoupling pressure Russia faced after it invaded Ukraine, according to a new report from the Rhodium Group and Atlantic Council.

Not everything cuts Beijing's way: Shortly before Xi's trip, Brazil appeared to reject its overtures to formally join the Belt and Road Initiative, a blow to a program that by the CSIS's count includes 22 of the 26 Latin America and Caribbean nations eligible for it.

Today, U.S. policymaking toward the region is heavily slanted toward illegal immigration and narcotics, instead of how its more recent general political stability and growing middle classes could work to America's advantage." [1]

1. World News: Latin American Trade Is Dominated by China. Areddy, James T; Dube, Ryan; Ruiz, Roque.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 14 Nov 2024: A.8.