U.S. intelligence were split over the strength of Afghan government, military, documents say

 

"WASHINGTON -- Leading U.S. intelligence agencies failed to predict the rapid Taliban takeover of Afghanistan before the final withdrawal of American troops and instead offered scattershot assessments of the staying power of the Afghan military and government, a review of wide-ranging summaries of classified material by The Wall Street Journal shows.

The nearly two dozen intelligence assessments from four different agencies haven't been previously reported. The assessments charted Taliban advances from spring 2020 through this July, forecasting that the group would continue to gain ground and that the U.S.-backed government in Kabul was unlikely to survive absent U.S. support.

The analyses, however, differed over how long the Afghan government and military could hold on, the summaries show, with none foreseeing the group's lightning sweep into the Afghan capital by Aug. 15 while U.S. forces remained on the ground.

A month after President Biden announced his decision to withdraw all U.S. troops, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a May 17 report titled "Government at Risk of Collapse Following U.S. Withdrawal." The report estimated that the government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani would fall by year's end, a summary said. Less than a month later, the agency issued another analysis titled: "Afghanistan: Assessing Prospects for a Complete Taliban Takeover Within Two Years," said a summary.

A June 4 Defense Intelligence Agency report, meanwhile, said the Taliban would pursue an incremental strategy of isolating rural areas from Kabul over the next 12 months, according to a summary. In an "Executive Memorandum" on July 7, the DIA said the Afghan government would hold Kabul, said a person familiar with the report.

The intelligence shortfalls underpinned some of the policy failures that resulted in chaotic mass-civilian evacuations in the deadly final weeks of the U.S.'s 20-year Afghan war.

The summaries of the reports, which start in April 2020, provide the most detailed picture to date of what the U.S. intelligence community was telling Mr. Biden, and President Donald Trump before him, as each leader sought to end the war that killed 2,400 U.S. military personnel.

Policy makers across the national security apparatus rely on such intelligence reports to shape their decisions. While varied and conflicting assessments are common, the disparities may complicate efforts among decision makers to reach consensus. For the Afghan withdrawal, contingency planning, including the evacuation operations, relied heavily on the intelligence assessments, said U.S. officials with knowledge of the policy planning.

Members of Congress have been scrutinizing many aspects of the tumultuous exit from Afghanistan, including the performance of the intelligence community, after the administration was blindsided by the Taliban's rapid advance.

Assumptions that the Afghan security forces and government could hold out for some time were central to the administration's withdrawal plans. Those called for the U.S. military to draw down rapidly, while the embassy remained well staffed to provide visas and other support to Afghan allies weeks and months after American troops left.

When the Afghan government cratered, the U.S. military -- much of which had left the country by August -- reversed course, sending thousands of troops to evacuate the embassy and Afghans. In the ensuing rush, a suicide bombing and other violence killed scores more Afghans and 13 U.S. service members. Tens of thousands of Afghan allies and about 200 Americans were left behind.

The Journal reviewed titles, dates and summaries of reports from the CIA, the DIA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the State Department's intelligence bureau.

Representatives of the CIA, the DIA, the State Department and the Office of Director of National Intelligence, which coordinates all U.S. intelligence agencies, declined to comment.

"Directionally, they were all correct that things were going to deteriorate," said a senior administration official, while acknowledging that the agencies provided a "mixed picture."

Mr. Biden promised to withdraw from Afghanistan when he ran for president, and the U.S. officials with knowledge of the policy planning said the varying intelligence assessments had little impact on his decision.

National security adviser Jake Sullivan said in August that the administration would conduct a "hotwash" of the withdrawal to determine "where we can find holes or weaknesses and plug them."

CIA Director William Burns, among others, has defended the intelligence agencies' overall performance, while acknowledging that events unfolded faster than predicted.

"There's a very sobering picture that we painted of some very troubling trend lines" in Afghanistan, he said last week. "So does that mean that we, with mathematical precision, can say that, you know, former President Ghani in Afghanistan is going to flee his office and not tell his senior-most aides on the 15th of August? No."" [1]

 

The question is more fundamental. We, the West, including Lithuanian elites,  were planting democracy in Afghanistan for many years at huge expense of governments' cash. This our work failed spectacularly. Why? What mistakes were made? How to avoid them next time?

 

1. World News: Agencies Missed Fast Fall of Kabul --- U.S. intelligence were split over the strength of Afghan government, military, documents say
Salama, Vivian; Strobel, Warren P.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 29 Oct 2021: A.16.