Lithuania's conflict with China is a strategic, not just tactical or communication error

  “Deciding to rename the Taiwanese office in Vilnius a Taiwanese representative office, Lithuania stumbled on a level playing field and crossed one of China's brightest red lines, which is respected by other Western countries, including the United States. With our steps, we have perpetuated the long-standing anger of the second most powerful country in the world, the consequences of which we will feel not for a month or a year, but for 20 or 30 years, maybe even longer.

 

    The naivety and inability of Lithuanian diplomatic leaders to understand how China will react is puzzling. Only a naive could think that Beijing would consider the name of the mission an insignificant, unobtrusive trifle.

 

    For half a century, Beijing has consistently warned all countries that relations with Taiwan must be kept to a minimum, that Beijing will not take any steps towards recognizing Taiwan’s sovereignty. In recent years, China’s attitudes have tightened, with its foreign policy becoming confrontational, combative, loudly condemning any criticism of China. During the first high-level talks with the Biden administration this spring, China made it clear that it would not accept "unfounded allegations from the United States," claiming that U.S. action had severely damaged relations. If this is the case with the United States, why think that the mistakes of a small country will be ignored, especially in 2020? Has the Chinese Embassy in Vilnius reacted unequivocally to what it considers to be provocative Lithuanian political initiatives?

 

    Lithuania's failure to catch up was so deep that Foreign Minister Landsbergis, surprised, said that "China's assessment is far too strict." Later in late November, he repeatedly deep ignorance, telling reporters that the Chinese tone is not very aggressive, the reaction is temporary and relations will return to normal.

 

    Those empty hopes would not have existed even if Lithuania had not forgotten the elementary rule that in order to anticipate China's reaction, it is not enough to think how Lithuania, as Lithuania, would react in similar circumstances. One has to predict how China will behave as China.

 

    Some commentators and supporters of the government say there is no need to highlight this incident, a mistake has been made, but it is tactical or communicative. I don’t understand their logic. If turning China into its long-term enemy is just a tactical mistake, then what would be considered a strategic mistake. The declaration of war?

 

    We need to learn from mistakes so that we do not repeat them, and not to deceive ourselves, as Landsbergis does, by taking full responsibility for the crisis on China. He recently wrote in his Facebook account that "allowing people to call themselves (Taiwanese) is not a mistake." This is an inaccurate description of the situation. China does not care as much how the Taiwanese play themselves, but as much as their state is recognized. In addition, does the fact that Lithuania is the only representative of Taiwan mean that it is the only one that considers it necessary to take into account the desire of Taiwanese people to call themselves Taiwanese, and that other EU countries impose a poor “Taipei” label on poor Taiwanese?

 

    It is necessary to examine how the decision was done, who was consulted. It is necessary to ask not only the SSD, other Lithuanian intelligence services and local specialists, but also much more foreign partners who know about China and its possible reaction. Coalition partners and the president have already said they had not heard of it before the name was announced.

 

    Consequently, the decision was made by a group of friends drinking coffee in a cozy office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is necessary to establish procedures and procedures for making important decisions that will allow modeling the possible reactions of other countries. It is too much a luxury to expect that every time wisdom will descend spontaneously from heaven to inspire the assembled.

 

    Lithuania's foreign policy needs to be rethought - not the main guidelines that are more or less agreed upon - about the rhetoric of its presentation and the image it seeks to create. For some time now, there has been an obvious desire to portray Lithuania as bolder, more virtuous, and more valued than other Western countries.

 

    Such portrayals are inaccurate, arrogant, annoying, and discouraging. What do we think of a person who constantly repeats that he is more generous than others? Our allies and other nations will notice and value our foreign policy as bold and fair, if it were, and without our self-promotion.

 

    I don’t think it’s wise to pull a lion’s mustache in hopes that he won’t react. China has just shown that words have consequences. Autocracies that violate human rights and democratic principles must be criticized, as must similar actions by the Allies. But you can do it without thickening the colors, screaming more often and louder than everyone else, without paying special attention to yourself. It remains to be hoped that Lithuania's foreign policy will have an independent content and principles that will survive the abandonment of the usual ways of presentation, that it is just meaningless noise and anger.

 

    It is equally important to coordinate in advance with EU countries and institutions, especially when there is reason to believe that strong support will be needed. This was not done before the decision on the name of the mission was taken. A unilateral challenge was made to China, and then the EU is expected to stand up in defense of us. In words, EU does so, and we must be grateful for the solidarity and support EU has shown. 

 

But the EU should not be expected to embark on a trade war with China over Lithuania's uncoordinated brave decision.

 

    There is also a tendency to present the current policy as a continuation of the partisan resistance, the events of January and the March 11th. I don't see that continuation. Partisans and 1991 freedom defenders risked their lives.

 

    The risks were real, remembering how in 1989. in April, Soviet soldiers in Tbilisi with rubber sticks and sharp shovels brutally wiped out a pro-independence demonstration, killing about 20 people and injuring hundreds. January 20 Soviet armored personnel invaded Baku, shooting at civilians, killing about 133 people and injuring 600. It is almost a blasphemy to equate the struggle for freedom and independence for one's country with the establishment of a trade mission, but Mr Landsbergis seems to be saying that if a person does not respect Mr Landsbergis' decision on the Taiwan mission, the person does not respect March 11 or January 13. This devalues ​​the struggle for freedom in Lithuania.

 

    Lithuania was not as brave as G. Landsbergis tries to portray. If it was important to defend the cause of freedom and support the Taiwanese defending their sovereignty, why did Lithuania not officially recognize Taiwan as an independent country, did not establish formal diplomatic relations, did not exchange ambassadors? There is a suspicion that the heroes were sought after by insuring themselves. Lithuania 2021–2022 it is a secure country defended by NATO and the EU, not a country overthrown and persecuted by the Soviets, fighting almost alone for its freedom.”