A 'Trumpier' Second-Term Foreign Policy.

"Donald Trump has a historic lead in the Republican primary, and while November 2024 is a long 13 months away, national polls point to a close race that Mr. Trump could win. It is time to think about what a second Trump term would mean for American foreign policy. Thanks to his first-term record, his statements since leaving office, and the views of Trump associates and confidants such as Richard Grenell, Mr. Trump's ambassador to Germany and acting director of national intelligence, it's possible to discern what a MAGA 2.0 foreign policy might look like.

A second Trump term would almost certainly be "Trumpier" than the first. For much of his first term, Mr. Trump surrounded himself with well-known conservative foreign-policy figures and senior military leaders, often deferring to their advice. More experienced, more confident in his own judgment and less deferential to others' expertise, Mr. Trump likely will fill senior positions with people who reflect rather than challenge his instincts and priorities.

There will be resistance from inside the government, but this time around it won't come from senior officials, only from career civil servants in the Pentagon, State Department and the Treasury, aided by allies in the intelligence world. Expect explosive leaks, bureaucratic slow-walking and a permanent state of trench warfare in the government machine.

Mr. Trump's talent for disruption will likely have larger and more lasting consequences in a second term than in the first. He has never been a supporter of the rules-based international order, and he attaches little importance to its institutions, from the United Nations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He prefers transactional agreements with other powerful world leaders and considers his reputation for unpredictability one of his greatest assets in international affairs.

This makes him a disconcerting figure for American allies. On the one hand, threatening an American withdrawal from NATO to force such countries as Germany to honor their spending commitments is something Mr. Trump might very well try.

 On the other, he could surprise the world -- and key American allies in Asia -- by a willingness to seek some kind of grand bargain with Xi Jinping.

Ukraine policy is harder to predict. If the aid pipeline to Ukraine is already drying up because of congressional Republican opposition, by next spring President Volodymyr Zelensky may choose to open negotiations with Moscow well before the American election. 

In any case, even if a second Trump administration ends aid to Ukraine, Mr. Trump's determination to increase American oil and gas production and boost military spending make a lasting reconciliation with Moscow unlikely.

Geographically, experienced Trump hands like Mr. Grenell suggest that the Western Hemisphere would be a major second-term focus. Re-establishing order on America's southern border matters much, much more to Team Trump than the future of Crimea. 

Expect a mix of threats, promises and a willingness to dance with the devil (perhaps even the Maduro government in Venezuela) in a single-minded focus on addressing the migration crisis.

Climate policy will shift dramatically. Mr. Trump shares President Biden's belief that "foreign policy for the middle class" entails large-scale federal intervention to protect American industry. But whereas Mr. Biden orients his massive program of industrial planning toward his climate-change goals, Mr. Trump will more likely intervene on behalf of fossil fuels, traditional heavy industry and the defense sector.

A second Trump term would see continuities as well. After grumbling and resistance, the Biden administration has embraced the essence of Mr. Trump's approach to important leaders such as the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, the president of Turkey and the prime ministers of Israel and India. 

A brief but expensive era of name-calling and vainglorious human-rights posturing has been replaced by pragmatic bargaining. 

Trumpian indifference to human rights and democracy could also affect relations with governments like the military rulers of Myanmar.

For many decades, foreign governments have tried to curry favor in Washington through developing business relationships with friends, associates and at times relatives of American presidents.

The interest of many Trump associates in lucrative business arrangements is as well known overseas as Hunter Biden's interest in "consulting." The profoundly corrosive and damaging erosion of norms around presidential conflicts of interest will continue and perhaps accelerate in a second Trump term.

There is a final area of continuity that shouldn't be ignored. Mr. Biden's global strength has been constrained by international skepticism about the durability of his party's hold on power. Similar doubts will dog Mr. Trump if he returns to the White House in 2025. The U.S. under Mr. Trump would remain deeply polarized, and foreigners would discount Mr. Trump's promises and threats, as they have done Mr. Biden's, to the degree that they believe that American policy will shift radically again in 2029." [1]

 

It might shift. It might not. In the long term we all are dead. Let us think about 2024. It is coming. It is big. By the way, D. Trump's agreement with Moscow would better lead Beijing to the desire to make concessions to Washington than the gift of hundreds of billions of dollars to easy to buy off and corrupt Ukrainian Zelensky.

1. A 'Trumpier' Second-Term Foreign Policy. Walter Russell Mead.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 03 Oct 2023: A.13.