"Lithuanian
Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis has a funny diplomatic voice in the
international arena, despite the fact that he represents one of the smallest
European states - the minister is fiercely seeking greater support for Ukraine,
supporting Taiwan, angering China.
Although the minister himself calls it
"values-based foreign policy", the interview in the BBC program
"HARDtalk", the British journalist Stephen Sackur questioned
whether the policy implemented by G. Landsbergis is really supported by the
leaders of the USA and Europe and among the Lithuanian people themselves.
- You have very
openly expressed your deep concern about what might happen in 2024. What are
you so worried about?
- I think that there is not enough understanding of what is
at stake if Ukraine is not able to expel Russia from the territory of its
country. We see that Russia is constantly mobilizing troops, despite the fact
that it is not officially declared. We see that Russia is arming itself,
entering a conflict economy, producing weapons, receiving weapons from Iran and
North Korea.
- Russia is also gaining momentum on the Eastern Ukrainian
front.
- Exactly, and we are faltering, stumbling. When the leaders
of the Baltic or Eastern flank countries speak like this, it is not only
because we feel that defending Ukraine is morally right, but we see it as an
existential issue. This means that if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will
continue its move, because it is very difficult to stop a machine of this
size - it cannot be stopped simply by good wishes. It must be stopped by
military means.
- Would you say that 60 billion was finally accepted in the
USA? Will the dollar support package for Ukraine be a factor that changes the
course of the conflict? Or are you still afraid that Joe Biden's administration,
even while sending new weapons to Ukraine, is constrained by the desire not to
escalate the situation with Putin?
- From the very
beginning, when the West formulated its strategy in the conflict with Ukraine,
it was more about the red lines that we set for ourselves. We sent messages to
V. Putin that we will not do this or that. All of these messages are about the
fact that we are not part of this conflict. I think it hindered the
decision-making process, it hindered us from explaining the situation to the
voters.
- You use the past tense.
- This, of course, continues. But we've changed over the
years: at first we said we wouldn't send certain ammunition or equipment, but
now we do. However, I don't think we understood the very concept - that we need
to draw red lines not for ourselves, but for V. Putin. We must discourage him
from continuing his actions. Because now he knows that we hold ourselves back
because there are things we don't intend to do. And with nuclear threats, it is
he who "dissuades" us. He tells us - if you support Ukraine up to a
certain level, I can do something.
"Then what is
your message?" In the past 48 hours, we've seen Putin order his military
to deploy a tactical nuclear weapon for yet another military exercise, all of
which will be quite close to the Ukrainian border. When he does, will your
message to your Western partners be "oh, ignore it, it's just a bluff.
Forget that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear weapon states. It
doesn't matter because he'll never really use it”? Will this be your message?
- I would ask the following question: can we count how many
times he has threatened in the past as well? Countless times, it was always a
bluff. He would gain nothing from it, he can only lose.
Some countries are now on Russia's side. China obviously
supports Russia, Russians have partners in Africa, Latin America.
He would lose it all in an instant if these threats came
true.
- However, you seem to be failing to convince people like
national security adviser Jake Sullivan in Washington, D.C., because he is
clearly concerned about the threat of escalation. You also fail to convince
some European leaders, such as Olaf Scholz, who has repeatedly emphasized his
desire to avoid dangerous escalation. They believe in the concept of
de-escalation.
- Yes, but the only way, if we follow this strategy, leads
to the destruction of the country, to a conflict outside of Ukraine, in which
other countries may be involved. Because we are sending a very clear signal to
V. Putin: if you threaten us, we back off. So now we have to ask the question:
If he attacked another country and threatened a tactical nuclear weapon, what
would we do? This is the biggest problem we have. Therefore, it is necessary to
push back - to show that if you try something like this, the response will be
ten times worse than what you expect now.
- Talk like this is, frankly, a spiral leading to
Armageddon. You are Lithuanian foreign minister and, with all due respect, you
are from a fairly small European country. Politicians in Washington, Berlin,
London and, of course, Moscow have to assess strategic reality very carefully,
but living in Vilnius, you may be a little removed from real responsibility.
- But we are not
separated from reality.
- This is true.
- We are a border state - we are the NATO state that is
closest to the conflict, so we tend to weigh our words and believe that giving
in to an intimidation leads to even greater intimidation. That's where we
started - why are we so concerned about the current situation, why does it
disturb us so much? Because we believe that we do not put up any barriers for
Russia to move forward. To be honest, I do not believe that this US support for
Ukraine is the factor that can change the course of the conflict. One gets the
impression that when Congress approved the aid package, the West calmed down.
It's like "well, we dodged a bullet once, so maybe we should reconsider
now, let's take some time." Time is our enemy. Russia digs in, moves
forward. Logistics take time, and the support package itself is not delivered
immediately.
- Do you feel that support is slow?
- I know that preparations are underway, some elements are
already moving towards Ukraine - at least this is the information we have from
the Ukrainians. But it's far from the whole package. Finally, the support will
reach Ukraine, but we have to understand that the other side is not waiting and
will not give us time until we get everything we need to feel comfortable. They
will take advantage of the moment when Ukraine is most vulnerable. And this is
where we must rise.
- We talked a lot about the dangers of nuclear weapons and
the strategies behind countermeasures to V. Putin's threats to use this weapon.
But you're talking more broadly - that we need to eliminate our own red lines.
This is partly reflected by President Emmanuel Macron's thoughts expressed a
few days ago about the possibility of sending troops not only from France, but
also from NATO partners to Ukraine. Do you believe this possibility is serious?
And would you in Lithuania be ready to send your own men and women to fight in
Ukraine?
- I think that we cannot completely rule out such a
possibility.
That's why I was very open from the beginning - that Lithuania
would be part of any coalition that would help Ukraine win. With our limited
opportunities, with our limited resources, we understand the size of our
country. But, again, as soon as concrete solutions are proposed, when they are
discussed, there is always a "no" at the table. It doesn't help us.
We cannot create a united front if there will always be some country that says
"this is too much". This is why we supported France and the French
president.
- You supported France, but obviously most of the others did
not. Germans, Americans did not support.
- But there was no such expectation.
- However, when you talk the way you are talking to me now,
there is a real danger that you will simply expose the very deep differences of
the Western Alliance regarding the support of Ukraine. Those different
positions are very deep, and very real.
- But those differences are already public. And I don't
think it's a very big problem.
- Don't you think that V. Putin could listen to
our conversation and be happy that the words you uttered would never have been
said in Berlin or Washington.
- I have no doubt
that V. Putin knows that there are certain countries that do not send
long-range missiles to Ukraine. But there are also countries that say we can do
it. And we are one of those countries. And there are countries that say their
technology cannot be used against targets in Russia, while there are other
countries, like ourselves now, that say you can do that with the weapons we
supply. In this case, there is no unity either, but it provides a strategic
opportunity for Ukraine. They can use what they get - they get certain
technologies that they wouldn't have gotten if we had stuck to the lowest
possible denominator. Then this conversation wouldn't exist at all, and Ukraine
might not even exist anymore.
- You firmly believe
that Ukraine can win and take back every inch of its territory, including
Crimea. But there are many people, even in the countries of the NATO Alliance,
who, speaking privately, do not believe it at all.
- But it depends on us. Conflict requires two things: one is
political will, the other is logistics.
- There is still realism. And openness.
- Ukrainians clearly
show that they have political will - more than enough.
- Now there is a really big problem in Ukraine, convincing
young men that joining the country's armed forces is good for them.
Mobilization is a big problem.
- It is very difficult to mobilize people when they are not
provided with ammunition. Again, it's our fault. If I had to look for the
culprits of the problem, I would put up a very big mirror, sit in front of it
and ask questions - not to Ukrainians, but to our own leaders. where are we Are
you serious about this? Do we understand the consequences if Ukraine is not
able to win?
To be honest, I have already participated in such
conversations, I have heard the arguments, but I have never heard a real
answer, so how do you imagine when V. Putin will stop? Will such a person as V.
Putin stop at all? What leverage do you expect to have? Do you expect to call
him? And why should he stop?
- You are very
strongly, like a hawk, involved in the fight for greater aid to Ukraine, for
its victory in the conflict.
But you are also sending a message to your own people
and to the people of Europe and the United States that your country is also
under great threat from Russia. It seems that you can imagine Russia attacking
Lithuania very soon. What evidence do you have to support this?
- Already at the beginning of the conversation, in response
to the first question, I said that supporting Ukraine is correct not only in a
moral sense - it is also an existential question.
"But don't you sow fear among your people?" Fears
that you don't really have a basis for. Even your country's president suggested
you "sit down and calm down" last year when you said it was only a
matter of time before Russia sent in troops.
- But I'm not the only one who says so. You probably know
that a large number of the leaders of the Eastern Flank states speak similarly.
Even Germany's defense minister is saying the same thing as he seeks to reform
the country's military.
- He spoke about the period from 5 to 8 years, and you are
talking about a much shorter period. Even your country's military commander
said that the probability of a Russia-NATO war starting this year or next is very
low.
- I am not quoted
correctly. My assessments do not differ from the assessments of other countries
in the region. However, the situation may change depending on how Ukraine holds
up. If Ukraine manages to win, push the front, then we will be in a completely
different strategic position. If they fail to do so, if the situation
deteriorates very suddenly, then there are many dangers.
- We talked a lot about your disappointment with the level
of support for Ukraine. What about military support for the Baltic countries
from NATO? For example, the Germans undertook to deploy a brigade specially
dedicated to the security of Lithuania. True, as I understand it, these forces
will not be fully prepared and deployed in place until 2027. In addition, Germany
is still debating how many soldiers will actually be sent to Lithuania and how
many will remain in Germany.
- No, such a discussion has already been completed - a full
combat-ready brigade, about 5,000 soldiers, will be deployed, all in our
territory.
- How do you think the Russians will respond to this?
-
Well, it's not our biggest concern at the moment.
- Shouldn't it be?
- We are reacting to
what the Russians are already doing.
- We are back to that spiral where each side accuses the
other of escalating actions.
Not so long ago, NATO promised that there would be no
permanent NATO bases in the Baltic states.
Now you say you will have 5000 German troops. I also noticed
that the Polish president even advocated the deployment of nuclear weapons on his
country's territory."
"Yes, and even that may not be enough." I'm not
talking about Polish decisions, but about 5,000 soldiers. We would expect even
more troops in the Baltic states. The same is happening in Latvia with the
deployed Canadian brigade. We are talking about a universal call that has not
yet been decided. But we have to keep our eyes wide open, watching what's
happening next to our borders."
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