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2021 m. spalio 21 d., ketvirtadienis

Will Covid Really Change the Way We Work?


"The U.S. economy is in the throes of what’s been called the Great Resignation: Workers are quitting their jobs at or near the highest levels on record since tracking began in 2001. The attrition is particularly acute in the hospitality sectors, but it isn’t limited to low-wage industries. As of August, more than 10 million jobs sat open, causing businesses to reduce their hours and change how they operate.

As my colleague David Leonhardt has said, what the economy is now experiencing is not a labor shortage so much as it is a shortage of workers who are willing to accept the terms employers are used to offering them.

“It’s like the whole country is in some kind of union renegotiation,” Betsey Stevenson, a University of Michigan economist who was an adviser to President Barack Obama, told The Times. “I don’t know who’s going to win in this bargaining that’s going on right now, but right now it seems like workers have the upper hand.”

Is the Great Resignation a sign of a major realignment in the labor market that could change the future of work or just a temporary readjustment? Here’s what people are saying.

Why the Great Resignation is happening

Surveys suggest that the pandemic led many workers to rethink their relationship with their jobs. As my colleague Paul Krugman has written, “America is a rich country that treats many of its workers remarkably badly”:

The pandemic is still making it prohibitive for some people to work, and the abundance of open jobs may be inspiring others to turn down offers they do not want.

Savings built up during the pandemic have played a key role in making this refusal possible. Over the past 18 months, many families received stimulus checks and increased unemployment benefits, and Americans now have trillions more in savings than they did before the pandemic. Most of those gains accrued to the wealthy — the soaring stock market caused their fortunes to balloon, further widening wealth inequality — but low- and middle-income households also saw their savings grow.

 

“The net result is that, arguably for the first time in decades, workers up and down the income ladder have leverage,” my colleague Ben Casselman writes. “And they are using it to demand not just higher pay but also flexible hours, more generous benefits and better working conditions.”

 

Some employers have raised their wages and expanded their benefits in response, but Casselman says that alone may not be enough to draw people who left back to work: The steepest drop in labor force participation came from older workers, who faced the greatest Covid risk. While some may return if the U.S. outbreak abates for good, others have permanently retired.

A shortage of affordable child care is also keeping people out of the labor force. Even before the pandemic, half of Americans lived in places where there was no licensed child care provider or where there were three times as many children as slots. And now, my colleague Claire Cain Miller reports, child care providers are operating at 88 percent of prepandemic capacity, in large part because they can’t find enough workers.

It’s no mystery why: The median hourly pay for the job is $12 — despite requiring qualifications, including background checks, certifications and even college degrees in some areas — and 98 percent of occupations pay more. Yet child care providers have not been able to significantly raise wages and expand benefits as other businesses have because more than 60 percent of families are already paying more for the service than they can afford. And as long as parents can’t find reliable, affordable child care, many won’t be able to return to work.

Is a shift in ‘attitudes’ enough to change the future of work?

“If you asked me to predict the most salutary long-term effects of the pandemic last year, I might have muttered something about urban redesign and office filtration,” The Atlantic’s Derek Thompson writes. “But we may instead look back to the pandemic as a crucial inflection point in something more fundamental: Americans’ attitudes toward work. Since early last year, many workers have had to reconsider the boundaries between boss and worker, family time and work time, home and office.”

But whether a shift has occurred in workers’ attitudes toward work is one question; whether employers will accommodate that shift is quite another.

They might if, as Leonhardt suggests as a possibility, we have truly entered a new era of tight labor markets. With more Americans unable or choosing not to work, companies would have little choice but to improve their pay and benefits. “In this scenario, the pandemic would represent a turning point,” he writes. “Almost a half-century of a low-wage economy would end, and incomes would grow more rapidly, as they did from the 1940s until the early ’70s.”

Better pay and perks alone, though, might not be enough. A McKinsey article from last month cautioned that employers will also have to make an effort to better understand how their employees’ relationship with work has changed and recalibrate accordingly: “If you’re a C.E.O. or a member of a top team, your best move now is to hit ‘pause’ and take the time to think through your next moves. A heavy-handed back-to-the-office policy or other mandates delivered from on high — no matter how well intentioned — are likely to backfire.”

But another possibility is that workers will soon lose their leverage. Most of the pandemic relief measures have ended, as Leonhardt notes, and the financial cushion most households have is still small: The median cash savings of the bottom quarter of households is about $1,000.

“Eventually those savings, especially for lower-income people, they’re going to run out,” Pablo Villanueva, an economist at UBS, told Casselman. “A lot of people are going to be increasingly unable to stay out of work even if they have some fear of Covid.”

And when they do return to work, Leonhardt says many will find a job market where employers hold the upper hand because of the decimation of labor unions and an increase in corporate concentration.

For now, Casselman says, there’s a standoff: “Workers are holding out until their savings disappear. Businesses are holding out until their customers disappear. Maybe one or the other will give, or maybe there will be a meeting in the middle. (Or, realistically, some of all three.)”

How does ‘Striketober’ fit into all this?

In unionized industries, resistance to management has taken a more militant form: strikes. In 2021, workers have initiated strikes against 178 employers, The Washington Post reports.

As Jonah Furman and Gabriel Winant write in The Intercept, this isn’t the 1940s, when one in 10 U.S. workers went on strike in a single year. But it also isn’t the 2010s, when large striking activity in the private sector was almost nonexistent.

The wave of strikes, economists say, is emanating from the same source as the wave of resignations: workers’ newfound leverage, which has enabled more resistance to the demands of employers. But whether that resistance can be organized and harnessed to increase labor’s long-term bargaining power remains to be seen.

“I am skeptical of the idea that there is a whole new world,” Aaron Sojourner, a labor economist at the University of Minnesota who worked in the Obama White House, told The New Yorker’s John Cassidy. “I don’t think the balance of power has shifted in a fundamental and permanent way.”

For that to happen, Cassidy says, government would have to intervene. The Federal Reserve and Congress could do so by keeping the unemployment rate low, since, he says, “as Karl Marx pointed out way back as 1867, there is nothing like a ‘reserve army’ of jobless workers to keep in check the demands of those who are employed.” The Biden administration could also more muscularly enforce labor laws and try to persuade the Senate to enact the PRO Act, which would strengthen labor rights and make it easier for workers to unionize.

“Going forward, the ability of workers to organize and maintain gains hinges on these policy changes,” Sojourner told Cassidy. “The reality is being defined on the ground right now.”"

May be, that facing Covid deaths people who were willing to slave for next fancier TV set and tastier junk food decided not to do that anymore. Then companies will be in tough spot with labor permanently.


 

Štai kaip Vakarai gali pasiekti pranašumą prieš Kiniją

 

  "Mums reikalingos naujos prekybos taisyklės, reglamentuojančios subsidijas ir technologijas, ir taisyklės, skirtos sustabdyti autonominių ginklų plitimą ir apriboti jų naudojimą. Bideno administracija taip pat turėtų siekti užtikrinti konkrečius pasaulinės energetikos, pastatų ir transporto sistemų pokyčius, kad pažabotų klimato kaitą.

     Kad įgytume reikiamą svertą, turime suteikti Kinijai naudingų rezultatų perspektyvą, kurią Pekinas galėtų pradėti nuo to, ką jie laikytų pagarbesne partneryste. JAV pareigūnai dažnai kalba apie „didėjantį spaudimą“ Kinijai, tačiau sankcijos ir muitai Kinijos politinio judėjimo apskritai nesukėlė. Judėjimą paskatino stabilesnių ir konstruktyvesnių santykių su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis perspektyva - tikėtinas D. Trumpo laikinojo prekybos susitarimo su Kinija veiksnys. Šiuo metu kinai to nemato ant derybų stalo“.

 

This Is How the West Can Get the Edge Over China


"We need new trade rules governing subsidies and technology, and rules to stop the spread and limit the use of autonomous weapons. The Biden administration should also aim to secure concrete changes in global energy, building and transport systems to curb climate change.

To gain the needed leverage, we need to give China the prospect of a beneficial outcome — which for Beijing could start with developing what they would consider a more respectful partnership. U.S. officials often talk about “increasing pressure” on China, but sanctions and tariffs have not generally produced Chinese policy movement. What has produced movement is the prospect of a more stable and constructive relationship with the United States — a likely driver behind Mr. Trump’s interim trade deal. Currently, the Chinese do not see this on the table."


Globalizacija nukenčia nuo pasiūlos krizės

    „Niekas globalizacijos pažadą neįkūnydavo labiau, nei kukli tiekimo grandinė. Dėl gamybos integracijos tarp sienų ir jų viduje vartotojai tikėjosi begalinės įvairovės.

    Tai dabar turi sunkumų. 2021 m. tiekimo grandinės krizė skatina atsitraukimą nuo globalizacijos, kaip ir 2008 m. pasaulinė finansų krizė.

    Šią naujausią krizę skatina trys didelės jėgos: „Covid-19“, klimatas ir geopolitika. Visos jos prisidėjo prie puslaidininkių trūkumo, kuris suluošino automobilių gamybą visame pasaulyje. „Covid-19“ sukelta plataus vartojimo elektronikos paklausa nukreipė lustus iš automobilių gamintojų, o virusų kontrolės priemonės nutraukė gamybą Malaizijoje. Ekstremalūs orai sustabdė lustų gamyklas Teksase ir grasino tą patį padaryti Taivane. Anot Chado Bowno iš Petersono tarptautinės ekonomikos instituto, JAV muitai ir eksporto draudimai sumažino lustų atsargas JAV ir paskatino kaupti Kinijos pirkėjus.

    Šios jėgos taip pat prisidėjo prie Didžiosios Britanijos energetikos krizės. „Covid-19“ ir „Brexit“ sumažino sunkvežimių vairuotojų, galinčių tiekti degalus, skaičių, o dėl vėjo trūkumo sumažėjo atsinaujinančios energijos tuo metu, kai gamtinių dujų atsargos buvo mažos. Kinijos ekonomiką sujaudino uždarymai, skirti sustabdyti visus „Covid-19“ protrūkius arba pasiekti anglies dvideginio mažinimo tikslus, o anglies trūkumą apsunkino baudžiamasis draudimas importuoti iš Australijos, reikalaujančios ištirti „Covid-19“ kilmę.

    Prieš du dešimtmečius investuotojai ir bankininkai laikė savaime suprantamu dalyku, kad kreditą visada bus galima gauti už tam tikrą kainą, ir sukūrė tuo paremtą verslą. Rezultatas buvo glaudžiai tarpusavyje susijusi finansų sistema, kurioje nebuvo klaidų, ir kuri sustingo sukrėtimų akivaizdoje.

    Panašiai tiekimo grandinės krizę sukėlė integruota ir efektyvi pasaulinė gamyba. Įmonės priėmė užsakomųjų paslaugų teikimą ir perkėlimą į kitą šalį, tik laiku pateiktas atsargas ir „kapitalo lengvumo“ modelius, kurie atskiria dizainą nuo gamybos. Pasaulio prekybos dalis, kurią sudaro pasaulinės vertės grandinės, kuriose produktas kerta bent dvi sienas, išaugo nuo 37% 1970 m. iki 52% 2008 m., kur, Pasaulio banko duomenimis, buvo maksimume.

    Šiandien įmonės ir vyriausybės pradeda nerimauti dėl priklausomybės nuo tolimų tiekėjų rizikos ir amortizatorių nebuvimo gyvybiškai svarbiose grandyse-nuo krovinių gabenimo jūra iki elektros perdavimo. Pavyzdžiui, pasaulinėje puslaidininkių tiekimo grandinėje yra daugiau nei 50 taškų, „kuriuose vienas regionas užima daugiau nei 65 proc. pasaulinės rinkos dalies“, teigiama „Boston Consulting Group“ ir Puslaidininkių pramonės asociacijos ataskaitoje. „Tai yra potencialūs nesėkmės taškai, kuriuos gali sutrikdyti stichinės nelaimės, infrastruktūros uždarymas ar tarptautiniai konfliktai“.

    „Covid-19“ yra didžiausias šios sistemos sukrėtimas, nutraukus gamybą, uždarius sienas ir išstumiant darbuotojus iš darbo jėgos. Mutuojantis virusas, atsparumas vakcinoms ir Kinijos nulinio „Covid-19“ politika reiškia, kad „Covid-19“ išlieka grėsmė tiekimo grandinei. Tačiau tai turėtų sumažėti, nes natūralus imunitetas ir skiepai sumažina viruso mirtingumą, o vyriausybės už Kinijos ribų daro išvadą, kad apribojimai ir sienų uždarymas yra per brangus atsakas.

    Tikėtina, kad klimato rizika didės dėl dažnesnių ekstremalių orų ir perėjimo prie atsinaujinančios energijos, kuriai trūksta iškastinio kuro pajėgumų. Naftos rinka yra pasaulinė: pasiūla vienoje vietoje gali patenkinti paklausą kitoje. Nors naftos kaina gali pakilti, tiekimas beveik niekada neišnyksta dėl nepanaudotų OPEC pajėgumų, privačių atsargų ir vyriausybės prižiūrimų avarinių rezervų. Nors gamtinės dujos yra mažiau judrios, nei nafta, jos vis tiek gali būti saugomos ir vis dažniau eksportuojamos skystu pavidalu.

    Priešingai, saulės ir vėjo energija paprastai sunaudojama taip, kaip yra gaminama, ir gali visiškai išnykti, jei nėra vėjo ar saulės. „Jokios švarios energijos OPEC šiuo metu neturi rezervinių atsinaujinančių energijos išteklių rezervo“, - neseniai paskelbtoje ataskaitoje pažymi Kevinas Bookas, patariamojo „ClearView Energy Partners LLC“ tyrimų direktorius. Tai galima išspręsti tik investuojant į perdavimą ir akumuliatorių saugojimą, kas gerokai atsilieka nuo investicijų į gamybą, praėjusią savaitę nurodė Tarptautinė energetikos agentūra, net kai investicijos į iškastinį kurą sumažėja. „Kažkas turi greitai pasikeisti, arba pasaulinės energijos rinkos laukia neramus laikotarpis“, - perspėjo ji.

    Protekcionizmas tiekimo grandines trikdo bent jau nuo 2008 m., kai žlugo pasaulinės prekybos derybų Dohos raundas. JAV ir Kinijos prekybos karas pakėlė šias trintis į naują lygį. Po to JAV, Kinija ir Europa siekia apsirūpinti pagrindiniais sektoriais, tokiais kaip puslaidininkiai ir baterijos. Kyla ir kitų grėsmių, pavyzdžiui, žalieji muitai daug anglies dioksido į aplinką importuojančiam produktui. Tuo tarpu savavališkas importo draudimas ir sulaikymas dabar yra įprastos Kinijos užsienio politikos priemonių rinkinio dalys, o eksporto kontrolė yra tokia dalis JAV. Nuolatinis buvusio prezidento Donaldo Trumpo grasinimas sankcijomis ir tarifais tolimesniems vidaus tikslams baigėsi, kai jis paliko prezidento pareigas, tačiau įmonės ir prekybos partneriai turi planuoti galimą jo sugrįžimą po kelerių metų.

    Ne visas spaudimas tiekimo grandinėms yra prieš globalizaciją. Technologijos ir toliau didina išorės darbų galimybes, ypač paslaugų srityje. Nepaisant to, įmonės tikriausiai dar kartą peržiūrės praktiką, kurią kažkada laikė savaime suprantamu dalyku, pavyzdžiui, minimalių atsargų laikymą ir pagrindinių komponentų įsigijimą iš politiškai rizikingų vietų. 

 

Šios savaitės ataskaitoje „Bank of America“ akcijų strategai nustatė, kad „S&P 500“ indekso įmonės 2000 m. JAV turėjo 2% daugiau gamybos vietų, palyginti su 2018 m., bet 5% mažiau Azijoje.

 

    Kaip finansų krizė paskatino bankus ir reguliavimo institucijas pirmenybę teikti atsparumui, o ne efektyvumui, tiekimo grandinės krizė greičiausiai lems, kad gamybos tinklai bus atsparesni netikėtumams, bet mažiau galės pradžiuginti vartotojus vis didesniu pasirinkimu ir vis mažesnėmis kainomis“ [1].

Užtat darbuotojai Vakaruose, įskaitant migrantus iš Lietuvos, pasidžiaugs sugrįžusiomis darbo vietomis. Darbo vietos sugrįžta į Vakarus ir iš Lietuvos, užtenka pasižiūrėti, kaip supuvo Lietuvos žemės ūkis.

1. U.S. News -- Capital Account: Globalization Takes Hit From Supply Crunch
Ip, Greg.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 21 Oct 2021: A.2.  

Globalization Takes Hit From Supply Crunch


"Nothing embodied the promise of globalization more than the humble supply chain. Thanks to the integration of production across and within borders, consumers have come to expect infinite variety, instantly available.

That is now under siege. The supply-chain crisis of 2021 is fueling the retreat from globalization, much as the global financial crisis of 2008 did.

Three big forces are driving this latest crisis: Covid-19, climate and geopolitics. All have played a part in the semiconductor shortage that has crippled automotive production world-wide. Covid-19-driven demand for consumer electronics diverted chips from car makers, and virus-control measures interrupted production in Malaysia. Extreme weather idled chip factories in Texas and threatened to do the same in Taiwan. And U.S. tariffs and export bans ran down chip inventories in the U.S. while prompting hoarding by Chinese buyers, according to Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Those forces also contributed to Britain's energy crisis. Covid-19 and Brexit reduced the number of truckers available to deliver fuel while a lack of wind reduced renewable power at a time when natural-gas reserves were low. China's economy has been tripped up by shutdowns intended to stamp out all Covid-19 outbreaks or meet carbon reduction goals, and coal shortages were aggravated by a punitive ban on imports from Australia for demanding an inquiry into Covid-19's origins.

Two decades ago, investors and bankers took for granted that credit would always be available at some price and built entire businesses around that premise. The result was a tightly interconnected financial system with no margin for error that seized up in the face of a shock.

Similarly, the supply-chain crisis was made possible by how integrated and efficient global production had become. Businesses adopted outsourcing and offshoring, just-in-time inventories, and "capital-light" models that split design from production. The share of world trade accounted for by global value chains -- in which a product crosses at least two borders -- rose from 37% in 1970 to 52% in 2008, where it plateaued, according to the World Bank.

Today, companies and governments are waking up to the risks of dependence on far-flung suppliers and the absence of shock absorbers in vital links, from seaborne freight to electricity transmission. For example, there are more than 50 points in the global semiconductor supply chain "where one region holds more than 65% of the global market share," according to a report by Boston Consulting Group and the Semiconductor Industry Association. "These are potential single points of failure that could be disrupted by natural disasters, infrastructure shutdowns, or international conflicts."

Covid-19 is the biggest shock to this system, shutting down production, closing borders and driving workers out of the labor force. A mutating virus, resistance to vaccines and China's zero-Covid-19 policy all mean Covid-19 remains a threat to the supply chain. But it should recede as natural immunity and vaccination reduce the virus's lethality and governments outside China conclude restrictions and border closures are too costly a response.

Climate risks are likely to grow, because of both more frequent extreme weather and the transition to renewable energy, which lacks the capacity buffers of fossil fuels. The oil market is global: Supply in one place can meet demand in another. While oil's price can gyrate, supply almost never disappears thanks to spare OPEC capacity, private inventories and government-maintained emergency reserves. Though less mobile than oil, natural gas can still be stored and, increasingly, exported in liquid form.

By contrast, solar and wind energy are generally consumed as they are generated, and can disappear altogether if wind or sun are absent. "No clean energy OPEC currently holds spare renewable energy capacity in reserve," notes Kevin Book, research director of advisory ClearView Energy Partners LLC, in a recent report. This can be solved only through investment in transmission and battery storage, which lags far behind investment in generation, the International Energy Agency indicated last week, even as investment in fossil fuels flattens. "Something has to change quickly or global energy markets face a turbulent period ahead," it warned.

Protectionism has been intruding on supply chains at least since 2008, when the Doha Round of global trade talks collapsed. The U.S.-China trade war took those frictions to a new level. In its wake, the U.S., China and Europe are all pursuing self-sufficiency in key sectors such as semiconductors and batteries. Other threats loom, such as green tariffs on high-carbon imports. Meanwhile, arbitrary import bans and detentions are now routine parts of China's foreign-policy tool kit, as export controls are part of the U.S.'s. Former President Donald Trump's regular threat of sanctions and tariffs to further domestic goals ended when he left office, but companies and trading partners must plan for his possible return in a few years.

Not all the pressures on supply chains are against globalization. Technology continues to increase the potential to outsource, especially in services. Nonetheless, companies are likely to revisit practices they once took for granted such as holding minimal inventories and sourcing key components from politically risky places.

 

In a report this week, Bank of America equity strategists found companies in the S&P 500 index had 2% more manufacturing locations in the U.S. in 2000 compared with 2018, but 5% fewer in Asia.

 

Just as the financial crisis drove banks and regulators to prioritize resilience over efficiency, the supply-chain crisis will likely result in production networks more resilient to surprises but less able to delight consumers with ever more choice at ever lower cost." [1]

At the same time, workers in the West, including migrants from Lithuania, are pleased with the return of jobs. Jobs are returning to the West and from Lithuania, it is enough to watch the decay of Lithuanian agriculture. 

1. U.S. News -- Capital Account: Globalization Takes Hit From Supply Crunch
Ip, Greg.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 21 Oct 2021: A.2.