Sekėjai

Ieškoti šiame dienoraštyje

2022 m. gruodžio 14 d., trečiadienis

Does Our Society Need Abortion?


"‌At an America’s Senate Banking Committee hearing shortly after the leak of the Supreme Court draft opinion overturning Roe v. Wade, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned that curtailing the right to an abortion “would have very damaging effects on the economy.” Women denied abortions would lose educational opportunities and see their “odds of living in poverty” or their “need for public assistance” rise. And this would have follow-on consequences for their children, who would then “grow up in poverty and do worse themselves.”

Yellen’s comments offer a useful place to start the final essay in my series unpacking the major pro-choice arguments that have circulated since the Dobbs decision. The first two columns were focused on physical and psychological issues, arguments about the personal burdens borne by women asked to carry unwanted pregnancies to term.

This one will focus more on economic and sociological issues, and particularly the belief that crucial elements in our current American way of life — economic prosperity, female opportunity, social stability — depend on the ready availability of abortion.

This belief has several points in its favor. First is the general reality that, while many other developed countries have somewhat more restrictive abortion laws than the most liberal U.S. states, almost none ‌‌have the sweeping bans pursued by the pro-life movement, the kind that ‌‌attempt to limit abortion to the most exceptional or dangerous situations. In general, prosperity, modernity and pro-choice policies appear as a package deal.

There are a few notable outliers — Ireland before 2018, Chile for the moment, Poland — but overall the pro-life movement’s goals are genuinely revolutionary, even utopian, relative to the pattern of the post-1960s developed world. And a certain skepticism is always appropriate when someone’s proposed system doesn’t have many existing models and the world as we know it tends the other way.

Then there is the specific evidence that the use of abortion can be associated with better socioeconomic outcomes for individual women. In the last column in this series I mentioned the Turnaway Study, an investigation comparing the lives of women denied abortions to similarly-situated women who obtained them, arguing that its evidence doesn’t necessarily support the simple pro-choice frame in which it is often placed. But that study does buttress Yellen’s economic claims, showing that women turned away from abortion do face subsequent socioeconomic hardship relative to women who obtain one. So if you simply generalized from those individual outcomes to the societal level, you would expect a pro-life society to be somewhat poorer and more stratified.

Indeed, even firm opponents of abortion sometimes allow that this might be the case. In an essay in these pages, Matthew Walther argued that pro-lifers needed to be prepared for the reality that “an America without abortion” might well “mean more single mothers and more births to teenage mothers, increased strain on Medicaid and other welfare programs, higher crime rates, a less dynamic and flexible work force, an uptick in carbon emissions, lower student test scores and goodness knows what else.” The principle that one must not kill an unborn child, he argued, will necessarily disrupt a society built on denying an unborn right to life, and thus abortion opponents need to be prepared for a difficult transition to the more just and decent society they seek.

There is wisdom in this perspective; a movement with utopian ambitions needs a recognition that it’s seeking a genuinely different society as well as a different set of laws.

But at the same time it concedes too much to the Yellen worldview, the abortion-as-economic-benefit analysis. And one reason to believe this comes from the work of Janet Yellen herself.

In 1996, Yellen and her husband, George Akerlof, joined their fellow economist Michael Katz in a paper titled “An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States.” They were attempting to explain what seemed like a riddle: In a world where strategies to control births had improved significantly, with contraception available and abortion legal, why were so many more women having children outside of marriage?

Raising kids alone is difficult, and single parenthood imposes substantial economic burdens, so you would think that in giving women more choice in when they carry a pregnancy to term, more women would choose to do so with the child’s father wedded and present. Instead, the opposite was happening, with post-1960s, post-Roe America seeing an unprecedented rise in the share of children born outside of wedlock — a rise that continued for more than a decade after 1996, before finally leveling off around 40 percent of all births, compared with 5 percent in 1960 and about 10 percent in 1970.

Part of the explanation that the paper proposed was that there had been a fundamental change in the reciprocal obligations of men and women. A system in which sex could be separated from fertility decisively, with abortion a guaranteed backstop for anyone who wanted it, made it much harder for women who wanted commitment and children to make long-term demands of the men who wanted to have sex with them. As Yellen and Akerlof wrote, in a Brookings policy brief adapted from the original paper, the old “shotgun marriage” scenario, where society expected men to “promise marriage in the event of a pregnancy,” depended on a sense of inherent obligation. But if any unintended pregnancy could be ended by the free choice of the woman, then the male could reasonably deny the existence of any definite obligation on his part.

“By making the birth of the child the physical choice of the mother,” Akerlof and Yellen concluded, “the sexual revolution has made marriage and child support a social choice of the father.” This shift, they suggested, could not be undone; any social conservatism appears in their analysis as a probably futile effort to “turn the technological clock backwards.” But the new female freedom came at a cost to women who wanted fidelity and children and didn’t want to have abortions; for them, the post-sexual revolution world was less supportive, its norms now reset to work against expectations of monogamy, commitment and support.

Men could lose out in this new culture as well. Just as the woman who wants commitment sees her position weakened when abortion is a normal and expected alternative, so does the man who wants involvement, obligation, an expectation he can rise to meet — and who is told instead, in every case where the woman’s choice is for abortion, to simply forget any paternal pang or instinct, to detach entirely from the life he cocreated. The man confronted by what in a different culture would be the most important obligation of his life is told in ours that it’s at most an economic burden, a matter of child-support payments — and if he’s lucky and she chooses to get an abortion, it won’t be even that.

Extend this imaginative analysis still further, and you can see that the right to abortion creates not just new social incentives that disfavor commitment and paternal obligation but also a kind of moral and spiritual alienation between the sexes. The most transformative thing that men and women do together becomes instead a ground of separation. The man’s right to avoid marital obligation separates the pregnant woman from either him, her unborn child or both. The woman’s right to end the pregnancy separates the man who doesn’t want to see it ended from what would otherwise be the most important relationship imaginable. And downstream from this alienation lies the culture we experience today, in which not just marriage rates but also relationships and sex itself are in decline, in which people have fewer children overall and fewer than they say they want, and also have more of them outside of wedlock than in the past.

All of this carries a set of socioeconomic costs to set against the benefits invoked by the Yellen of 2022. Yes, individual by individual, women who obtain abortion in a pro-choice society can improve their own financial picture or educational prospects; so can the man who avoids paternal obligations through the woman’s right to choose. But male and female choices overall, the cultural matrix that determines their prospects for stable relationships, romantic happiness and a productive adulthood, may still be shaped for the worse by a society that defaults so often to abortion.

If that shaping influence yields fewer marriages and fewer two-parent households, it will place much more financial stress on women who choose to become mothers.

If it yields more children growing up without a father, and especially more sons growing up with absent dads — as Richard Reeves’s recent book, “Of Boys and Men,” points out, boys seem to fare particularly poorly in those circumstances — then it will impose multigenerational costs on those kids’ economic prospects.

And if it yields fewer children in the long run, not just because of abortion itself but because the sexes are failing to pair off, then that will be a permanent drag on prosperity and growth.

One can counter that if abortion is a fundamental liberty, a requirement of equality, none of this should matter. Any cost to prosperity and social stability is trumped by the necessity of emancipating women, and we just have to accept that we’re still groping our way toward a stable alternative to the patriarchal order we rightly overthrew (or haven’t finished overthrowing).

But that’s just the pro-choice version of the Walther argument — that sometimes justice requires accepting destabilization and disorder — and it should be acknowledged as such, rather than dressed up as a defense of bourgeois prosperity and growth.

A subtler rejoinder might point out that nothing is simple here. Just as the original sexual revolution was a multi-factorial affair, the current alienation of the sexes can’t just be about abortion; it’s shaped by everything from globalization’s effect on blue-collar male wages to the internet’s effect on current young-adult social lives. The Yellen-Akerlof-Katz paper may have been a plausible analysis, but it didn’t claim to measure an exact “Roe v. Wade” effect, separate from all other forces shaping the modern socioeconomic landscape. And as Yellen and Akerlof argued in drawing pro-choice conclusions, you can’t assume that such an effect could be reversed just by reversing abortion policy; we don’t know how much of the shift was driven by the birth control pill alone, or what effect anti-abortion laws would have once the cultural transition they describe has taken place.

But you also can’t just assume that our society’s post-1960s path is inevitable and impossible to redirect, that we’re on the only road an economically advanced society can ever take. You can’t insist that the immediate economic benefits of ending a pregnancy should be counted in Roe v. Wade’s favor, but any of the larger negative shifts in mating and marriage and child rearing associated with abortion can’t be considered as part of the debate.

Here the pro-life cause’s very utopianism, its goal of a society for which no definite model yet exists, can be an analytic asset, while the practiced realism of the pro-choice side can double as excuse making for the unhappy aspects of the status quo. If you sit fully inside the dominant paradigms of our society, then abortion seems like it must be good for the economy — the woman who gets an abortion has more time and money for her own education, the unborn child might have been poor and costly to the welfare state, and so on.

But step outside those frameworks, try to look at the larger direction of the developed world — even try to imagine yourself passing the judgments of capital-H History on our society from a vantage point a few centuries hence.

What you might see from this perspective is a world where economic growth has decelerated under the rule of social liberalism, and various forms of stagnation have set in. A world clearly shadowed by the effects of family breakdown and social atomization, with loneliness and despair stalking young and old alike. A rich world whose chief economic problem over the next few generations is population aging, population decline, childless cities and empty hinterlands and a vast inverted demographic pyramid on the shoulders of the young.

And then you would also see, from this arc-of-history vantage point, the most influential voices in our aging, unhappy, stagnation-shadowed society — the most educated and impassioned and articulate, the most self-consciously devoted to the idea of progress — committing and recommitting themselves to the view that nothing is so important as to continue ensuring that hundreds of thousands of unborn lives can be ended in utero every year.

I conclude this series with an appeal to readers who are thus committed. Giving due weight to all the reasons that you hold so firmly to this principle, I beseech you to consider that you are making a mistake."


The drone army is displacing artillery, aviation and the navy: The main findings of the operation in Ukraine

"Drones are cheaper, often more accurate and even safer than classical weapons.

 

 As the experience of the operation in Ukraine shows, drones are gradually displacing a large part of traditional weaponry, and in the future, the one country that can produce more and cheaper drones may be stronger, than others.

 

For a long time, in reconnaissance, aviation was almost the only way to look at the composition of the enemy. However, with the development of air defense systems, it has become increasingly dangerous for aircraft to fly in foreign airspace. The U-2, the most famous reconnaissance plane in the USA, has been in service for 65 years, and it is already planned to be decommissioned in 2023. Even earlier, the SR-71 Blackbird aircraft retired from service.

 

They are being replaced by reconnaissance drones such as the RQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk and others. The Global Hawk is the most expensive mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicle, with an estimated cost of around $140 million. Its development program cost 14 billion dollars. And the smallest drone - "Black Hornet" - weighs only 33 grams.

 

However, after the start of the operation in Ukraine, most armies have to reconsider the principles of which tactical drones to choose.

 

Experience has shown that it makes little sense to invest millions of dollars in expensive and technologically advanced drones - it is more important to have a lot of them. 

 

However, it was the NATO troops who took the first path.

 

"Real operation requires a lot of cheap drones that can be mass-produced and quickly," writes forbes.ua columnist Vladimir Datsenko.

 

In Ukraine, the reconnaissance function is usually performed by simple commercial drones with a quality camera and good control. They allow you to quickly adjust the artillery fire, increase the effectiveness of the destruction of shots. More advanced drones allow artillery shells to be directed at a target under the control of the drone operator, allowing for the destruction of moving targets without specific coordinates.

 

Larger drones are used as attack drones. They carry small guided missiles that are sufficient to destroy a single piece of machinery or equipment. 

 

Drones were developed for this purpose before the operation, but now in Ukraine drones are being used in tasks where their usefulness was previously questioned.

 

Drone mortars

 

Already at the beginning of the operation, drones began to be used not only for reconnaissance, but also to drop something. Such tactics have been used in other events, such as in Syria, but in Ukraine it has become a mass phenomenon. Videos abound on social networks where Ukrainian drones drop grenades on Russian positions.

 

Conventional mortars are quite inaccurate, and a drone can more safely drop an explosive with an accuracy of about one meter and save ammunition.

 

800 of Taiwan's latest Revolver 860 drones, which have a built-in drum system that can hold eight mines, depending on their caliber, have already reached Ukraine. This drone can fly 20 kilometers and stay in the air for up to 40 minutes.

 

However, Ukraine is already starting to use even more powerful domestically produced drones that have two drums. Drones with larger explosives also appear.

 

These drones cost the same as traditional mortars - about 20-50 thousand dollars, but their efficiency is incomparably higher. The biggest drawback is that they are sensitive to electronic interference.

 

If you can protect yourself from traditional mortars in the trenches, it is not a big obstacle for drones hanging over the ditch. Drones are gradually becoming an alternative.

 

Small kamikaze drones

 

These are drones that can hover over the target for a long time (loitering ammunition). The US has a fairly effective kamikaze drone, the Switchblade 600, which uses the same warhead as the Javelin anti-tank missile. However, the US has not started supplying such weapons to Ukraine en masse. One such drone costs as much as 220 thousand dollars, about the same as a Soviet infantry fighting vehicle. The target should not be cheaper than the means by which it is destroyed.

 

Russia is also developing such drones - "Lancet" and "Kub", but there are questions about how effective they are. A video appeared on social networks in which a Lancet apparently destroys a Ukrainian howitzer. Although the video looked convincing, Ukrainian journalists later showed that the damage from the howitzer was minimal.

 

The weight of the warhead of Russian drones is about 2-5 kilograms - of course, they are dangerous for soldiers. Ukrainians themselves appreciate that Russian drones are quite slow and noisy, so the efficiency may be low.

 

By comparison, the Javelin anti-tank missile has an 8.4-kilogram warhead and a directional blast that can penetrate even the armor of modern tanks. It is doubtful that the Lancet would do more serious damage to heavy armored vehicles. 

 

But the Russians have a lot of Lancets, it meets the criteria of a "cheap and simple" drone, it can be mass produced and replenish depleted resources quickly.

 

Ukraine received some kamikaze drones from Poland, but their warhead is even smaller, about 8 kilos, can only be used to attack manpower. Traditional drones and mortars do this more efficiently, assesses V. Datsenko.

 

"Ukraine is losing the race for drones hanging in the air for a long time. Even with the dubious effectiveness of the Lancet, Russia has a systemic solution and is using it. 

 

Of course, Ukraine has Excalibur guided artillery shells, which ensure accurate strikes within a radius of 40 kilometers. However, Excalibur projectiles cost almost the same as Switchblade 600 - about 180 thousand dollars," he reviewed.

 

Big drones kamikaze

 

Drones capable of carrying more than 50 kilograms of explosives were used by the Ukrainian side in the first operation, attacking Russian oil bases. It is likely that Chinese commercial "Mugin-5 PRO" drones, which cost about 10 thousand dollars, are used for this purpose. The advantage of these drones is the flying distance, which reaches from 250 to 1500 kilometers.

 

These drones are extremely simple, cheap, and deliver the "cargo" to the location based on GPS coordinates. 

 

These drones are not controlled by the operator, so they are immune to interference by electromagnetic means. They fly a defined route at a relatively low altitude.

 

However, Ukraine has not yet been able to gain mass access to such systems. Only recently, the country's defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom announced that it had completed the development of a drone capable of flying 1,000 kilometers and carrying an explosive weighing 75 kilograms. There is no talk of mass production yet.

 

At the time, Russia began using Iranian-made Shaded-136 drones in August. V. Datsenko estimates that Russia could have ordered about 2,500 such drones from Iran when Ukraine used maybe about 10.

 

Iran has been developing a long-range kamikaze drone program for years because the technology for missiles that can fly 1,000 kilometers is expensive. For example, the price of the Russian Iskander missile is about 1-3 million dollars, and already in the first months of the operation, the stocks of these missiles were almost exhausted.

 

Kamikaze drones are hundreds of times cheaper, can be produced quickly in large batches, and have their main parts sourced from civilian low-cost drones. But more such drones are needed. If one cruise missile carries a load of 250-500 kilograms, the drone is limited to 25-50 kilograms. Cheap internal combustion engines do not allow you to fly fast. For example, the Iranian "Shahed-136" flies at a speed of 100-180 km/h, while the cruise missile is about 1000 km/h. Ballistic missiles or artillery shells are much faster.

 

The higher the speed, the more difficult it is to shoot down a missile or projectile, which is why NATO has not considered large kamikaze drones as an alternative to existing systems, despite their low cost.

 

For Ukraine, the drone is currently the only available option to hit targets at a distance of more than 300 km.

 

In the long run, Ukrainian drones may begin to pose a threat to Russian ammunition depots, airfields, and oil bases further away. It is likely that in the long run, drones with jet engines will also appear, which will allow reaching a speed of more than 1000 km/h.

 

Kamikaze ships - USV

 

Perhaps the most famous innovation this fall is the British kamikaze drones, also known as USVs (unmanned surface vehicles). They finally buried Russian hopes of attacking Odessa. Ukraine applied such weapons without having long-range missiles that would pose a greater threat to Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

 

Like drones, USVs have the same advantages and disadvantages. They are much cheaper and easier to make than missiles, but they are slower and easier to stop. However, using a large number of hard-to-see small boats greatly increases the chance of success.

 

It is not clear what the results of the Ukrainian attack on the Black Sea Fleet brought, but after it the Russians redeployed most of their ships to Novorossiysk, while Ukraine is currently building a full fleet of USVs.

 

There may come a time when the traditional fleet will be powerless against thousands of times cheaper mass-produced unmanned craft.

 

Anti-drone drones may be coming soon

 

While a cheap missile is an effective weapon against an expensive aircraft, swarms of drones mean that shooting them down with missiles is impractical, and simpler means will have to be sought. Ground installations cannot be installed everywhere, they are transported slowly by a limited road network.

 

As a result, we may soon see drones that destroy other drones.

 

"Weapons must not only be super-technological. Their costs must be based on their capabilities on the battlefield. They must be sufficient to stop the primitive mass forces of other countries," says the Forbes analyst.

 

He expects that in the coming years, the revolution of unmanned systems will take place in the world. For this, systems are being developed that would allow controlling drones at extremely long distances. This can be done with solutions similar to Starlink satellite internet, which would ensure fast and high-quality communication in any location.

 

"Much will depend on who develops new technologies faster and in larger volumes," the reviewer concluded.""

 

It means that Starlink is doomed. Any serious power will destroy these satellites

Dronų armija išstumia artileriją, aviaciją ir laivyną: pagrindiniai operacijos Ukrainoje atradimai


"Dronai pigesni, dažnai taiklesni ir net saugesni, nei klasikiniai ginklai. Bepiločiai orlaiviai, kaip rodo operacijos Ukrainoje patirtis, palaipsniui išstumia didelę dalį tradicinės ginkluotės ir ateityje stipresnis gali būti tas, kuris pajėgs dronų gaminti daugiau ir pigiau.

Žvalgyboje aviacija ilgą laiką buvo kone vienintelis būdas pasižvalgyti į priešo sudėtį. Tačiau tobulėjant oro gynybos sistemoms, orlaiviams skristi užsienio oro erdvėje tapo vis labiau pavojinga. JAV garsiausias žvalgybinis lėktuvas U-2 tarnauja jau 65-erius metus, 2023 metais jau planuojama nutraukti jo eksploatavimą. Dar anksčiau iš tarnybos pasitraukė „SR-71 Blackbird“ orlaivis.

Jų vieton stoja žvalgybiniai dronai, pvz., „RQ-9 Reeper“, „RQ-4 Global Hawk“ ar kiti. „Global Hawk“ yra brangiausias masiškai gaminamas bepilotis orlaivis, jo kaina, vertinama, siekia apie 140 milijonų dolerių. Jo kūrimo programa atsiėjo 14 milijardų dolerių. O pats mažiausias dronas – „Black Hornet“ – sveria vos 33 gramus.

Tačiau prasidėjus operacijai Ukrainoje daugumai kariuomenių tenka persvarstyti principus, kokius taktinius dronus rinktis.

Patirtis parodė, kad nedaug yra prasmės investuoti milijonus dolerių į brangius ir technologiškai pažangius dronus – svarbiau, kad jų būtų daug. Tačiau būtent pirmuoju keliu nuėjusios NATO kariuomenės.

„Realiai reikia labai daug pigių dronų, kurie gali būti gaminami masiška ir greitai“, – rašo forbes.ua apžvalgininkas Vladimir Datsenko.

Ukrainoje žvalgybos funkciją paprastai atlieka paprasti komerciniai dronai, turintys kokybišką kamerą ir užtikrinantys gerą kontrolę. Jie leidžia greitai pakoreguoti artilerijos ugnį, padidinti šūvių naikinimo efektyvumą. Pažangesni dronai leidžia artilerijos sviedinius nukreipti į taikinį, kontroliuojant drono operatoriui – taip galima judančius taikinius naikinti be specifinių koordinačių.

Didesni dronai naudojami kaip atakos dronai. Jais gabenamos nedidelės valdomos raketos, kurių pakanka sunaikinti vieną technikos ar įrangos vienetą. Tam dronai ir buvo kuriami prieš operaciją, tačiau dabar Ukrainoje dronai atsiskleidžia ir tokiose užduotyse, kuriose jų naudingumu anksčiau buvo abejojama.

Dronai minosvaidžiai

Jau operacijos pradžioje dronai pradėti naudoti ne tik žvalgybai, bet ir norint ką nors numesti. Tokios taktikos naudotos ir kituose kitur, pvz., Sirijoje, tačiau Ukrainoje tai tapo masiniu reiškiniu. Apstu vaizdo įrašų socialiniuose tinkluose, kur Ukrainiečių dronai ant rusų pozicijų numeta granatas.

Įprasti minosvaidžiai yra gana netaiklūs, o dronas gali saugiau numesti sprogmenį maždaug vieno metro tikslumu ir taupyti amuniciją.

Ukrainą jau pasiekė 800 naujausių Taivano dronų „Revolver 860“, kuriuose įmontuota būgno sistema gali talpinti aštuonias minas, priklausomai nuo jų kalibro. Šis dronas gali nuskristi 20 kilometrų ir ore kyboti iki 40-ies minučių.

Tačiau Ukraina jau ima naudoti ir dar galingesnius vietoje pasigamintus dronus, kurie turi du būgnus. Taip pat pasirodo ir dronai su didesniais sprogmenimis.

 

Kainuoja šie dronai tiek pat, kiek ir tradiciniai minosvaidžiai – apie 20-50 tūkst. dolerių, tačiau jų efektyvumas nepalyginimai didesnis. Didžiausias trūkumas – jie jautrūs elektroniniams trikdžiams.

Jei nuo tradicinių minosvaidžių galima saugotis apkasuose, virš griovio pakibusiems dronams tai nėra didelė kliūtis. Palaipsniui dronai tampa alternatyva.

Maži dronai „kamikadzės“

Tai dronai, kurie virš taikinio gali kyboti ilgą laiką (angl. loitering munition). JAV turi gana efektyvų droną „kamikadzę“ – „Switchblade 600“, kuriame naudojama tokia pati kovinė galvutė, kaip ir prieštankinėje raketoje „Javelin“. Tačiau JAV nepradėjo tokių ginklų Ukrainai tiekti masiškai. Vienas toks dronas kainuoja net 220 tūkst. dolerių, panašiai tiek pat, kiek ir sovietinė pėstininkų kovos mašina. Taikinys neturėtų būti pigesnis, nei priemonė, kuriuo jis naikinamas.

Rusija taipogi kuria tokius dronus – „Lancet“ ir „Kub“, tik kyla klausimų, kiek jie efektyvūs. Socialiniuose tinkluose buvo pasirodęs vaizdo įrašas, kuriame, tikėtina, „Lancet“ sunaikina ukrainiečių haubicą. Nors vaizdo įrašas atrodė įtikinamai, vėliau Ukrainieičų žurnalistai parodė, kad haubicos pažeidimai minimalūs.

 

Rusijos dronų kovinės galvutės svoris siekia apie 2-5 kilogramus – žinoma, jie pavojingi kariams. Patys ukrainiečiai vertina, kad rusų dronai yra gana lėti ir triukšmingi, todėl efektyvumas gali būti mažas.

Palyginimui, „Javelin“ prieštankinė raketa turi 8,4 kilogramų galvutę ir kryptingai nukreipiamą sprogimą, kuris įveikia net ir modernių tankų šarvus. Abejotina, ar „Lancet“ padarytų rimtesnės žalos sunkiasvorėms šarvuotoms transporto priemonėms. Tačiau rusai „Lancet'ų“ turi daug, tai atitinka „pigaus ir paprasto“ drono kriterijų, jį galima gaminti masiškai ir greitai papildyti ištuštėjusius išteklius.

Ukraina gavo šiek tiek dronų „kamikadzių“ iš lenkijos, tačiau jų kovinė galvutė dar mažesnė, apie 0,8 kilogramo, jais galima atakuoti tik gyvąją jėgą. Tradiciniai dronai minosvaidžiai tą daro efektyviau, vertina apžvalgininkas V. Datsenko.

„Ukraina pralaimi lenktynėse dėl ilgai ore kabančių dronų. Net ir vertinant abejotiną „Lancet“ efektyvumą, Rusija turi sisteminį sprendimą ir jį naudoja. Žinoma, Ukraina turi „Excalibur“ nutaikomų artilerijos sviedinių, kurie užtikrina tikslius smūgius 40 kilometrų spinduliu. Tačiau „Excalibur“ sviediniai kainuoja beveik tiek pat, kiek ir „Switchblade 600“ – apie 180 tūkst. dolerių“, – apžvelgė jis.

Dideli dronai kamikadzės

Dronus, galinčius nešti didesnius nei 50 kilogramų sprogmenis, pirmoji operacijoje panaudojo Ukrainos pusė, atakuodama Rusijos naftos bazes. Tikėtina, tam pasitelkti Kinijos komerciniai „Mugin-5 PRO“ dronai, kurie kainuoja apie 10 tūkst. dolerių. Šių dronų pranašumas – nuskrendamas nuotolis, kuris siekia nuo 250 iki 1500 kilometrų.

Šie dronai itin paprasti, pigūs, o „krovinį“ pristato į vietą pagal GPS koordinates. Šie dronai nėra kontroliuojami operatoriaus, tad jie kada atsparūs trikdymui elektromagnetinėmis priemonėmis. Jie skrenda apibrėžtu maršrutu gana žemame aukštyje.

Tačiau Ukraina kol kas neturėjo galimybės gauti masinės prieigos prie tokių sistemų. Tik neseniai šalies gynybos konglomeratas „Ukroboronprom“ pranešė baigęs kurti droną, galintį nuskristi 1000 kilometrų ir gabenti 75 kilogramų svorio sprogmenį. Kol kas nėra kalbų apie masinę gamybą.

Tuo metu Rusija nuo rugpjūčio pradėjo naudoti Irane gamintus „Shaded-136“ dronus. V. Datsenko vertina, kad Rusija iš Irano galėjo užsakyti apie 2500 tokių dronų tuomet, kai Ukraina panaudojo gal apie 10.

Iranas jau daug metų plėtoja ilgo nuotolio dronų kamikadzių programą, kadangi 1000 kilometrų galinčių nuskristi raketų technologijos yra brangios. Pvz., Rusijos raketos „Iskander“ kaina siekia apie 1-3 milijonus dolerių ir jau pirmaisiais operacijos mėnesiais šių raketų atsargos buvo beveik išnaudotos.

 

Dronai kamikadzės yra šimtus kartų pigesni, gali greitai būti gaminami didelėmis partijomis, o pagrindinės dalys – iš civilinių pigių dronų. Tačiau tokių dronų reikia daugiau. Jei viena sparnuotoji raketa neša 250-500 kilogramų krovinį, dronas būna apribotas iki 25-50 kilogramų. Pigūs vidaus degimo varikliai neleidžia skristi greitai. Pvz., iranietiškas „Shahed-136“ skrenda 100-180 km/h greičiu, kai sparnuotoji raketa – apie 1000 km/h. Balistinės raketos ar artilerijos sviediniai yra gerokai greitesni.

Kuo didesnis greitis, tuo sudėtingiau raketą ar sviedinį numušti, dėl to NATO nesvarstė didelių kamikadzių dronų alternatyvos egzistuojančioms sistemoms, nepaisant jų pigumo.

Ukrainai dronas tuo metu yra kol kas vienintelė pasiekiama galimybė pataikyti į taikinius, esančius toliau nei 300 km.

Ilgainiui ukrainiečių dronai gali pradėti kelti pavojų toliau esantiems Rusijos amunicijos sandėliams, aerodrmams, naftos bazėms. Tikėtina, kad ilgainiui pasirodys ir dronai su reaktyviniais varikliais, kurie leis pasiekti ir didesnį nei 1000 km/h greitį.

Laivai kamikadzės – USV

Ko gero garsiausiai nuskambėjusi naujovė šį rudenį – Ukrainos dronai laivai-kamikadzės, dar vadinami USV (angl. unmanned surface vehicle). Jie galutinai palaidojo Rusijos viltis atakuoti Odesą. Ukraina tokius ginklus sukūrė neturėdama ilgo nuotolio raketų, kurios keltų didesnę grėsmę Rusijos Juodosios jūros laivynui.

Kaip ir bepiločiai orlaiviai, USV turi tuos pačius privalumus ir trūkumus. Jie gerokai pigesni ir lengviau pagaminami nei raketos, tačiau jie lėtesni, lengviau ir juos sustabdyti. Tačiau naudojant didelį kiekį sunkiai pastebimų nedidelių laivelių, sėkmės tikimybė gerokai padidėja.

Neaišku, kokius rezultatus atnešė Ukrainos ataka prieš Juodosios jūros laivyną, tačiau po jos rusai daugumą savo laivų perdislokavo į Novorosijską, o Ukraina tuo metu kuria visą USV parką.

Gali ateiti laikai, kai tradicinis laivynas taps bejėgis prieš tūkstantį kartų pigesnius didelėmis partijomis gaminamus nepilotuojamus laivelius.

Netrukus gali pasirodyti prieš dronus kovojantys dronai

Nors pigi raketa yra efektyvus ginklas prieš brangiai kainuojantį orlaivį, tačiau aibės dronų reiškia, kad juos numušinėti raketomis yra nepraktiška – teks ieškoti paprastesnių priemonių. Antžeminiai įrengimai ne visur gali būti įrengti, jie lėtai pervežami ribotu kelių tinklu.

Dėl to netrukus galime pamatyti ir tokių dronų, kurie naikins kitus dronus.

„Ginklai turi būti ne tik supertechnologiški. Jų išlaidos turi būti grįstos jų pajėgumais mūšio lauke. Jie turi būti pakankami, kad sustabdytų primityvias masines autoritarinių šalių pajėgas“, – teigia „Forbes“ apžvalgininkas.

Jis tikisi, kad artimiausiais metais pasaulyje vyks nepilotuojamų sistemų revoliucija. Tam kuriamos sistemos, kurios leistų valdyti dronus itin dideliu nuotoliu. Tam gali būti pasitelkti panašūs į „Starlink“ palydovinio interneto sprendimai, kurie užtikrintų sparčią ir aukštos kokybės komunikaciją bet kurioje vietoje.

„Daug kas priklausys nuo to, kuris naujas technologijas išplėtos greičiau ir didesnėmis apimtimis“, – apibendrino apžvalgininkas."

 

 Tai reiškia, kad Starlink yra pasmerktas. Bet kokia rimta galia sunaikins šiuos palydovus