EU and China: Dangerous Cracks in European Unity

“Should Europe show toughness against China's striving for world power? The German traffic light parties in Berlin do not agree, let alone the 27 EU countries. The gap is particularly evident in one question.

Josep Borrell made half-hearted efforts at best to spread optimism. His proposals on how the EU should deal with China were well received, said the European Union's foreign policy representative a few days ago after a meeting of European foreign ministers in Stockholm. The talks were "not easy". But all 27 member countries agree that Europe needs to recalibrate its China strategy. Everyone sees that Beijing is behaving less like a partner and more like a "systemic rival". And that it is necessary to reduce the EU's dangerous economic dependency on China for important raw materials and modern technologies - keyword "de-risking".

How far this unity goes in practice could be seen on Sunday. The Hungarian government tweeted pictures of Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó boarding a Learjet. Szijjártó, it was said, was on his way to Beijing to talk "about the advantages of cooperation with China" and about "the opportunities that both sides offer". Not a word about de-risking or even systemic rivalry.

"If we don't speak with one voice, the Chinese will eat us for breakfast."

Borrell describes such cracks in European unity as "nuances". But this word acrobatics does not make the disagreement any less dangerous. "If we don't speak with one voice, the Chinese will eat us for breakfast," warns a diplomat in Brussels. Because Beijing has no interest in the EU making itself more independent of China and standing by Washington's side, where not only de-risking has long been the talk of the town, but rather "decoupling," a far-reaching decoupling. Beijing's counter-strategy is to widen and exploit the cracks in Europe - for example, by specifically wooing individual EU members like Hungary.

The driving force behind the European de-risking strategy is the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. Her authority has proposed a number of laws in recent months, all of which aim to reduce Europe's dependence on Chinese supplies - for strategically relevant raw materials such as rare earths, but also for green and high technology such as batteries for electric cars and computer chips. This should minimize the risk of being taken hostage by Beijing for security reasons in the event of a conflict. "It's about more resilience," says a diplomat.

For von der Leyen, this is the logical consequence of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The conflict has shown how dangerous it is for the EU to become economically dependent on Russia. In the case of Russia, this dependency was limited to oil and gas supplies. Getting out of it was difficult and expensive.

In the case of China, on the other hand, Europe's dependency is much greater, it includes in one form or another almost everything you need to maintain a competitive economy or to convert it to be climate-neutral.

This is precisely what makes it so difficult for EU countries to agree on what de-risking means in reality - even if, as is expected, the heads of state and government officially defined the term at their summit in Brussels in late June should write in the closing statement. "The positions are still quite far apart here," says a diplomat.

Some also want to sanction Chinese companies because of Russia

This is also reflected in the working paper that Borrell wrote as a basis for discussion at the foreign ministers' meeting in Stockholm last week. To a large extent, it consists of formulations in which all 27 EU countries can somehow find themselves. On the one hand, it is clear, says Borrell, that Beijing aims to change the Western world order, that it is using its economic power to be politically aggressive. On the other hand, Europe must continue to work with China where necessary and possible, for example on climate protection. Borrell's paper for the foreign ministers sounds much more reserved than the speech in which Ursula von der Leyen presented her de-risking plans a few weeks ago.

In one specific case, this gap between the Commission and EU governments in terms of their willingness to confront Beijing is currently clearly visible: the Commission has proposed that the new sanctions package against Russia also include punitive measures against a handful of Chinese companies that support the Russian military in Ukraine . In many EU capitals, however, there are serious concerns about alienating Beijing in this way. Berlin is not enthusiastic about the idea either.

Incidentally, the European consensus is not exactly promoted by the fact that the German government is still looking for its own China strategy internally. The range of positions in the EU corresponds pretty much exactly to the range of positions in the traffic light coalition, a diplomat in Brussels complains.

There is actually a wide gulf between the Greens around Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (who is still spinning herself by 360 degrees and wandering aloud, why her position does not change as a result of her movements [1] (K.)) and Economics Minister Robert Habeck, who want to take a rather tough approach to Beijing, and Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who approved the participation of a Chinese state-owned company in part of the port of Hamburg.

Scholz uses the term de-risking himself, but likes to precede it with an adjective: "clever".

He seems to reserve the right to define what is stupid and what is smart de-risking in individual cases. Not everyone in Brussels thinks this is clever German leadership.

However, there are also observers in the EU who believe that Europe should not belittle itself when dealing with China. Beijing's nervous response to the de-risking debate shows China has something to lose and the EU has leverage. In Brussels, for example, attention was paid to the fact that Beijing urgently wants to revive an agreement with the EU that is intended to facilitate mutual investments. The deal is on hold after Beijing issued travel bans against several MEPs who had criticized the oppression of Uyghurs in China.

Beijing recently offered Brussels to lift these sanctions - without demanding anything in return. That was a rather "un-Chinese" behavior, says a diplomat. "But the Chinese fear that the EU and the US will act as one. That's why they want to split the West and Europe.""

 

Europe's most important economy, Germany, sells so much of everything to China that it would sink into the stone age without this trade. German Chancellor Scholz therefore wants a smart European policy towards China. And if he wants it, he gets it.

 1."Annalena Baerbock and the 360 turn aka: she is not the sharpest knife in the drawer."

Rules for Pentagon Use of Proxy Forces Shed Light on a Shadowy War Power

"Newly disclosed documents include Special Operations forces directives for managing counterterrorism and irregular warfare surrogate fighters.

U.S. Special Operations forces are not required to vet for past human rights violations by the foreign troops they arm and train as surrogates, newly disclosed documents show.

While the gap in rules governing vetting for a counterterrorism program have previously been reported based on anonymous sources, the documents provide official confirmation. Under the program, American commandos pay, train and equip foreign partner forces and then dispatch them on kill-or-capture operations.

The documents, including two sets of directives obtained by The New York Times through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, also show a similar gap exists in another Pentagon surrogate force program for so-called irregular warfare. It is aimed at disrupting nation-state rivals via operations that fall short of full armed conflict — including sabotage, hacking and information campaigns like propaganda or clandestine efforts to shape morale.

While the Pentagon is more open about security cooperation in which it assists allies and partners in expanding their own capacities, it rarely discusses its use of surrogates, or the foreign troops with whom Special Operations forces work to pursue specific American objectives. The documents open a window on how the programs function and what rules govern them.

Proxy forces are an increasingly important part of American foreign policy. Over the past decade, the United States has increasingly relied on supporting or deputizing local partner forces in places like Niger and Somalia, moving away from deploying large numbers of American ground troops as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even as that strategic shift is meant to reduce the risk of American casualties and blowback from being seen as occupiers, training and arming local forces creates other hazards.

The disclosures underscored a need for tighter rules on proxy forces, Representative Sara Jacobs, Democrat of California, argued. “We need to make sure that we are not training abusive units to become even more lethal and fueling the conflict and violence that we’re aiming to solve,” she said. “And that starts with universal human rights vetting.”

Last year, she and Senator Chris Van Hollen, Democrat of Maryland, sponsored an amendment to a defense bill to require human rights vetting of surrogate forces that passed the House but not the Senate. She said she planned to introduce a more comprehensive bill to tighten such rules.

A senior Defense Department official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive operations, said that all members of a proxy force were already subjected to extensive screening to ensure that they would not attack or spy on American forces. The official maintained that vetting was sufficient to weed out bad actors.

Lt. Col. Cesar Santiago-Santini, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement to The Times that the department had found “no verifiable gross violations of human rights” by participants of either proxy force program.

Katherine Yon Ebright, a counsel with the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University’s law school who has written critically about both programs, said that Pentagon officials have sent mixed signals about whether surrogate forces are vetted for past human rights violations, with current and former officials sometimes contradicting one another.

“It’s very helpful now to have these internal policies in hand that definitively show that human rights vetting is not required,” Ms. Ebright said. “It’s been frustrating, the more you know about this, because of those mixed messages and the opacity.”

The Pentagon keeps secret much about its proxy force operations.

In February, the Government Accountability Office completed a report titled “Special Operations: Overarching Guidance Needed to Oversee and Assess Use of Surrogate Forces to Combat Terrorism,” but everything about it beyond its title is classified. (The Times is seeking a declassification review under the Freedom of Information Act.)

The Pentagon also will not disclose a comprehensive list of partner forces and the countries in which they are operating. The Defense Department official said the list is classified primarily because of its sensitivity to partners, citing situations in which a foreign government has agreed but wants to keep its participation quiet for its own domestic political reasons.

The documents obtained by The Times include directives for two programs that are named for the laws that authorize them. The Section 127e program, commonly called “127 Echo,” can spend up to $100 million a year on counterterrorism proxies. The Section 1202 program is authorized to spend up to $15 million a year on surrogates for irregular warfare.

The rules lay out the process by which special operators propose developing a new partner force, which is ultimately up to the secretary of defense. The State Department’s chief of mission in the affected country — if there is one — must also concur, but the rules do not require consulting the secretary of state in Washington. The programs cannot be used for covert operations.

The laws creating the two programs do not provide free-standing operational authority, the documents say. They do not detail the scope and limits on whom the programs can target.

For the counterterrorism program, the proxy force must be used against an adversary deemed to be covered by the Authorization for Use of Military Force that Congress enacted after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the senior Defense Department official said. The executive branch has interpreted that law as a legal basis to wage an armed conflict against Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Somali militant group Al Shabab.

It is unclear whether the program has always been limited to groups covered by the force authorization. Reporting by The Intercept and Politico has suggested that the Pentagon may have used the program to support a force in Cameroon battling both an ISIS affiliate and Boko Haram, a group not deemed to be covered by the authorization However, some Boko Haram members also have ISIS links.

The irregular warfare program has provided training to allied forces in countries that face a threat of invasion by larger neighbors, the senior Defense Department official said. The Washington Post has reported that an irregular warfare proxy program in Ukraine was terminated just before the open conflict with Russia started, and that some officials want to restart it.

The directives also describe the vetting that allied partners must undergo before American taxpayers pay their salaries and put weapons and specialized military equipment, like night-vision goggles, in their hands.

Screening includes collecting people’s DNA; analyzing phone call logs, travel histories, social media posts, and social contacts; checking local and national records for derogatory information; and conducting security interviews. Leaders who will come into greater contact with American troops and learn more about their plans must also undergo behavioral health interviews and lie-detector tests.

But the purpose of this vetting is to detect counterintelligence risks and potential threats to American forces. The directive does not mention violations of human rights — such as rape, torture or extrajudicial killings.

The irregular warfare directive is less detailed about vetting. But it explicitly says, “The provision of support under Section 1202 is not contingent upon successful human rights vetting requirements as defined in” a statute with a rule known as the Leahy Law.

The Leahy Law, named after former Senator Patrick Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, bans security assistance to units of foreign militaries or other security forces that have a history of gross violations of human rights. (The law does not cover nonstate forces, like a tribal militia.)

Still, Colonel Santiago-Santini, the Pentagon spokesman, said in his statement that the department was “confident that our vetting system for Section 127e and 1202 programs would reveal any human rights concerns with potential recipients.”

At first, the Pentagon’s version of the Leahy Law applied only to training. But in 2014, Congress expanded it to providing equipment and other assistance. But in a memo that year signed by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and obtained by The Times separately from the information act lawsuit, the Pentagon declared that the Leahy Law did not apply to counterterrorism surrogates.

The memo said that enabling proxy forces to help Special Forces counterterrorism operations is “not assistance” to the foreigners. This purported distinction — that building up proxy forces so they can assist the United States in pursuing its objectives is legally different from assisting foreign partners in building up their own security abilities — is disputed.

A critic of that theory is Sarah Harrison, who worked as a Pentagon lawyer from 2017 to 2021 and is now at the International Crisis Group, where she has called for requiring human rights vetting of surrogate forces. She argued that the Pentagon’s narrow interpretation of the Leahy Law is “a dishonest reading of the plain text and intention of Congress.”"

Pentagono įgaliotųjų pajėgų naudojimo taisyklės atskleidžia šešėlinę karo galią

„Naujai atskleisti dokumentai apima Specialiųjų operacijų pajėgų nurodymus dėl kovos su terorizmu ir nereguliarių karo pakaitinių kovotojų valdymo.

 

Naujai atskleisti dokumentai rodo, kad JAV specialiųjų operacijų pajėgos neprivalo tikrinti ankstesnių žmogaus teisių pažeidimų, kuriuos padarė užsienio kariai, kuriuos jos ginkluoja ir moko, kaip surogatus.

 

Nors anoniminiais šaltiniais anksčiau buvo pranešta apie taisyklių, reglamentuojančių kovos su terorizmu programos patikrinimo spragą, dokumentai pateikia oficialų patvirtinimą. Pagal programą Amerikos komandosai moka, apmoko ir aprūpina užsienio partnerių pajėgas, o paskui siunčia jas į žudymo arba gaudymo operacijas.

 

Dokumentai, įskaitant du direktyvų rinkinius, kuriuos „The New York Times“ gavo per Informacijos laisvės įstatymo ieškinį, taip pat rodo, kad panaši spraga egzistuoja ir kitoje Pentagono pakaitinių pajėgų programoje, skirtoje vadinamajam nereguliariam karui. Šia programa siekiama sužlugdyti nacionalinių valstybių konkurentus, atliekant operacijas, kurios nepasiekia visiško ginkluoto konflikto lygio, įskaitant sabotažą, įsilaužimus ir informacines kampanijas, tokias, kaip propaganda arba slaptos pastangos formuoti moralę.

 

Nors Pentagonas atviriau kalba apie bendradarbiavimą saugumo srityje, kai jis padeda sąjungininkams ir partneriams plėsti jų pajėgumus, tačiau retai diskutuoja apie tai, kaip panaudoti surogatus arba užsienio karius, su kuriais specialiųjų operacijų pajėgos dirba, siekdamos konkrečių Amerikos tikslų. Dokumentai atveria langą, kaip veikia programos ir kokios taisyklės jas reglamentuoja.

 

Įgaliotosios pajėgos yra vis svarbesnė Amerikos užsienio politikos dalis. Per pastarąjį dešimtmetį Jungtinės Valstijos vis labiau pasitikėjo vietinių partnerių pajėgų palaikymu ar pavadavimu tokiose vietose, kaip Nigeris ir Somalis, o ne dislokuoti daug amerikiečių sausumos karių, kaip tai buvo daroma Irake ir Afganistane.

 

Net jei šis strateginis poslinkis yra skirtas sumažinti amerikiečių aukų ir smūgio, kuris bus laikomas okupantais, riziką, vietos pajėgų mokymas ir ginklavimas kelia kitų pavojų.

 

Atskleidimas pabrėžė, kad reikia griežtesnių taisyklių dėl įgaliotųjų pajėgų, teigė Kalifornijos demokratė Sara Jacobs. „Turime įsitikinti, kad nemokome smurtaujančių padalinių, kad jie taptų dar mirtingesni ir kurstytų konfliktą bei smurtą, kurį siekiame išspręsti“, – sakė ji. „Ir tai prasideda nuo visuotinio žmogaus teisių patikrinimo“.

 

Praėjusiais metais ji ir senatorius Chrisas Van Hollenas, Merilando demokratas, parėmė gynybos įstatymo pataisą, pagal kurią būtų reikalaujama, kad būtų tikrinamos žmogaus teisės, kai pakaitinės pajėgos praėjo Atstovų rūmus, bet ne Senatą. Ji teigė planuojanti pateikti išsamesnį įstatymo projektą, kuriuo būtų sugriežtintos tokios taisyklės.

 

Vyresnysis Gynybos departamento pareigūnas, norėjęs likti anonimiškas, kad galėtų aptarti jautrias operacijas, sakė, kad visi įgaliotųjų pajėgų nariai jau buvo kruopščiai tikrinami, siekiant užtikrinti, kad jie nepultų ir nešnipinėtų Amerikos pajėgų. Pareigūnas tvirtino, kad patikrinimo pakako, kad būtų pašalinti blogi veikėjai.

 

Pentagono atstovas pulkininkas leitenantas Cesaras Santiago-Santini sakė „The Times“ paskelbtame pareiškime, kad departamentas nenustatė „jokių patikrinamų šiurkščių žmogaus teisių pažeidimų“ tarp abiejų įgaliotųjų pajėgų programų dalyvių.

 

Niujorko universiteto teisės mokyklos Brennano teisingumo centro patarėja Katherine Yon Ebright, kuri kritiškai parašė apie abi programas, sakė, kad Pentagono pareigūnai siuntė prieštaringus signalus apie tai, ar surogatinės pajėgos yra tikrinamos dėl praeities žmogaus teisių pažeidimų, tiek esamų, tiek buvusių. pareigūnai kartais prieštarauja vienas kitam.

 

„Dabar labai naudinga turėti šias vidaus politikos kryptis, kurios aiškiai parodo, kad žmogaus teisių tikrinimas nereikalingas“, – sakė ponia Ebright. „Tai buvo nelinksma, kuo daugiau apie tai žinai, dėl tų mišrių pranešimų ir neskaidrumo.

 

Pentagonas daug laiko paslaptyje apie savo įgaliotųjų pajėgų operacijas.

 

Vasario mėn. Vyriausybės atskaitomybės biuras parengė ataskaitą „Specialios operacijos: visapusiškos gairės, reikalingos pakaitinių pajėgų panaudojimui, kovojant su terorizmu, prižiūrėti ir įvertinti“, tačiau viskas, kas su ja susiję, išskyrus pavadinimą, yra įslaptinta. (The Times siekia išslaptinimo peržiūros pagal Informacijos laisvės įstatymą.)

 

Pentagonas taip pat neatskleis išsamaus partnerių pajėgų sąrašo ir šalių, kuriose jos veikia. Gynybos departamento pareigūnas sakė, kad sąrašas yra įslaptintas pirmiausia dėl jo jautrumo partneriams ir nurodė situacijas, kai užsienio vyriausybė sutiko, bet nori tylėti dėl savo vidaus politinių priežasčių.

 

„The Times“ gautuose dokumentuose yra nurodymai dviem programoms, pavadintoms pagal jas leidžiančius įstatymus. Programa Section 127e, paprastai vadinama „127 Echo“, per metus gali išleisti iki 100 mln. dolerių kovos su terorizmu įgaliotiniams. Programa Section 1202 yra įgaliota išleisti iki 15 milijonų dolerių per metus neteisėto karo pakaitalams.

 

Taisyklėse nustatytas procesas, kurio metu specialūs padaliniai siūlo sukurti naujas partnerių pajėgas, kurios galiausiai priklauso nuo gynybos sekretoriaus. Valstybės departamento atstovybės nukentėjusioje šalyje vadovas, jei toks yra, taip pat turi sutikti, tačiau taisyklės nereikalauja konsultuotis su valstybės sekretoriumi Vašingtone. Programos negali būti naudojamos slaptoms operacijoms.

 

Dokumentuose teigiama, kad įstatymai, kuriais kuriamos dvi programos, nesuteikia savarankiškos veiklos įgaliojimų. Juose nenurodoma, kam programos gali būti taikomos, ir ribos.

 

Vykdant kovos su terorizmu programą, įgaliotosios pajėgos turi būti naudojamos prieš priešininką, dėl kurio, kaip manoma, taikomas leidimas naudoti karines pajėgas, kurį Kongresas patvirtino po 2001 m. rugsėjo 11 d. išpuolių, sakė vyresnysis Gynybos departamento pareigūnas. Vykdomoji valdžia šį įstatymą aiškino, kaip teisinį pagrindą pradėti ginkluotą konfliktą prieš „Al Qaeda“, „Islamo valstybę“ ir Somalio kovotojų grupuotę „Al Shabab“.

 

Neaišku, ar programa visada buvo taikoma tik grupėms, kurioms buvo išduotas leidimas pajėgoms. „The Intercept“ ir „Politico“ pranešimai rodo, kad Pentagonas galėjo panaudoti programą, siekdamas paremti pajėgas Kamerūne, kovojančias ir su ISIS filialu, ir su „Boko Haram“ – grupe, kuriai netaikomas leidimas. Tačiau kai kurie „Boko Haram“ nariai taip pat turi ISIS ryšių.

 

Pagal nereguliaraus karo programą buvo rengiami mokymai sąjungininkų pajėgoms šalyse, kurioms gresia didesnių kaimynų invazija, sakė aukšto rango Gynybos departamento pareigūnas. „The Washington Post“ pranešė, kad prieš pat prasidedant atviram konfliktui su Rusija buvo nutraukta nereguliaraus karo tarpininkavimo programa Ukrainoje, o kai kurie pareigūnai nori ją paleisti iš naujo.

 

Direktyvose taip pat aprašomas patikrinimas, kurį turi atlikti sąjungininkai partneriai, kad Amerikos mokesčių mokėtojai sumokėtų atlyginimus ir į rankas padėtų ginklus bei specializuotą karinę įrangą, pavyzdžiui, naktinio matymo akinius.

 

Atranka apima žmonių DNR rinkimą; telefono skambučių žurnalų, kelionių istorijos, socialinių tinklų įrašų ir socialinių kontaktų analizė; vietinių ir nacionalinių įrašų tikrinimas, ar nėra žeminančios informacijos; ir saugumo pokalbių vedimas. Lyderiai, kurie daugiau bendraus su amerikiečių kariais ir sužinos daugiau apie jų planus, taip pat turi atlikti elgesio pokalbius ir atlikti melo detektorių testus.

 

Tačiau šio patikrinimo tikslas – nustatyti kontržvalgybos riziką ir galimas grėsmes Amerikos pajėgoms. Direktyvoje nemini žmogaus teisių pažeidimai, pavyzdžiui, išžaginimas, kankinimai ar neteisminiai žudymai.

 

Neteisėto karo direktyva yra mažiau išsami apie patikrinimą. Tačiau jame aiškiai sakoma: „Pagalbos teikimas pagal 1202 skirsnį nepriklauso nuo sėkmingo žmogaus teisių patikrinimo reikalavimų, kaip apibrėžta“ statute su taisykle, žinoma kaip Leahy įstatymas.

 

Leahy įstatymas, pavadintas buvusio senatoriaus Patricko Leahy, Vermonto demokrato, vardu, draudžia teikti saugumo pagalbą užsienio kariuomenės ar kitų saugumo pajėgų daliniams, kurie yra patyrę šiurkščių žmogaus teisių pažeidimų. (Įstatymas netaikomas nevalstybinėms pajėgoms, pavyzdžiui, genčių milicijai.)

 

Vis dėlto Pentagono atstovas pulkininkas Santiago-Santini savo pareiškime teigė, kad departamentas yra „įsitikinęs, kad mūsų 127e ir 1202 skirsnių programų tikrinimo sistema atskleis bet kokius potencialių gavėjų susirūpinimą dėl žmogaus teisių“.

 

Iš pradžių Pentagono Leahy įstatymo versija buvo taikoma tik mokymams. Tačiau 2014 m. Kongresas jį išplėtė ir suteikė įrangą bei kitą pagalbą. Tačiau tais metais gynybos sekretoriaus Chucko Hagelio pasirašytame atmintinėje, kurią „The Times“ gavo atskirai nuo ieškinio dėl informacijos, Pentagonas paskelbė, kad Leahy įstatymas netaikomas kovos su terorizmu surogatams.

 

Atmintinėje sakoma, kad leidimas įgaliotosioms pajėgoms padėti Specialiųjų pajėgų kovos su terorizmu operacijose nėra „ne pagalba“ užsieniečiams. Šis tariamas skirtumas – kad įgaliotųjų pajėgų kūrimas, kad jos galėtų padėti Jungtinėms Valstijoms siekti savo tikslų, teisiškai skiriasi nuo pagalbos užsienio partneriams stiprinant jų pačių saugumo gebėjimus – ginčytinas.

 

Šios teorijos kritikė yra Sarah Harrison, kuri 2017–2021 m. dirbo Pentagono teisininke, o dabar dirba Tarptautinėje krizių grupėje, kur ji paragino reikalauti, kad surogatinės pajėgos būtų tikrinamos žmogaus teisių klausimais. Ji teigė, kad Pentagono siauras Leahy įstatymo aiškinimas yra „nesąžiningas paprasto teksto ir Kongreso ketinimo skaitymas“."