"Europe lost in Ukraine" - "A gigantic paradox". Prof. Rafał Chwedoruk: Part of Europe has opted for the continuation of the conflict in Ukraine

 

"In the face of voices about the need for large expenditures on armaments in Europe, a sharp increase in debt can be expected, and Poland will face a politically suicidal debate for its participants on the restoration of compulsory military service - assessed Prof. Rafał Chwedoruk. Joanna Ćwiek-Świdecka's interlocutor pointed out that Europe lost in Ukraine, and the United States is reorienting its policy.

 

The effects of the events may be the process of deepening European integration and a decline in the importance of nation states - he predicted.

 

After the failure of Friday's talks between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump in the White House, in a situation when the Ukrainian president left Washington ahead of time and the American-Ukrainian agreement on the exploitation of raw materials in Ukraine was not signed, a meeting of leaders of some European countries took place in London on Sunday, who discussed the situation in Ukraine and security in Europe.

 

Asked to comment on the events of recent days, political scientist from the University of Warsaw, Prof. Rafał Chwedoruk, assessed in a conversation with Joanna Ćwiek-Świdecka that "more has happened in terms of form, not content". - We in Poland did not want to accept that the internal interests in the United States, in terms of various pressure groups, large social groups, political parties and factions, are simply different.

 

For years, we have been fed with a de facto propaganda vision of how wonderful it is when the outgoing president symbolically hands over power to his successor and the United States continues its policy in the main areas, in this case international policy. This was an absolutely false vision - he said.

 

Conflict in Ukraine. Prof. Rafał Chwedoruk: Some European countries have bet on continuing the armed conflict

 

- We have an externalization of the fact that for the Republicans, strategic interests concern Asia, China as competition, especially in terms of industry, and also - for various reasons - the Middle East - continued the guest of "Rzeczpospolita". - We did not want to accept that the Western world is more of a mythologized concept than a real one, that the difference in interests between the United States and Western Europe is a permanent difference and a political alliance does not annihilate such interests - he added.

 

- At the moment, we are simply dealing with the process of reorientation of American policy and the desire to close those disputes and conflicts that the current administration considers secondary and harmful - said Prof. Chwedoruk.

 

He argued that in Europe "we are dealing with a gigantic paradox".

 

- A significant part of European countries, countries with the greatest potential, tried to prevent conflict, in the first weeks they tried to mediate, but then tied their interests to the administration of the previous president (Joe Biden - ed.), they bet on the continuation of the armed conflict, and not on seeking peace. After the change of administration (in the USA - ed.), the French and to some extent the Germans found themselves in a complete political vacuum - he assessed.

 

In his opinion, the Ukrainian authorities did not realize that with Trump's arrival "the realities have completely changed".

 

- In reality, what is important in politics will happen in the next few weeks - predicted Joanna Ćwiek-Świdecka's interlocutor.

 

Is the Trump-Zelensky quarrel a total disaster for Ukrainian diplomacy?

 

Commenting on the stormy course of Volodymyr Zelensky's conversation with Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, Prof. Rafał Chwedoruk noted that there is an ongoing political conflict in Ukraine, and Friday's events, according to reports from "bloggers distant from Zelensky", were poorly received as a "total disaster for Ukrainian diplomacy", especially in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

 

Did Volodymyr Zelensky allow himself to be provoked in the Oval Office? - I think that if we look closely, I don't think that all this is limited to directing, because there was a very heavy curse in Russian addressed to a politician who will probably try to become Donald Trump's successor - emphasized the political scientist. He referred to the recording, which is supposed to show that during the conversation with the president and vice president of the USA, Zelensky quietly cursed at J.D. Vance.

 

According to Chwedoruk, the statements of European politicians in London show that the president of Ukraine "did not win the game with the Americans". - Because absolutely nothing results from the meeting in London, except that there will be another meeting - added the professor. He also expressed the view that "Europe can only act reactively in a situation where all the cards are on the American side".

 

According to the political scientist, the leaders of the USA and Ukraine will sit down at the negotiating table again.

 

Will Poland face a debate on the restoration of compulsory military service?

 

Recently, voices of European leaders have appeared about the need to militarize Europe. - As taxpayers of the national we should immediately grab our pockets. Such militarization means the prospect of a long-term decline in the standard of living in Europe, and many European economies, including the most important one for us, Germany, are experiencing structural problems - commented Rafał Chwedoruk. - An attempt to invest in armaments is an attempt to invest that will never fully pay off. They can drive some sectors of the economy in the short term, but they mean a sharp increase in debt - he assessed.

 

- This also means, in the Polish case, a politically suicidal debate for anyone who gets involved in it, on the restoration of compulsory military service, of course under a different name and probably not for a period of two or three years - he emphasized, adding that armaments in Europe will on balance strengthen the United States, because "a huge part of these armaments will have to be associated with the American industry".

 

"Europe lost in Ukraine"

 

- What I think is very important from a Polish perspective, which we do not want to fully accept, is that Europe lost in Ukraine, and I do not mean the outcome of the armed struggle, because this can be assessed in different ways, but politically it lost everything it could - said prof. Rafał Chwedoruk in an interview with Joanna Ćwiek-Świdecka. - The entire European modus vivendi was based on cheap raw materials from Russia and cheap Chinese consumer products. The former have already been limited or are still being purchased from Russia only as Kazakh, Indian, and probably soon also as American - he added.

 

He pointed out that Europe was facing a "fundamental dilemma" regarding the issue of deepening integration.

 

- The defeated European elites tried to win the catastrophe of 2022 to their advantage by pointing to the Russian bogeyman as an inspiration to deepen European integration in the political dimension - he noted. - We will be dealing with a rather serious situation and discussion here as well, because we will have to realistically address these processes.

 

These processes will mean weakening the ability of the nation state to influence, entrusting the Union with increasingly greater functions - he continued."

 

The Germans and French are using this fear of Russia to deprive us, the Lithuanian people, of the remaining opportunities to solve the issues, that are important for us. Former communist henchmen (Ožys, Nausėda, Grybauskaitė, social democrats and others) are fiercely serving their new masters.

Spalio 7 d. dar kartą atskleidė pažįstamą nesėkmę šnipinėjime - vyraujantį vertinimą

 

 „TEL AVIV – gerokai prieš „Hamas“ 2023 m. spalio 7 d. išpuolius, Izraelio kariuomenė turėjo daug įrodymų, kad kažkas bręsta.

 

 Izraelis daugiau, nei metus turėjo slaptą „Hamas“ masinės invazijos planą. Gazos ruožo pasienyje esantys kariai ištisas savaites stebėjo, kaip Hamas vykdo reidus Izraelio karinėse bazėse ir civilinėse bendruomenėse. O šalies saugumo vadovai perspėjo, kad kelis mėnesius trukusios ginčytinos vidaus diskusijos ir protestai dėl politinių klausimų padarė Izraelį pažeidžiamą.

 

 Naktį prieš išpuolį Izraelio vidaus žvalgybos agentūra Shin Bet sužinojo, kad dešimtys ar šimtai „Hamas“ narių suaktyvino mobiliųjų telefonų paslaugą Izraelio tinkluose – tai stiprus signalas, kad jie netrukus planuoja būti Izraelyje. Izraelio šnipai perėmė signalus, kad dalis „Hamas“ vadovybės pasitraukė į pogrindį ir „Hamas“ komandų grupės pradėjo telktis vietose aplink Gazos ruožą.

 

 Išgirtos Izraelio žvalgybos tarnybos diskutavo, ką visa tai reiškė, iki gilios nakties ir nusprendė iš naujo įvertinti rytą. Apie aušrą „Hamas“ atakavo iš esmės taip, kaip numatyta prieš metus užfiksuotame plane, palikdamas maždaug 1 200 žuvusiųjų ir 250 paimtų įkaitais Gazoje.

 

 Izraelis išsamiai išdėstė savo nesėkmes šią savaitę paskelbtoje ataskaitoje. Kartu su atskiromis klaidomis buvo didelė žvalgybos klaida, kuri nuolat kartojosi per visą istoriją.

 

Mokslininkai ją vadina „strategine žvalgybos nesėkme“ – nesugebėjimu matyti miško už medžių.

 

 Ją nesunku pastebėti istorijoje, bet atkakliai sunku apsisaugoti, kai ji išsiskleidžia. Intelektas apima informacijos gabalų paėmimą ir teorijų kūrimą, nuo kurių gali būti sunku mintis pakreipti. Įrodymai, kurie prieštarauja vyraujančiam vertinimui, dažnai atmetami.

 

 „Jei gera žvalgyba pasako, ko, tavo manymu, neatsitiks, tu tiesiog jos nenaudosi“, – sakė Kalgario universiteto istorijos profesorius Johnas Ferrisas, tyrinėjantis žvalgybą ir jos trūkumus.

 

 Spalio 7 d. išpuolių atveju Izraeliui susidarė įspūdis, kad „Hamas“ siekė ekonominių nuolaidų, kurstydamas įtampą pasienyje. Nė vienas aukšto rango pareigūnas nemanė, kad JAV įtraukta teroristinė grupuotė, žymiai silpnesnė už Izraelio kariuomenę, norėjo plataus masto karo.

 

 Beveik lygiai prieš 50 metų Izraelis padarė panašią katastrofišką klaidą.

 

 Egiptas ir Sirija sutelkė pajėgas prie savo sienos ir paskelbė apie ketinimą susigrąžinti teritoriją, kurią Izraelis iš jų atėmė prieš šešerius metus. Izraelis gavo daugybę įspėjimų, kad karas neišvengiamas.

 

 Tačiau iki pat karo pradžios, 1973 m. spalio 6 d., Izraelis manė, kad jo priešai blefuoja. Jokiu būdu, tuo metu manė Izraelio žvalgyba, jo kaimynai taip greitai po triuškinamo pralaimėjimo 1967 metais vėl norėjo karo.

 

 Prieš tris dešimtmečius JAV padarė dar didesnę sprendimo klaidą. Prieš Japonijos puolimą prieš JAV Ramiojo vandenyno laivyną Perl Harbore 1941 m. gruodžio 7 d., Vašingtonas turėjo aiškių ženklų, kad tai ateis.

 

 Dieną prieš išpuolį JAV žvalgyba iššifravo Japonijos žinutes, rodančias, kad taikos derybos, kurias jie vedė su JAV, stabdomos. Japonų karo laivai prieš kelias savaites dingo Ramiajame vandenyne. JAV armija ir karinis jūrų laivynas perspėjo apie galimus karo veiksmus.

 

 Tačiau, sakė Ferrisas, JAV aukščiausioji JAV atstovai neįsivaizdavo, kad Japonija gali kariauti su Amerika arba yra suinteresuota kariauti. Netgi paskutinė proga pasiruošti – kai radaras už 137 mylių nuo Havajų krantų užfiksavo 183 orlaivius likus maždaug valandai iki jų smūgio – buvo netinkamai išnaudota.

 

 Po karo štabo viršininko padėjėjas generolas Shermanas Milesas apibendrino nesėkmę: "Turėjome kriterijų. Neturėjome pagrindo abejoti apytiksliu jų  tikslumu. Tačiau jie buvo visiškai klaidingi."

 

 Maždaug prieš šešis mėnesius Sovietų Sąjunga padarė savo klaidą. Sovietų žvalgyba Josifui Stalinui pateikė aiškių įrodymų, kad nacistinė Vokietija, tariamai sąjungininkė, rengia didžiulę invaziją. Tačiau istorikai teigia, kad Stalinui nepavyko sutelkti savo kariuomenės.

 

 Ferrisas sakė, kad spalio 7 d. buvo viena baisiausių strateginės žvalgybos nesėkmių, nes Izraelis buvo visiškai nustebintas.

 

 Izraelio kariuomenės pareigūnai teigė klaidingai manę, kad jų žvalgybos aparatas toks geras, kad žinojo, kas nutiks.

 

 „Buvome priklausomi nuo tikslios žvalgybos informacijos“, – sakė vienas iš pareigūnų, kuris žurnalistams pristatė spalio 7-osios tyrimo išvadas. „Priklausomybė yra mąstymas, kad žinai viską“.” [1]

 

1.  World News: Oct. 7 Marked Familiar Failure in Spying. Lieber, Dov.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 03 Mar 2025: A8.

Oct. 7 Marked Familiar Failure in Spying - Prevailing Assesment

 

"TEL AVIV -- Well before Hamas launched its Oct. 7, 2023, attacks, Israel's military had plenty of evidence that something was brewing.

Israel had been in possession of a secret Hamas plan for a mass invasion for more than a year. Soldiers on the border of Gaza had observed Hamas practicing raids on Israeli military bases and civilian communities for weeks. And the country's security chiefs had been warning that months of contentious internal debate and protests over political issues had left Israel vulnerable.

The night before the attack, the Shin Bet, Israel's domestic intelligence agency, learned that dozens to hundreds of Hamas members had activated mobile-phone service on Israel's networks, a strong signal they planned to be in Israel soon. Israel's spies picked up signals that some of Hamas's leadership had gone underground and that groups of Hamas commandos had begun gathering in spots around the Gaza Strip.

Israel's vaunted intelligence services debated what it all meant until deep in the night and decided to reassess in the morning. Around dawn, Hamas attacked essentially as outlined in the plan captured a year earlier, leaving roughly 1,200 dead and 250 taken as hostages to Gaza.

Israel detailed its failings in a report past this week. Along with the discrete mistakes was a big-picture intelligence blunder of a type that has repeated itself regularly throughout history. Scholars call them "strategic intelligence failures" -- an inability to see the forest for the trees.

They are easy to spot in hindsight but stubbornly hard to guard against as they are unfolding. Intelligence involves taking pieces of information and forming theories, which can be hard to shake. Evidence that contradicts the prevailing assessment often gets dismissed.

"If good intelligence tells you what you think won't happen, you just won't use it," said John Ferris, a history professor at the University of Calgary who studies intelligence and its failings.

In the case of the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel was under the impression that Hamas was angling for economic concessions by stirring up tension on the border. No senior official thought the U.S.-designated terrorist group, significantly weaker than Israel's military, wanted a full-scale war.

Almost exactly 50 years earlier, Israel had made a similar catastrophic blunder.

Egypt and Syria were mobilizing forces on its border and declared their intention to win back territory Israel took from them six years earlier. Israel had received numerous warnings that war was imminent.

Yet, right up until just before war broke out, on Oct. 6, 1973, Israel thought its enemies were bluffing. No way, thought Israeli intelligence at the time, did its neighbors want war again so soon after a crushing defeat in 1967.

Three decades earlier, the U.S. made an even bigger error in judgment. Before the Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, Washington had clear signs it was coming.

The day before the attack, U.S. intelligence decrypted Japanese messages that indicated they were through with peace talks they had been conducting with the U.S. Weeks earlier, the Japanese fleet had disappeared into the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Army and Navy sounded warnings of possible hostilities.

Yet, said Ferris, the U.S. top brass didn't imagine Japan was capable of or interested in war with America. Even a final opportunity to prepare -- when radar picked up 183 aircraft 137 miles off the Hawaiian coast about an hour before they struck -- was mishandled.

After the war, Gen. Sherman Miles, the assistant chief of staff, summed up the failure: "We had a yardstick. We had no reason to doubt our yardstick's approximate accuracy. Yet it was wholly false."

About six months earlier, the Soviet Union had made its own blunder. Soviet intelligence had given Joseph Stalin clear evidence that Nazi Germany, purportedly an ally, was preparing a massive invasion. But historians say Stalin failed to mobilize his army.

Ferris said Oct. 7 was among the most egregious strategic intelligence failures because of how absolutely Israel was taken by surprise.

Israeli military officials said they mistakenly believed their intelligence apparatus was so good that they knew what would happen.

"We were addicted to the precise intel information," said one of the officers who presented the findings of the Oct. 7 investigation to reporters. "The addiction is thinking you know everything."" [1]

1.  World News: Oct. 7 Marked Familiar Failure in Spying. Lieber, Dov.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 03 Mar 2025: A8.