Kyiv Is Closer to Berlin Than Caracas: German Leader Merz is a First German, that Supports a Law Only when that Support Helps Him to Sell Tanks “Leopard” to Ukrainians

“While the Chancellor does indeed invoke international law, his party colleagues view Trump’s actions in Venezuela pragmatically. Within the SPD, however, the stance is more critical.

 

Even his one-day trip to Lithuania on Monday could not spare Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul from having to defend—or rather, to justify—Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s (both CDU) stance regarding American intervention in Venezuela. Specifically, he had to explain why the Federal Government has not yet publicly articulated a clear position. In this Baltic state, the focus—unsurprisingly—is on the threat posed by Russia. For Berlin, a decisive argument for condemning Moscow’s attack on Ukraine has, from the very beginning, been the appeal to the violation of international law. It is all the more striking, therefore, how much Berlin is now struggling to provide an international-law assessment of the American attack.

 

For the Federal Government, the situation is difficult—not least because of the Chancellor’s first foreign trip of the new year. On Tuesday, this trip takes Merz to Paris for the Ukraine conference. When America ramped up the pressure on Venezuela in recent weeks—primarily through attacks on alleged smuggler boats—German criticism remained notably restrained. Given that the Federal Government is expending considerable energy in its efforts to find a solution to the Ukraine war—specifically by attempting to reconcile the sensitivities of the White House with Germany’s own security requirements—it is deemed essential not to sour the atmosphere on a different front.

 

When asked about this connection while in Lithuania, Wadephul offered no direct answer. Instead, he employed the very word that Merz had already introduced over the weekend to justify Berlin’s decision to take its time in legally assessing the events in Venezuela—a word that continued to be heard repeatedly from government circles throughout Monday: *complex*. "It is a complex situation that demands a precise analysis from all of us," says Wadephul. Shortly before boarding his plane in Berlin that morning, while speaking on *Deutschlandfunk* radio, he had—in response to a question regarding the international-law assessment stated that he does not head an institute for international law, but rather serves as the "chief foreign policy official."

 

One argument cited in Berlin to justify this restraint in judgment is that the government in Venezuela lacks legitimacy—and indeed, its president is not recognized by Germany. Wadephul also points this out. If current developments were to lead to fair elections, that would surely be "a positive development," he says. While the minister himself adopts a pragmatic stance, his party's foreign policy experts are even more explicit. "We do ourselves no favors if we pass a hasty judgment now and thereby get into a dispute with the US President—a man whose support we actually want to win," Jürgen Hardt, the Christian Democrat who serves as the Union parliamentary group's foreign policy spokesperson, told *Bayerischer Rundfunk*. While acknowledging that there are indeed "quite a few question marks" from the perspective of international law, he argues that Germany's primary objective must be to exert influence on US policy in those areas "where it directly concerns us." He notes that this approach has already proven successful with regard to Ukraine policy. Armin Laschet (CDU), Chairman of the Bundestag's Committee on Foreign Affairs, strikes a similar note. "Would it be wise for Europeans to decide now to issue a one-sided condemnation of US President Donald Trump?" Laschet asks. The likely result, he suggests, would be a loss of influence in Ukraine policy.

 

The message from the CDU's foreign policy experts is unequivocal: Kyiv is closer than Caracas.

 

Their Social Democratic coalition partner, however, does not view matters quite so dispassionately. Over the weekend, SPD Chairman Lars Klingbeil—who also serves as Finance Minister and Vice-Chancellor—issued a statement in which he leveled sharp criticism at the Maduro regime; yet, he went on to assert that such criticism could "not serve as a justification for disregarding international law." This statement could be interpreted as an indication that he believes precisely this international law is, in fact, being disregarded. On Monday, observers within the Merz camp pointed out that both Klingbeil and Merz have, after all, emphasized the importance of adhering to international law—meaning they were not far apart. Both institutions—the Chancellery and the Ministry of Finance—had coordinated their statements prior to their release.

 

Alongside Party Chairman Klingbeil, other SPD politicians also spoke out—and, compared to the Union parties, did so unequivocally. "This course of action is unacceptable and constitutes a grave breach of international law," stated, for instance, Deputy Parliamentary Group Leader Siemtje Möller. In doing so, she articulated the prevailing view within the SPD.

 

Nevertheless, the party finds it easier than its coalition partner to criticize Trump for his actions in Venezuela. For within the Federal Government, there is only one person responsible for maintaining reasonably stable contact with the American President: Friedrich Merz. This fact is acknowledged within the SPD without envy. Thus, it was notable that in all the statements regarding Venezuela, while Trump and Maduro appeared, but not the Federal Chancellor. The Association of Social Democratic Lawyers went the furthest; in a statement issued on Monday, it demanded that the Federal Government explicitly identify and condemn the violation of international law committed by the USA.

 

Moreover, within the SPD itself, one might reasonably assume that Ukraine lies closer to Merz’s heart than Venezuela.

 

The Social Democrats support Merz in no area as strongly as they do in his Ukraine policy.

 

When, late last year, he brought the Ukrainian and American sides together at the negotiating table in Berlin, his coalition partner was full of praise and appreciation. Merz’s camp, for its part, acknowledges and accepts that the pressure within the SPD to critically assess Trump’s actions is significantly higher. Thus, the Venezuela issue does not appear likely to trigger the first coalition spat of the year.

 

The opposition, meanwhile, is free to play its hand without restraint. Deborah Düring, foreign policy spokesperson for the Green Party parliamentary group, told the *F.A.Z.* that Merz had failed to grasp "the gravity of the situation." "The international order, which is founded upon international law, is in a state of disintegration. Anyone who fails to take a stand on this issue contributes to the erosion of international law."” [1]

 

1. Kiew ist Berlin näher als Caracas. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 06 Jan 2026: 4. Von Mona Jaeger, Eckart Lohse und Matthias Wyssuwa, Berlin

Trumpas svarsto galimybę JAV pasitraukti iš „popierinio tigro“ NATO dėl Europos nesugebėjimo atsakyti tuo pačiu

NATO tampa atpirkimo ožiu dėl problemų, kurias sukelia Irano dronų ir raketų efektyvumas. Tankai ir lėktuvai, nuolatiniai NATO žaisliukai, pastaruoju metu tapo mažiau įdomūs.

 

Nuo 2026 m. balandžio mėn. JAV pareigūnai abejoja NATO verte ir kaltina sąjungininkus dėl paramos stokos konflikte su Iranu, ypač turint omenyje, kad Irano dronų ir raketų technologijos meta iššūkį tradiciniams kariniams ištekliams.

 

Konfliktas išryškino šiuolaikinio karo pokyčius, kai pigūs Irano dronai pranoksta tradicinius tankus ir lėktuvus.

 

NATO kaltinimas ir susiskaldymas: JAV pareigūnai išreiškė nusivylimą, kai kurie dešiniųjų pažiūrų žiniasklaidos ir vyriausybės atstovai kritikavo NATO sąjungininkus už tai, kad jie nepalaiko, JAV vadovaujamų, pastangų Irano kare.

 

Karo keitimas: Irano ekonomiškai efektyvių dronų ir raketų naudojimas sukėlė didelių sutrikimų ir atskleidė, kad tradicinė karinė įranga (tankai, lėktuvai) yra mažiau veiksminga, iš naujo apibrėždama konfliktus.

Operacinė įtampa: JAV perspėjo apie aljansų „persvarstymą“ dėl to, ką Europos partneriai, neprisijungę prie Hormūzo sąsiaurio užtikrinimo, suvokia kaip „išdavystę“.

 

Veiklos problemos: Nors kai kurie pareigūnai teigė apie „puikius“ rezultatus, kiti pastangas atremti Irano dronų kampaniją apibūdino, kaip „nuviliančias“.

 

„Prezidentas Donaldas Trumpas teigia, kad persvarsto Amerikos narystę NATO, nes nė viena narė neatsiliepė į jo prašymą padėti apsaugoti Artimuosius Rytus nuo Irano grėsmių, – sakė jis vienam britų laikraščiui.

 

JAV prezidentas Donaldas Trumpas „The Daily Telegraph“ sakė, kad „iš tikrųjų sunku patikėti“ griežtais Šiaurės Atlanto sutarties organizacijos (NATO) Europos narių atsisakymais, kad instinktas susivienyti po kitos narės vėliava, kai to prašoma, nebuvo refleksyvus.

 

Po JAV valstybės sekretoriaus Marco Rubio pirmadienį paskelbto pareiškimo, kad Amerikos narystė Aljanse turės būti „peržiūrėta iš naujo“, prezidentas Trumpas patvirtino, kad persvarsto Amerikos įsitraukimą, ir pridūrė: „NATO manęs niekada nepaveikė. Visada žinojau, kad jie yra popierinis tigras, ir, beje, Putinas tai taip pat žino.“

 

Prezidentas paminėjo Jungtines Valstijas, kurios 2022 m., prasidėjus įvykiams Ukrainoje, puolė į pagalbą Europai – nors ji nėra NATO narė, ir Vašingtonas jokiu būdu nebuvo įpareigotas to daryti pagal sutartį – kaip Amerikos, kuri dabar ragina savo Europos NATO sąjungininkes paremti, atitikmenį. Jis laikraščiui sakė:

 

[Europos] nebuvimas ten, iš tikrųjų buvo sunku patikėti.

 

„Ir aš nedariau didelio sandorio. Aš tiesiog pasakiau: „Ei“, žinote, aš per daug nereikalavau. Aš tiesiog manau, kad tai turėtų būti automatiškai.

 

Mes ten buvome automatiškai, įskaitant Ukrainą. Ukraina nebuvo mūsų problema. Tai buvo išbandymas, ir mes buvome ten dėl jų, ir mes visada būtume buvę ten dėl jų. Jie nebuvo ten dėl mūsų.

 

Iš kelių Trumpo pastabų šiuo klausimu pastarosiomis savaitėmis aiškiai matyti, kad iš visų NATO sąjungininkių prezidentas jaučiasi labiausiai išduotas dėl Jungtinės Karalystės neįsitraukimo.“ Kaip minėta anksčiau, dešimtmečius vienas iš pagrindinių Jungtinės Karalystės indėlių į Vakarų aljansą buvo Karališkojo laivyno specializuoti pajėgumai, o šiame konflikte labai reikia minų paieškos pajėgumų, kuriais iki šiol specializavosi JK.

 

Vis dėlto dėl iždo taupymo šioje misijoje atsirado „pajėgumų trūkumas“, o tai reiškia, kad paskutinės kartos minų kovos laivai buvo išparduoti dar prieš pradedant eksploatuoti naująją įrangą. Tokie trūkumai tapo JK kariuomenės gyvenimo realybe, kuriai sunku išsakyti savo nuomonę vyriausybėje, kai tokia politika kaip vis didesnės socialinės išmokos yra aiškesnis balsų laimėtojas, tačiau tai bene pirmas kartas, kai pajėgumų trūkumas sutapo su staigiu, skubiu poreikiu.

 

JK pareiškė, kad vadovaus tarptautinei koalicijai, siekiančiai užtikrinti Hormūzo sąsiaurio saugumą, tačiau, kaip ir kitos šalys, atsisako įsitraukti, kol karas Irane vis dar vyksta.

 

Pirmadienį karo sekretorius Pete'as Hegsethas sarkastiškai pasakė apie JK nesugebėjimą pranešti Artimuosiuose Rytuose: „Visame pasaulyje yra šalių, kurios taip pat turėtų būti pasirengusios imtis veiksmų šiame svarbiame vandens kelyje, ne tik Jungtinių Valstijų karinis jūrų laivynas. Paskutinį kartą, kai tikrinau, turėjo būti ir didelis blogasis karališkasis laivynas, kuris taip pat galėtų būti pasirengęs daryti tokius dalykus.“

 

Prezidentas Trumpas šiandien vėl apie tai kalbėjo, sakydamas apie Britaniją: „Jūs net neturite karinio jūrų laivyno“ ir pareikšdamas, kad net bandymas patarti JK ministrui pirmininkui serui Keirui Starmeriui apsvarstyti galimybę tarnauti savo nacionaliniams interesams buvo beprasmis, nes jis turėjo vieno kelio mąstyseną, kuri visiškai nebuvo sutelkta į karalystės ar jos sąjungininkų gynybą.

 

„Viskas, ko Starmeris nori, yra brangūs vėjo malūnai, kurie kelia jūsų energijos kainas iki lubų“, – sakė prezidentas Trumpas.

 

Kaip pranešta, Marco Rubio pirmadienį sakė:

 

Prezidentas ir mūsų šalis turės visa tai iš naujo peržiūrėti, kai ši operacija bus baigta. Tačiau viena iš priežasčių, kodėl NATO yra naudinga Jungtinėms Valstijoms, yra ta, kad ji suteikia mums bazavimosi teises nenumatytiems atvejams. Tai leidžia mums dislokuoti karius, lėktuvus ir ginklus tose pasaulio dalyse, kuriose paprastai neturėtume bazių. Tai apima ir didžiąją Europos dalį. ---

 

Ir matyti, kad bėdos metu Jungtinės Valstijos nustatė rimtą grėsmę mūsų nacionaliniam saugumui ir nacionaliniams interesams. Ir mums reikėjo vykdyti šią operaciją. Ir turime tokias šalis kaip Ispanija, NATO narė, kurią esame įsipareigoję ginti, neleidžia mums naudotis savo oro erdve ir tuo giriasi, neleidžia mums naudotis savo bazėmis. Ir yra kitų šalių, kurios taip pat tai padarė. Taigi jūs klausiate savęs: kokia iš to nauda Jungtinėms Valstijoms?"

 

Trump Considering Withdrawing U.S. From ‘Paper Tiger’ NATO Over Europe’s Failure to Reciprocate

  

NATO is being scapegoated for the problems caused by Iran's drone and missile effectiveness. Tanks and planes, NATO's constant playthings, have become less interesting these days.

 

As of April 2026, U.S. officials are questioning the value of NATO and blaming allies for a lack of support regarding the conflict with Iran, particularly as Iran's drone and missile technologies challenge traditional military assets.

 

The conflict has highlighted a shift in modern warfare, where low-cost Iranian drones are outmatching traditional tanks and planes.

 

    NATO Scapegoating & Divisions: U.S. officials have expressed frustration, with some in right-wing media and government criticizing NATO allies for not supporting the U.S.-led efforts in the Iran war.

    Shifting Warfare: Iran’s use of cost-effective drones and missiles has caused significant disruption and revealed that traditional military hardware (tanks, planes) is less effective, redefining conflicts.

    Operational Strain: The U.S. has warned of a "re-examination" of alliances due to what is perceived as a "betrayal" by European partners who have not joined in securing the Strait of Hormuz.

 

    Performance Issues: While some officials claimed "remarkable" performance, others described the efforts to counter Iran's drone campaign as "disappointing".

 

“President Donald Trump says he is reconsidering America’s membership of NATO after not a single member heeded his call for aid in securing the Middle East from Iranian threats, he told a British newspaper.

 

It was “actually hard to believe” the hard refusals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO’s) European members, that the instinct to rally to the flag of a fellow member when called wasn’t reflexive, U.S. President Donald Trump has told The Daily Telegraph.

 

In remarks that follow and acknowledged  U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Monday statement that America’s membership of the alliance would have to be “re-examined”, President Trump confirmed he was reconsidering America’s engagement and added: “I was never swayed by NATO. I always knew they were a paper tiger, and Putin knows that too, by the way.”

 

The President cited the United States rushing to Europe’s aid when Ukraine events started in 2022 — which is not a NATO member, and Washington was in no way treaty-bound to do so — as a counterpart for America now calling on its European NATO allies to put their shoulder to the wheel. He told the broadsheet:

 

    …[Europe] not being there, it was actually hard to believe.

 

    “And I didn’t do a big sale. I just said, ‘Hey’, you know, I didn’t insist too much. I just think it should be automatic.

 

    We’ve been there automatically, including Ukraine. Ukraine wasn’t our problem. It was a test, and we were there for them, and we would always have been there for them. They weren’t there for us.

 

It is plainly evident from Trump’s several remarks on this matter in recent weeks, that of all the NATO allies the President feels most betrayed by the failure of the United Kingdom to get involved. As previously stated, for decades one of the primary inputs of the United Kingdom into the Western alliance is the specialist capabilities of the Royal Navy, and in this conflict there is a strong need for minesweeping capacity, something that until recently the UK specialised in.

 

Yet treasury penny-pinching has seen this mission ‘capability gapped’, meaning the last generation of mine warfare vessels has been mostly retired before the new equipment has entered service. Such gaps have become a fact of life for the UK military, which struggles to make its voice heard in government when policies like ever-greater welfare handouts are a clearer vote winner, but this is perhaps the first time capability gapping has coincided with a sudden, urgent need so badly.

 

The UK has said it will lead an international coalition to secure the Strait of Hormuz, but like the other nations refuses to involve itself while the war in Iran is still active.

 

On Monday, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth sardonically said of the UK’s failure to report in the Middle East: “there are countries around the world who ought to be prepared to step up on this critical waterway as well, not just the United States Navy. Last time I checked there was supposed to be a Big Bad Royal Navy that could be prepared to do things like that as well.”

 

President Trump again spoke of this today, saying of Britain “You don’t even have a navy”, and stating even attempting to counsel UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer to consider serving his national interest was pointless because he had a one-track mind that was very much not focussed on defence of the realm, or its allies.

 

“All Starmer wants is costly windmills that are driving your energy prices through the roof”, President Trump said.

 

As reported, Marco Rubio said on Monday:

 

    The president and our country will have to reexamine all of this after this operation is over. But one of the reasons why NATO is beneficial to the United States is that it gives us basing rights for contingencies. It allows us to station troops, aircraft, and weapons in parts of the world that we wouldn’t normally have bases. And that includes in much of Europe. ---

 

    And to see that in a time of need, the United States has identified a grave risk to our national security and our national interests. And we needed to conduct this operation. And we have countries like Spain, a NATO member that we are pledged to defend, denying us the use of their airspace and bragging about it, denying us the use of our of their bases. And there are other countries that have done that as well. And so you ask yourself, well, what is in it for the United States?”