Putin's Endgame: Undo Post-Cold War Mistakes

 

"The world's attention is on eastern Ukraine, where Moscow's forces circle. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin's ambitions extend far beyond. He wants to renegotiate the end of the Cold War.

Whatever follows Russia's large-scale military maneuvers, and the announcement Monday to recognize the independence of two breakaway Ukrainian regions and orders to send troops there, Mr. Putin has made clear he wants to redraw the post-Cold War security map of Europe.

Mr. Putin spelled out a list of grievances Monday over the treatment of Russia by the U.S. and Europe in the past three decades. "Russia has every right to take retaliatory measures to ensure its own security," he said. "This is exactly what we will do."

The speech, and the demands he has made of the U.S. in the prelude to the crisis, reveal how Mr. Putin's vision for the future seeks in many ways to recreate the past.

The Russian leader is trying to stop further enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whose expansion he sees as encroaching on Russia's security and part of the West's deception and broken promises. He wants NATO to scale back its military reach to the 1990s, before it expanded east of Germany. The demands would reverse many of the extraordinary changes in Europe that took place in that decade.

In sum, Mr. Putin seeks to undo many of the security consequences of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, an event the Russian leader has called the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century.

Given that the past century encompassed two world wars, the Holocaust and much else, Mr. Putin's superlative is revealing. It reflects what he saw at close hand in the 1990s: the collapse of the Soviet empire, Moscow's reliance on the West for handouts as its economy went into free fall and his country's internal chaos. The West, meanwhile, trumpeted its Cold War victory.

Those years were part of Mr. Putin's personal experience, said Mary Sarotte, history professor at Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Putin was a KGB operative stationed in Dresden, Germany, as the Berlin Wall fell, before he was pulled back to the Soviet Union in 1990 as it was about to collapse.

The Russian leader is now seeking to create a buffer zone around his country, as it had in Soviet times, Ms. Sarotte said, and muscle Moscow's way back to the superpower table alongside the U.S.

Mr. Putin's approach is aimed squarely at the U.S., over the heads of other NATO countries, and it reflects several beliefs: that the world's affairs should be settled by the great powers, which include Russia; NATO is a U.S. instrument in the way the Warsaw Pact was a Soviet one, and its other members lack agency; and Moscow should control its own backyard, as it did in the Soviet era.

"Russia wants to have coercive power. This is what this is about," said Fiona Hill, senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council during the Trump administration. Nothing is asked of Ukraine, which Mr. Putin has depicted as not even a country.

In a lengthy essay published in July, Mr. Putin seeks to justify Russia's claim to Ukraine, writing that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are one people, all descended from Ancient Rus, the largest state in Europe in the ninth century. Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, he wrote, is the mother of Russian cities.

"For Putin, it's not just 30 years of historical wrong but centuries of injury inflicted on Russia, the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire," Ms. Hill said.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said in Munich over the weekend that Mr. Putin, as a historian, doesn't leave much room for optimism.

"The only principle that can guarantee security in Europe is to accept borders as they are," Mr. Scholz said.

Looking back, many current and former Western officials say it is clear that the U.S. and its allies handled relations with Moscow poorly in the 1990s, and that the triumphalism over winning the Cold War was excessive.

Some also say that Europe's security arrangements need rebuilding, in part because many of the Soviet-era arms agreements aimed at reducing tensions have been abrogated after mutual accusations of cheating.

While the officials say Moscow must be part of those discussions, they won't be willing accomplices to Mr. Putin's efforts to turn back the clock.

"Although I think that Western diplomacy was arrogant and incompetent in the 1990s, and we're paying the price now, that is not a reason for Putin to put himself in a posture that makes other people think he's about to launch a war," said Rodric Braithwaite, who was British ambassador to Moscow when the Soviet Union collapsed.

He said Mr. Putin's views aren't unique. "What Putin says about the humiliation of the Soviet collapse, the enlargement of NATO, and the intimate historical link between Russian and Ukrainian history is not his own idea," Mr. Braithwaite said. "Millions of Russians think and feel just like he does."

Yet in 1994, Russia joined with the U.S. and U.K. in committing "to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine" and "to refrain from the threat or use of force," a security guarantee that helped persuade Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons.

Moscow's current demands call for the U.S. to agree to block further NATO expansion -- a step that would keep Ukraine, as well as Finland and Sweden, out of the alliance if they wanted to join. The U.S. has replied to the demands but hasn't disclosed its contents.

Russia also wants U.S. and other nonnational NATO forces to pull out of countries that joined NATO after 1997 -- which includes all those once in the Soviet orbit. It also seeks the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. Moscow wants the commitments in a treaty, presumably knowing no U.S. president would likely sign it, and the Senate would refuse to ratify it. America's newest NATO allies would reject it, as well.

Mr. Putin's narrative of how the West deceived Moscow in the 1990s begins with deliberations over the reunification of Germany. It extends to the negotiations ahead of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, which laid out the basis for cooperation between the alliance and Russia.

The Russians say that in discussion over German reunification in 1990, the U.S. and other Western politicians and officials assured Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. They also say NATO promised in 1997 that it wouldn't station troops farther than the alliance's eastern border at the time.

Ms. Sarotte has used both official and personal records to examine the Russian claim. She found that U.S. and European politicians did suggest in 1990 that NATO wouldn't expand east. In 1997, the alliance declared it had no intention of moving troops closer to the Soviet border. Moscow never received these assurances in legal form.

In a recently published book, "Not One Inch," Ms. Sarotte describes how former Secretary of State James Baker in 1990 laid out a hypothetical bargain with Mr. Gorbachev, who had hundreds of thousands of troops in East Germany: What if you let your part of Germany go, and we agree that NATO will "not shift one inch eastward from its present position?"

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl also told Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow that NATO wouldn't extend east." [1]

1. Putin's Endgame: Undo Post-Cold War Accords
Fidler, Stephen. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 22 Feb 2022: A.1.