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2023 m. gegužės 9 d., antradienis

The 2023 crony-capitalism index

"Over the past 20 years, Britain's capital was so welcoming to oligarchs that it became known as "Londongrad". Many bought mansions from Highgate to Hyde Park; a couple bought into football clubs. After start of events in Ukraine in February last year, 48 oligarchs were placed under Western sanctions. The immense wealth of many of Vladimir Putin's associates highlights the problem of crony capitalism and why more should be done to combat it.

According to the latest instalment of our crony-capitalism index, which first estimated how much plutocrats profit from rent-seeking industries almost a decade ago, crony capitalists' wealth has risen from $315bn, or 1% of global gdp, 25 years ago to $3trn or nearly 3% of global gdp now (see chart 1).

Some 65% of the increase has come from America, China, India and Russia.

Overall 40% of crony-capitalist wealth derives from autocratic countries and amounts to 9% of their gdp.

There are hundreds of billionaires around the world whose riches are largely believed to derive from sectors which often feature chummy dealings with the state.

The way we estimate all this is to start with data from Forbes. The magazine has published an annual stock-take of the world's wealthy for nearly four decades. In 1998 it reckoned that there were 209 billionaires with a total worth of $1trn, equivalent to 3% of global gdp. This year the publication details 2,640 billionaires worth $12trn or 12% of gdp. Most of those listed do not operate in rent-seeking sectors. Adjusting for rising prices—$1bn in 1998 is now equivalent to $3.3bn—there are 877 billionaires (at 1998 prices) with a collective worth of $9trn.

We classify the source of wealth into rent-seeking and non-rent-seeking sectors.

An economic rent is the surplus remaining once capital and labour have been paid which, with perfect competition, tends towards zero.

Rent-seeking is common in sectors close to the state, including banking, construction, property and natural resources. It can sometimes be possible for rent-seekers to inflate their earnings by gaining favourable access to land, licences and resources. They may form cartels to limit competition or lobby the government for cosy regulations. They may bend rules, but do not typically break them.

Russia is, once again, the most crony-capitalist country in our index (see chart 2). Billionaire wealth from crony sectors amounts to 19% of gdp. Crony wealth declined from $456bn in 2021 to $387bn this year. Only one-fifth of Russian billionaires' wealth is derived from non-crony sectors, which shows just how distorted the economy is.

In March last year, the g7, the eu and Australia launched the Russian Elites, Proxies and Oligarchs (repo) Task Force to "isolate and exert unprecedented pressure on sanctioned Russian individuals". A year later it announced that it had blocked or frozen $58bn of assets. But repo admits that in some cases oligarchs have found it easy to evade sanctions by using shell companies, passing assets to family members or investing in property.

Wealth is increasingly stored in manicured lawns and marble columns.

Our index illuminates other trends among the mega-wealthy. Many of America's 735 billionaires have been hit by the crash in tech stocks last year; three-fifths of global tech-billionaire wealth originates there. The country's nasdaq composite, a tech-tilted index, lost about a third of its value between November 2021 and December 2022. We reckon American tech billionaires saw their riches decline by 18%.

Overall crony-sector wealth amounts to around 2% of gdp in America, whereas non-crony-sector wealth is 15%.

But tech exhibits some crony characteristics. America's 20 biggest tech companies raked in half of all the industry's sales in 2017, making it the country's most concentrated sector. Tech firms are among the biggest lobbyists in Washington, with eight firms collectively spending $100m last year. Reclassify tech as a crony industry in our index and America's crony wealth increases to 6% of gdp.

Meanwhile, Chinese billionaires continue to struggle with the vagaries of their government. Since Xi Jinping launched a crackdown on private capital, crony wealth has fallen sharply, from a peak of 4.4% of gdp in 2018 to 2.5% now. Tycoons of all stripes operate only with the consent of the state. In 1998 there were just eight billionaires in the country (including Hong Kong and Macau), with a total worth of $50bn. Now its 562 billionaires command $2trn.

By our measure crony capitalists account for about one-quarter of that total. A recent working paper published by the Stone Centre on Socio-Economic Inequality, part of the City University of New York, finds that between 83% and 91% of corrupt senior officials were in the top 1% of the urban income distribution because of their illegal incomes. Without that money, just 6% would be in that bracket.

Since Mr Xi came to power in 2012 over 1.5m people have been punished in an ongoing anti-corruption drive. High-profile tycoons also face more scrutiny. When Jack Ma, a co-founder of the tech giant Alibaba, disappeared in late 2020 after criticising the authorities, he was worth nearly $50bn. He recently re-emerged worth half of what he had been. Bao Fan, a billionaire banker, was whisked away in February to help with an investigation. He has not been seen since.

Official talk of "common prosperity" has created a cottage industry for getting money out of China. Singapore is a prime destination for it. In 2019 the country had just 33 Chinese family offices—firms which manage a family's assets. There were perhaps 750 by the end of 2022.

India's leader, Narendra Modi, has favourites among the country's corporate captains. Over the past decade, wealth from crony-capitalist sectors has risen from 5% to nearly 8% of its gdp.

Gautam Adani, the owner of the conglomerate of the same name, was briefly the world's third-richest person in September. But in January his company was accused of fraud and stockmarket manipulation by Hindenburg Research, an American short-seller. It denies all accusations. His wealth has fallen from $90bn to $47bn.

Don't take a slice of my pie

What happens when cronyism gets completely out of control? If elites so enrich themselves that they impoverish a country, a "kleptocracy" forms, declared Stanislav Andreski, a Polish sociologist. He warned against such regimes and their effects in the late 1960s. It has taken more than 50 years for Western countries to heed him.

Identifying kleptocracy is more art than science. Our findings correlate only somewhat to indices of democracy and corruption. And in any case, at what level does corruption destroy the functions of the state? usaid, America's agency for international development, issued an 84-page "dekleptification" guide last year.

After studying 13 countries including Brazil, Malaysia and Ukraine, it recommends breaking up corrupt monopolies and digitising ownership registries, among other important measures.

America is also trying to whip up international fervour for a crackdown. In March it hosted its second "summit for democracy". Seventy-four countries representing two-thirds of global gdp declared that, among other things, they would work to "prevent and combat corruption". Russia and China were understandably missing. Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa were among those less understandably so.

At the summit Janet Yellen, America's treasury secretary, pointed out that "kleptocrats launder kickbacks through anonymous purchases of foreign real estate". So starting next year America will require firms formed or operating in the country to reveal their real, or "beneficial", owners. Another 36 countries have signed up to America's declaration to make concealing identity more difficult. But transparency is not a silver bullet. Last year a new law in Britain required foreign businesses that own property assets to register themselves and disclose their true owners. A report in February by an anti-corruption watchdog found that the owners of 52,000 of the 92,000 properties subject to the new rule remained undisclosed. Shady owners skirt rules and registries often lack the resources to police them.

America also frets about "golden" visas, which sell citizenship for a chunk of cash. Five Caribbean tax havens sell passports which provide visa-free travel to around 150 countries for $100,000-150,000 each. Britain's tier-one visa scheme, launched in 2008, gave permanent residency within five years to foreigners who could prove they had £1m ($1.25m) to invest in British bonds or shares. It closed a week before the events in Ukraine started because of fears about Russian money (talk about closing the stable door once the thoroughbred has bolted). Of the 13,777 visas issued, a fifth went to Russians (including ten to oligarchs now under sanctions), a third to Chinese.” [1]

1. "The 2023 crony-capitalism index." The Economist, 6 May 2023, p. NA.

Laikas (labai atsargiai) bendrauti su Talibanu

Kaip dygliakiaulės užsiima seksu? Labai atsargiai.  

„Du dešimtmečius Amerika ir jos NATO sąjungininkės iššvaistė didžiulius kiekius kraujo ir lobių beprotiškai optimistiškam valstybės kūrimo projektui Afganistane. Jis baigėsi prieš 20 mėnesių, kai Talibano kovotojai juodais turbanais grįžo į Kabulą, o amerikiečių diplomatai pašėlusiai degino savo bylas, o NATO kariai oro uoste sulaikė išsigandusių afganų bangą.

 

     Chaotiškas Amerikos pasitraukimas pakenkė jos, kaip supervalstybės, kuri palaiko jos sąjungininkus, patikimumui. Tačiau Vakarų politika Afganistano atžvilgiu tebėra nenuosekli ir neveiksminga, kaip išsamiai aprašome gyvenimą, valdant Talibanui.

 

     Amerika ir jos sąjungininkai izoliavo šalį. Jie iš esmės nutraukė pagalbą, kuri kažkada sudarė 75% Afganistano biudžeto, ir sulaikė 9,5 mlrd. dolerių valstybės atsargų. Ir vis dėlto džihadistų terorizmas ir humanitarinės krizės Afganistane daro šalį sunkiai ignoruojamos. Jame yra „al Qaeda“ likučiai ir vietinis „Islamo valstybės“ skyrius, kuris rengia sprogimus Kabule ir trokšta tai padaryti užsienyje. Vakarų paramos praradimas sukėlė ekonomikos krizę, kuri milijonams gresia badu.

 

     Vakarai kovoja su šiomis dvigubomis krizėmis iš tolo. Amerika kovoja su terorizmu bepiločiais orlaiviais, įskaitant praėjusių metų smūgį Kabule, per kurį žuvo Al-Qaeda lyderis. Pašaliniai asmenys teikia pagalbą per JT agentūras ir NVO.

 

     Talibanas nusipelnė savo parijos statuso. Jų aukščiausiasis lyderis Hibatullah Akhundzada uždraudė mergaitėms lankyti mokyklą ir moterims daugumą darbo vietų. Tačiau Talibano izoliavimas nepadės Afganistano moterims. Jis nenuvers ir net nedestabilizuos režimo, kuris yra tvirtai kontroliuojamas. Tai tik sustiprins griežtos linijos šalininkus.

 

     Patvirtinti savo neapykantą Vakarams, kietosios linijos šalininkai padeda kai kuriems teroristams savo aikštėje. Amerikos gebėjimas sulaikyti šiuos džihadistus iš tolo atrofuos, kai jos žinios apie vietą išnyks. Taigi Afganistano grėsmė pasauliui didėja. Tuo tarpu atsiribojimas apsunkina masines kančias. Šiais metais JT surinko tik 9% iš 4,6 mlrd. dolerių, kurių reikėtų.

 

     Talibano puolimas prieš moterų laisvę ir orumą daro glaudų ryšį su juo neįmanomu. Tačiau verta išbandyti keletą kuklesnių ir selektyvesnių žingsnių. Amerika turėtų spausti bankus, kad jie nutrauktų neoficialų draudimą bendrauti su Afganistanu, kuris stabdo jos ekonomiką. Ji turėtų išleisti eksperimentinę dalį suverenių atsargų (kai kurie siūlo 100 mln. dolerių per mėnesį) technokratams, vadovaujantiems šalies centriniam bankui. Vakarų donorai turėtų išnagrinėti, kaip per JT finansuoti kai kuriuos apleistus infrastruktūros projektus, dėl kurių šalis galėtų būti mažiau priklausoma nuo pagalbos. Laikui bėgant, jie galėtų atnaujinti diplomatinį ryšį, kurio Amerika ir kiti jau tyliai siekia.

 

     Niekas nėra optimistiškai nusiteikęs, kad Talibanas gali būti paskatintas elgtis geriau. Tačiau kuklios tokio pobūdžio priemonės išnagrinėtų galimybę. Nepaisant A. Akhundzados, mulos yra labiau mišrūs, nei anksčiau. Dauguma Talibano ministrų nepritaria moterų draudimui mokytis.

 

     Kai kuriais atžvilgiais jų rezultatai, valdant Afganistaną, yra geresni, nei korumpuotų Vakarų remiamų vyriausybių, kurias jie pakeitė (iš dalies todėl, kad tas vyriausybes apgulė Talibanas).

 

     Neaišku, kad įsitraukimas sustiprintų pragmatikus tarp jų, bet teoriškai tai gali būti.

 

     Bet koks bendravimas su Talibanu daugeliui atrodo nesąžiningas. Tai suprantama, bet neteisinga. Afganistano politikoje nėra gero pasirinkimo. Tačiau esant realizmui ir stipriam diplomatiniam skrandžiui, šalis gali būti šiek tiek mažiau baisi savo žmonėms ir atnešti mažiau galvos skausmo pasauliui." [1]

 

Išvada: kai mes pasitraukiame, vietinių gyvenimas tampa daug geresnis, nes žymiai mažiau korupcijos.

 

1. "Time to engage (very carefully) with the Taliban." The Economist, 6 May 2023, p. NA.

Time to engage (very carefully) with the Taliban.

 

How do porcupines have sex? Very carefully.

"For two decades, America and its NATO allies squandered vast amounts of blood and treasure on a wildly optimistic state-building project in Afghanistan. It ended 20 months ago, when the Taliban's black-turbaned fighters swept back into Kabul, while American diplomats frantically burned their files and NATO troops held back a tide of terrified Afghans at the airport.

America's chaotic pull-out damaged its credibility as a superpower that sticks by its allies.  But Western policy towards Afghanistan remains incoherent and ineffectual, as we report in a detailed look at life under Taliban rule.

America and its allies have isolated the country. They have largely shut off the aid that once provided 75% of Afghanistan's budget, and withheld $9.5bn of its sovereign reserves. And yet the persistence of jihadist terrorism and humanitarian crises in Afghanistan makes the country hard to ignore. It harbours remnants of al-Qaeda and a local chapter of Islamic State that is setting off blasts in Kabul and is eager to do so abroad. Its loss of Western support has triggered an economic crunch that threatens millions with starvation.

The West is grappling with these twin crises from a distance. America is doing counter-terrorism by drone—including a strike in Kabul last year that killed al-Qaeda's leader. Outsiders are dispensing aid through UN agencies and NGOs.

The Taliban deserve their pariah status. Their supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, has banned girls from school and women from most workplaces. Yet isolating the Taliban will not help Afghan women. It will not topple or even destabilise the regime, which is in firm control. It will only boost its hardliners.

Confirmed in their hatred of the West, the hardliners are succouring some of the terrorists on their turf. America's ability to zap these jihadists from afar will atrophy as its local knowledge fades. Afghanistan's threat to the world is thus increasing. Meanwhile, disengagement makes it harder to alleviate mass suffering. This year, the UN has raised only 9% of the $4.6bn in emergency aid it says hungry Afghans need.

The Taliban's assault on women's freedom and dignity makes close engagement with them impossible. Yet it is worth trying some more modest and selective steps. America should press banks to end the informal ban on dealing with Afghanistan that is throttling its economy. It should release an experimental portion of the sovereign reserves (some suggest $100m a month) to the technocrats running the country's central bank. Western donors should explore funding, through the uN, some of the abandoned infrastructure projects that could make the country less aid-dependent. In time, they could upgrade the diplomatic outreach that America and others are already quietly pursuing.

No one is optimistic that the Taliban can be incentivised to behave better. But modest measures of this kind would explore the possibility. Notwithstanding Mr Akhundzada, the mullahs are more mixed than in the past. Most Taliban ministers oppose the female education ban.

In some ways, their performance in governing Afghanistan is better than that of the corrupt Western-backed governments they replaced (partly because those governments were besieged by the Taliban).

It is not clear engagement would bolster the pragmatists among them, but in theory it might.

Engaging with the Taliban in any way seems unconscionable to many. That is understandable, but wrong. There is no good option in Afghan policymaking. But with realism and a strong diplomatic stomach, the country could be made slightly less awful for its people and less of a headache for the world.” [1]

Conclusion: When we go away, the life of locals gets much better with much less corruption.

1. "Time to engage (very carefully) with the Taliban." The Economist, 6 May 2023, p. NA.