Thinking Prior to Thought

 

"Everything Is Predictable

By Tom Chivers

Atria, 384 pages, $29.99

First articulated in the 18th century by a hobbyist-mathematician seeking to reason backward from effects to cause, Bayes' theorem [1] spent the better part of two centuries struggling for recognition and respect. Yet today, argues Tom Chivers in "Everything Is Predictable," it can be seen as "perhaps the most important single equation in history." It drives the logic of spam filters, artificial intelligence and possibly our own brains. It may soon help us work through tricky social problems like vaccine hesitancy. Once you start to look for it, Mr. Chivers says, you start to see Bayes' theorem everywhere.

At its core, the theorem provides a quantitative method for getting incrementally wiser by continuously updating what you think you know -- your prior beliefs, which initially might be subjective -- with new information. Your refined belief becomes the new prior, and the process repeats.

The essential concept was developed by Thomas Bayes, a Presbyterian minister in Britain, and rescued from oblivion by his friend Richard Price, who published it in 1763. The work "sunk almost without trace," Mr. Chivers says, until it was independently discovered and refined in 1774 by the French polymath Pierre-Simon Laplace.

Before the theorem and its broader pattern of reasoning could gain much traction, Mr. Chivers explains, it was overtaken by approaches that felt less "soft and squishy." In the early 19th century, for example, Belgian prodigy Adolphe Quetelet began measuring anything that could be objectively quantified, like the chest size of Scottish soldiers. His interest was "social physics" -- using the rigors of mathematics to improve society.

In the early 20th century, the charge to treat data hermetically was led by two British scholars, Karl Pearson and R.A. Fisher, who despised subjectivity, Bayesian reasoning and each other. The analytical methods they developed -- particularly the concept of "statistical significance" -- are ubiquitous in scientific publications today, representing a core principle of what is now known as "frequentist statistics." In this framework, the analysis relies strictly on observed data, independent of prior beliefs.

 Bayesian statistics, by contrast, dynamically update beliefs about a hypothesis as more data become available.

Despite the "furious rejection of Bayesianism" by Fisher and his colleagues, Mr. Chivers says, "people kept rediscovering or reinventing it, because it kept working." Harold Jeffreys, a Cambridge geologist, used it to assess Earth's composition; insurance underwriters used it to set premiums for workplace liabilities; artillery commanders used it to aim projectiles. Even as the techniques of Pearson and Fisher became enshrined in statistics departments, a rebellious community of Bayesians persisted on the fringes, devouring books that were "passed down almost like samizdat," as Mr. Chivers puts it. In 1979, the dispersed Bayesian community convened in Valencia, Spain, for a conference that would become a quadrennial tradition, famous for late-night singalongs featuring alcohol-infused statisticians warbling "There's no theorem like Bayes' theorem" and "Then I saw Tom Bayes, now I'm a believer."

At times Mr. Chivers, a London-based science journalist who now writes for Semafor, seems overwhelmed by an admittedly complex subject, and his presentation lacks the clarity of Sharon Bertsch McGrayne's "The Theory That Would Not Die" (2011). 

Yet he is onto something, since Bayes' moment has clearly arrived. He notes that Bayesian reasoning is popular among "people who come from the new schools of data science -- machine learning, Silicon Valley tech folks." The mathematician Aubrey Clayton tells him that, in the cutting-edge realms of software engineering, "Bayesian methods are what you'd use."

Bayes' theorem is considered essential for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. It's used when a radiology AI identifies a cancer and when ChatGPT composes a story. If there is a problem, Mr. Chivers suggests, it is that we don't use Bayesian reasoning often enough. It could improve the quality of scientific literature by giving researchers a "vehicle for skepticism." It might also help us make better predictions. The "superforecasters" identified by the political psychologist Philip Tetlock use a Bayesian approach, establishing priors, tracking their results and revising their assumptions as they attempt to predict events such as currency moves and election results.

It's notoriously difficult for most people to grasp problems in a structured Bayesian fashion. Suppose there is a test for a rare disease that is 99% accurate. You'd think that, if you tested positive, you'd probably have the disease. But when you figure in the prior -- the fact that, for the average person (without specific risk factors), the chance of having a rare disease is incredibly low -- then even a positive test means you're still unlikely to have it. 

When quizzed by researchers, doctors consistently fail to consider prevalence -- the relevant prior -- in their interpretation of test results. 

Even so, Mr. Chivers insists, "our instinctive decision-making, from a Bayesian perspective, isn't that bad." And indeed, in practice, doctors quickly learn to favor common diagnoses over exotic possibilities.

Bayesian reasoning also reminds us that when doctors encounter patient preferences that seem irrational (refusing childhood vaccines comes to mind), they should focus on identifying the underlying beliefs, since it's likely the priors that are dubious, not the reasoning that follows. Relatedly, Mr. Chivers notes, depression may result from "inappropriately strong priors on some negative belief." The promise of psychedelic medicines like psilocybin could lie in their ability to "flatten" these priors and help patients access a balanced worldview.

Our brains work by making models of the world, Mr. Chivers reminds us, assessing how our expectations match what we earn from our senses, and then updating our perceptions accordingly. Deep down, it seems, we are all Bayesians.

---

Dr. Shaywitz is a physician-scientist and board adviser, a lecturer at Harvard Medical School and an adjunct fellow at the American Enterprise Institute." [2]

1. "Bayes theorem:

 

P(A|B)    =  (P(B|A)xP(A))/P(B)  

A, B           = events
P(A|B)       = probability of A given B is true
P(B|A)       = probability of B given A is true
P(A), P(B) = the independent probabilities of A and B

Explanation in sentences:

 "To find the conditional probability P(A|B) using Bayes' formula, you need to:

    Make sure the probability P(B) is non-zero.
    Take the probabilities P(B|A) and P(A) and compute their product.
    Divide the result from Step 2 by P(B).
    That's it! You've just successfully applied Bayes' theorem!"  

Definition:

  "The basic definition of probability is the ratio of all favorable results to the number of all possible outcomes."

2. Thinking Prior to Thought. Shaywitz, David A.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 15 May 2024: A.15.

Elektromobiliai ir Bidenizmo beprotybė

  „Atėjo laikas pripažinti, kad Bideno administracijai gali būti kažkas daugiau, nei gyvatės įkandimas.

 

     Naujausias faktinės klinikinės nekompetencijos įrodymas yra 100% Kinijos elektrinių transporto priemonių tarifas, paskelbtas antradienį. Jei tikslas yra priversti amerikiečius naudoti elektromobilius, kaip prasminga padidinti jų kainą vartotojams? 

 

Taip nėra. Tikrasis paaiškinimas yra žinomas procesas, kurio metu bloga politika gimdo blogą politiką – šiuo atveju Detroite įvykusi nelaimė, dėl kurios elektromobiliai patyrė milijardus nuostolių, visuomenė nenusipirks už nieką, panašų į jų kūrimo kainą.

 

     Jei New York Times yra teisus, tarifai nebus taikomi Kinijoje pagamintiems benzininiams automobiliams. Galbūt, prezidentas Bidenas pakankamai gerai nesupranta savo Rube'o Goldbergo sąrankos, kad suprastų, jog Detroito benzininių transporto priemonių pelnas yra labai reikalingas, kad būtų galima paremti jo elektrinių transporto priemonių poreikį.

 

     Bideno darbuotojai naudoja protekcionizmą, kad nuslėptų fiskalinį ir pramoninį fiasko, kurį jis sukelia vykdydamas savo elektroninių transporto priemonių politiką.

 

     Mes žavingai kalbame apie strateginius mąstytojus, kurie gali „matyti už kampų“. Bideno administracija, matyt, net negali įžvelgti kito akivaizdaus dalyko, kuris įvyks.

 

     Bideno planas sustiprinti savo nuopelnus už Amerikos atsigavimą po Covido, kurį jis vis tiek ketino gauti, susprogo, kai jo papildomos išlaidos pagalbai padidino infliaciją, kuri dabar slegia jo ekonomikos valdymą.

 

     Jo epidemiologiškai nereikalingi skiepų mandatai buvo nuogas bandymas išplauti Trumpo "Operacijos didžiausias įmanomas greitis" kreditą jo kryptimi. Šie mandatai, į kuriuos atvirai ciniškai žiūrėjo net jo paties politiniai patarėjai, dabar skatina Roberto F. Kennedy jaunesniojo rinkėjų vakcinų skepticizmą, rinkėjų, kurių balsus J. Bidenas norės gauti rudenį.

 

     Pokštas atpasakojo atpasakojimą, bet kai jo vieno žmogaus protų trestas Jake'as Sullivanas perėjo į žurnalo „Foreign Affairs“ puslapius ir pavertė Bidenizmą į didingą strateginę pjesę, jis įtraukė pretenziją į taikiausius Vidurio Rytus šios kartos gyvenime.

 

     Straipsnis buvo spaustuvėje, kai Viduriniuose Rytuose spalio 7 d. prasidėjo karas.

 

     Tačiau, kalbant apie simboliką ir doleriais, pono Bideno įvartis elektra yra bene pats simboliškiausias jo įvarčių eilėje, o tai jam gali kainuoti lemiamą Mičigano valstiją.

 

     Netgi aukščiausi Bideno klimato apsaugos pareigūnai, jei jiems bus suteiktas anonimiškumas, pripažins, kad žaliosios energijos subsidijos nepadeda sumažinti iškastinio kuro naudojimo ir išmetamųjų teršalų. Jo klimato strategija įkūnija tokį „greitą“, bet klaidingą mąstymą, apie kurį velionis nobelistas Danielis Kahnemanas parašė knygą, apie kurį įspėjo.

 

     Deja, greitas mąstymas yra vienintelis ponui Bidenui. Nepadeda tam tikri „New York Times“ apžvalgininkai, kurie, nors ir žino geriau, vis tiek stengiasi suteikti jam dorybių, panašių į F.D. Ruzvelto. Panašu, kad jie pamiršta senstantį šifrą, kuriuo link 2020 m. nominuoti buvo siekiama blokuoti Bernie’į Sandersą partijų lyderių, kurie tiksliai numatė, kad Bidenas gali pasislėpti savo rūsyje ir leisti kartą per šimtmetį pandemijai nugalėti Donaldą Trumpą.

 

     D. Trumpas taip pat yra instinktų politikas – pagrindinis jo instinktas yra be galo cinizmas apie tokius žmones, kaip Bidenas. Dėl to D. Trumpas daug ką praleidžia (kaip kartais politikoje vaidina vaidmenį), tačiau jo šnervės bent jau atviros tikrovės dvelksmui.

 

     P. Bideno silpnas ir recidyvistinis pataikavimas jauniems rinkėjams su studentų paskolų atleidimu; jo apgailėtinas bandymas būti abiejose Izraelio ir „Hamas“ karo pusėse.

 

     Belieka tik vienas paaiškinimas, kodėl J. Bidenas ir toliau stringa pasienyje, nepaisant jo paties FTB perspėjimų dėl teroristų įsiskverbimo: jis kreipiasi į aktyvistų grupę, per mažą, kad galėtų būti kvalifikuojama net kaip balsavimo blokas. Tas pats pasakytina ir apie jo iškrypėlišką nenorą pasiųsti signalą, kurį pasauliui aiškiai reikia išgirsti apie didėjančius JAV gynybos biudžetus.

 

     To ir daugybės kitų dalykų būtų buvę galima išvengti, jei J. Bidenas būtų radęs išminties ir santūrumo daryti taip, kaip iš pradžių užsiminė, t. y. išsivaduoti nuo pašėlusių karjeristinių skaičiavimų ir įsitraukti į vienos kadencijos prezidento vaidmenį.

 

      (Galų gale, karjeristinis skaičiavimas atrodo ypač niūrus iš politiko, akivaizdžiai perkopusio pensinį amžių ir pasiruošusio ganykloms.)

 

     Tačiau įvertinkite Team Biden vieną Hunterio gudrumo pratimą. Jie teisingai suprato, kad bet kuris respublikonų kandidatas, neįvardytas Trumpu, gali leisti rinkėjams išlieti savo išmetimo instinktą. Kad išvengtų Jimmy Carterio likimo, jie pasirūpintų, kad rinkėjai galėtų atsikratyti Bideno, tik pasiduodami D. Trumpui.

 

     Šis statymas gali dar pasiteisinti ponui Bidenui, jei ne šaliai.

 

     Jei jis pralaimės, tai taip pat paskatins jį pakilti į prezidento reitingo apačią, visam laikui išstumiant nesėkmingą Jamesą Buchananą, kaip blogiausią Amerikos prezidentą." [1]

1.EVs and the Inanity of Bidenism. Jenkins, Holman W; Jr.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 15 May 2024: A.15. 

EVs and the Inanity of Bidenism

"It's time to admit that the Biden administration might be something more than snake-bit.

The latest evidence of actual clinical incompetence is its 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles, announced Tuesday. If the goal is to get Americans to use EVs, how does it make sense to raise their cost to consumers? It doesn't. The real explanation is the familiar process by which bad policy begets bad policy -- in this case, the disaster unfolding in Detroit saddled with billions in losses for EVs the public won't buy at anything resembling the cost of building them.

If the New York Times is correct, the tariffs won't apply to Chinese-built gasoline cars. President Biden perhaps doesn't understand his own Rube Goldberg setup well enough to realize that Detroit's gasoline-vehicle profits are desperately needed to support his electric-vehicle boondoggle.

Mr. Biden's staff is using protectionism to conceal the fiscal and industrial fiasco he's conjuring with his EV policy.

We speak admiringly of strategic thinkers who can "see around corners." The Biden administration is apparently unable even to see the next obvious thing that's going to happen.

Mr. Biden's plan to amplify his credit for America's post-Covid recovery, which he was going to get anyway, blew up when his additional splurge of relief spending stoked the inflation that sours voters now on his economic management.

His epidemiologically unnecessary vaccine mandates, were a naked attempt to leach some Operation Warp Speed credit in his direction. These mandates, which even his own political advisers were openly cynical about, now feed the vaccine skepticism of Robert F. Kennedy Jr. voters that Mr. Biden will wish he had in the fall.

The joke has grown stale in the retelling, but when his one-man brain trust, Jake Sullivan, took to the pages of Foreign Affairs magazine to gussy Bidenism into a grand strategic play, he included a claim of credit for the most peaceful Mideast in a generation.

The article was at the printer when the Middle East exploded on Oct. 7.

In symbolism as well as dollar terms, however, Mr. Biden's EV own goal is perhaps his most emblematic in a succession of own goals, which may well cost him the crucial state of Michigan.

Even Mr. Biden's top climate officials, if granted anonymity, will admit green energy subsidies do nothing to cut fossil-fuel use and reduce emissions. His climate strategy embodies the kind of "fast" but faulty thinking the late Nobelist Daniel Kahneman wrote a book warning about.

Unfortunately fast thinking is the only kind Mr. Biden does. Not helping are certain New York Times columnists who, despite knowing better, still strain to grant him FDR-like virtues. They seem to forget the aging cipher maneuvered toward the 2020 nomination to block Bernie Sanders by party leaders who accurately foresaw that Mr. Biden could hide in his basement and let a once-a-century pandemic defeat Donald Trump.

Mr. Trump is a politician of instinct too -- his main instinct being a bottomless cynicism about people like Mr. Biden. This causes Mr. Trump to miss a lot (like the occasional role principle plays in politics) but his nostrils are at least open to whiffs of reality:

Mr. Biden's weak and recidivistic pandering to young voters with student-loan forgiveness; his pathetic attempt to be on both sides in the Israel-Hamas war.

Only one explanation is left for Mr. Biden's continued stalling on the border despite stark warnings from his own FBI about terrorist infiltration: He is pandering to a group of activists too small to qualify even as a voting bloc. The same also goes for his perverse unwillingness to send the signal the world clearly needs to hear about rising U.S. defense budgets.

This, and so much else, might have been avoided if Mr. Biden had found the wisdom and self-restraint to do as he originally implied -- i.e., free himself from frantic careerist calculation and embrace the role of one-term president.

 (After all, careerist calculation looks especially shabby from a politician visibly past retirement age and ready for the pasture.)

But credit Team Biden with one exercise in Huntereseque shrewdness. They rightly saw that any Republican nominee not named Trump might give voters rein to vent their throw-the-bum-out instinct. To avoid Jimmy Carter's fate, they would make sure voters could only rid themselves of Mr. Biden by surrendering to Mr. Trump.

This bet may yet pay off for Mr. Biden, if not the country. 

Should he lose, it also sets him up to rocket to the bottom of the presidential standings, permanently displacing the luckless James Buchanan as America's worst president." [1]

1.EVs and the Inanity of Bidenism. Jenkins, Holman W; Jr.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 15 May 2024: A.15.