"Rebels at Sea
By Eric Jay Dolin
Liveright, 302 pages, $32.50
When Britain's American colonies declared their independence in July 1776, they faced not only a larger, better-equipped army but the world's pre-eminent navy. With 270 warships, including 131 lethal ships of the line, the Royal Navy ruled the Atlantic and Caribbean, projecting military might and guarding the trade routes that were the arteries of empire. With good reason could a contemporary handbook for British sailors smugly note that "the monarchs of Great Britain have a peculiar and sovereign authority upon the ocean."
By contrast, in the summer of 1776 the American navy, which the Continental Congress had authorized the previous October, boasted about a dozen vessels, with nothing approaching a ship of the line in size or firepower. Over the course of the Revolutionary War, the navy launched some 60 warships, though no more than about half saw service at any given time. By 1783 the Royal Navy swelled to 468 ships, which the Admiralty wielded to terrible effect, supporting the army, disrupting American trade and protecting British commerce.
Confronting overwhelming odds, the Continental Congress turned to privateers -- that is, armed, privately owned vessels authorized to seize enemy shipping. As William Ellery, a signer of the Declaration of Independence from Rhode Island, pointed out, "We cannot with all the naval force we collect be able to cope with the Royal Navy. Our great aim should be to destroy the trade of Britain." Congress began issuing letters of marque, the legal documents authorizing privateers, in April 1776. During the war, their number grew to perhaps 1,700 -- or nearly 30 times the size of the regular navy.
Eric Jay Dolin, the author of several books on early American seafaring, believes that these privateers have received short shrift in other histories of the Revolution. His thoroughly researched, engagingly written "Rebels at Sea" gives them their due.
Called "legalized pirates" by their detractors and "the militia of the sea" by their admirers, privateers had been setting sail since at least the 13th century, when Henry III of England commissioned them to counter French attacks along the English coast. Despite this long resume, not to mention the endorsement of Founding Fathers such as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, privateering was still controversial at the time of the Revolution, even among the colonists. Some critics argued that the practice was unworthy of a civilized nation and a stain on the young country's honor. Others pointed out that the privateers competed with the Continental army and navy for men, supplies and weapons. And still others groused that the privateers were motivated by greed rather than by patriotism. The counter to this last charge is that, under the customs of the time, the captains and crews of a nation's own navy ships also had an extra pecuniary motivation to capture enemy ships, as they were awarded a portion of the "prize."
To distinguish privateering from piracy, Congress, like other governments, imposed strict regulations on the practice. Privateers' owners were required to post a substantial bond, ranging from $5,000 to $20,000, which would be forfeited if they failed to comply. All captured ships had to be "libeled," or brought before a court of vice admiralty, to prove that they were legal prizes. And if privateersmen abused their prisoners or otherwise behaved contrary to the "practices of civilized nations in war," they faced severe penalties. Apparently, according to Mr. Dolin, the regulations were effective and crews generally hewed to the law.
Privateering was undeniably risky, but it also could be very lucrative. After a prize was ruled lawful, the vessel and its cargo would be auctioned, with 100% of the proceeds (minus court costs) divided among the owners, investors, captain, officers and crew. With luck, an ordinary seaman could collect as much as GBP 500 for a single voyage of several weeks, at a time when a skilled carpenter earned less than GBP 100 a year. For an investor, a successful cruise could net thousands of pounds.
Among the many Patriots whose fortunes were made or expanded by privateering was Nathaniel Tracy of Newburyport, Mass., principal owner of 47 ships that captured a total of 120 British vessels, with cargoes worth nearly $4 million, or more than $80 million today. No wonder so many affluent Americans were eager to invest in privateers. Such venture capitalists included George Washington, fellow generals Nathanael Greene and Henry Knox, Paul Revere and Elbridge Gerry, another signer of the Declaration of Independence.
Some privateers were specially built for the purpose, but many had been converted from fishing and merchant vessels. Whatever their origin, all the ships had to be swift and, ideally, well-enough armed to intimidate prizes into surrendering without a fight. Since privateers were no match for British ships of war, their captains generally fled instead of engaging Royal Navy regulars. But when a ship couldn't outsail its foes, or when a potential prize resisted, a bloody action could ensue, and "Rebels at Sea" vividly recounts some of these battles, as vessels with evocative names such as Vengeance, Eagle and Defiance face off against the enemy.
One of the fiercest of these duels took place in September 1781 off Charleston, S.C., when the British sloop of war Savage was attacked by the faster, more heavily armed American privateer the Congress. For four hours the ships pummeled each other, sometimes maneuvering so close that the muzzle fire of the cannons on one ship burned sailors on the opposing vessel. By the time the Savage finally struck its colors, eight of its crew were dead and 34 were wounded. On the Congress, 11 men had been killed and 30 injured. The American ship was so badly damaged that three days' repairs were required before it could raise sail. The Savage needed five days to get underway; then, as the prize was being sailed toward port, it was recaptured by another British ship.
Most of "Rebels at Sea" is dedicated not to stirring stories of the privateers' derring-do but to an informed, and ultimately more satisfying, consideration of the general role of the practice in the Revolution. Britain also commissioned privateers -- nearly 2,700, or about a thousand more than the Continentals -- and captured somewhere between 600 and 700 American ships. By comparison, the rebels managed to take perhaps 1,600 to 1,800 British vessels, conservatively valued at about GBP 8 million, or some $1.5 billion today.
According to Lloyd's of London, which was insuring British merchant ships a century before the Revolution, each year between 1779 and 1782 American privateers seized about 8% of Britain's commercial fleet. The Americans were particularly effective in the Caribbean, where they disrupted the all-important sugar trade, which was valued at around GBP 3 million a year, or twice as much as all exports from North America combined. By 1778 the Continental privateers had already captured some 250 British merchantmen operating in the area and had reduced British trade there by two thirds. Among the prizes taken were more than 40 ships transporting more than 10,000 enslaved Africans -- men, women and children who were auctioned in America and the French Caribbean, in a shameful episode that Mr. Dolin rightly calls "the greatest blemish on the privateering record."
"Rebels at Sea" also details the surprising role that privateering played in America's diplomatic maneuvering with France. Soon after Benjamin Franklin arrived in Paris in December 1776, he and his fellow envoys persuaded the French to open their ports in both France and the Caribbean to American privateers. This gave the ships safe harbor as well as a new market for their prizes, and drove yet another wedge between Britain and its longtime rival. Although France waited until after the rebel victory at Saratoga in October 1777 to enter the war, its collaboration with the privateers helped to lay the groundwork for a victorious partnership, Mr. Dolin argues, by exposing Britain's vulnerabilities and demonstrating the Americans' capabilities and determination. Ultimately, the French sent ships of their own into the conflict, and forced the surrender of Lord Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown, Va., on October 19, 1781, effectively ending the war.
Historians generally agree that although the minuscule Continental navy fought valiantly -- think of John Paul Jones's defiant "I have not yet begun to fight!" -- the regular fleet had little effect on the war's outcome. The far more numerous privateers made several important contributions: forcing the Royal Navy to divert assets, furnishing the rebels with desperately needed cash and commodities, bolstering American morale, and goading exasperated British merchants to advocate for peace. Mr. Dolin convincingly contends that the underappreciated "militia of the sea" played a critical role in the colonies winning their independence, despite Britain's "peculiar and sovereign authority upon the ocean."
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Mr. Helferich's most recent book is "Hot Time," a historical novel published under the pen name W.H. Flint." [1]
1. REVIEW --- Books: America's Sailors Of Fortune
Helferich, Gerard.
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 02 July 2022: C.7.
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