“What a summer. The Trump administration slapped punitive tariffs of 50% on India while administration officials and MAGA influencers vilified America's most important potential long-term partner in the Indo-Pacific. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a highly publicized visit to a Chinese-sponsored anti-American political summit.
Fortunately, September seems to have brought a change in the weather.
President Trump came within hailing distance of an apology on Friday when he called Mr. Modi a great prime minister and praised the special relationship between the world's two largest democracies. New Delhi was quick to respond, with Mr. Modi praising his good friend Donald Trump and pointedly skipping a virtual Brics trade summit called by Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.
But if the atmospherics have improved, the underlying problems remain. Indian exports to the U.S. face higher tariffs than goods from Asian export powerhouses like South Korea, Vietnam and Japan. The Trump administration is penalizing friendly India for buying Russian oil while giving China a pass. That apparent unfairness has ignited waves of anti-American bitterness across the spectrum of Indian politics.
India isn't the only Indo-Pacific partner where Trump administration policy shifts have roiled the waters. The ham-fisted Immigration and Customs Enforcement raid on South Korean workers at a Hyundai facility in Georgia ignited a political crisis in a perennially touchy and strongly nationalist treaty ally. Japan's Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba resigned from his post in part due to political fallout from American tariffs on a country whose help is crucial for achieving U.S. goals vis-a-vis China.
Many American foreign-policy observers and veteran officials see this administration's every move through the lens of a deep loathing of Mr. Trump and his political base, and they aren't shy about saying so. For these critics, the turmoil in relations with America's most important Asian partners further demonstrates the toxic mixture of illiberal malignancy and destructive incompetence they believe characterizes Mr. Trump's every act. But to stop there, as so many analysts do, is both to miss the true dimensions of the crisis in American foreign policy and to blind oneself to the strategic opportunities that exist.
For 25 years after the Cold War, Washington had a simple and elegant grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific. It was relatively cheap to keep the sea lanes open to trade and to provide American security guarantees to allies. Encouraging Indo-Pacific countries to follow the path of export-led economic development that brought unprecedented prosperity to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and ultimately China would benefit the U.S. generally and American multinationals especially. At the same time the strategy promoted democratic governance and pro-Western politics across a vital region of the world.
The approach remains elegant and appealing but is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration's shift toward protectionism in the Indo-Pacific may reflect Mr. Trump's heterodox economic views, but it is enabled by a bipartisan shift away from trade policies grounded in promoting export-oriented growth models in less-developed economies. And the demand that allies and partners do more in defense cannot simply be reduced to isolationism. It also reflects the increasing costs and risks of American security guarantees amid the rising threat from China.
Viewed from this perspective, the summer spat between India and the U.S. looks more consequential. If Washington were to adhere to the pre-Trump strategy for the Indo-Pacific, our policy would be to encourage India to challenge China as an export-oriented manufacturing platform, using India's cheap labor to drive industrial growth by producing for Western markets. This approach would be popular in India and would likely check Chinese ambitions by building up India as a rival power.
American public opinion, however, seems unlikely to support or even to tolerate policies of this kind in the long run.
The U.S.-India partnership, like our alliances and relationships across the Indo-Pacific, will need to rest on a more sustainable basis. In India's case, the way forward for both countries is to deepen cooperation in areas that matter to both. Building a technosphere that China doesn't dominate, deterring Chinese aggression in and around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, countering jihadist terrorism and stabilizing the Middle East, fracturing the troubling Sino-Russian alliance, and reducing Chinese influence in India's neighborhood are important to Washington and New Delhi.
India will continue to export goods and talented migrants to the U.S., and both countries will benefit from the exchange [1].
But populism in India and America isn't going away. Serious policymakers must listen to public opinion in both countries to keep worse storms than those that troubled the relationship this summer from recurring.” [2]
1. After huge tariffs and raids on immigrants? Dream of it…
2. A U.S.-India Repair Attempt. Walter Russell Mead. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 09 Sep 2025: A13.
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