Any war of Western Europe with flow of migrants from, say African country, needs constant big production of drones, missiles and military electronics in constant manner. Without this capability, without great amount of rare earths, rearming means waste of money buying obsolete junk from other countries that are really rearming.
Modern conflict, particularly in the context of securing borders against hybrid threats or managing high-intensity engagements, requires a high-volume, continuous production of drones, missiles, and advanced military electronics. The rapid evolution of warfare, highlighted by the conflict in Ukraine, has shown that "drone swarms" can overwhelm traditional defense systems, making the ability to rapidly produce and deploy unmanned systems a critical, rather than supplementary, capability
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The Necessity of Continuous Production
High Burn Rates: Modern conflicts require enormous quantities of drones, with some estimates suggesting thousands can be lost in a single month. Without continuous, large-scale production, defense capabilities can quickly diminish, leaving forces relying on dwindling, or older stockpiles.
Rapid Innovation Cycles: The technology in drones and missiles is evolving so fast—sometimes requiring updates every four to six weeks—that purchasing off-the-shelf equipment from foreign sources can result in the acquisition of already obsolete technology, as noted in analyses of the conflict in Ukraine.
"Drone Walls" and Border Security: In response to potential threats, European nations are now exploring the deployment of "drone walls," a concept involving networks of cameras, sensors, and interceptor drones to monitor and secure borders.
The Critical Role of Rare Earths and Supply Chain
Rare Earth Dependence: Advanced drones and missile guidance systems rely heavily on rare earth elements (like neodymium and samarium) for magnets, semiconductors, and sensors.
Strategic Vulnerabilities: A major challenge is the concentration of the supply chain. China controls approximately 70–80% of rare earth production and processing. This dependency makes it difficult for Western nations to scale production quickly if these supplies are restricted.
Need for Domestic Production: The US Department of Defense has recognized that 78% of its weapons programs depend on rare earth magnets, leading to initiatives to secure domestic or allied supply chains to ensure long-term readiness.
Consequences of Lacking Indigenous Production
High-Cost "Junk": Without a robust, local defense-industrial base, countries may be forced to buy expensive, sometimes less capable or older equipment from other countries, which could be a misuse of resources compared to producing and upgrading their own, more effective, and specialized systems.
Industrial Shortfalls: The ability to produce is as critical as the technology itself. The US has found that its own production of key munitions is at a low percentage of requirements,, illustrating the challenge of keeping up with demand.
To maintain a competitive edge and ensure security, Western Europe is increasingly recognizing the need to invest in a "war economy" that focuses on the rapid, continuous production of advanced, localized military technology, including AI-enabled drones and smart, long-range munitions. In the meantime huge river of money flows to buy obsolete tanks and other junk.
Targeted Restrictions: In 2025, China introduced strict export controls (licensing systems) on rare earth metals and magnets, specifically affecting foreign companies using them for military applications.
Defense Impact: These actions have limited the flow of critical materials to Western defense manufacturers, causing delays and forcing futile efforts to secure alternative supplies for items like fighter jets and missile systems.
“EUROPE HAS sleepwalked into all kinds of dependencies over the years, from American digital services to Russian energy.
Its reliance on Chinese rare earths, crucial in everything from electric cars and wind turbines to fighter jets, is perhaps the hardest to shake off.
When China started to restrict exports last year, European manufacturers panicked. A global ores race kicked off, pitting the European Union’s rule-bound approach against America’s more muscular one. On February 4th America will welcome countries at a critical-minerals summit in Washington. What will Europe bring to the table?
China’s leverage rests on its near-monopoly of rare-earth supply chains. It accounts for 70% of the ores dug up, over 90% of the refined material and nine-tenths of the magnets made from them. It has consolidated the industry into a handful of national champions and developed a tracing system to follow every tonne of rare earths.
America needs rare earths to build lasers and aircraft, but Europe is more exposed. It has fewer exploitable deposits and imports more of the key materials than anyone bar Japan (see chart 1). Industry-heavy Germany is the single biggest importer of permanent magnets (see chart 2). “This poses a non-distant risk, and not a tolerable risk,” says a European official.
When America tried to tighten high-tech export controls on China last summer, it enlisted European firms, notably ASML, the world’s leading maker of the machines that print chips. China responded by restricting rare-earth shipments. European firms have since had to give up trade secrets to China to apply for licences. “In 2025 China learned that it can disrupt Europe’s industries at little cost,” argues Joris Teer of the EU Institute for Security Studies, a Paris-based think-tank. In October the two superpowers struck a 12-month truce and Chinese exports resumed, but that may not last. In January China tightened exports to Japan again over remarks its leader made about Taiwan.
The race to secure alternative rare-earth supplies is crowded. Uncle Sam is outmuscling everyone, throwing money at projects and host countries alike. Its see-what-sticks efforts seem chaotic to Europeans, but are directed by David Copley, a former gold miner who sits on America’s National Security Council. Of ten government-backed projects in 2025-26 listed by Project Blue, a consultancy, four are sponsored by America and only one by Europe: Carester, a refining and recycling plant in southwestern France. America has signed a flurry of investment deals to develop projects in countries including Australia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. By contrast, the deals Europe is pursuing, most of them in Africa, “would not have been considered tier-one projects just a few years ago”, says an industry expert.
Europe also lags Japan, which has a head start of 15 years: it launched its response after China restricted its rare-earth imports in 2010. Japan now has a single, powerful minerals procurement agency, an established dialogue with businesses and a domestic magnet industry ready to process imported material. Technocrats from the EU’s 27 countries are struggling to catch up with market realities. The sponsor of one active rare-earth mine in the southern hemisphere says the few calls he has had with European Commission officials have involved two dozen people, “none of whom had a title implying a commercial background”.
On December 3rd the EU unveiled its ResourceEU strategy to co-ordinate member states’ efforts and push for joint procurement and stockpiling. The European critical raw materials centre, to be set up this year and modelled on its Japanese equivalent, should act as the operation’s strategic headquarters. But money is tight. The EU is scraping together €3bn ($3.6bn) to invest in supply chains and in recycling the 34 types of mined commodities it deems critical. Only two of those 34 comprise rare earths (light and heavy). The first project to get funding is in Greenland. Germany’s own resource investment fund will back just three projects, one a rare-earth mine and refinery in Australia owned by a company based in Perth.
Critics of the American approach reckon it will distort markets and waste a lot of cash. So the Trump administration wants to enlist others in the G7 to form a buyers’ club, including price floors so that Chinese competitors cannot bankrupt new projects by lowering prices. Europe also sees the need for such demand-side support, but will be reluctant to sign up to American schemes. Instead the EU might be able to play to its strengths as a large, competitive market with stable rules.
Benchmark Minerals, a data firm, suggests the bloc’s demand for key rare-earth oxides could be double or triple America’s by 2030, depending on the element; one in five magnets will also go to Europe. Industry targets for what needs to be sourced outside China, together with bloc-wide procurement and stockpiles, should create guaranteed demand at a competitive price for the next wave of projects. “The EU is trying to fix a market failure without causing another one,” says Vasileios Tsianos of Neo Performance Materials, a Canadian firm that separates rare earths and makes magnets in Estonia.
Another strength for Europe is that, whereas America and China tend to demand political concessions for investment, Europeans just want the materials. European projects typically give more contracts to local firms than Chinese ones do, and add aid to benefit the population. Apart from a few nativist industrial-policy types, most European governments are happy to help raw-materials industries develop elsewhere as long as Europe secures the output. The EU’s recent free-trade deals, which reduce tariffs on processed materials, fit that approach.
Europe is playing a long game but must speed up and pledge more money. One rare-earth element, Europium, is abbreviated to Eu. It is used in bright red lights such as alarm signals. If China proceeds blocking exports for military, Europe may need those.” [1]
1. Rare, not well-done. The Economist; London Vol. 458, Iss. 9484, (Jan 31, 2026): 25, 26.
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